Vines v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question on this appeal is whether the Criminal Court of Baltimore erred in denying the motion of Jasper Vines, Jr. to suppress certain statements made by him while in the custody of the police. Vines was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin “in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate under all the circumstances an intent to manufacture and distribute” the drug. He was sentenced to the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction for a period of twenty years. 1 The question was one of those placed before the Court of Special Appeals on direct appeal. 2 That court held that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, and finding no reversible error with respect to the other contentions made by Vines, affirmed the judgment.

Vines v. State, 40 Md. App. 658 , 394 A. 2d 809 (1978) (Moylan, J. concurring; Lowe, J. dissenting). The question was presented to us by Vines’ petition for a writ of certiorari and the State’s cross-petition conditioned upon our grant of Vines’ petition, both of which we granted. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. ³⁷² I The circumstances surrounding the making of the challenged statements were brought out at the hearing on the motion to suppress held out of the presence of the jury. Certain of the circumstances were not disputed.

Vines was arrested in his residence during the execution of a search and seizure warrant. He was taken to police headquarters. In the interview room he was informed of his rights pursuant to the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). He refused to sign the form waiving those rights and invoked the right to remain silent, asserting that “he didn’t want to answer any questions.” No further questions material to the issue before us were thereafter asked him by the police.

He remained in the interview room for about half an hour while Detective William Snipes of the Baltimore City Police Department completed the administrative procedures for booking Vines, including completion of a narcotic addict form. Vines was then taken to the roll call room. Displayed on a table in that room was some of the contraband recovered in the raid. 3 This contraband was included in the inventory of seized property noted on the back of the warrant. On the table were thirteen tinfoil packets of various sizes, some opened and some closed, each of which contained white powder with brown specks.

Vines was given a copy of the warrant containing the inventory. Other evidence relating to the circumstances regarding the making of the statements was conflicting. It is plain, however, that the trial court, as was its right, believed the ³⁷³ version offered by the police. According to them, when Vines invoked his right to remain silent he said that he was “going to get a lawyer, but didn’t want one at that particular time.” 4 When Vines was taken to the roll call room and given a copy of the warrant containing the inventory of the property seized, he was told that this is what was recovered from his house during the raid.

Thereupon he looked at the display on the table for a couple of seconds, sat down on a chair and “made an outburst,” stating that “it was his stuff” and asking “what he could do to help himself out.” 5 These two statements were the subject of the motion to suppress. The police indicated that the immediate reason for taking Vines to the roll call room was “to show him what was taken out of his premises and give him the papers,” that is the warrant with the inventory of the articles seized. The main purpose, however, was to get him to turn State’s evidence, “to obtain his help in getting information relative to who was over top of him.” When Snipes was asked whether another purpose was to have Vines make an incriminating statement, he responded: “I would say it was a thought, but that was not the main purpose.” II At the heart of the question whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the statements is the display of the physical evidence. The viewing by Vines of the evidence in the roll call room leads to the question whether the confrontation (1) constituted an “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda , or (2) rendered the statements involuntary in the traditional sense.

In denying the motion to suppress, the trial judge found that there had not been an “interrogation” in the roll call ³⁷⁴ room and that the statements made by Vines had been voluntarily made. He did not think that Vines was compelled under the atmosphere here to say anything, and he wasn’t asked any questions as far as I am concerned in the roll call room. It may be true that [Vines] didn’t want to talk, he didn’t want to answer any questions other than the addict form [completed by Snipes], and if he didn’t want to talk he didn’t have to say anything. I think he chose voluntarily to say something, maybe on the spur of the moment or maybe he regretted it later, or maybe felt later I should have kept my big mouth shut, but he said it.

I also find that the statement which [Vines] may have made subsequent thereto, what can I do for myself, is also admissible. I don’t think that is a product of the interrogation or statement. The majority opinion of the Court of Special Appeals was in complete accord with the views of the trial judge. It held that “although the inculpatory statements were made in a custodial setting, ... they were not the product of ‘interrogation’ proscribed by the Miranda decision,” and on its “independent review of the record as a whole,” it was convinced that Vines’ constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was in no way violated.” Vines v. State, 40 Md. App. at 661 .

(1) Miranda held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. [ 384 U. S. at 444 .] Thus, in order to be subject to the Miranda warnings, statements must flow from a “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. See State v. Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 36-37 , ³⁷⁵ 375 A. 2d 1105 , cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1002 (1977). “Custodial interrogation,” was said by Miranda to “mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U. S. at 444 . “Because the custody issue has arisen more frequently and has generally been regarded as a more difficult one, a good deal more attention has been paid to what constitutes custodial interrogation than to what constitutes custodial interrogation. ” Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is “Interrogation”? When Does It Matter?, 67 Geo. L.J. 1 , 14 n. 85 (1978) (hereinafter “Kamisar”).

Here, however, the custodial aspect of “custodial interrogation” presents no problem. It is patent that Vines was in custody at the time he made the statements. The point to be resolved is whether, in the circumstances, the viewing of the evidence by Vines was tantamount to an “interrogation” by the police. Miranda does not specifically define “interrogation.” We agree, however, with the refusal of the Court of Special Appeals to interpret, under the circumstances here, “the statement made by the police to [Vines] and [Vines’] viewing of the narcotics as ‘interrogation’ simply because they were followed by an incriminating disclosure from [Vines].” Vines v. State, 40 Md. App. at 660 .

Throughout the opinion of the Court in Miranda , “interrogation” is equated with “questioning.” For example, the meaning of “custodial interrogation” as we have indicated, is in terms of “questioning” initiated by law enforcement officers. 384 U. S. at 444 . The warnings must be given prior to any “questioning.” Id. If the suspect indicates that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no “questioning.” Id. at 444-445 . The privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized when an individual is taken into custody and is subjected to “questioning.” Id. at 478 .

The view that questioning is an integral part of a Miranda “interrogation” is supported by subsequent opinions of the Supreme Court. The Miranda principle was held to be “applicable to questioning which takes place in a prison setting during a suspect’s term of imprisonment on a separate offense, Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1503 (1968) and to questioning taking place in a suspect’s home, ³⁷⁶ after he has been arrested and is no longer free to go where he pleases. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 , 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969).” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 494-495 , 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) (emphasis added). C. McCormick, Evidence 329 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972) states flatly: “A statement obtained without giving the Miranda warnings and according the defendant the prescribed rights is inadmissible only if it is the result of ‘questioning’ or ‘interrogation’... [T]he courts have had little difficulty characterizing police activity as ‘interrogation’ when a statement is responsive to police inquiries which on their face call for an answer.” It may be that certain police conduct, though not verbal, may nevertheless be tantamount to interrogation for purposes of requiring Miranda warnings.

This is suggested in 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 826 a at 383, n. 23 (Chadbourn Rev. ed. 1970). See McCormick at 329-330; Rothblatt and Pitler, Police Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers — Where Do We Go From Here? 42 Notre Dame Law. 479 , 486, n. 42 (1967); Graham, What Is “Custodial Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 59, 107-111 (1967). There seems to be genera] agreement, however, that Miranda does not apply to “administrative questioning,” the routine questions asked of all arrestees who are “booked” or otherwise processed. Kamisar at 7, n. 41 and at 14, n. 85.

See McCormick at 330; Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation? 25 S.C.L.Rev. 699, 704-705 (1974); C. Whitebread, Constitutional Criminal Procedure 178-179 (1978); Graham at 104-106. The short of it is that whether police conduct is tantamount to “interrogation” in the contemplation of Miranda depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Other than with respect to “administrative questioning,” the cases throughout the country have presented a wide variety of fact patterns and judicial attitudes both as to the principle involved and its application. They establish no clear pattern we are persuaded to follow. 6 ³⁷⁷ In the case before us, when Vines invoked his right to remain silent, all questioning proscribed by Miranda ceased.

In the roll call room, shortly thereafter, Vines was given a copy of the search warrant containing the inventory of the property taken. This was in compliance with Maryland Rule 707, now Rule 780. Rule 707 a provided that an officer taking property under a search warrant shall make a written inventory of the property taken in the presence of the person from whom the property is taken if such person is present at the time the warrant was executed. Section b provided that the officer shall leave a copy of the inventory and a copy of the warrant with the person from whom the property ³⁷⁸ was taken, if such person is present at the time the search warrant is executed....

When the officer gave Vines the copy of the warrant containing the inventory, he merely made the true statement that this was what was recovered from Vines’ house during the raid. We find it plain in the circumstances that the giving of the inventory to Vines in compliance with our rules of procedure, coupled with the simple factual statement by the police, was not tantamount to an “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda . The display of some of the property taken does not compel a contrary result on the facts of this case. In oral argument before us, defense counsel agreed that making known to Vines what property had been taken, even had the police read the inventory to him, would not have been an “interrogation.” We fail to see how, in the circumstances, a confrontation with some of the physical evidence listed in the inventory changed the conduct of the police to an “interrogation.” In other words, there was no “interrogation” here to which the Miranda code was applicable. 7 Vines relies on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 , 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977).

That case turned on the constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 405-406 . But even if it be deemed that it was implicit in the holding that the conduct of the police officer in giving what has been called the “Christian burial speech” to the suspect was tantamount to an interrogation, it is readily apparent that Williams is so factually different ³⁷⁹ from the case before us as to provide no support for Vines’ position. (2) A statement is voluntary in the traditional sense when it is “obtained without force applied, coercion used, hope held out or promise made on the part of the authorities....

In other words, a confession or admission is not ‘voluntary’ if it is the product of physical or psychological coercion.” Kidd, 281 Md. at 35-36 . 8 Miranda expressly affirmed that “ ‘[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any