Stone v. State

RAKER, Judge. Following his conviction in the District Court of Maryland, the Petitioner, Todd Erik Stone, appealed to the Circuit Court for Worcester County in exercise of his right to trial de novo. Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.) § 12-401(0 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The circuit court dismissed his appeal.

The question we must decide in this case is whether the circuit court may consider an appeal withdrawn and dismiss the appeal in a criminal case from a judgment of the District Court when the defendant failed to appear because he was incarcerated out-of-state and his failure to appear was not wilful, voluntary nor a result of neglect or inaction on his part. We shall hold that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal. I. This case stems from Petitioner Todd Erik Stone’s conviction in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Worcester County for theft over the value of $300, in violation of Maryland Code, (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 342.

On September 10, 1993, the District Court issued a warrant for Stone’s arrest for theft. After the State learned that Stone was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Cresson, Pennsylvania, the State’s Attorney for Worcester County lodged a detainer against him for the theft charge pending in the District Court. Petitioner exercised his rights under Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (I.A.D.) and requested final disposition of the theft charge pending in Worcester ¹⁰¹ County, Maryland. 1 Stone was transported to Maryland, the outstanding arrest warrant was served upon him, and his trial was scheduled in the District Court. On June 29, 1995, Stone was convicted in the District Court of theft over the value of $300.

On the same day, the District Court sentenced him to five years incarceration, all but eighteen months suspended, three years probation to be served consecutive to his Pennsylvania sentence. The Maryland authorities then returned Stone to Pennsylvania to complete his sentence. On July 21, 1995, Stone noted a timely appeal to the Circuit Court for Worcester County. See Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.) § 12-401 of the Courts and Proceedings Article.

The circuit court scheduled Stone’s trial for October 12, 1995. The clerk of the circuit court notified Stone at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute of his trial date. The notice, a circuit court summons, advised Stone that his case had been scheduled for a jury trial on October 12, 1995, and commanded him to appear before the Circuit Court for Worcester County on September 6, 1995, to answer a charging document (his de novo appeal) filed in that court, unless counsel entered a appearance before that date. On September 5, 1996, the Public Defender entered an appearance line, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense on behalf of Stone, elected a trial by jury, and demanded a speedy trial.

In a letter dated September 6, 1995, the Public Defender advised Stone that his appeal had been filed in the circuit court and that he “must file another request for disposition under the Interstate Detainer Act so that PA. will bring you for your new trial. You can get the forms at your jail in PA and file them immediately.” ¹⁰² Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, Stone attempted to comply with his attorney’s advice. On a Pennsylvania Department of Corrections form, Stone sent a brief note to a Pennsylvania prison records administrator, stating: I was over to see you last week concerning a court date I have in Maryland on 10/12/95. I believe you were to check on it & get back with me.

I need to refile the Interstate Agreement. Can you see me soon about this matter? The documents from Stone’s prison institutional file suggest that the Pennsylvania officials took the position that the I.A.D. was not available to Stone since he had already been tried and sentenced on the charges underlying the detainer lodged against him. 2 Handwritten notes in Stone’s file indicate that the Pennsylvania officials believed that Stone was pursuing an appeal of his sentence on Detainer # 6179810. The prison record reads: Called Public Defenders Office in Snow Hill, Md. re: I.AD. and appeal of sentence on Detainer # 6179810.... [T]hey will have to get a Governor’s Warrant to take subj. out since he went out under I.A.D. and was sentenced.

Mrs. Murphy said she never heard of this and will check it out---- 3 Petitioner was not present when his case was called for trial in the circuit court. Stone’s attorney explained to the court that Stone was incarcerated in Pennsylvania, and because ¹⁰³ there was not a detainer -within the I.A.D. in effect against Stone, Stone was unable to invoke the provisions of Article III of the I.A.D. that would trigger his transportation to Maryland. The State’s Attorney contended that the State had done all that was required and that Stone’s absence was due to his failure to follow the proper procedures under the I.A.D. The court agreed with the State and dismissed the appeal. The docket entry in the circuit court reads: 1995, Oct. 12....

Case is to be remanded back to District Court. The defendant having failed to appear as required, and lack of action on his part, the appeal is considered withdrawn and it is DISMISSED by the Circuit Court. Stone appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and we granted certiorari before that court considered the matter. We hold that the circuit court erred when it dismissed Stone’s de novo appeal and we therefore reverse.

II

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his appeal and requests that this Court reinstate his appeal. He maintains that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to appear due to his own inaction. He argues that without a detainer lodged against him, he was unable to invoke the provisions of the I.A.D. that would entitle him to be transported to Maryland. The State maintains that the circuit court properly dismissed Stone’s appeal and that Stone did not need a second detainer.

The State argues that “the charges that Stone faced in the circuit court, identical to those upon which he was tried in the District Court, fall within the purview of the I.A.D.” According to the State, Stone should have asserted his rights under the I.A.D., by “formally requesting final disposition of the circuit court charges.” It is the State’s position that Stone could have been transferred to Maryland for his circuit court trial based on the initial detainer lodged against him before his District Court trial. Since he could have invoked the ¹⁰⁴ I.A.D. but did not, the State continues, Stone failed to appear due to his own inaction and thus dismissal was appropriate.

III

This case addresses the interaction of Maryland’s two-tiered trial court system and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. We shall begin with an overview of both schemes before we explore how they interact and how they apply in this case. A. Maryland, along with a several of our sister states, has a two-tiered trial court system that provides for trial de novo on appeal to the general jurisdiction trial court. 4 See, e.g., Hardy v. State, 279 Md. 489, 490 , 369 A.2d 1043, 1045-46 (1977). The District Court of Maryland has original jurisdiction in all misdemeanor cases, and certain designated felonies, including both felony and misdemeanor theft in violation of Article 27, §§ 342-344.

Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.) § 4-301(b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. A defendant convicted in the District Court may appeal to the circuit court for a trial de novo. See Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.) § 12-401(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (an appeal from District Court to circuit court shall be tried de novo). The trial de novo in circuit court proceeds on the original District Court charging document, Lewis v. State, 289 Md. 1, 4-5 , 421 A.2d 974, 977 (1980), and the District Court judgment remains in effect pending the appeal to the circuit court, unless and until superseded by a judgment of the circuit court or a disposition by nolle prosequi or stet.

Maryland Rule 7-112; see Stanton ¹⁰⁵ v. State, 290 Md. 245 , 428 A.2d 1224 (1981). De novo appeals, however, are treated “as wholly original proceedings, that is, as if no judgment had been entered in the lower court.” Hardy v. State, 279 Md. 489, 493 , 369 A.2d 1043 (1977). Thus, under the Maryland scheme, the circuit court proceeding occupies a unique position as both an appeal and a trial. 5 Because the District Court judgment remains in effect after a circuit court appeal has been dismissed, dismissal of the appeal has different consequences than the dismissal of charges in an original trial. Dismissal of the charges in an original trial often benefits the defendant, particularly when the charges are dismissed with prejudice.

Dismissal of the circuit court appeal, on the other hand, deprives the appellant of his right to appeal a District Court judgment as guaranteed by statute in Maryland. An appeal from a judgment of the District Court is an appeal as a matter of right. Under Maryland Rule 7-114, the circuit court may dismiss an appeal when “an appeal to be heard de novo has been withdrawn pursuant to Rule 7-112.” Maryland Rule 7-112 provides in pertinent part: (d) Withdrawal of Appeal; Entry of Judgment. (1) An appeal shall be considered withdrawn if the appellant files a notice withdrawing the appeal or fails to appear as required for trial or any other proceeding on the appeal.

(2) Upon a withdrawal of the appeal, the circuit court shall dismiss the appeal, and the clerk shall promptly return the file to the District Court. Any order of satisfaction shall be docketed in the District Court. Thus, an appellant’s failure to appear for trial constitutes a withdrawal of the appeal, which in turn provides grounds for dismissal. ¹⁰⁶ We find the rationale in our cases addressing the defendant’s right to be present at trial instructive. In order to waive the right to be present at trial, a defendant must have voluntarily failed to appear, engaged in disruptive conduct in the courtroom, or at least have agreed to or acquiesced in his absence from the trial.

Maryland Rule 4—231(c); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253 , 658 A.2d 239 (1995); Barnett v. State, 307 Md. 194, 202-03 , 512 A.2d 1071, 1078-79 (1986). Likewise, the right to be present at a trial de novo cannot be considered waived by non-appearance, that is, withdrawn, when the trial court has information that the appellant’s failure to appear was neither wilful nor voluntary. Cf. Maryland Rule 4—231(c); Stewart v. State, 334 Md. 213 , 638 A.2d 754 (1994); Barnett, 307 Md. at 212 , 512 A.2d at 1079 .

Of course, when a defendant fails to appear at the designated time and place, and there is nothing before the court to justify the defendant’s absence, it is proper to presume that the defendant has withdrawn the appeal. See Maryland Rule 7-112(d). Because Petitioner’s counsel advised the circuit court of Stone’s whereabouts, we must evaluate what, if any, action Petitioner could have taken while serving his sentence in Pennsylvania to facilitate his presence at his de novo appeal in the circuit court. We turn now to a brief overview of the I.A.D. B. As this case demonstrates, a Maryland defendant’s right to two trials on the same charging document complicates the procedures for resolving detainers under the I.A.D. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers consists of nine articles and is codified at Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, §§ 616A-616R.

The purpose of the I.AD. is to encourage the expeditious disposition of charges and to establish cooperative procedures among member parties to facilitate such resolution. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351 , 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1842-43 , 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978); State v. Jefferson, ¹⁰⁷ 319 Md. 674, 679 , 574 A.2d 918, 920 (1990). The drafters of the Agreement also desired to remedy the adverse side-effects that detainers may have on prisoners. 6 This is reflected in Article I, which states, in pertinent part: The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 616B.

The I.A.D. is applicable when there is an untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner. Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 616D(a). The provisions of the I.A.D. are activated only when a detainer based on an untried indictment, information or complaint is filed with the custodial State by a member party. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343 , 98 S.Ct. at 1838-39 ; Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 307 , 455 A.2d 973, 975 (1983); Burns v. State, 523 So.2d 604, 606 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987), review denied, 534 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1988); People v. Hood, 223 Ill.App.3d 157 , 164 Ill.Dec. 851 , 583 N.E.2d 1173 (1991), cert. denied, 144 Ill.2d 638 , 169 Ill.Dec. 147 , 591 N.E.2d 27 (1992); State v. Anderson, 121 Wash.2d 852, 855 P.2d 671, 676 (1993); see also Leslie W. Abramson, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers: Narrowing Its ¹⁰⁸ Availability and Application, 21 N.E. J.Crim. & Civ.

Confinement 1 (1995). Although the I.A.D. does not define detainer, this Court has described a detainer “within the contemplation of the I.A.D. [as] ‘a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.’ ” Jefferson, 319 Md. at 678 n. 2, 574 A.2d at 919 -20 n. 2 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) and S.Rep. No. 1356, 91st.

Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1970, pp. 4864, 4865). The Supreme Court has more generally defined a detainer as a “request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when the release is imminent.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 , 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3403 , 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). Numerous cases have further refined what constitutes a detainer for purposes of the I.A.D. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 , 105 S.Ct. 3401 , 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (holding that a detainer based on a parole violation does not qualify under the I.A.D.); United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 , 98 S.Ct. 1834 , 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (holding that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not constitute a detainer for purposes of the I.A.D.); Hopper v. United States Parole Commission, 702 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.1983) (same as Carchman); State v. Smith, 316 Md. 223 , 557 A.2d 1343 (holding that a felony arrest warrant lodged as a detainer is effective to invoke the I.A.D.) (1989); Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303 , 455 A.2d 973 (1983) (same as Carchman); State v. Boone, 40 Md.App. 41 , 388 A.2d 150 (1978) (same as Mauro); People v. Castoe, 86 Cal.App.3d 484 , 150 Cal.Rptr. 237 (1978) (holding that detainer lodged against a prisoner who has been convicted but not yet sentenced is not effective to invoke I.A.D.); People v. Hood, 223 Ill.App.3d 157 , 164