Verges v. Verges

Moylan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Stephen F. Verges, and the appellee, Evelyn M. Verges, were married on March 14, 1936, in Ellicott City, Maryland. Two children were born as a result of that marriage, both of whom have long since reached adulthood. The appellant was and is a practicing doctor of medicine in the District of Columbia.

Apparently for the psychological benefit of their daughter, the appellant sent the appellee, his then wife, and his daughter to live in Italy in 1957. The wife and daughter remained in Italy until 1962. During that time, the appellant provided for them. Upon the return of the appellee-wife to this country in 1962, she found that her husband was involved romantically with another woman.

The appellant suggested to the appellee that she should live separate and apart from him. She complied. An order was passed by the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia in October of 1962 directing the appellant to pay the appellee $600 per month for her separate support and maintenance. At some time in 1963, the appellant left this country and took up residence for approximately three years in Spain.

The appellee-wife filed for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on June 2, 1965, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The appellant-husband was served by publication. The final divorce decree was filed on February 10, 1966. Upon proper motion and by timely revision, it was amended to reserve jurisdiction in the court upon the question of alimony.

The appellant-husband returned to the United States and Montgomery County in 1966. ⁶¹⁰ On September 2, 1966, the appellee moved that the Circuit Court for Montgomery County fix the amount of alimony. The appellant moved to strike that motion. After a jurisdictional issue was decided adversely to the appellant, a hearing on the question of alimony was held before Judge John P. Moore, of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, on March 1, 1967. Because of the transitional character of the appellant’s occupational status at the time of that hearing, in that he was then considering transferring his practice to New York, Judge Moore ordered that he pay to the appellee $200 per month for a period of 90 days and that the entire matter be reset for an additional hearing at the end of those 90 days.

Through inadvertance or negligence, that rehearing was not set in conformance with Judge Moore’s order. With no formal order directing him, the appellant-husband voluntarily paid and the appellee-wife accepted the sum of $200 per month for her support from March, 1967, until June, 1970. On May 11,1970, the appellee-wife filed a petition for the fixing of permanent alimony. A hearing was set before the Domestic Relations Master and was heard by the Master on October 5, 1970.

The report of the Master was filed with the court on October 21, 1970. The Master’s report recommended that the appellant-husband be required to pay to the appellee-wife alimony in the amount of $400 per month. Pursuant to that recommendation, a final decree was signed by Judge Ralph G. Shure, of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, on October 28, 1970, fixing alimony in the amount of $400 per month. On November 2, 1970, the appellant-husband filed exceptions to the Master’s recommendations and requested a hearing before the court.

On November 6, 1970, Judge Kathryn J. Shook entered an order overruling the appellant’s exceptions on the ground that they had not been timely filed. On November 30, 1970, the appellant filed a Motion to Vacate the Decree awarding alimony, pointing out to the court ⁶¹¹ that the exceptions had, indeed, been timely filed. On January 12, 1971, two separate orders were signed by Judge Shook. The first order, recognizing that the appellant was correct in his contention that his exceptions had been timely filed, granted the appellant’s petition to strike that order and indicated that the court would reconsider the exceptions.

The second order, without benefit of hearing or oral argument, overruled the appellant-husband’s exceptions. On January 14, 1971, Judge Shook signed a final decree fixing alimony in the amount of $400 per month. Upon this appeal, the appellant-husband contends that the alimony award of $400 per month was excessive and he requests that this Court exercise its power to reduce the award to a reasonable amount. A word is in order about the latitude which is appropriately ours in reviewing a decision of the chancellor below on the question of alimony.

As Judge (now Chief Judge) Hammond said for the Court of Appeals in Donigan v. Donigan, 208 Md. 511 , at 521: “The award of alimony generally is a question of judgment on facts not in dispute and it is peculiarly the kind of determination which an appellate court feels freer to make than it does in matters which depend upon credibility, where the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses are important and the determination of disputed facts controls the case. Undoubtedly, this is the reason why this Court sometimes has changed the award of alimony, without expressly saying (as necessarily was implicit in the decision) that the chancellor was clearly wrong.” There is, a fortiori, reason for latitude in this case since we have here the precise situation facing the Court of Appeals in Donigan , whereof Judge Hammond said further, at 521: “In the case before us the chancellor did not see the witnesses and decided the case from the rec ⁶¹² ord, even as do we, without the benefit of oral argument which we have enjoyed, so that his opportunity for a sound exercise of judgment was not as great as ours.” A myriad of factors interplay in determining an appropriate award of alimony. As Chief Judge Murphy said for this Court in Quinn v. Quinn, 11 Md. App. 638 , at 643: “It was held in Waters v. Waters, 191 Md. 436 , that in determining an