Thompson v. State

Elkkidge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Maryland Code (1974, 1975 Cum. Supp.), § 4-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article vests exclusive original jurisdiction in the District Court over certain enumerated criminal offenses, including those in which a person at least 16 years old is charged with violation of the motor vehicle laws. Certain exceptions to the District Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction are set forth in § 4-802 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Included among these exceptions is § 4-802 (d), which provides: 11Jury trial. —- (l) The District Court is deprived of jurisdiction if a defendant is entitled to and demands a jury trial at any time prior to trial in the District Court. “(2) A defendant may demand a jury trial in a criminal case if the penalty for the offense with which he is charged permits imprisonment for a period in excess of three months; the state may not demand a jury trial.” ⁴⁴ Section 4-302 (e) provides, with certain exceptions not here applicable, that “ ... the District Court does not have jurisdiction of an offense or offenses otherwise within the District Court’s jurisdiction if a person is charged with an offense or offenses arising from the same circumstances but not within the District Court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the circuit court for the county has exclusive original jurisdiction over all the offenses.” The term “circuit court” includes the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Code (1974), § 4-101 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. On March 23, 1974, James Howard Thompson was issued traffic summonses for three alleged violations of the motor vehicle laws: (1) driving while intoxicated, in violation of Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol., 1975 Cum.

Supp.), Art. 66V2, § 11-902 (a); (2) driving while his ability was impaired, in violation of Art. 66V2, § 11-902 (b); and (3) “skidding, spinning of wheels,” in violation of Art. 66V2, § 11-1117. The offense of driving while intoxicated is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by fine of not more than $1,000, or both, Art. 66V2, § 17-101 (b) (i); the offense of driving while ability is impaired is punishable by imprisonment for not more than two months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, Art. 66V2, § 17-101 (b) (ii); and the offense of “skidding, spinning of wheels” is punishable by a fine of not more than $500, Art. 66V2, § 17-101 (b). Consequently, only one of the alleged offense's, driving while intoxicated, carried such maximum penalty as would entitle Thompson to demand a jury trial prior to trial in the District Court pursuant to § 4-302 (d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. When Thompson appeared for trial in the District Court he demanded a jury trial pursuant to § 4-302 (d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

Thereafter, the entire case was transferred to the Criminal Court of Baltimore for trial. ⁴⁵ When the case was called for trial in the Criminal Court, the State announced that it was entering a nolle prosequi with respect to the alleged violation of Art. 66V2, § 11-902 (a), driving while intoxicated. Thompson subsequently reiterated his demand for a jury trial in the Criminal Court, or alternatively he insisted that the remaining charges be returned to the District Court for disposition by that court. The trial judge rejected the demand for a jury trial, deciding that since the remaining offenses with which Thompson was charged were “petty,” there was no right to a trial by jury in the Criminal Court. Further, the trial court refused to return the case to the District Court, stating that once jurisdiction over the case was lawfully acquired it had no authority to return the lesser charges to the District Court after a nolle prosequi was entered on the charge of driving while intoxicated.

Thereafter, Thompson was convicted in the non-jury trial of violating Art. 66V2, § 11-902 (b), driving while ability impaired, and acquitted of the remaining charge. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Thompson contended that under § 4-302 (d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article he was entitled to a jury trial in the Criminal Court on the remaining charges. Alternatively, Thompson argued that if he had no right to a jury trial in the Criminal Court, then that court was deprived of jurisdiction over the remaining charges, and the case should have been returned to the District Court. The Court of Special Appeals rejected Thompson’s contention that he was entitled to a jury trial in the Criminal Court.

Thompson v. State, 26 Md. App. 442, 446-447 , 338 A. 2d 411 (1975). The court held that § 4-302 (d), entitling a criminal defendant to a jury trial only where the offenses entailed a possible penalty in excess of three months’ imprisonment, applies both to demands in the District Court for jury trials and to criminal proceedings generally in the circuit courts or Criminal Court of Baltimore. Since the remaining charges against Thompson did not carry a penalty of more than three months’ imprisonment, the Court of Special Appeals held that § ⁴⁶ 4-302 (d) expressly denied him a jury trial in the Criminal Court. The court also rejected Thompson’s alternative contention that the case should have been returned to the District Court, deciding that once the Criminal Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the case the “subsequent entry of the nol pros had no effect on the continuance of its jurisdiction to decide the remaining charges.” 26 Md. App. at 447 .

We issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether Thompson was entitled to a jury trial in the Criminal Court on the remaining charges, or alternatively whether those charges should have been returned for trial in the District Court. 1 (1) Initially, we observe that the Criminal Court properly acquired jurisdiction over all three of the offenses with which Thompson was charged. As mentioned, the District Court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction where a person at least 16 years old is charged with violation of the motor vehicle laws, § 4-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 4-302 (d), however, provides that where a defendant is charged in the District Court with an offense which permits imprisonment in excess of three months, he may demand a jury trial at any time prior to trial, causing the District Court to be “deprived of jurisdiction.” Further, under § 4-302 (e): “Several offenses. — Except as provided in Subtitle 5, the District Court does not have ⁴⁷ jurisdiction of an offense or offenses otherwise within the District Court’s jurisdiction if a person is charged with an offense or offenses arising from the same circumstances but not within the District Court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the circuit court for the county has exclusive original jurisdiction over all the offenses.” The three offenses with which Thompson was charged in the District Court, viz. driving while intoxicated, driving while impaired, and “skidding, spinning of wheels,” all arose from the same circumstances.

Thompson demanded a jury trial on the charge of driving while intoxicated which, under Art. 66V2, § 17-101 (b) (i), permits imprisonment for a period in excess of three months, causing the District Court to be “deprived of jurisdiction” over that charge. Section 4-302 (d) (1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Consequently, under the provisions of § 4-302 (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the Criminal Court had “exclusive original jurisdiction over all the offenses” “arising from the same circumstances,” even though those offenses were “otherwise within the District Court’s jurisdiction.” Thus, upon Thompson’s timely demand for a jury trial in the District Court, exclusive original jurisdiction over all three offenses became vested in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. (2) Thompson alternatively argued in the Court of Special Appeals that under § 4-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the Criminal Court’s continuing jurisdiction over the case depended on his being prosecuted in that court for an offense punishable by more than three months’ imprisonment.

Therefore, he urges, the State’s entry of a nolle prosequi on the charge of driving while intoxicated operated to divest the Criminal Court of jurisdiction over the two remaining offenses. We disagree. Section 4-302 deals only with circumstances whereby jurisdiction attaches in the circuit courts over ⁴⁸ offenses “otherwise within the District Court’s jurisdiction.” Nothing in the provisions of that section or of any other statute or Rule of this Court supports Thompson’s contention that the Criminal Court’s jurisdiction may be subsequently ousted by dropping the intoxicated driving charge. In many circumstances, once a court lawfully acquires jurisdiction over a case, that jurisdiction may continue despite subsequent events, even though those events would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.

See Automatic Retailers v. Evans Cig. Serv., 269 Md. 101, 105 , 304 A. 2d 581 (1973); Hardisty v. Kay, 268 Md. 202, 212 , 299 A. 2d 771 (1973); Ledford Const. Co. v. Smith, 231 Md. 596, 600 , 191 A. 2d 587 (1963); Kramer v. Kramer, 26 Md. App. 620, 634 , 339 A. 2d 328 (1975); Gray v. State, 6 Md. App. 677 , 253 A. 2d 395 (1969). (3) Thompson primarily contends that he was entitled to a jury trial in the Criminal Court on the two remaining charges.

As previously mentioned, the Court of Special Appeals held that § 4-302 (d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article expressly denied the right to a jury trial in the Criminal Court where the offenses did not involve a maximum penalty exceeding three months’ imprisonment. In our view, § 4-302 (d) concerns only the right to make a demand, in the District Court, for a jury trial. It has no application to the right to a jury trial for charges pending in the Criminal Court. Section 4-302 (d) is contained within Title 4 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which deals exclusively with the jurisdiction of the District Court.

Subtitle 3 of that title is concerned only with the criminal jurisdiction of the District Court. Section 4-301 sets forth the exclusive original jurisdiction of the District Court. Section 4-302 relates to exceptions to that jurisdiction, including under § 4-302 (d) the circumstance where the “defendant is entitled to and demands a jury trial at any time prior to trial in the District Court.” (Emphasis supplied.) As § 4-302 (d) makes clear, the section deals only with a demand made in ⁴⁹ the District Court, which demand may be made where the maximum penalty for the offense charged exceeds three months’ imprisonment. The three month criterion was established in connection with the creation of the District Court system in Maryland, being part of the law implementing the constitutional amendment establishing the District Court, Laws of Maryland, 1971, Ch. 423, § 145 (b) (5) (ii).

We therefore disagree with the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that § 4-302 (d) removes the right to demand a jury trial in the circuit courts as well as in the District Court where the charge does not carry a penalty of at least three months’ imprisonment. In our opinion, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases in the circuit court and Criminal Court of Baltimore, as opposed to the District Court, has not been limited by statute. In such circumstances, where a defendant is charged with a crime in a court of general common law jurisdiction, and where no legislative enactment restricts his right to a jury trial, we believe he is entitled to