Stewart v. State

³⁷⁴ GARRITY, Judge. This case principally concerns the criminal responsibility of an assailant under the felony-murder doctrine for the fright-induced death of a robbery victim. Our focus of attention on this issue will be whether the evidence was sufficient to prove a causative relationship between the robbery and the victim’s death from heart failure approximately two hours later. Facts At approximately 11:15 during the evening of November 19, 1983, two men entered the In-Town Motor Hotel in Montgomery County while two others remained in a nearby car.

One of the men handed the desk clerk, 60-year old Pearl Pizzamiglio, a paper bag with a note attached which read “Don’t say a word. Put all the money in this bag and no one will get hurt!” Mrs. Pizzamiglio placed $176.00 in the bag and the two men fled to their waiting vehicle and drove off. Mrs. Pizzamiglio immediately called the police and within minutes the four suspects were apprehended. Montgomery County Police Officer Nancy Calder arrived at the motel at 11:21 p.m. and spoke with Mrs. Pizzamiglio in the motel lobby for approximately 35 to 40 minutes.

Officer Calder reported that Mrs. Pizzamiglio, who was pale, nervous, and jittery, related that although she did not know if the individual who handed her the note had a weapon, she described him as “scary mean looking.” Officer Calder further testified that while in the process of transporting Mrs. Pizzamiglio to the police station in an effort to see if she could identify the individuals who had just been arrested, the officer noticed that Mrs. Pizzamiglio began holding her chest and developed difficulty in breathing. Officer Calder immediately summoned the Rescue Squad which arrived within minutes. Upon administering oxygen, the Rescue Squad transported Mrs. Pizzamiglio to Suburban Hospital, where she arrived at 12:30 a.m. Soon after she arrived at the hospital, Mrs. Pizzamiglio experi ³⁷⁵ enced cardiac arrest and, after attempts at treatment proved unsuccessful, expired at 1:28 a.m.

The appellant, Michael Stewart, concedes that he was the person who had handed the bag and attached note to Mrs. Pizzamiglio. At the trial the State presented evidence that the appellant was competent to stand trial and that Mrs. Pizzamiglio had been frightened to death by the robbery. The court determined that the appellant was competent to stand trial and the jury found that Mrs. Pizzamiglio’s death was a direct result of the robbery. Stewart was convicted of felony-murder and robbery and found to be responsible at the time of the commission of the offense.

The robbery charge was merged into the felony-murder count and Stewart was sentenced to life imprisonment, with all but fifteen years suspended. The appellant presents the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to make adequate findings regarding appellant’s competency to stand trial. 2. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain a conviction of felony-murder when the underlying offense was an unarmed robbery and the victim died some two hours later of heart failure. 3.

Whether the instructions on the issue of causation were erroneous. I. Competency to Stand Trial The appellant’s initial argument is that under Hill v. State, 35 Md.App. 98 , 369 A.2d 98 (1977), the court’s failure to stop the trial at various intervals, as well as its failure to conduct a hearing and make findings regarding his competency to stand trial, was reversible error. After a pretrial hearing on the issue of competency the appellant was found to have been competent at the time of the commission of the offense and competent to stand trial. Three months later, however, on the first day of trial, ³⁷⁶ appellant’s counsel proffered that since the pretrial hearing, the appellant’s behavior had been bizarre.

Counsel further advised that the day before the trial date, the appellant had been re-examined by his psychiatrist, Dr. Kline, who had not changed his opinion that the appellant was insane and incompetent. Defense counsel cited the fact the appellant was still taking anti-psychotic drugs, and that there had been incidents at the jail he felt demonstrated psychosis. As an example, counsel advised that “[m]y client took his medicine, filled it with water from the toilet, drank it; took butter and tried to rub it all over his head and face.” Despite this proffer, the trial judge ruled that the prior determination of competency still remained as the proffer failed to show that the appellant’s condition had substantially changed since the prehearing. Furthermore, because of the appellant’s erratic behavior throughout the trial, the trial judge made various findings on the record that he believed the appellant was fully able to understand the proceedings and to assist in his own defense.

We discussed in Hill, supra, the statute on competency to stand trial (then art. 59, § 23). We quoted from our decision in Colbert v. State, 18 Md.App. 632 , 308 A.2d 726 (1973) in which we held that: The statute requires that the determination be made “upon the testimony and evidence presented on the record,” but it does not require that such testimony and evidence be presented in a separate hearing, as appellant contends. We said in Strawderman [v. State ], 4 Md.[App. 689] at page 695 [ 244 A.2d 888 ], “Of course, in a jury trial, evidence with regard to it should be received out of the presence of the jury,” but we did not say, nor do we now say, that a judge with no jury present is required to use any magic words to designate as a separate hearing the presentation to him of testimony and evidence for his determination of the competency of the accused to stand trial. It is sufficient if the testimony and evidence are on the record. ³⁷⁷ Hill addresses the mandatory nature of an initial determination of competency when the issue is properly raised.

Hill does not, however, address the discretionary nature of a reconsideration of competency. Because the pretrial hearing met the requirements in Hill for the initial competency determination, we believe that the proffer on the first day of trial (that the appellant was incompetent) suggested at most that a reconsideration be made of the appellant’s competency. Health General Art. § 12-103(c) provides: Reconsideration of Competency. — At any time during the trial and before verdict, the court may reconsider the question of whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. The language is clear that a reconsideration of competency is discretionary.

There are no requirements for an additional hearing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. We believe that the trial court’s finding, that the appellant’s mental condition had not changed from the time of the pretrial determination on competency, was not clearly erroneous. We therefore hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to conduct another hearing on the issue of the appellant’s competency to stand trial.

II

Criminal Responsibility for Death by Fright The thrust of appellant’s position is that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction of felony-murder. Although he does not contest that Mrs. Pizzamiglio’s death occurred subsequent to the robbery that he committed, he argues that his acts were not the legal cause of her death as “death is not a probable and natural consequence of an unarmed robbery.” (Emphasis supplied.) In support of his theory, the appellant relies on Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438 , 444 A.2d 1034 (1980). The Court of Appeals in Campbell was concerned with the responsibility of felons for the lethal acts of others. More particularly, whether under the felony-murder doc ³⁷⁸ trine, the killing of a co-felon during an armed robbery, either by a police officer attempting to apprehend him, or by a victim resisting the armed robbery, constituted murder in the first degree on the part of the surviving felon.

The Court determined that as the killing of the co-felon had been committed to thwart a felony rather than to further it, the surviving felon was not guilty of murder. Writing on behalf of the Court, Judge Davidson stated: We now hold that ordinarily, under the felony-murder doctrine, criminal culpability shall continue to be imposed for lethal acts committed by a felon or an accomplice acting in furtherance of a common design. However, criminal culpability ordinarily shall not be imposed for lethal acts of non-felons that are not committed in furtherance of a common design. Clearly, the thrust of the inquiry under Campbell , whether the lethal acts of a non-felon should constitute felony-murder on the part of a surviving felon, is inappropriate to the analysis in the case sub judice where the appellant’s own conduct and its link to the death of his robbery victim is at issue.

We therefore must determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that Mrs. Pizzamiglio’s death was a natural consequence of the appellant’s unlawful act. At early common law physical injury was required before criminal responsibility was imposed for homicide. In re Heigho, 18 Idaho 566 , 110 P. 1029 (1910). The modern trend, however, is to determine criminality according to the degree of causative relationship between the unlawful act of the accused and the death of the victim.

Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1072 . To warrant a conviction for homicide it must be established that the act of the accused was a proximate cause of death. “If the act of accused was the cause of the cause of death, no more is required.” 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 11. ³⁷⁹ The appellant’s attempts to distinguish various cases which hold an accused criminally responsible for the death of a victim by fright are not persuasive. The appellant argues that State v. Spates, 176 Conn. 227 , 405 A.2d 656 (1978) is inapplicable to the present case because in Spates the defendant used a gun to rob the victim, tied his hands and legs, and abandoned him despite the victim’s pleas for a doctor because he was having a heart attack. The appellant contends that the State’s case on causation is much weaker in the instant case.

Weaker, however, is not the standard. As noted above, if a direct causal link between the accused’s actions and the victim’s death can be established, no more is required. The appellant further argues that neither State v. Luther, 285 N.C. 570 , 206 S.E.2d 238 (1974) nor State v. Edwards, 136 Ariz. 177 , 665 P.2d 59 (1983) is applicable to the instant matter. He claims that in both cases there was displayed a deadly weapon which, in one instance, was used.

In the instant case no weapon was displayed or used. Furthermore, in Luther and Edwards the victim died during or immediately following the crime. In the present case the victim expired more than two hours after the incident. As a result, the appellant claims that the causal link between Mrs. Pizzamiglio’s death and his unlawful act is not as direct as in Luther and Edwards .

In State v. Luther, supra, the accused struck the victim with a lead pipe. The victim died and an autopsy determined that there had been “a hardening of the arteries of the heart and no traumatic injury sufficient to cause death ...” Luther, 285 N.C. at 575 , 206 S.E.2d 238 . However, it was further determined that “the increased cardiac demand” occasioned by the altercation could have been the cause of death. The Court concluded that if the victim’s “death came about as a result of the conjunction of his heart disease with either the violence or excitement and shock of defendant’s assault it was still brought about by ³⁸⁰ defendant’s unlawful act, for the consequences of which he would be answerable.” Id.

The accused in State v. Edwards, supra, had robbed bar patrons at gunpoint. In the course of the robbery a gun was placed against the neck of the proprietor who was ordered to open a safe. Suddenly, the victim’s face went blank as he “slumped in a chair and began making a snoring sound.” When the police arrived at the store, the proprietor was dead. The doctor who performed an autopsy on the victim testified that the cause of death had been due to a heart attack caused by the “fright-flight-fight syndrome.” Edwards, 136 Ariz. at 186 , 665 P.2d 59 .

He explained: [W]hen a person is faced with a stressful or frightening situation, his body will manifest certain reactions. Adrenalin will start to flow and the heart will begin to pound hard, supplying the higher requirement of increased blood to the muscles, preparing the person to fight or flee. Id. Even though the victim suffered from a pre-existing heart disease and “a coronary attack could have been prompted by other causes completely independent of the robbery” the examining doctor maintained that the victim’s heart attack and death had been “caused by the anxiety of the robbery.” Id.

From this testimony the Court concluded that “there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support the finding that the attack was caused by the robbery.” Id. Despite the factual differences pointed out by the appellant between the case sub judice and those above, the similar applications of the law render them indistinguishable. In each of the three cases, criminal responsibility for the victim’s death was based on whether the “cause of the cause of death” was the illegal act of the accused. Other cases which turn on this point include Ohio v. Losey, No. 84 AP-768 slip op.

(Ohio, June 25, 1985); Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325 , 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982); State v. McKeiver, 89 N.J. ³⁸¹ Super. 52, 213 A.2d 320 (1965); and In re Heigho, 18 Idaho 566 , 110 P. 1029 (1910). In Ohio v. Losey, supra, the defendant Losey approached a house late at night and knocked on the door. After receiving no response from within, he forced the door open and attempted to remove a bicycle. A friend outside warned of a car approaching slowly and the defendant left the bike beside the door and fled, leaving the front door open.

The homeowner testified that he heard a noise and soon thereafter his mother, who shared the residence, came to his bedroom because she too had heard a noise. Together they went to the living room whereupon they discovered the front door open and the bicycle near the door. The son testified that his mother was very upset upon discovering the burglary and that he had never seen her that upset. Soon thereafter she collapsed.

The emergency squad was called and after attempting to revive her for almost an hour the mother was pronounced