Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp

Bruce Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp Inc., No. 7, Sept. Term, 2020. Opinion by Hotten, J. REAL PROPERTY — LANDLORD-TENANT — LICENSEES. Determining whether a person residing on property based on an agreement is a tenant or a licensee requires a reasonable and objective analysis of the surrounding facts and circumstances. The lack of exclusive possession and not paying rent indicates that the person is a licensee and not a tenant.

COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS — JURISDICTION — DISTRICT COURT — WRONGFUL DETAINER. Wrongful detainer is a permissive action. Parties who wish to remove a person in unlawful possession of property may either file a wrongful detainer action in the District Court, or they may pursue other legal remedies, such as a trespass action in the circuit court. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 434503-V Argued: November 5, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 7 September Term, 2020 __________________________________ BRUCE UTHUS v. VALLEY MILL CAMP, INC. __________________________________ Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Hotten, J. __________________________________ Filed: March 4, 2021 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-03-04 12:08-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This appeal stems from a family dispute regarding a family business and the resulting familial fallout.

Respondent, Valley Mill Camp, Inc. (“Valley Mill”), terminated the employment of Petitioner, Bruce Uthus (“Uthus”), and asked him to vacate the campground residence where he had been living for approximately twenty years. When Uthus refused to leave, Valley Mill filed a trespass action against Uthus in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. In response to a motion for partial summary judgment advanced by Valley Mill, the court entered judgment in its favor. Thereafter, Uthus appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed.

Uthus timely appealed to this Court, and we granted certiorari to resolve the following question: “Can a person claiming the right to possession against a person in actual peaceable possession of real property bring an action in circuit court for common law trespass to recover possession of the property?”1 We answer the question in the affirmative and for the reasons expressed below, shall affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Valley Mill operates a children’s seasonal camp on a roughly sixty-acre parcel of land near Germantown, Maryland. The land on which the camp is operated is currently owned by Seneca Joint Venture, a Maryland general partnership that includes Bruce Uthus, Uthus’ question, which we rephrased for the sake of clarity, presented in full asks: 1 “Can a person claiming the right to possession against a person in actual peaceable possession of real property bring an action in circuit court for common law trespass to recover possession of the property, when the Maryland legislature has committed such actions for possession to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the District Court?” Evelyn McEwan, Valley Mill, the Robert McEwan Trust, and Seneca Venture, LLC. Valley Mill leases the property from Seneca Joint Venture.

Valley Mill had been family owned and operated since Robert McEwan started the camp in 1956. Evelyn McEwan, who took over after her father Robert’s retirement, is currently Valley Mill’s president and sole shareholder. Uthus is Evelyn’s son. Uthus began working at the camp in 1995, at the request of his mother and grandfather.

In 1997, Uthus assumed various positions at the camp year-round, eventually serving as camp director and member of Valley Mill’s board of directors. For the next two decades, Valley Mill provided Uthus with a car, an apartment unit on the campgrounds rent free, and health insurance, as part of his employment. In May 2017, after some escalating familial disagreements, Valley Mill removed Uthus from its board of directors and terminated his employment. Additionally, Evelyn requested that Uthus vacate the campgrounds, but he refused.

Thereafter, Valley Mill sued Uthus for trespass2 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on July 17, 2017. In response, Uthus argued that he was entitled to indefinitely reside on the property, based on a past oral promise from his grandfather and his partnership status at Seneca Joint Venture. 2 Valley Mill’s complaint also included claims for tortious interference with economic relationships, defamation, and detinue along with the trespass claim, and sought injunctive relief and damages, as well as eviction. The circuit court granted Uthus’ motion for partial summary judgment on the tortious interference with economic relationships claim and the remaining counts were subsequently dismissed by Valley Mill. 2 After discovery, Valley Mill moved for partial summary judgment. Following a hearing on July 25, 2018, the circuit court found that: [A]t this point there doesn’t appear to be any factual dispute about certain facts, and that is that Valley Mill Camp has a lease on this property, and that at some point Mr. Uthus was employed there at the camp, to help run the camp, and that employment ended in May of 2017.

And he was asked to vacate the premises, and apparently he has not. [U]nder the claim that’s been brought for trespass, Valley Mill has the exclusive right to possess that property, and that they’ve given notice to Mr. Uthus to vacate the property, which he hasn’t, which clearly shows that his presence on the property is without the consent of [Valley Mill]. [Accordingly,] I’ll grant the motion for summary judgment as to the claim of trespass, which is Count 4. The circuit court also awarded nominal damages to Valley Mill and ordered Uthus to vacate the property. On August 10, 2018, Uthus filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the order of the circuit court, alleging that the court both erred in granting summary judgment and lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the trespass claim. The circuit court denied the motion.

Uthus timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on the trespass claim was erroneous for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and alternatively, that no trespass occurred because Uthus was in physical possession. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. First, the Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over the trespass claim because Uthus was a licensee of Valley Mill, not a tenant. According to the Court of Special Appeals, the failure of Uthus to pay rent reflected that Uthus was merely a licensee of Valley Mill. 3 Second, the Court of Special Appeals held that there was a valid trespass claim because the elements of trespass—intentional interference with the possessory interest of another—had been established.

Uthus timely appealed to this Court, and we granted certiorari. STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we first determine whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 24–25, 63 A.3d 582, 589 (2013). If no genuine dispute of material fact exists, we review questions of law under the non-deferential de novo standard of review, that is, whether the circuit court’s conclusions of law were legally correct.

Koste, 431 Md. at 24–25, 63 A.3d 582, 589 (“On review of an order granting summary judgment, our analysis begins with the determination of whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists; only in the absence of such a dispute will we review questions of law.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The parties do not dispute the material facts here. Therefore, under a de novo standard, we review the circuit court’s legal conclusions to determine whether they are legally correct. DISCUSSION The jurisdictional question raised here highlights some of the different options that an owner claiming the right to possession of a property can take against a person in actual possession.

In that regard, we must define the parameters that distinguish a tenant from a licensee. Valley Mill is claiming possession from Uthus, who has remained in actual possession of the apartment on the campgrounds following Valley Mill’s termination of his employment and request to vacate the premises. The legal mechanism advanced by 4 Valley Mill to regain possession was a common law trespass action in the circuit court. Uthus argues that Valley Mill was limited to pursue an action to repossess the apartment in the District Court, and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.

We disagree. The jurisdiction of the circuit courts and District Court is statutorily conferred under Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”). Section 1- 501 states: “The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the State.

Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county . . . except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.” There are specific instances where jurisdiction lies exclusively with the District Court. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-401(4) states: “[T]he District Court has exclusive original civil jurisdiction in . . . [a]n action involving landlord and tenant, distraint, or wrongful detainer, regardless of the amount involved[.]” While the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction in landlord and tenant, distraint, and wrongful detainer actions, “the District Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the ownership of real property or of an interest in real property.” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-402(b).

Thus, if a real property dispute involves “the ownership of real property or of an interest in real property,” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4- 402(b), the District Court does not have jurisdiction. However, if a case presents a “landlord and tenant, distraint, or wrongful detainer” issue, then the District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over that case, “regardless of the amount involved[.]” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-401(4). 5 In the instant case, Uthus argues that the District Court should have exclusive jurisdiction over this action as either a landlord-tenant matter or wrongful detainer action.3 Landlord-Tenant The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is a prerequisite for the District Court to have exclusive jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 4-401(4): “[T]he District Court has exclusive original civil jurisdiction in . . . an action involving landlord and tenant[.]” “It has long been the law in Maryland that, where the relevant facts are undisputed, ‘the question whether the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties . . . [is] a question of law to be determined by the Court upon the consideration of the facts.’” Delauter v. Shafer, 374 Md. 317, 324 , 822 A.2d 423, 427 (2003) (quoting Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. 10, 23 (1864)); see also McDaniel v. Baranowski, 419 Md. 560, 574 , 19 A.3d 927, 935 (2011) (“The legal relationship between landlord and tenant is governed by the contract between the parties as well as any statutory authority.”) (internal citations omitted). 3 The third possibility for the District Court to have exclusive jurisdiction under Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-401(4), distraint, is not at issue here. As this Court has explained, “[t]he landlord remedy of distraint simply refers to an action for distress for rent[.]” Hudson v. Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City, 402 Md. 18 , 29 n.7, 935 A.2d 395 , 401 n.7 (2007); see also State v. Goldberg, 437 Md. 191 , 231 n.3, 85 A.3d 231 , 255 n.3 (2014) (Watts, J., dissenting) (“Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘distrain’ as follows: ‘To force (a person, usu. a tenant), by the seizure and detention of personal property, to perform an obligation (such as paying overdue rent).’ Black’s Law Dictionary 508 (8th ed. 2004).”).

Because Valley Mill is seeking possession of the campgrounds and is not seeking rent from Uthus, distraint would not be an appropriate action for Valley Mill to file and Uthus does not argue that the District Court should have exclusive jurisdiction in this case as a distraint action. 6 The agreement between a landlord and a tenant typically takes the form of a lease, which the Maryland Code, Real Property Article (“Real Prop.”) § 1-101(h), defines as “any oral or written agreement, express or implied, creating a landlord and tenant relationship, including any ‘sublease’ and any further sublease.” Although the record reflects that Uthus and Valley Mill may have had an oral agreement regarding Uthus residing on the campgrounds as part of his employment, the agreement was never reduced to writing. To ascertain whether the oral agreement created a landlord-tenant relationship between Valley Mill and Uthus, we consider “what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the arrangement meant” under an “objective interpretation of the writings and surrounding circumstances.” Delauter, 374 Md. at 324–25, 822 A.2d at 427 (quoting Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425 , 435–36, 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To do so, we examine the defining characteristics of a tenancy: possession, owner recognition, and rental payments. See, e.g., Curtis v. U.S. Bank Nat.

Ass’n, 427 Md. 526, 536 , 50 A.3d 558, 564 (2012) (“Under elementary principles of real property law, a tenant properly on the premises of a property has a right of possession as against a landlord.”); Delauter, 374 Md. at 326 , 822 A.2d at 428 (“Other important factors indicating that the use of premises was under a license and not a lease are whether any facts show that the alleged tenant was recognized as tenant by the owner and whether rent was paid[.]”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); University Plaza v. Garcia, 279 Md. 61, 66 , 367 A.2d 957, 960 (1977) (“[I]n this State rent is . . . payment for the tenant’s use, possession and enjoyment of the land.”); Miller v. State, 174 Md. 362, 368 , 198 A. 710, 714 (1938) (“During the term of the tenancy, unless 7 permitted by the terms of the lease, a landlord has no more right to enter premises possessed by the tenant than a stranger would have.”). A landlord-tenant relationship likely exists when a person resides on the property of a landowner by virtue of an agreement that includes payments of rent and exclusive possession. The resident has the possessory right to exclude the landowner from entering the property without permission of the resident. See, e.g., Curtis, 427 Md. at 536 , 50 A.3d at 564 .

The landowner, by virtue of the agreement, recognizes the resident’s right to reside on the property, and the resident pays the landowner rent for residing on the property. See, e.g., Delauter, 374 Md. at 326 , 822 A.2d at 428 . Thus, when the indicia of a landlord- tenant relationship—exclusive possession, owner recognition, and rental payments—are present, a landlord-tenant relationship may be formed, regardless of whether the parties reduced their agreement to writing. By contrast, a person residing on a property by virtue of an agreement with the landowner which does not contain the indicia of a landlord-tenant relationship, may be considered a licensee of the landowner and not a tenant.

Unlike a tenancy, the licensee is only on the property with “a license[, which] is merely a privilege to do some particular act or series of acts on land without possessing any estate or interest therein.” Supervisor of Assessments of Anne Arundel Cty. v. Hartge Yacht Yard, Inc., 379 Md. 452, 468 , 842 A.2d 732, 741 (2004) (quoting Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 320 , 41 A.2d 66, 68 (1945)). As this Court has long recognized, “a mere license may be revoked at the pleasure of the licensor[.]” Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Potomac Coal Co., 51 Md. 327, 330 (1879) (“[A license] is a power or authority given to a [person] to do some lawful act, and is a personal 8 liberty to the party to whom given . . . [t]he general doctrine is, that a mere license may be revoked at the pleasure of the licensor[.]”). See also Hartge Yacht Yard, Inc., 379 Md. at 468–69, 842 A.2d at 741–42 (citing Hess v. Muir, 65 Md. 586, 600 , 5 A. 540 , 543–44 (1886) (“Holding that the privilege of locating oyster lots on State-owned river bottom has no elements of a grant by patent, but is simply a license, revocable at the pleasure of the Legislature.”) (alterations omitted); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Brack, 175 Md. 615, 622 , 3 A.2d 471, 475 (1939) (“[A] license for the use of land is revocable, both at law and in equity, whether the license is or is not executed by the expenditure of money by the licensee; and that the latter, upon the revocation of the license, can claim compensation for expenditures made by him upon the premises on the faith of the license, as against the original licensor only.”); Rau v. Collins, 167 Md. App. 176, 192 , 891 A.2d 1175, 1184 (2006) (“A license is also revocable at the pleasure of the party making it[.]”). The issue of whether a person residing and working on land was considered a tenant or a licensee, in the absence of a written agreement and the payment of rent, was before this Court in Delauter v. Shafer, 374 Md. 317 , 822 A.2d 423 (2003).

In Delauter, a family member inhabited and helped operate a family-owned farm for decades under a familial agreement but did not pay rent or reduce any part of the agreement to writing. 374 Md. at 320–21, 822 A.2d 423, 425 . This Court explained the distinction between an agreement that creates a tenancy and an agreement that creates a license as follows: “A tenancy involves an interest in the land passed to the tenant and a possession exclusive even of the landlord except as the lease permits his entry, and saving always the landlord’s right to enter to demand rent or to make repairs. A mere permission to use land, dominion over it remaining in the owner and no interest in or exclusive possession of it being given, is but 9 a license. That one who is tenant under a lease has the possession of the land serves to distinguish him from a licensee, that is, a person to whom is given merely permission to use the land for a specified purpose.

Such a person has not the possession of the land, this remaining in the licensor, and he has not, it seems, any interest in the land which he can assert as against a third person, that is, he has no rights in rem. The question whether an instrument is a lease, creating an estate in favor of another and the consequent relation of tenancy, or is merely a license, is one properly of the construction of the language used, as showing an intention to give possession vel non. That this is so has been quite often recognized.” [1 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 79, at 117–18 (3d ed.1939) (footnotes omitted)]. “[I]f the language used purports to give another the right to use the land only for a specific purpose, and there is nothing to show an intention to give the right of possession, a tenancy cannot be regarded as arising.” 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant § 7, at 25 (1910). See also Miller v. State, 174 Md. 362, 368 , 198 A. 710, 714 (1938) (“During the term of the tenancy, unless permitted by the terms of the lease, a landlord has no more right to enter premises possessed by the tenant than a stranger would have”); Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 82 Md. App. 577, 586 , 572 A.2d 1144, 1149 (1990) (“It is an elementary principle of real property law that a tenant has a right of possession of demised premises to the exclusion of the landlord”).

Other important factors indicating that the use of premises was under a license and not a lease are whether any facts “show[ ] that [the alleged tenant] was recognized as tenant by the” owner and whether “rent was paid,” Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. at 25 . See University Plaza v. Garcia, 279 Md. 61, 66 , 367 A.2d 957, 960 (1977) (“[I]n this State rent is ... payment for the tenant's use, possession and enjoyment of the land”); Worthington v. Cooke, 56 Md. 51 (1881). 374 Md. at 325–26, 822 A.2d at 427–28. This Court concluded that the nonexistence of exclusive possession and the absence of any rental payments demonstrated that the agreement was a license and not a lease. 374 Md. at 326 , 822 A.2d at 428 (“[I]t is clear that no lease existed between the [parties]. [The 10 resident] never had exclusive possession of the farm[.] There was never a demand for rent. No writings characterized this family relationship as one of landlord-tenant.”).

Delauter is an example of the appropriate case-by-case analysis employed to determine whether an employment agreement creates a lease or a license. This Court considered whether the resident paid the landowners rent for residing on the property and whether the resident maintained exclusive possession with regards to the landowners. Because neither exclusive possession nor payment of rent were present, this Court held that a landlord-tenant relationship had not been formed. Delauter, 374 Md. at 327 , 822 A.2d at 428 .

We employ the same analysis here, considering the helpful hallmarks of a tenancy—exclusive possession, owner recognition, and rental payments—to determine whether the agreement between Uthus and Valley Mill created a tenancy. For many years, Uthus worked for Valley Mill in various capacities and resided in an apartment on the campgrounds. The parties did not reduce their agreement regarding the occupancy of the apartment to writing. In the absence of a written agreement, we make a reasonable and objective interpretation of the circumstances to determine whether the elements of a landlord-tenant relationship—possession, owner recognition, and rental payments—are met.

Uthus claims actual possession of the apartment based on residing there for many years. However, we fail to see how that residency alone is dispositive of the question before us. Uthus was removed from the board of directors of Valley Mill and remained an employee until the president of Valley Mill, Evelyn McEwan, requested that he vacate the apartment. By refusing to vacate the apartment on the campgrounds against the wishes of 11 the owner, in the absence of some other right to reside there, Uthus cannot claim possession of the apartment in a way that would equate to a tenancy.

Uthus made no rental payments, nor did Valley Mill demand any rental payments from him. Rental payments are a strong indicium of a landlord-tenant relationship, and since rent was not part of the agreement between Uthus and Valley Mill, Uthus was not a tenant of Valley Mill, but an employee who was allowed to reside in the apartment on the campgrounds during the tenure of his employment. Once the employment was terminated and Uthus was asked to vacate the premises, he no longer had the right to occupy the apartment. In sum, considering that Uthus remained in the apartment without an exclusive right to possess the apartment, and failed to make any rental payments, we conclude that Uthus was a licensee of Valley Mill and not a tenant.

Therefore, inasmuch as Uthus was a licensee of Valley Mill and not a tenant, the District Court would not have exclusive jurisdiction over this action under Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 4-401(4) (“[T]he