State v. Watson

CHASANOW, Judge. On September 13, 1987, at approximately 5:45 p.m., the Harford County Police and an ambulance crew responded to a “911” call initiated by Ethel Watson (Watson) from his motel room at the Chase Manor Motel. When they arrived at Watson’s room, they found the dead body of Watson's girlfriend, Jeanette Hill, on the bed. Watson was next to her trying to revive her.

It was apparent that Ms. Hill had been dead for some time. While police and ambulance personnel were at the scene, Watson appeared calm, nonchalant, unexcited, and uncaring. It was only later, when talking to police, that he became nervous. Although he admitted being with Ms. Hill at the time of her death, Watson gave conflicting versions of what had occurred.

An autopsy revealed that Ms. Hill’s death had been caused by manual strangulation and multiple blows with a human fist or other blunt instrument. The autopsy also revealed that Ms. Hill had been pregnant. Watson was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. Watson elected a jury trial and, at his trial, testified that on the fatal day he picked up Ms. Hill, with whom he had a longstanding relationship, to take her to Aberdeen to ⁵⁰ visit members of her family.

According to Watson, on the way to Aberdeen he and Ms. Hill purchased some liquor and then rented a room at the Chase Manor Motel. Around 2:30 p.m., Watson took a nap. At approximately 4:50 p.m., he heard Ms. Hill calling from the bathroom. He rushed into the bathroom and found her squatting in the shower.

Watson picked her up, carried her to the bed, dried her, and helped her to dress. Watson testified that he then went outside and started his car. When Ms. Hill did not emerge from the room, Watson returned and found her lying on the floor. He put her back on the bed and, at that time, noticed blood coming out of her mouth.

When more blood appeared, Watson “decided to call for an ambulance.” The defense moved in limine to preclude the State from cross-examining Watson about a 1981 conviction for “second-degree rape” under Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, § 463(a)(3). The trial judge, citing Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 363 , 535 A.2d 445, 452 (1988), properly precluded such cross-examination because the second-degree rape conviction was not a common law felony, crimen falsi, or lesser crime bearing on credibility and, therefore, could not be used to impeach Watson’s credibility. Later in his defense, Watson called eight character witnesses, all of whom testified to their opinions as to Watson’s peaceful and non-violent character. 1 Over objection, the character witnesses were asked by the State on cross-examination if they were aware of Watson’s conviction of second-degree rape and whether this knowledge caused them to change their opinions. Most of the witnesses ⁵¹ responded that they were aware of the earlier conviction and that it had no effect on their opinions.

Defense counsel objected to the use of the “second-degree rape” conviction to cross-examine the character witnesses and pointed out that the second-degree rape conviction was for “statutory rape,” 2 under Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 463(a)(3), which makes it a crime to have vaginal intercourse, consensual or not, with a child under 14 years of age when the defendant is more than four years older than the victim. Defense counsel contended that the “second-degree rape” did not involve force and that the conviction was for having sexual intercourse with a consenting 13-year-old girl. This was supported by the record of the second-degree rape conviction proffered by the State which included a pre-sentence investigation containing the following “Description of Present Offense”: “The victim who is thirteen years old states that she and the defendant engaged in vaginal intercourse on more than one occasion, but was never forced to do so. Further the victim stated that she was in love with the accused.” The trial judge, although he had excluded the use of the conviction to impeach the defendant’s credibility, admitted it in cross-examination of the character witnesses to test the basis for each of their opinions of the defendant’s character for peacefulness and non-violence.

Watson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed and, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the trial judge erred in admitting Watson’s prior conviction of second-degree rape during cross-examination of defendant’s character witnesses. We ⁵² granted certiorari to determine whether Watson’s prior conviction was admissible to impeach the opinions expressed by defense witnesses who testified to Watson’s good character for peacefulness and non-violence. It is a basic principle of our legal system, requiring no citation of authority, that the State may not offer, as proof of guilt, evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character and, therefore, likely to commit the offense charged.

The defendant may, however, offer as proof of innocence evidence of good character to establish that it is unlikely that a person of such good character would commit the crime. This one-sided, but helpful, option which is available to the defendant is not without risk. The potential price that a defendant may pay for offering proof of his or her good character is to throw open an avenue of inquiry previously foreclosed to the State. If the defendant calls witnesses to testify to his or her good character for a relevant character trait, then the prosecutor may offer evidence to establish the defendant’s bad character for the same trait, Comi v. State, 202 Md. 472, 478-79 , 97 A.2d 129, 131-32 , cert. denied, 346 U.S. 898 , 74 S.Ct. 223 , 98 L.Ed. 399 (1953); 5 L. McLain, Maryland Evidence §§ 404.1(c) at 342-44, and 404.2 at 346-48 (1987), and may cross-examine the defendant's character witnesses about their knowledge of the defendant’s character or the soundness of their opinions.

Winters v. State, 301 Md. 214, 232 , 482 A.2d 886, 895 (1984); Taylor v. State, 278 Md. 150, 152 , 360 A.2d 430, 432 (1976). See also Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445 , 397 A.2d 600 (1979) (character witness must have adequate basis for opinion). Cross-examination of defense character witnesses may be a very potent weapon for the State. The State may question a character witness about any crimes and offenses committed by the defendant which are relevant to the character trait testified to by the witness.

Comi, 202 Md. at 478-79 , 97 A.2d at 131-32 . The purpose of this inquiry is to test the witness’ knowledge, as well as the validity of the opinion expressed by the witness. ⁵³ See Winters, 301 Md. at 232 , 482 A.2d at 895 ; Taylor, 278 Md. at 152 , 360 A.2d at 432 . A character witness’ testimony about a defendant’s good character or good reputation is weakened if the witness did not know of, or had not heard about, relevant criminal acts committed by the defendant. Alternatively, establishing that a character witness was aware of relevant criminal acts committed by the defendant and still maintains a good opinion of the defendant’s character or reputation despite such knowledge may undermine the witness’ judgment or the soundness of the witness’ opinion.

Improper cross-examination of a character witness can be highly prejudicial. As the Supreme Court recognized in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 , 69 S.Ct. 213 , 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948), merely asking questions suggesting past criminal acts committed by an accused may “waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box.” Id. at 481, 69 S.Ct. at 221 , 93 L.Ed. 176 . Cross-examination of a character witness about criminal acts not clearly relevant to the character traits inquired into on direct examination should not be permitted. When a character witness testifies regarding a specific character trait, cross-examination must be limited to those crimes or acts of the defendant which evidence bad character for that specific character trait.

Because of the tremendous potential for prejudice in this area, trial judges must be careful to assure that only relevant, probative cross-examination is permitted. For example, if a defendant is charged with embezzlement and calls character witnesses to testify to his good character for honesty, those witnesses should not be cross-examined about prior assaults the defendant may have committed. Prior assault convictions are not relevant to the character trait of honesty. State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 512 , 510 A.2d 253, 257-58 (1986).

Similarly, if a defendant is on trial for a crime of violence and calls witnesses for his good character for peacefulness, his prior convictions for embezzlement would not be relevant to his character for the trait of peacefulness. ⁵⁴ In Aaron v. United States, 397 F.2d 584 (5th Cir.1968), the defendant, charged with embezzlement and related offenses, offered character testimony about his good reputation for “honesty and fair dealing.” It was held to be error for the prosecutor to ask on cross-examination of the character witness whether the witness had heard that the defendant was fired from his job at a previous bank because of an “illicit affair” with a woman. The court stated: “Appellant was on trial for a crime which involved the question of his honesty and fair dealing. The direct examination of his character witness was properly limited to these areas. Rumors of an illicit affair with a woman, even if these rumors were true, were wholly immaterial to the character traits involved in this case.

The question was therefore improper, and the defense objection was properly sustained.” Id. at 585 . Louisell and Mueller in their multi-volume set entitled Federal Evidence suggest, when the State seeks to cross-examine a character witness about prior misconduct of an accused, that the trial judge should, outside of the presence of the jury: 1) determine that there is a good faith basis for the inquiry; 2) determine that the acts or events about which the prosecutor proposes to inquire are relevant to the particular character trait testified to by the witness on direct examination; 3) determine that the acts are not too remote in time to be relevant cross-examination of the character witness; 4) reject any inquiry where the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value; and 5) if requested, instruct the jury that the purpose of the question is only to test the basis for the character witness’ testimony. 2 D. Louisell & C.