Toth v. State

CATHELL, J. This case arises out of a traffic stop that occurred on June 12, 2004, in Worcester County. David Louis Toth, appellant, was charged with speeding, driving while under the influence of alcohol and driving while impaired by alcohol, violations of Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), §§ 21-801.1 and 21-902(a) and (b) of the Transportation Article. 1 The case was ³²⁰ originally scheduled to be tried in the District Court of Maryland but appellant prayed a jury trial and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court. Appellant then filed a motion to suppress in connection with the § 21-902 charges. On February 2, 2005, a hearing was held on appellant’s motion to suppress.

The motion was granted on the same day and on that date the State, appellee, entered a nolle prosequi 2 for the charges, leaving only the speeding violation before the Circuit Court. 3 Pursuant to Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 26-204 of the Transportation Article 4 appellant attempted ³²¹ to pay the $75.00 fine provided for in the citation issued for the speeding violation. 5 Under instructions from the circuit court judge presiding over the case, the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court refused to accept payment of the fine. On April 4, 2005, trial was held in the Circuit Court. Appellant again attempted to tender payment of the fine. The judge refused to accept the payment, heard from the parties, and found appellant guilty of speeding.

The judge then imposed the maximum penalty for the violation ($500.00) plus costs of $166.00, for a total fine of $666.00. Appellant timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. This Court, on its own initiative and prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, granted certiorari. Toth v. State, 390 Md. 90 , 887 A.2d 655 (2005).

Appellant submits three questions: “1. Did the Circuit Court err in refusing to apply § 26-204(b)(1)(iii), Transportation, Md.Code Ann? 2. Does a Circuit Court Judge have the authority to order the Clerk of the Circuit Court to ignore, or disobey, a Statute? 3. May the Court consider a charge, to which the State has entered a nolle prosequi, in sentencing?” We hold that the Circuit Court erred in refusing to apply § 26—204(b)(1)(iii) to the case at bar by failing to adhere to the plain language of the statute and allow payment of the $75.00 ³²² fine.

As a result of our disposition of question one, we need not resolve questions two and three. I. Facts On October 5, 2004, trial on the traffic charges was scheduled in the District Court of Maryland. At that time appellant requested a trial by jury. All of the charges in the case were then transferred to the Circuit Court as required by Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 4-302(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

See Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 745 , 580 A.2d 188, 191 (1990) (“[Ujnder § 4-302, once a person is charged in the circuit court, the District Court is divested of jurisdiction over all offenses arising out of the same accompanying facts.”). On October 21, 2004, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence in connection with the § 21-902 violations. As stated earlier, on February 2, 2005, a hearing was held before the Circuit Court and appellant’s motion was granted. The State then entered a nolle prosequi for the § 21-902 alcohol related violations.

The case remained in the Circuit Court with only the charge for a speeding violation. The docket reflects that on the next day after the motions hearing, February 3, 2005, a trial date was scheduled on the speeding charge for April 4, 2005. Prior to April 4, 2005, appellant several times attempted to pay the $75.00 fine for the speeding violation, as indicated in the citation. Correspondence between appellant’s counsel and the Office of the Clerk of the Court indicates that the trial judge ordered the Clerk not to accept payment of the fine for the speeding violation.

A letter from the Clerk, dated February 10, 2005, states: “Dear [Counsel]: In response to your written request ... that the above referenced case be reset for a jury trial, I have conferred with [the trial judge] regarding this matter and he has advised me to schedule this case as a non-jury trial. Also, [the trial judge] has instructed that the clerk’s office should not accept payment of the fine for the speeding violation at this time.” ³²³ [Emphasis added]. Appellant, nevertheless, sent a check in the amount of $75.00 to the Clerk’s office for payment of the pre-set fine. A letter dated March 1, 2005, from the Clerk, returned that check to appellant’s counsel, stating: “Dear [Counsel], Per verbal order of [the trial judge] said instrument is herewith returned, pending outcome of the April 4, 2005 Trial....” On April 4, 2005, trial was held in the Circuit Court.

When asked by the trial judge for the plea, appellant’s counsel responded: “Pursuant to Section 26-204, Your Honor, he appears and tenders his check, Your Honor.” After some very brief discussion concerning § 26-204, the trial judge stated: “Okay. Well, if he’s got a check I’ll take that as a plea of guilty. I will hear the facts.” After the facts were presented, the trial judge found appellant guilty of the speeding violation. The trial judge then imposed the maximum fine of $500.00 plus $166.00 in court costs, for a total of $666.00.

Appellant’s counsel posited: “And, Your Honor, may I ask the Court the reasoning for the fine?” The trial judge replied: “No, sir. I’ve imposed my fine.” II. Standard of Review This case was tried in a circuit court without a jury, therefore, our standard of review is dictated by Maryland Rule 8-131(e). We recently stated in Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366 , 879 A.2d 1064 (2005): “According to Maryland Rule 8-131(c) ‘when an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence.

It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.’ The clearly erroneous standard does not apply to legal conclusions. Nesbit v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 72 , 854 A.2d 879, 883 (2004). ‘When the trial court’s order “involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo ³²⁴ standard of review.” ’ Nesbit, 382 Md. at 72 , 854 A.2d at 883 (quoting Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 , 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002)).” Gray, 388 Md. at 374-75 , 879 A.2d at 1068 . The issues before the Court involve an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, in particular § 26-204 of the Transportation Article. Thus, we will review whether the Circuit Court’s conclusion was legally correct under a de novo standard.

III

Discussion The Plain Language of § 26-204 Allows Payment of a Citation Fine. Appellant argues that the plain language of § 26-204 allows for the payment of a citation fine to constitute a conviction and, thereby, satisfy one’s obligation to the court in regard to that violation. The State argues that because appellant had requested a trial for his offenses (when he prayed a jury trial for the § 21-902 violations, which were subsequently nolle prossed), and the trial date of April 4, 2005, had already been set (on February 3, 2005) before appellant attempted to make payment of the citation fine, that appellant was bound to appear for trial and the Clerk did not need to accept payment of the fine amount. 6 We disagree. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature.

Mackey v. Compass Mktg., Inc., 391 Md. 117, 141 , 892 A.2d 479, 493 (2006); Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. 563, 576 , 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005). If the statute is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as it is written. Mackey, 391 Md. at 141 , ³²⁵ 892 A.2d at 493 ; Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 689 , 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004). Section 26-204(a) states that: “A person shall comply with the notice to appear contained: (1) In a traffic citation issued to the person under this subtitle; or (2) In a summons, other writ, or a trial notice issued by either the District Court or a circuit court in an action on a traffic citation.” (Emphasis added).

Subsection (b)(1) goes on to state that: “For purposes of this section, the person may comply with the notice to appear by: (i) Appearance in person; (ii) Appearance by counsel; or (iii) Payment of the fine, if provided for in the citation.” § 26-204(b)(1). A $75.00 fine was provided for in the citation at issue. The plain language of § 26-204 is clear and unambiguous. As applicable to the facts of the case sub judice, appellant had to comply with the notice to appear contained in the trial notice issued by the Circuit Court.

There are three ways in which appellant could have complied: (1) by appearing in person, (2) by appearing by counsel, or (3) by payment of the fine, if