Toney v. State

HOLLANDER, Judge. In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Leon Eugene Toney, appellant, pled guilty to second degree assault. Thereafter, he was sentenced to a term of five years’ incarceration; all but 18 months of the sentence was suspended. The court also gave Toney credit for 188 days of pre-trial incarceration.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether, in sentencing appellant, the court erroneously failed to credit him with an additional 98 days that he served in pre-trial home detention. Appellant was incarcerated before trial from August 18, 1999, until December 13, 1999, when he was granted pre-trial release. From December 13, 1999, until his sentencing on April 20, 2000, appellant was on pre-trial release in a home ⁶⁹² detention program. On May 26, 2000, after his sentencing, appellant filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, alleging that the court erred by failing to credit him with the 98 days that he spent in a pre-trial home detention program.

When the court denied the motion, appellant noted this appeal. DISCUSSION Maryland Code Ann. (1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), Article 27, Section 638C(a), mandates that when an individual is in custody before trial and is subsequently convicted on the charge for which he or she was held, the time spent in custody prior to the imposition of sentence must be credited against the sentence imposed. The intent of the statute is to insure that a defendant receives as much credit as possible for time spent in custody, consistent with constitutional and practical considerations. See Dedo v. State, 343 Md. 2, 9 , 680 A.2d 464 (1996); Fleeger v. State, 301 Md. 155, 160-165 , 482 A.2d 490 (1984).

In support of his contention, appellant relies on Dedo . There, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant was entitled to credit for time spent before trial in a home detention program. The Court reasoned that the restraints placed upon the defendant were “sufficiently incarcerative” so that the effect was custodial, even though the defendant was not housed in a jail or prison. In reaching that conclusion, the Court focused on the following factors: The home detention contract characterized Dedo’s confinement as incarceration; Dedo could have been charged with escape for any unexcused or unexplained absence from his home during curfew hours; he was subject to the control of the warden of the detention center and the home detention staff; any violation of home detention would have led to Dedo’s immediate imprisonment; Dedo’s movements and activities were electronically monitored; he was required to permit home detention staff to enter his home at any time; and Dedo was subject to alcohol restrictions and random drug and alcohol testing.

Dedo, 343 Md. at 12-13 , 680 A.2d 464 . ⁶⁹³ Analogizing to Dedo , appellant argues that the conditions of his home detention were “sufficiently incarcerative” so as to merit custodial credit. Under the applicable “Conditions of Release,” appellant was subject to “electronic monitoring,” and he was not permitted to leave his residence without permission from his case manager. Further, appellant was required to have regular contact with a case manager at designated times. He was also obligated to notify the authorities if he changed his address, planned to leave the area, had further involvement with the criminal justice system, or received a continuance of his trial.

Additionally, Toney was to report for drug testing and was precluded from contacting the victim. After the list of conditions, the following language appears: WARNING: THE COURT REQUIRES U.S. TO SUBMIT A REPORT SETTING FORTH YOUR RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABOVE CONDITIONS OF PRETRIAL RELEASE. YOUR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THESE CONDITIONS MAY RESULT IN THE ISSUANCE OF A BENCH WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. The State also cites Dedo, 343 Md. at 12 , 680 A.2d 464 , but argues that the conditions of release here were not “sufficiently incarcerative to satisfy the custody requirement of Art. 27, § 638C(a).” Rather, the State asserts that Dedo is distinguishable, for two reasons: 1) Unlike Dedo, appellant was not committed to the custody of the Prince George’s County Detention Center.

Instead, Toney was to be monitored by Pretrial Release Services for Prince George’s County. 2) The document