Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp

Bruce Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp, Inc., No. 2366, Sept. Term 2018. Opinion filed on December 18, 2019, by Berger, J. LANDLORD-TENANT - LEASE VERSUS LICENSE - OCCUPANCY INCIDENTAL TO EMPLOYMENT Generally, a person who occupies premises belonging to an employer is not a tenant when the occupancy is incidental to, or necessary for, performance of the employment. The lack of rent payment required of an employee is a strong indication that no lease was intended. TRESPASS - JURISDICTION An employee of a summer camp who resided in an apartment on the summer camp’s property and who paid no rent for the apartment was a licensee, not a tenant, of the employer.

When the employer filed a trespass claim against the employee after he failed to vacate the property following the termination of his employment, the circuit court had jurisdiction to address the trespass claim. The claim was not a landlord-tenant action required to be brought in the District Court. TRESPASS - POSSESSION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT The circuit court appropriately granted summary judgment to the employer when the terminated employee presented no evidence beyond conclusory statements that he was in actual legal possession of the apartment located on the employer’s property. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 434503-V REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2366 September Term, 2018 ______________________________________ BRUCE UTHUS v. VALLEY MILL CAMP, INC. ______________________________________ Berger, Nazarian, Reed, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Berger, J. ______________________________________ Filed: December 18, 2019 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2019-12-18 13:41-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This appeal arises from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granting a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Valley Mill Camp, Inc. (“Valley Mill”), appellee.

The Complaint that initiated the lawsuit giving rise to this appeal alleged, inter alia, that Bruce Uthus (“Uthus”), appellant, had trespassed on Valley Mill’s property. After discovery, Valley Mill moved for partial summary judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered summary judgment in Valley Mill’s favor on the trespass claim and ordered Uthus to vacate the property. Uthus filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to address the trespass claim.

The circuit court denied Uthus’s motion, and Uthus appealed. On appeal, Uthus presents two issues for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: I. Whether the circuit court erred when it determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the trespass claim.

II

Whether the circuit court erred by granting Valley Mill’s motion for summary judgment on the trespass claim. Perceiving no error, we shall affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Valley Mill operates a summer camp for children on approximately sixty acres in Germantown, Maryland. The camp has been operated by Uthus’s family since 1956.

The sole shareholder of Valley Mill is Evelyn McEwan, Uthus’s mother. Ms. McEwan is also Valley Mill’s President. Valley Mill leases the property (the “Property”) upon which the camp operates from Seneca Joint Venture, a Maryland general partnership composed of Ms. McEwan, the Robert McEwan Trust, Valley Mill, Uthus, and Seneca Venture, LLC. Uthus is a former employee and former member of the Board of Directors of Valley Mill.

In May of 2017, Valley Mill terminated Uthus’s employment.1 Prior to Uthus’s termination, Uthus had resided in an apartment unit on the Property. Uthus had resided in the apartment for approximately nineteen years while employed by Valley Mill. After the termination of Uthus’s employment, Valley Mill asked Uthus to vacate the apartment, but he refused to do so. On July 17, 2017, Valley Mill filed a complaint against Uthus in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County alleging that Uthus was trespassing on the Property. 2 Following discovery, Valley Mill moved for summary judgment on the trespass count.

At the conclusion of a hearing on the motion on July 25, 2018, the circuit court issued its oral ruling as follows: So at this point there doesn’t appear to be any factual dispute about certain facts, and that is that Valley Mill Camp has a lease on this property, and that at some point Mr. Uthus was employed there at the camp, to help run the camp, and that employment ended in May of 2017. And he was asked to vacate the premises, and apparently he has not. 1 The reasons for Uthus’s termination are absent from the record, and, regardless, are irrelevant to the determination of the issues on appeal. 2 The complaint sought preliminary and injunctive relief enjoining Uthus from communicating with the camp’s employees, campers, and camper’s families. The complaint included claims of tortious interference with economic relationships, defamation, and detinue along with the trespass claim. In addition to granting Valley Mill summary judgment on the trespass claim, the circuit court granted Uthus summary judgment on the tortious interference with economic relationships claim.

The remaining counts were subsequently voluntarily dismissed by Valley Mill. 2 So under the claim that’s been brought for trespass, Valley Mill has the exclusive right to possess the property, and they’ve given notice to Mr. Uthus to vacate the property, which he hasn’t, which clearly shows that his presence on the property is without the consent of [Valley Mill]. So I’ll grant the motion for summary judgment as to the claim of trespass, which is Count 4. Uthus filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the circuit court’s order on August 10, 2018.3 In his motion, Uthus alleged that: (1) the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the trespass claim, and (2) the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment on the trespass claim because Uthus physically possessed the apartment. The circuit court denied Uthus’s motion.

This timely appeal followed. Additional facts shall be set forth as necessitated by our discussion of the issues on appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW The entry of summary judgment is governed by Maryland Rule 2-501, which provides: The court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(f).

The Court of Appeals has described the standard of review to be applied by appellate courts reviewing summary judgment determinations as follows: 3 Uthus appeared at the July 25, 2018 hearing pro se. His August 10, 2018 motion was filed through counsel. 3 On review of an order granting summary judgment, our analysis “begins with the determination [of] whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists; only in the absence of such a dispute will we review questions of law.” D’Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 574 , 36 A.3d 941, 955 (2012) (quoting Appiah v. Hall, 416 Md. 533, 546 , 7 A.3d 536, 544 (2010)); O’Connor v. Balt. Cnty., 382 Md. 102, 110 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1196 (2004). If no genuine dispute of material fact exists, this Court determines “whether the Circuit Court correctly entered summary judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condo., 404 Md. 560, 571 , 948 A.2d 11, 18 (2008) (citations omitted).

Thus, “[t]he standard of review of a trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment on the law is de novo, that is, whether the trial court’s legal conclusions were legally correct.” D’Aoust, 424 Md. at 574 , 36 A.3d at 955 . Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 24-25 (2013). Because this case presents only issues of law, we apply the de novo standard of review. DISCUSSION I. Uthus’s first appellate argument focuses on the circuit court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction to consider Valley Mill’s trespass claim.

Uthus asserts that the trespass claim brought by Valley Mill is actually “either a wrongful/forcible detainer action or a landlord/tenant action, and therefore pursuant to [Md. Code 1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.),] § 4-401(4) [of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”)] is committed by the legislature to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the District Court in which the property at question is located.” As we shall explain, we are not persuaded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider Valley Mill’s trespass claim. 4 CJP § 4-401 provides, in relevant part: “Except as provided in § 4-402 of this subtitle, and subject to the venue provisions of Title 6 of this article, the District Court has exclusive original civil jurisdiction in . . . [a]n action involving landlord and tenant, distraint, or wrongful detainer, regardless of the amount involved . . . .” CJP § 4-402 provides that “the District Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the ownership of real property or of an interest in real property.” Uthus characterizes the dispute at the center of this appeal as a landlord/tenant or wrongful detainer action, but Uthus has presented no evidence of a landlord/tenant relationship between himself and Valley Mill. Indeed, as we shall explain, the record reflects that Uthus was a licensee of Valley Mill during his employment, not a tenant. “Where the relevant facts are undisputed, ‘the question [of] whether the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties . . . [is] a question of law to be determined by the Court upon the consideration of the facts.’” Delauter v. Shafer, 374 Md. 317, 324 , (2003) (quoting Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. 10, 23 (1864)). Landlords and tenants have a special class of relationship that is governed by statutes as well as common law.

See generally 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 1 (2019) (discussing the nature of the landlord and tenant relationship). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has observed that “[t]here are unique factual and legal characteristics of the landlord-tenant relationship that justify special statutory treatment inapplicable to other litigants.” Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72 (1972). Under Maryland law, a “landlord” is defined as “any landlord, including a ‘lessor[,’]” and a “lease” is defined as “any oral or written agreement, express or implied, creating a landlord and tenant relationship, including any ‘sublease’ and any 5 further sublease.” Md. Code (1974, 2015 Repl.

Vol.), § 1-101(g)-(h) of the Real Property Article (“RP”). To our knowledge, Maryland appellate courts have not expressly addressed whether an employee who occupies premises belonging to an employer is a tenant of the employer. Other courts have generally held the following: A person who occupies the premises of the person’s employer as part compensation for such employment generally is considered to be in possession as an employee, rather than as a tenant, where the occupancy is connected with and incidental to, or is required for the necessary or better performance of, the employee’s services. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 8 (2019).

See, e.g., Moore v. Williams College, 702 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 414 Fed. Appx. 307 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying Massachusetts law) (determining that a college professor, who was provided with faculty housing by the college, was not a “tenant” of the college and was not entitled to the protections of state statute protecting tenants from certain actions of their landlords when the professor’s housing was provided as a condition of employment and only for so long as he remained employed by the college); GENC Realty LLC v. Nezaj, 52 A.D.3d 415, 415 , 860 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (2008) (determining that a superintendent, who was previously a rent-controlled tenant, had exchanged his status of tenant for that of employee, and landlord-tenant relationship ceased to exist after he accepted the superintendent position); Bennardo v. Searchwell, 54 Misc. 3d 924, 928 , 43 N.Y.S.3d 878, 881 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2016) (determining that home healthcare aide, who occupied the premises of the owner prior to 6 the owner’s death, was a licensee whose occupancy rights terminated upon the end of her employment). Critically, the lack of rent payment required of an employee is a “strong consideration to show that no lease was intended.” 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 7 (2019) (citing Mead v. Owen, 80 Vt. 273 (1907)).

See also Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. 10, 25 (1864) (explaining that whether a purported tenant is “recognized as a tenant by the” owner and whether “rent was paid” are relevant to the determination of whether a lease existed). A 2004 advisory opinion by the Office of the Attorney General is instructive on this issue. “We have explained that, ‘[w]hile not binding . . . the opinions of the Attorney General are, nevertheless, generally entitled to careful consideration.’” Dyer v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard Cty., 216 Md. App. 530, 536 (2014) (quoting Scott v. Clerk of Circuit Ct. for Frederick Cnty., 112 Md. App. 234, 240 , (1996)). The Office of the Attorney General considered whether a live-in domestic employee had tenancy rights, and, specifically, the right to invite and receive guests. 89 Op. Att’y Gen. 3 (2004).4 The Attorney General observed that courts have “looked to a number of factors” when determining whether an occupant is a tenant: For example, a person who rents a room, provides furnishings, maintains the room, and excludes others, including the property owner, is likely to be found to be a tenant.

Mathews v. Livingston, 85 A. 529 (Conn. 1912). On the other hand, a 4 The advisory opinion further considered whether a live-in employee’s rights would be affected if the residence is owned by a foreign diplomat or by a foreign government that employees a household employee to work for a diplomat. This portion of the advisory opinion is irrelevant to the issues before us in this appeal. 7 person who occupies a room to which the owner has free access will ordinarily be found to be a lodger and not a tenant. Tamanian v. Gabbard, 55 A.2d. 513 (D.C. 1947), Johnson v. Kolibas, 182 A. 2d 157 (N.J. App. 1962), or for other reasons, Taylor v. Dean, 78 A.2d 382 (D.C. App. 1951).

Among the other factors that courts have considered are whether the occupants share kitchen and bath facilities, and whether furnishings, linens, or maid services are provided. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Quirt, 28 Md. App. 603, 611 , 346 A.2d 497 (1975); Johnson v. Kolibas, 182 A.2d 157 (N.J. Super. 1962). 89 Op. Att’y Gen. at 5. The opinion further considered the specific context of an employee who occupies premises belonging to an employer: Courts have often held that an employee who occupies premises belonging to an employer is not a tenant when the occupancy is incidental to, or necessary for, performance of the employment.

See 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 9. This rule has been applied to situations involving domestic employees. See Dobson Factors,