Maryland case law › State v. Ward

State v. Ward

95 Md. 118 (1902) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedPage, J.✓ Good law
HoldingThe appellee, Ward, was arrested under a warrant issued by a Justice of the Peace of Anne Arundel County for violating sections 253-256 of the Public Local Laws of Anne Arundel County (as amended by ch.

Page, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellee was arrested under a warrant issued by a Justice of the Peace of Anne Arundel County, charged with a violation of sections 253, 254, 255 and 256 of the Public Local Laws of Anne Arundel County as amended by chapter 582 of the Acts of 1892. When brought before the Justice he prayed a jury trial, which was refused. The trial having resulted in the conviction of the appellee an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court.

In that Court the State’s attorney moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground “that the offense charged in the warrant is one that is not the subject of appeal from the Justice of the Peace;” and the prisoner moved to quash the warrant and reverse the judgment because the Justice had refused a jury trial. The Circuit Court reversed the judgment and the State appealed. The only points claiming consideration are, first, had the prisoner a right to claim a jury trial, and second, having been denied this, had the Justice jurisdiction to try and finally determine the matter before him. The sections of the local code to which we have referred regulate the shooting of wild fowl in Anne Arundel County.

The 253rd, 254th sections provide for the obtaining of licenses to place blinds and shoot therefrom; the 255th makes it unlawful to establish blinds or put out decoys within three hundred yards of an already licensed blind; and by the 256th, “if any person shall violate any of the provisions of preceding sections, he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof before any Justice of the Peace in Anne Arundel County shall be fined a sum not less than five nor more than twenty dollars for each offense, with the costs of prosecution for the same: provided that an additional fine of five dollars shall be imposed upon the owner 122 .of any blind who shall establish the same at a point nearer ■than three hundred yards from a blind already established and licensed for each week said blind shall remain after due notice has been given to remove the same by the owner of the blind first established and licensed.” These sections were originally enacted in 1882, ch. 400, amended in 1886, ch. 366, and again amended in 1892, ch.- 582. The 256th. section, which provides the penalty, remains as enacted by .the amendment of 1886. • There is nothing in the original Act or any of its amendments that confers upon the defendant the right of ¡claiming a jury trial or places any limitation, upon the authority of the Justice of the Peace to try an.d determine -all .persons who may be brought before him charged with a vio■latiofi of any of its provisions. It is contended however that the case is within the provisions of section 1 iA of Article 52 of the Code of Public General ¡Laws, which provides that if any person, when brought before •a Justice having jurisdiction, shall before trial pray a .jury trial, it shall then be the duty of the Justice to commit the alleged offender for trial in the Circuit Court. That sectipn •was first enacted in 1880, ch. 326.

It has remained substantially the same up to the present timethe only material amendment thereto being by the Act of 1890, ch. 618, whereby the right of appeal from the Justice to the Circuit Court was extended to the alleged offender, and the State even after there had been before the Justice a waiver of a jury trial. But section 11 A, Art. 52, cannot be held to include all criminal cases n over which Justices of the Peace have jurisdiction. It was •not intended to change or limit the jurisdiction which they ■then possessed or which ..thereafter, might be conferred upon them-, “by or under the laws of this State.” Its purpose was not to interfere with that jurisdiction but, as the title of the ■Act of i88o sets forth, “to confer additional jurisdiction.” What that “additional jurisdiction” should be is clearly stated, viz. first concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court in all cases of assault without any felonious intent and all cases of assault and battery, and all

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