Thomas v. Motor Vehicle Administration

ADKINS, J. Again we are asked to interpret the legislation imposing administrative sanctions on drivers for refusal to submit to a test to determine alcohol concentration. See Md.Code (1977, 2009 RepLVoL), Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article (“TA”). Our interpretation is guided by the legislative intent to enhance public safety with prompt removal of drunk drivers from the road. Upon being detained on suspicion of drunk driving, Petitioner Matthew C. Thomas was asked to submit to a preliminary breath test pursuant to TA Section 16-205.2.

He was then advised of his rights with regard to a alcohol concentration test (“chemical breath test”) by oral recitation of a standard Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) form. Thomas refused to take any breath test and was arrested. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) later suspended Thomas’s driver’s license for his refusal of the chemical breath test, and the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County affirmed that decision. On appeal, Thomas argues that he had been improperly advised of his rights because the officer had never offered Thomas the chemical breath test and had not arrested or formally charged Thomas prior to his refusal.

Thomas claims that this procedure was unduly misleading, and thus his license should not have been suspended. We granted Thomas’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari 1 to consider the following questions: ²⁸⁵ A. As a matter of first impression, does Maryland Annotated Code, Transportation § 16-205.1(b) require an officer to arrest, take into custody, and/or charge a person with a violation of the traffic law before effectively satisfying the officer’s duty to fully advise a person of the administrative sanctions for refusal of a § 16-205.1 chemical breath test as a matter of law? B. Whether the Petitioner was not “fully advised” of the administrative sanctions for refusing a chemical breath test and was mislead where Petitioner was requested to submit to a preliminary breath test by an officer at the scene of a traffic stop, Petitioner initially agreed to the preliminary breath test and the officer immediately began reading the DR-15 advice of rights form at the scene of the traffic stop? C. Whether the denial of a MVA subpoena request for a police officer by an Administrative Law Judge[,] where the documentary evidence constituting the testimony of the absent officer is conflicting on its face[,] requires resolution of the conflicting testimony in favor of Petitioner and dismissal of the MVA’s case?

We shall hold that Thomas was properly advised of his rights, and thus affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS On a late evening in March, Private Nemser and another police officer of the Hyatsville Police Department responded to a complaint that a person driving a silver Mustang was speeding and blaring loud music. After arriving at the location, Nemser observed a silver Mustang and pulled behind it. Thomas, the driver of that vehicle, then accelerated quickly, spinning the car’s tires.

Nemser initiated a traffic stop and his fellow officer approached the vehicle and ordered Thomas out. Thomas struggled to exit his vehicle, and Nemser noticed that he had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. The other officer observed a nearly empty pint bottle of Jack Daniels Whiskey sitting in ²⁸⁶ Thomas’s cup holder. Thomas was unable to maintain his balance well enough to perform any Field Sobriety Tests.

Nemser asked Thomas to take a preliminary breath test, and Thomas agreed. Nemser then began to advise Thomas of his rights by reading to him from the DR-15 Advice of Rights Form. This form sets forth a driver’s rights with regard to the chemical breath test, a test that is wholly separate from the preliminary breath test. Compare TA § 16-205.1 (chemical breath test) 2 with TA § 16-205.2 (preliminary breath test). 3 The very first paragraph of the DR-15 provides as follows: You have been stopped or detained and reasonable grounds exist to believe that you have been driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle under circumstances requiring that you be asked to submit to a test under § 16-205.1 of the Maryland Vehicle Law.

In this situation, the law deems that you have consented to take a test to measure the alcohol concentration or drug or controlled dangerous substance content in your system. You may refuse to submit to the test(s), unless you were in a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of or life-threatening injury to another person. The remainder of the DR-15 form sets forth the consequences for refusing to submit to the Section 16-205.1 chemical test. 4 ²⁸⁷ A refusal results in suspension of the driver’s license. See TA § 16-205.1(b)(l)(i)(3).

The preliminary breath test, on the other hand, has no adverse consequences for refusal. See TA § 16-205.2(d). As Nemser was reading from the DR-15, Thomas informed the officer that he would not sign any paperwork or take a breath test. 5 Nemser signed the DR-15, certifying that he ²⁸⁸ advised Thomas of his rights pursuant to the form, and in the place for the driver’s signature, Nemser wrote “REFUSED.” Nemser also checked the box indicating that the driver refused the chemical breath test. He then took Thomas into custody and placed him in the front seat of his marked police car.

Before they departed for the police station, however, Thomas urinated in the front seat and Nemser immediately removed him. Nemser then issued four traffic citations to Thomas, and, to prevent further damage to the vehicle, released Thomas to walk to his home, which was approximately 100 yards away. Three months after that night, Thomas appeared for his administrative hearing. 6 At the hearing, the ALJ accepted into evidence Nemser’s DR-15A Order of Suspension, DR-15 Advice of Rights Form, Officer’s Alcohol Influence Report, and Thomas’s driving record. Although Nemser was not present at the hearing to testify, he had summarized the night’s events in his Alcohol Influence Report, part of which provided: THOMAS continually asked why he was stopped.

When he was told that he was driving his vehicle, he stated “My car is parked in front of my house.” He was unaware that he was sitting ten feet away from his vehicle. THOMAS was staggering around until we had him sit on the curb. I asked him if he would like to take a preliminary breath test and he said yes. While reading the DR-15 to THOMAS, he informed me that he would not sign any paperwork or take a breath test.

I took THOMAS into custody and placed him in the front seat of my marked [car] and prepared to transport him to the [police station]. Just before I began ²⁸⁹ driving THOMAS looked at me and stated “I just fucked you!” I asked him what did he mean by that. He repeated again, “I just fucked you!” I told him that I didn’t understand what he meant. He then stated “I just pissed all over your front seat.” I immediately removed him from the vehicle in order to prevent further damage to the seat [and issued him four citations].

After admission of this evidence, Thomas moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the evidence did not prove that he had been offered a chemical test and thus, he could not have refused what he was never offered. The ALJ denied Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss, and Thomas was immediately sworn in to testify. 7 On the witness stand, Thomas simply testified that he had not been offered a chemical breath test, that he had never been transported to the police station, and that he had signed the citations issued to him. Thomas’s attorney then argued that, because TA Section 16-205.1 required that Thomas be charged before Nemser could offer the chemical breath test, Thomas had only refused the preliminary breath test. The ALJ disagreed, finding that Thomas had been fully and properly advised of his rights and had refused the chemical breath test.

The ALJ concluded that Thomas had alcohol in his system that night, citing Nemser’s report that Thomas had been staggering about, had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol on his breath, could not exit his vehicle without falling to the ground, and later urinated in the front seat of the police vehicle. Accordingly, the ALJ did not give “much credibility to [Thomas’s testimony that he had not refused a chemical breath test] because of the state he was in when all of this was occurring.” The ALJ suspended Thomas’s driver’s license for 120 days, and disqualified his commercial driver’s license for one year, pursuant to TA Sections 16-205.1(b)(l)(i)(3)(A) and 16-205.1(b)(l)(iii)(l). Thomas challenged the ALJ’s decision in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, but was unsuccessful. In affirm ²⁹⁰ ing the ALJ’s decision, the Circuit Court determined that nothing in Nemser’s Alcohol Influence Report or the DR-15 Advice of Rights Form would prevent a reasoning mind from coming to the same conclusion as the ALJ, and thus the ALJ’s ruling must stand.

Thomas then petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which we granted. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review When reviewing an administrative agency’s judgment, we are mindful of the highly deferential standard afforded to an administrative agency: A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record. ... [A] court’s task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency[.] Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency.

Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. Motor Vehicle Administration v. Illiano, 390 Md. 265, 274-75 , 888 A.2d 329, 335 (2005) (quotations marks and citations omitted). ²⁹¹ II. Analysis A. Potential Gatekeepers: Whether Formal Charges Or An Arrest Must Precede A Request For A Chemical Breath Test Thomas argues that, according to TA Section 16-205.1, an officer has not fully advised a person of the administrative sanctions associated with refusing a chemical breath test until the officer has charged that individual with a violation of the motor vehicle laws. Thus, a person cannot be penalized for any test refusal that occurs before he or she has been arrested for drunk driving.

As evidence, Thomas points to 16-205.1(b)’s language setting forth the consequences for a test refusal: [A] person may not be compelled to take a test. However, the detaining officer shall advise the person that, on receipt of a sworn statement from the officer that the person was so charged and refused to take a test ... the Administration shall [suspend the driver’s license].[ 8 ] TA § 16-205.1(b) (emphasis added). Thomas claims that this language supports an interpretation that TA Section 16-205.1 requires a formal charge before the advice of rights is effective. He also claims sustenance from Sections 10-302 through 10-309 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C JP”), ²⁹² which govern evidence in relation to motor vehicle laws. 9 CJP Section 10-802 (“Chemical test for alcohol, drug or controlled dangerous substance content — Purpose”) begins “[i]n a prosecution for a violation of law concerning a person who is driving or attempting to drive a vehicle in violation of [the motor vehicle laws] a [chemical breath test] may be administered[.]” (Emphasis added).

Thomas reasons that the term “prosecution” assumes a charge against the driver for a violation of the law. In addressing Thomas’s arguments, we adhere to the well-known and oft-recited cannons of statutory interpretation. “[O]ur primary goal [when analyzing a statute] is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision[.]” People’s Ins. Counsel Div. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 408 Md. 336, 351 , 969 A.2d 971, 979 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Our first step is to look at the statutory language. See Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 11 , 874 A.2d 439, 445 (2005). “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions, and our analysis ends.” People’s Ins. Counsel, 408 Md. at 351 , 969 A.2d at 980 .

Throughout this process, this Court “must always be cognizant of the fundamental principle that statutory construction is approached from a ‘commonsensical’ perspective. Thus, we seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994) (citations omitted). The General Assembly enacted TA Section 16-205.1 “to reduce the incidence of drunken driving and to protect public safety by encouraging drivers to take alcohol concentration tests; the statute was not meant to protect drivers.” ²⁹³ Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 255 , 923 A.2d 100, 108 (2007). Accordingly, subsection (a)(2) provides: Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is used by the public in general in this State is deemed to have consented ... to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol[.] (Emphasis added).

The legislatively designed incentive for taking the test comes in the form of subsection (b)(1), which allows “a driver’s license to be suspended promptly for suspected 11 drunken driving if the person refused a test to determine alcohol concentration.” Shepard, 399 Md. at 255 , 923 A.2d at 108 . Also contained within TA Section 16-205.1 is a list of procedures established by the General Assembly for an officer who “stops or detains” a driver on suspicion of drunk driving. Specifically, subsection (b)(2) states: [I]f a police officer stops or detains any person who the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe is or has been driving ... a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ... the police officer shall: (i) Detain the person; (ii) Request that the person permit a test to be taken; (in) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed for test results indicating an alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 but less than 0.15 at the time of testing; (iv) Advise the person of the administrative sanctions ... that shall be imposed for refusal to take the test and for test results indicating an alcohol concentration of 0.15 or more at the time of testing; and (v) Advise the person of the additional criminal penalties that may be imposed ... if the person knowingly refused to ²⁹⁴ take a test arising out of the same circumstances as the violation. (Emphasis added).

In Willis v. State, 302 Md. 363 , 488 A.2d 171 (1985), we held that TA Section 16-205.1’s phrase “stops or detains” carried the same meaning as “apprehended” in CJP Section 10-303. 10 See 302 Md. at 376 , 488 A.2d at 178 . We stated that “an accused is ‘apprehended’ when a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is or has been driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated or while under the influence of alcohol and the police officer reasonably acts upon that information by stopping or detaining the person.” Id. Later, in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617 , 510 A.2d 1078 (1986), we held that TA Section 16-205.1 “was not invoked until the officer ‘stops or detains any individual.’ ” 306 Md. at 625 , 510 A.2d at 1082 (emphasis in original). We went on to explain that “the word ‘detain’ is used twice in § 16-205.1” but that the second use of the word did not have a meaning different from or more restrictive than the first.

Id. at 625 n. 1, 510 A.2d at 1082 n. 1. “Simply put, the proper interpretation of the section is: if the officer first detains (or stops) one whom he has reasonable grounds to believe is driving while intoxicated, the officer shall further detain the individual in order to carry out the procedures prescribed by the section.” Id. The word “detain” has multiple meanings, including “to arrest, to check, to delay, to hinder, ... to restrain from proceeding____” Black’s Law Dictionary 449 (6th ed.1990). Yet, for purposes of TA Section 16-205.1, it is evident that “detain” does not mean a formal arrest. That section applies when an officer “detains” a driver that the officer has “reasonable grounds” to believe is driving under the influence.

See TA § 16-205.1(b)(2). The pairing of these two terms is crucial ²⁹⁵ to our analysis. In a previous case, we have held that the “reasonable grounds” language signifies a detention short of arrest. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241, 254 , 923 A.2d 100, 107 (2007).

In Shepard , a driver argued that the “reasonable grounds” language meant that, at the very least, the officer must have probable cause. We rejected this argument, explaining that “Section 16-205.1 does not require an arrest to precede an officer’s request for the driver to take a test[,]” but rather requires that “the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while under the influence of alcohol.” 11