Wagner v. State

GRAEFF, J. After an eight-day trial, a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted John Wagner, appellant, of first degree felony murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and a consecutive sentence of twenty years for the conspiracy conviction. 1 On appeal, appellant presents seven questions for our review, which we have rephrased slightly as follows: 1. Did the trial court err by refusing to ask appellant’s requested voir dire question? 2. Must appellant’s convictions be reversed as a result of the introduction of other crimes evidence? 3.

Did the trial court err in admitting evidence that appellant called out his girlfriend’s name while in custody, and thereafter in refusing to allow appellant to introduce evidence to explain his action? 4. Did the trial court err in restricting appellant’s ability to cross-examine a witness regarding her eligibility for parole? 5. Did the trial court err in admitting hearsay evidence? 6. Did the trial court err in refusing to tailor its flight and concealment of evidence instructions to both sides’ theories of the case? 7.

Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s request to appear without shackles during the announcement of the verdict and polling of the jury? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court. ⁴³² FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On July 25, 2010, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Stephen Pitcairn arrived at Penn Station in Baltimore City. He was returning from a trip to New York, where he celebrated his 24th birthday with his sisters. While Mr. Pitcairn was walking from the station to his apartment, located in the Charles Village section of Baltimore City, he was attacked and robbed by two individuals.

Less than an hour later, at 12:05 a.m. on July 26, 2010, Mr. Pitcairn died due to a stab wound to his chest. When Mr. Pitcairn arrived at the train station at approximately 11:00 p.m., he called his mother, Gwen Pitcairn, to let her know that he was back in Baltimore. He said he was going to walk home from the station, which he estimated to be a 15-20 minute walk. Mr. Pitcairn asked his mother to talk to him on his cell phone until he got home, stating: “I always feel so safe when you’re on the phone with me.” Mr. Pitcairn was telling Ms. Pitcairn about his weekend with his sisters when Ms. Pitcairn heard “a lot of noise and commotion.” She heard Mr. Pitcairn state that he did not have any money, and he said: “Here, take my wallet.” Ms. Pitcairn heard a man say “shut up” twice.

She then heard “something [that] sounded like [Mr. Pitcairn] got punched” and “shuffling” sounds. Someone then disconnected the call from Mr. Pitcairn’s phone. Ms. Pitcairn, who was at her home in Florida, called 411 and was connected to 911 in Baltimore. By the time she spoke with the 911 operator, the Baltimore police already were aware that there had been an incident.

At 2:45 a.m. on July 26, 2010, Ms. Pitcairn learned that Mr. Pitcairn had been killed. Prior to the assault, Reggie Higgins was at his home on St. Paul Street. He heard loud noises outside, looked out of his second-floor window, and saw three people scuffling on the sidewalk in front of his home. Mr. Higgins observed a thin white male who was approximately six feet tall, whom he later ⁴³³ learned was Mr. Pitcairn, backing away from two black individuals, both of whom Mr. Higgins believed were men.

One of the individuals had braided hair or twists, and the other had short hair. Mr. Pitcairn yelled: “[H]elp,” and Mr. Higgins ran down the stairs to his first-floor window to get a better view. He saw the two individuals tussling with Mr. Pitcairn, and he went to get his keys to go outside. When he looked back out the window, he saw Mr. Pitcairn on the ground.

The assailant with short hair was leaning over Mr. Pitcairn, and the other was holding something, which appeared to be a wallet. Mr. Higgins used his keys to open his security door and yelled: “Hey!” By that time, however, the two assailants were gone. Mr. Higgins ran to Mr. Pitcairn, saw that he was badly injured, and ran back inside to call 911. When he returned, he told Mr. Pitcairn that the police and an ambulance were on the way.

Mr. Pitcairn kept struggling to speak, but the only word Mr. Higgins could make out was: “Mom.” Officer Michael Harren, a police officer with the Baltimore City Police Department, responded to Mr. Higgins’ address at 11:25 p.m. He saw Mr. Higgins holding and comforting Mr. Pitcairn. Mr. Pitcairn was alive, but he was not very responsive. Medics arrived at the scene three to four minutes later and rushed Mr. Pitcairn to Johns Hopkins Hospital.

Forty minutes later, Officer Harren learned that Mr. Pitcairn had died at the hospital. Mr. Higgins told the police that Mr. Pitcairn was attacked by two men. He believed that both assailants were men: (1) because he assumed that a woman would not be involved in that kind of activity; and (2) based on their build and stature. Both assailants were shorter than six feet tall and slightly built.

Due to the low light, he was unable to get a close look at their faces, but he could tell that they both had medium complexions. Mr. Higgins observed that the attacker with the short hair was wearing blue jeans and a white or light gray T-shirt. He was not sure about the color of the attacker’s ⁴³⁴ clothing, however, as he is “a little colorblind” and has trouble seeing certain colors. Mr. Higgins believed that the assailants had run south, down St. Paul Street.

Police investigators later obtained video footage from the intersection of Charles Street and 26th Street that showed two people running westbound on 26th Street, between St. Paul and Charles Streets, at 11:22 p.m. At approximately 11:50 p.m., Gregory Boris, the lead detective in the investigation of Mr. Pitcairn’s murder, arrived at Mr. Higgins’ address. The crime scene, which took up a small portion of the sidewalk, consisted of Mr. Pitcairn’s “red and black gym bag, a flip-flop” and a pool of blood. After returning to the Baltimore Police Department Homicide Unit, Detective Boris called Ms. Pitcairn, who advised that her son had offered his iPhone and brown leather wallet to the assailants.

In response to the murder, Officer Kevin Ege was assigned to patrol the area. At 2:54 a.m. on July 26, 2010, as Officer Ege was driving north on Charles Street approaching 25th Street, he saw two individuals talking animatedly and gesturing abruptly. As he got closer, one of the two, Tyrene Williams, flagged him down. The person with Ms. Williams, a black male wearing dark-colored shorts and a white t-shirt, ran away as Officer Ege approached. 2 Ms. Williams pointed to the man and said: “[Y]ou’re looking for him for the robbery at the gas station tonight.” Officer Ege believed that Ms. Williams’ comment was related to Mr. Pitcairn’s robbery and murder.

He detained Ms. Williams and tried to follow the man who had been with her, but he was unable to locate the man. Officer Ege took Ms. Williams to the Homicide Unit; she arrived at the police station at 3:04 a.m. At 4:00 a.m., Detective Boris was notified that Officer Ege had located a possible witness to Mr. Pitcairn’s murder. He ⁴³⁵ interviewed Ms. Williams, who gave a taped statement to the police at 4:27 a.m., stating that appellant robbed a white man, hurt him, and took his credit card.

Ms. Williams advised that she had gone to a gas station as part of a scheme to use Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card to buy gas for people in exchange for money. Based on information from Ms. Williams, the police obtained a search and seizure warrant for the second floor apartment at 2607 Maryland Avenue, where Ms. Williams lived with a number of other individuals, including appellant. At 5:52 a.m., before the search warrant was executed, a police officer located Kevin Cosby. He was walking on the 2400 block of Charles Street, and the officer flashed his lights and told Mr. Cosby to stop.

In response to the officer’s question regarding a murder, Mr. Cosby told him that he did not know anything about anyone getting killed. The officer took Mr. Cosby to the Homicide Unit, where he was immediately placed in a holding cell. Mr. Cosby was wearing a white tank top, checkered shorts, white tennis shoes with green stripes, and a white baseball cap. Detective Boris interviewed Mr. Cosby at the police station.

After receiving his Miranda 3 rights, Mr. Cosby agreed to speak with the police about his actions the night of July 25, 2010. Mr. Cosby stated that appellant advised that he “beat a man to death,” and Mr. Cosby then used the victim’s credit card to get money. Mr. Cosby told Detective Boris the location of Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card, he went with Detective Boris to a location several blocks from appellant’s apartment, and he pointed out where the credit card was concealed. Detective Boris found the card hidden in a wall, wrapped in a Powerball ticket.

At 7:10 a.m., a SWAT team executed the search warrant for appellant’s apartment. Detective Boris arrived at the residence after all the individuals present had been secured in the kitchen. These individuals, including appellant, appellant’s ⁴³⁶ girlfriend Lavelva Merritt, Howard Michael Martin, Earlene Thomas, Tameka Quashie, Rodney Brown, as well as Rodney Brown’s infant son, were then transported from the residence to the Homicide Unit. When Detective Boris arrived at the residence, he noticed what appeared to be blood smudges on the door.

After the arrival of the crime lab, Detective Boris began searching the apartment for evidence related to the murder. In the front bedroom, Detective Boris noticed a LeBron James jersey that was draped over the back of a chair. The jersey appeared to be damp and cool, indicating that it could have been washed recently. Underneath the jersey was a pair of blue jean shorts, which Detective Boris placed on top of the jersey. 4 Detective Boris also observed under the chair a pair of white tennis shoes, which appeared to have been worn recently and had possible blood stains.

He recovered a cell phone from inside one of the shoes. On a shelf in the bedroom, in plain view, Detective Boris saw the card insert portion of a brown leather Coach wallet, which Ms. Pitcairn later identified as a portion of Mr. Pitcairn’s wallet. He asked the crime scene technician to photograph and recover the wallet insert. In addition to the other clothing items, the police also recovered a white hat that appeared to have blood on the brim, along with a second pair of white tennis shoes inside of a milk crate on the floor of the room.

Detective Boris discovered a black folding knife inside the left shoe, and Mr. Pitcairn’s iPhone in the right shoe. Under a bed in the room, he found three other knives, two sharpened screwdrivers, a brown or maroon wallet, and several cell phones. ⁴³⁷ On July 27, 2010, appellant was charged with first degree murder, second degree murder, armed robbery, robbery, first degree assault, second degree assault, theft, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Five of the residents of 2607 Maryland Avenue testified at appellant’s trial as witnesses for the State, including Ms. Merritt, who was charged with the same crimes as appellant for her role in Mr. Pitcairn’s death. Ms. Merritt testified that, prior to July 25, 2010, she had been living at 2607 Maryland Avenue with appellant, her boyfriend; her mother, Ms. Thomas; her mother’s boyfriend, Mr. Martin; her cousin, Mr. Cosby; and Ms. Williams, for a few weeks. 5 She and appellant, whom she also called “Ya-Ya,” had been dating for two years and they had a good relationship.

At that time, she was using “a lot of drugs,” including heroin and cocaine. On July 25, 2010, Ms. Merritt was at home during the day; she had not used any drugs. That evening, Ms. Merritt and appellant left the apartment because appellant said he “wanted some money.” Ms. Merritt understood appellant to mean that he “wanted to rob somebody.” She agreed to go with him to find someone to rob, and they left, without having any particular destination. Ms. Merritt did not bring a weapon with her, but appellant brought a “pocket knife.” Ms. Merritt described appellant’s clothing that day as khaki shorts, white Nike Airs, and a LeBron James jersey.

She wore pink stretch pants, a grey shirt, and flip flops. A couple hours later, they saw Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby. Ms. Merritt, appellant, and Mr. Cosby talked about robbing people, and Ms. Williams listened. Mr. Cosby told the group that he previously had “robbed a white lady” and “had no problem with robbing anybody.” They discussed profiling victims based on whether or not they looked like they had any ⁴³⁸ money, and at the end of the conversation, the two couples went their separate ways, with no plans to meet up again.

Ms. Merritt and appellant went to a bar on St. Paul Street, near the train station, waiting for a victim. They noticed Mr. Pitcairn as he was leaving the train station. Appellant and Ms. Merritt looked at each other to signal that “he was our victim.” They followed Mr. Pitcairn up the street, and when he reached a part of the street where Ms. Merritt and appellant thought no one would see them, Ms. Merritt and appellant grabbed him from behind. Mr. Pitcairn told them he did not have any money; he tried to back away as appellant held him with one hand and pulled the knife out with the other.

Appellant attempted to close the knife while keeping his grip on Mr. Pitcairn, and as he swung Mr. Pitcairn around to get a better grip, he stabbed him with the knife. Mr. Pitcairn fell to the ground and said: “[T]ake my wallet, I don’t have [any] money.” Once Mr. Pitcairn was on the ground, appellant took his wallet, and Ms. Merritt punched him in the head and took his phone. Ms. Merritt heard a female voice on the phone saying “hello, hello, hello,” and then hanging up. Mr. Pitcairn’s phone subsequently rang and displayed the name “dad,” at which point Ms. Merritt turned the phone off.

After taking Mr. Pitcairn’s wallet and phone, appellant and Ms. Merritt ran back to their apartment. Ms. Merritt did not realize that appellant had stabbed Mr. Pitcairn until she saw “a bunch of blood” on appellant’s hands. Appellant told Ms. Merritt that he thought he hurt Mr. Pitcairn “really bad,” and he had “never seen this much blood in my life.” When they got to the apartment, appellant opened the front door, and they headed straight to the bathroom to take off appellant’s jersey, shorts, and shoes, and to wash the knife. Ms. Merritt washed Mr. Pitcairn’s blood off the knife, and appellant washed his jersey and shoes.

Ms. Merritt and appellant also washed their hands. Appellant took off his khaki shorts and put them in a plastic bag, along with Mr. Pitcairn’s wallet, and ⁴³⁹ tied the bag. Ms. Merritt told appellant to get rid of the jersey, but instead, he placed it on top of a chair in their room. After cleaning up, Ms. Merritt and appellant went to the front bedroom.

Appellant was upset over what happened with Mr. Pitcairn, and he began crying, stating: “[A]ll that over a phone, I didn’t mean to do it” and “I think I stabbed him twice ... that was a lot of blood.” Ms. Merritt told appellant not to worry about it, that “he’s going to make it.” After Ms. Merritt and appellant talked about what had happened, they “got down to business” to try to figure out how they could get money. Ms. Merritt stated that she was “going to sell his phone tomorrow.” Appellant suggested that they use Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card to get money, but he stated that he did not know how to use a credit card to get cash. While appellant and Ms. Merritt were talking in the bedroom, Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby arrived. Appellant asked Ms. Merritt if she wanted to ask Mr. Cosby how to get cash from the credit card, but Ms. Merritt stated: “I don’t trust [Mr. Cosby] like that.” Appellant told them that “we just hurt this white boy pretty bad.” He did not give them specifics as to what happened, just that they had hurt Mr. Pitcairn.

He explained that they had taken Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card, but he did not know what to do with it. Ms. Williams then suggested they use it to sell gas. Ms. Merritt and appellant told Mr. Cosby and Ms. Williams that they could not go outside for fear of the police. Mr. Cosby and Ms. Williams then offered to use Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card to sell gas, on the condition that Mr. Cosby and appellant would split whatever money they made.

As they were leaving the house, Mr. Cosby took the bag containing appellant’s shorts and Mr. Pitcairn’s wallet and put it in a dumpster. Mr. Cosby and Ms. Williams returned to the house shortly thereafter; they were unable to use Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card without having his zip code. Mr. Cosby got Mr. Pitcairn’s wallet from the dumpster, obtained his Florida ID, and then appellant wrote Mr. Pitcairn’s zip code on a lottery ticket and gave it to Mr. Cosby. Appellant removed the insert portion of appellant’s wallet, which contained cards and ⁴⁴⁰ photos, put the rest of the wallet back in the plastic bag, and Mr. Cosby threw the bag back in the dumpster.

Mr. Cosby returned later with money and “ready,” which Ms. Merritt testified was a form of crack cocaine. Appellant and Mr. Cosby smoked the crack in the bathroom and split the money between them. Mr. Cosby then woke Ms. Williams, who was sleeping on the floor, to go with him to the gas station. After Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby left, appellant began crying again.

Ms. Merritt tried to console him, telling him that Mr. Pitcairn would be alright. Appellant and Ms. Merritt fell asleep, and they woke up to the sound of the police coming into the apartment. Appellant put Mr. Pitcairn’s phone and the knife in a pair of shoes in a crate. At trial, Ms. Merritt used a laser pointer to identify herself and appellant from the video footage taken of two people running on 26th and Charles Streets.

She described appellant’s clothing in the video, including the LeBron James jersey, khaki shorts, white tennis shoes, and a white hat. From the footage, it appeared that Ms. Merritt had something in her hands, which she testified were her flip-flops and Mr. Pitcairn’s phone. Ms. Merritt identified the knife police found in the white shoe as the knife that appellant used to stab Mr. Pitcairn. She and appellant shared the white tennis shoes that were worn by appellant the night of the murder, which the police found underneath a chair in the room.

Ms. Merritt acknowledged that the facts she gave in her testimony were different from those she gave when she first spoke to the police. The initial version of events that she gave to the police, in a taped statement, was that, on July 25, 2010, she and appellant were at home all day, and that her cousin, Mr. Cosby, had come to the apartment -with a credit card around 11:00 p.m. She gave the statement to protect appellant because she “didn’t want him to go to jail.” After giving her initial statement, she went back to her cell. Later that day, she decided she wanted to speak to the detectives again because she “wanted the truth to get out,” because “what happened to Mr. [Pitcairn] was wrong and it ⁴⁴¹ shouldn’t never happened.” Ms. Merritt was led back to an interview room, passing appellant’s cell on the way, and she began giving the police different information regarding her involvement.

While in the interview room, she heard appellant shouting her name several times. After hearing appellant, she “felt that [she] was doing him wrong, so I told the police that I didn’t want to cooperate.” At that point, she ended the interview. On September 13, 2010, after Ms. Merritt had been charged with murder and other offenses, she met with police detectives and an Assistant State’s Attorney to discuss a proffer agreement. Ms. Merritt understood the terms of the agreement to be that nothing she said that day would be used against her in court unless she were to testify in her own defense.

Ms. Merritt decided to tell the police what happened on July 25, 2010, because she “felt bad for the family,” and Mr. Pitcairn’s murder “wasn’t even supposed to go down like that and it should have never happened.” She initially lied about what happened to protect appellant, not herself, explaining: “[I]f I really wanted to protect myself then I would still not say nothing whatsoever.” On May 11, 2011, Ms. Merritt entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which she would be given a 15-year sentence, the State would dismiss the murder charges and conspiracy to commit murder charges, and she would testify against appellant. Ms. Merritt acknowledged that she “could still be prosecuted for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder if the State [was] not satisfied with [her] testimony.” Ms. Merritt, who had two prior convictions for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute was aware that, on April 18, 2011, her thumb print was found on Mr. Pitcairn’s iPhone. Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby both testified for the State regarding the events leading up to and following Mr. Pitcairn’s murder. 6 Ms. Williams had lived at 2607 Maryland Avenue ⁴⁴² for three months prior to July 25, 2010. She described the sleeping arrangements in the bedroom she shared, as follows: Ms. Thomas and Mr. Martin slept on the one bed in the room; appellant, whom Ms. Williams knew only as “Ya-Ya,” and Ms. Merritt slept on a mattress on the floor; and Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby slept on blankets on the floor.

The back room of the apartment was occupied by a young woman, her boyfriend, and their baby. On July 25, 2010, Ms. Williams, who described herself as a “moderate drug user,” used cocaine and heroin throughout the day, stating that her drug use went “from the moment I woke up until like twelve o’clock that night.” Mr. Cosby, who described himself as a “light drug user,” testified that he used heroin and cocaine with Ms. Williams throughout the day. Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby left the apartment around 9:00 a.m. and walked to Charles Street, and they remained out of the apartment all day. At 11:00 p.m. on July 25, 2010, Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby were sitting on a bench at a bus stop at Charles Street and 25th Street.

Appellant and Ms. Merritt joined them and began talking. Ms. Williams testified that appellant said that he was looking for someone to rob, and while he and Ms. Merritt discussed robbing someone, she and Mr. Cosby just listened. Mr. Cosby testified that he did not participate in the conversation about robbing people because he did not want to “go[ ] to no jail for no stupid stuff.” At the end of the conversation, appellant and Ms. Merritt walked away and turned right on 25th Street toward St. Paul Street, and Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby walked up Charles Street back toward their apartment on Maryland Avenue. On the way home, Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby ran into a friend, with whom they used drugs.

They then returned to the house and noticed police cars around the area of Charles ⁴⁴³ Street and Maryland Avenue, as well as a police helicopter flying overhead. When Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby arrived at the apartment, appellant and Ms. Merritt were in their bedroom, along with Ms. Thomas and Mr. Martin, who were sleeping. Mr. Cosby testified that appellant and Ms. Merritt were “breathing all hard,” and when he asked why they were out of breath, appellant told him that he “just beat this little white guy up so bad, I feel bad about what I did to him.” Ms. Williams testified that appellant told her that “he had robbed this guy at the gas station ... he hurt him real bad.” Ms. Merritt and appellant then asked Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby how to use a credit card to get cash. Appellant showed Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card, wallet, Florida driver’s license, and iPhone.

Appellant came up with the idea to use the credit card at a gas station to buy people gas in exchange for cash, but he and Ms. Merritt did not want to go outside because the police were out, and appellant knew he had seriously hurt Mr. Pitcairn. Mr. Cosby volunteered to go instead. Ms. Williams accompanied Mr. Cosby to the gas station, explaining that she was “fading” and wanted more drugs. They unsuccessfully attempted to use the card at one gas station, after which Ms. Williams returned to the house because she “didn’t feel right.” Mr. Cosby went to another gas station and then returned to the house twenty minutes later after he was unable to use the credit card without Mr. Pitcairn’s zip code.

Appellant then wrote Mr. Pitcairn’s zip code down and gave it to Mr. Cosby. Mr. Cosby testified that appellant instructed him to throw away Mr. Pitcairn’s wallet, and he put the wallet in a dumpster. Mr. Cosby did not recall a pair of bloody shorts being in the bag. When Mr. Cosby returned to the gas station, he used the card to buy gas in exchange for cash, and he then used some of the money to buy crack cocaine.

He returned an hour later with the money and crack, which he split with appellant. Ms. ⁴⁴⁴ Williams and appellant then got into an argument. They left the apartment and continued arguing until they reached Charles Street and 25th Street. At that point, Ms. Williams saw a police officer, and she flagged him down for the purpose of telling the officer that Mr. Cosby had a stolen credit card.

Mr. Cosby, who had drugs and Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card on him, ran. Ms. Williams then told the officer: “[TJhere he goes ... he’s the one that did the robbery at the gas station.” She made that statement to indicate that Mr. Cosby had the stolen credit card; she did not want him to have it. 7 Mr. Cosby ran to a friend’s house on Charles Street and “stayed in there until it got late.” He was sitting on the front steps when he saw a police car coming up the street. Mr. Cosby got up and started walking down the street, with the officer following him. The officer flashed his lights at Mr. Cosby and told him to stop.

At that point, Mr. Cosby had hidden Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card, and he did not have any drugs on him. Mr. Cosby stopped, gave the officer his name, and the officer said that the police were looking for him. The officer asked Mr. Cosby about a murder, and Mr. Cosby said he did not know anything about anyone getting killed. The officer then took Mr. Cosby to the police station.

Ms. Williams’ description of appellant’s clothes that evening matched that given by Ms. Merritt, i.e., a LeBron James jersey, khaki-colored pants, a white hat, and white tennis shoes. She identified the white tennis shoes that contained a ⁴⁴⁵ knife and Mr. Pitcairn’s iPhone as appellant’s shoes, and she described the knife as “the knife that Ya-Ya carries.” Ms. Williams had seen appellant with the knife the night of the murder. Mr. Cosby testified that the white shoes under the chair in the room, as well as the LeBron James jersey, were appellant’s. Mr. Cosby testified that he kept his clothes in a little black bag in the room, and that the only shoes he owned were the white and green shoes that he was wearing on July 25 and 26, 2010.

Both Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby acknowledged that they had prior convictions, Ms. Williams for robbery and theft, and Mr. Cosby for first-degree burglary, robbery, attempted distribution of cocaine, rogue and vagabond and theft. Ms. Thomas testified that she owned the apartment at 2607 Maryland Avenue where she lived with appellant, Ms. Merritt, Ms. Williams, Mr. Cosby, and Mr. Martin. Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby stayed at the apartment occasionally and kept “a couple plastic bags of clothes” in the room. On July 25, 2010, Ms. Thomas went to bed between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m.

At that time, appellant, Ms. Merritt, Mr. Martin, and the family that lived in the back bedroom of the house were at home. Mr. Martin was lying in bed next to Ms. Thomas watching television, and appellant and Ms. Merritt were on their mattress on the floor, also watching television. Ms. Thomas subsequently woke up between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m. She went into the kitchen and observed Mr. Cosby and Ms. Williams arguing; they then left the apartment.

Ms. Thomas went back to sleep in the bedroom with Mr. Martin; Ms. Merritt and appellant also were in the bedroom. She woke up at approximately 7:30 or 8:00 a.m.; the police were entering the apartment. Ms. Thomas went to the police station, where she gave a taped statement, which was consistent with her testimony. Ms. Thomas identified the jersey and shoes recovered from the apartment as belonging to appellant.

She testified that she kept a butcher knife, several other knives, a box cutter, and a screwdriver under her mattress. Ms. Thomas had ⁴⁴⁶ never seen appellant with a knife, but she knew that her daughter, Ms. Merritt, carried a small pocket knife. Ms. Thomas acknowledged that she had prior convictions for second-degree burglary and possession with intent to distribute narcotics. Mr. Martin testified that, on the day of the murder, he spent the day watching movies and drinking.

Appellant and Ms. Merritt were at the apartment during the day; they left at approximately 11:00 p.m. and returned approximately an hour later. When appellant and Ms. Merritt left the apartment, Mr. Martin was watching movies, while Ms. Thomas was sleeping beside him. When Mr. Martin went to sleep at approximately 4:00 a.m., appellant and Ms. Merritt were on the floor sleeping. Mr. Martin identified the jersey found by police in the apartment as appellant’s, along with the pair of white tennis shoes found under the chair in the front bedroom.

He testified that the white tennis shoes found in the crate in the bedroom also belonged to appellant. Detective Boris testified that Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card records confirmed that his Citibank card was used on July 26, 2010, at 1:48 a.m. to make a $56.96 purchase at an ExxonMobile gas station, and then again at 2:07 a.m. to make a $43.64 purchase at the Greenmount BP Amoco station. Detective Boris obtained video footage from both gas station parking lots, which depicted a man, who Detective Boris identified as Mr. Cosby, purchasing gas. The State presented numerous witnesses to explain the forensic evidence that was recovered during the investigation of Mr. Pitcairn’s robbery and murder.

The blood smudges observed by Detective Boris on the front door of 2607 Maryland Avenue yielded a DNA profile consistent with Mr. Pitcairn and the DNA of an unknown individual. Swabs taken from the neckline and sleeve cuffs of the jersey identified as appellant’s, contained a DNA profile consistent with appellant, Ms. Merritt, and at least one unknown individual. Mr. Pitcairn, Ms. Thomas, Mr. Martin, and Ms. Williams could not be excluded as potential contributors to the DNA profile. ⁴⁴⁷ The suspected blood stain on the left shoe that police found under the chair yielded a DNA profile consistent with a mixture of Mr. Pitcairn’s DNA and the DNA of another individual. Appellant and Ms. Merritt were identified as possible contributors to the DNA profile that was mixed with Mr. Pitcairn’s.

The chances of selecting an unrelated individual as a possible contributor to that sample was one in 118,000 for African American individuals. Swabs taken from the interior of the shoe under the chair contained a DNA profile consistent with a mixture of appellant’s, Ms. Merritt’s, and at least two unknown individuals’ DNA. Swabs from the right shoe contained a DNA profile consistent with a mixture of appellant’s, Ms. Merritt’s, and at least one unknown individual’s DNA. A blood stain on the inside of the handle of the folding knife found inside one of the white shoes contained a DNA profile that was consistent with that of Mr. Pitcairn and an unknown individual.

Numerous pieces of evidence obtained from 2607 Maryland Avenue were tested for the presence of fingerprints. The only latent print that was found was on Mr. Pitcairn’s iPhone, and fingerprint analysis revealed that the print matched Ms. Merritt’s left thumb. Dr. Russell Alexander, an Assistant Medical Examiner in the Office of Chief Medical Examiner in Baltimore, determined that Mr. Pitcairn’s death was a homicide, and the cause of death was a two-inch deep stab wound to Mr. Pitcairn’s chest, which injured the left ventricle, or the main pumping chamber, of his heart. He explained that a stab wound to the heart is characterized by “very rapid and very severe [ ] bleeding,” both internally and externally.

Dr. Alexander also observed scrapes on Mr. Pitcairn’s lips as well as his left hand, knees, legs, and feet, but he was unable to determine whether the stab wound or the other injuries occurred first. Dr. Alexander agreed that abrasions could be a sign that a physical struggle occurred, but he opined that Mr. Pitcairn’s injuries could have been caused by “terminal collapse,” when an injured person falls to the ground as part of the dying process. ⁴⁴⁸ As indicated, the jury convicted appellant of first degree felony murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. Yoir Dire Question During voir dire, the court addressed the potential jurors about the nature of the charges and then asked the following three-part question: First, has any member of the jury panel ever been the victim of a violent crime?

Second, has any member of the jury panel ever been convicted of a crime? And, third, does any member of the jury panel have a pending criminal charge? The prosecutor asked that the court to broaden the question to include “any member of [the jurors’] immediate family.” Defense counsel agreed, asking the court to further broaden the scope of the inquiry to include jurors’ close friends. The court noted that, in previous trials, where a potential juror was “affected by a family member being a victim of a crime, they responded].” It asked defense counsel whether the question he was proposing was “a mandatory voir dire question,” and defense counsel responded that the question was not mandatory “in and of itself.” The court denied the request.

Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in refusing to broaden the voir dire question regarding whether a panel member had been a victim of a violent crime to include family members and close friends. He argues that the voir dire question asked by the court, without the additional inquiry regarding family and friends, “was insufficient to root out prejudice” and was not adequately covered by other questions. He asserts that, given the facts of this case, “where the State presented evidence that the victim’s mother was on the phone with the victim while he was being attacked,” “a juror whose ⁴⁴⁹ family member or close friend had been victimized would be less able to set aside the emotional response in favor of an impartial assessment of the evidence.” The State argues that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in declining to ask appellant’s requested voir dire question, asserting that the question was “not reasonably likely to reveal a challenge for cause” and was “fairly covered by other questions posed by the court.” 8 Specifically, it contends that, “whether the panel members, themselves, had ever been the victim of a violent crime was not a required area of inquiry in the first instance, and it was not incumbent upon the court to extend the inquiry to include friends and family.” It further contends that, even if a prospective juror was biased based on his or her experience with a family member or friend who was a victim of a crime, that person would have strong feelings about the offense charged and would have responded to other voir dire questions asked by the court. In Maryland, “ ‘the sole purpose of voir dire is to ensure a fair and impartial jury by determining the existence of cause for disqualification.’ ” Washington v. State, 425 Md. 306, 312 , 40 A.3d 1017 (2012) (quoting Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146, 158 , 923 A.2d 44 (2007)).

The voir dire process “entails examination of prospective jurors through questions propounded by the judge (or either of the parties, if allowed by the judge) to determine the existence of bias or prejudice, and literally translated, means ‘to say the truth.’ ” Charles and Drake v. State, 414 Md. 726, 733 , 997 A.2d 154 (2010). We review a trial court’s refusal to propound a requested voir dire question under the abuse of discretion standard. ⁴⁵⁰ State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 43-44 , 12 A.3d 671 (2011). We afford the trial court “broad discretion in running voir dire, ” id. at 44 , 12 A.3d 671 because “[t]he trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and observe the prospective jurors, to assess their demeanor, and to make factual findings.” Washington, 425 Md. at 314 , 40 A.3d 1017 . The judge’s conclusions are “entitled to substantial deference, unless they are the product of a voir dire that ‘is cursory, rushed, and unduly limited.’ ” Id.

(quoting White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 241 , 821 A.2d 459 (2003)). That discretion, however, “is circumscribed by the defendant’s ‘right to have questions propounded to prospective jurors on their voir dire, which are directed to a specific cause for disqualification.’ ” Shim, 418 Md. at 44-45 , 12 A.3d 671 (quoting Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 644-46 , 989 A.2d 1150 (2010)). The Court of Appeals has explained that specific causes for disqualification involve biases “directly related to (1) the defendant, (2) the witnesses, or (3) the crime.” Shim, 418 Md. at 45 , 12 A.3d 671 . Thus, it is mandatory for the court to inquire into the following areas: bias based on race, ethnicity, or cultural heritage; bias against defense witnesses; religious bias; an unwillingness to convict in capital cases; a juror’s strong feelings toward the crime charged; and placement of undue weight on police officer credibility.

Washington, 425 Md. at 315 , 40 A.3d 1017 ; Shim, 418 Md. at 45-46 , 12 A.3d 671 ; Curtin v. State, 393 Md. 593 , 609-10 n. 8, 903 A.2d 922 (2006). Appellant concedes that “an affirmative answer to the question of whether a family member or close friend was the victim of a violent crime would not have provided cause for disqualification by itself.” Maryland case law supports that concession. In Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 217-18 , 686 A.2d 274 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1146 , 117 S.Ct. 1318 , 137 L.Ed.2d 480 (1997), the circuit court asked the venire: “ ‘Has any member of the prospective jury panel or a member of your family or a close personal friend of yours ever had a prior experience as a ⁴⁵¹ juror, witness, victim or defendant in any criminal homicide or aggravated assault proceeding?’ ” On appeal, Perry argued that the court committed reversible error in declining to broaden the question to substitute “any crime of violence” for “aggravated assault.” Id. at 218, 686 A.2d 274 . The Court rejected that argument, stating: A juror’s having had prior experience as a juror, witness, victim or defendant in a criminal proceeding of any kind, or in one involving a crime of violence, is not per se disqualifying.

It is even less tenable to argue that a juror is disqualified simply because of the experience of a member of the prospective juror’s family or on the part of a close personal friend. Id. Accord Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 37 , 633 A.2d 867 (1993) (“Short of those instances where there is a demonstrably strong correlation between the status in question and a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification, mere status or acquaintance is insufficient to establish cause for disqualification of a prospective juror.”); Yopps v. State, 234 Md. 216, 221 , 198 A.2d 264 , cert. denied, 379 U.S. 922 , 85 S.Ct. 279 , 13 L.Ed.2d 336 (1964) (court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask whether any jurors or family members had been the victim of burglary because it did not relate to a cause of disqualification); Phenious v. State, 11 Md.App. 385, 388 , 274 A.2d 658 (“an inquiry concerning whether or not a prospective juror has been the victim or a witness to a crime similar to the one charged in the indictment is not a proper question on voir dire since it does not provide a basis for challenge for cause”), cert. denied, 262 Md. 748 (1971). Appellant notes that, in Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 17 , 759 A.2d 819 (2000), the Court of Appeals acknowledged “the relevance of the experiences and associations to the venire persons’ qualification to serve on the jury.” Dingle did not, however, overrule the above cited cases, and as appellant has acknowledged, the Court of Appeals, in subsequently listing the mandatory areas of inquiry, has not listed an inquiry regarding whether a juror, or family or friends, has been a victim of a crime.

Given the existing precedent, we cannot ⁴⁵² conclude here that, after exercising its discretion to ask potential jurors if they had been victims of violent crimes, the court abused its discretion in declining to broaden the question to include family members or close friends. 9 Even if the Court of Appeals subsequently overrules its prior precedent, we note that, in this case, the trial judge determined, based on his experience, that other questions asked of the panel would elicit any bias related to the victimization of family members or friends. The record supports this determination; multiple panel members responded to the question asking if any member of the panel held “strong feelings regarding robberies or homicides,” including panel members whose “strong feelings” were based upon the experience óf victimized family and friends. Accordingly, where the question appellant requested was not a mandatory question, and where other questions “ ‘created a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present,’ ” Washington, 425 Md. at 313-14 , 40 A.3d 1017 (quoting White, 374 Md. at 242 , 821 A.2d 459 ), we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire in this case.

II

Other Crimes Evidence Appellant next contends that his convictions should be reversed because other crimes evidence was improperly admitted on four occasions. Specifically, appellant argues that the court erred in: (1) admitting photo arrays containing his mug shot; (2) permitting Ms. Merritt to suggest that she knew he had committed other robberies; (3) admitting evidence that he used crack cocaine; and (4) denying his motion for a mistrial after Mr. Cosby testified that appellant had been “locked up” ⁴⁵³ in the past. The State argues, as set forth below, that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion with respect to each of the four rulings challenged by appellant. A. Photo Array Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photo arrays from which Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby identified him as the person who told them that he had robbed and hurt someone.

He acknowledges that “the identity of Mr. Pitcairn’s assailant was in dispute,” but he asserts that “the ability of Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby to identify [appellant] was not,” and therefore, the photo arrays “added nothing of probative value to the State’s case.” Moreover, he argues, because the photo arrays “obviously contained mug shots,” suggesting that he had committed other crimes, the prejudice in admitting the photo arrays outweighed any probative value. The State argues that the court properly admitted the photo arrays. It asserts that they were relevant, and, contrary to appellant’s contention, appellant’s photo was not obviously a mug shot. Evidence is relevant if it has “ ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’ ” State v. Simms, 420 Md. 705, 725 , 25 A.3d 144 (2011) (quoting Md. Rule 5-401). “Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Md. Rule 5-402.

In reviewing a trial court’s determination that evidence is relevant and admissible, we apply the “de novo” standard of review to the court’s “conclusion of law that the evidence at issue is or is not ‘of consequence to the determination of the action.’ ” Simms, 420 Md. at 725 , 25 A.3d 144 (quoting Parker v. State, 408 Md. 428, 437 , 970 A.2d 320 (2009)). Even if legally relevant, however, “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the ⁴⁵⁴ danger of unfair prejudice.” Maryland Rule 5-403. The weighing determination is left to the trial court’s discretion and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Simms, 420 Md. at 725 , 25 A.3d 144 .

Accord Cousar v. State, 198 Md.App. 486, 517 , 18 A.3d 130 (2011) (the “ ‘final balancing between probative value and unfair prejudice is something entrusted to the wide discretion of the trial judge’ ”) (quoting Oesby v. State, 142 Md.App. 144, 167 , 788 A.2d 662 (2002)). The Court of Appeals has explained that “ ‘a ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling.’ ” King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697 , 967 A.2d 790 (2009) (quoting North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 14 , 648 A.2d 1025 (1994)). Rather, the “ ‘decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’ ” Id. (quoting North, 102 Md.App. at 14 , 648 A.2d 1025 ).

Accord Oesby, 142 Md.App. at 167-68 , 788 A.2d 662 (“Reversal should be reserved for those rare and bizarre exercises of discretion that are, in the judgment of the appellate court, not only wrong but flagrantly and outrageously so.”). Thus, the first step in our analysis is whether the ability of Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby to identify appellant in the photo arrays was relevant. The record reflects that Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby had known appellant only for a few months before Mr. Pitcairn’s murder, they spoke with him only in passing, and they knew him only as “Ya-Ya.” Further, in light of Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby’s testimony that they had been using drugs the day and night of the murder, including during the time when they interacted with and observed appellant, their ability to accurately identify him was at issue. Accordingly, the fact that Ms. Williams and Mr. Cosby independently selected appellant’s photo as that of “Ya-Ya” was relevant to show that they were able to accurately identify appellant.

Moreover, we disagree with appellant regarding the potential prejudice of the photo. To be sure, in Arca v. State, 71 ⁴⁵⁵ Md.App. 102, 104, 106 , 523 A.2d 1064 , cert. denied, 310 Md. 276 , 528 A.2d 1287 (1987), this Court held that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a photographic array that included “what is obviously a police ‘mug shot’ of appellant,” noting that the admission of the police photographs created a danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant because, “[w]ith the defense being self-defense, the jury’s decision could well have been influenced by the thought that appellant had a prior record and was consequently a bad person.” In that case, however, the photographs “showed the front and profile view commonly associated with police ‘mug shots.’ ” Id. at 106, 523 A.2d 1064 . Here, by contrast, appellant’s photo displayed in the arrays was not “obviously” a mug shot. Rather, the photo was a head shot of appellant, taken from a similar perspective as the other photos in the array, in which all that was visible was appellant’s face and neck area.

Appellant’s photograph was not obviously a mug shot. The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the photo arrays as relevant evidence that did not pose a risk of unfair prejudice to appellant. B. Ms. Merritt’s Testimony Prior to trial, the court addressed the admissibility of evidence of Ms. Merritt’s understanding of the following question appellant asked Ms. Merritt: “[D]o you want to make some money[?]” The State proffered that Ms. Merritt would testify that she understood that to mean that appellant wanted to commit a robbery, based on her “participation in past robberies with the Defendant.” Defense counsel objected to Ms. Merritt’s testimony as “inadmissible other crimes evidence,” arguing that the testimony was “an attempt to admit through the back door prior alleged untried robberies committed by [appellant].” The court ruled that the State could elicit Ms. Merritt’s interpretation of Mr. Wagner’s question, but not the basis for her interpretation. The court reasoned that the “interpretive ⁴⁵⁶ statement” was “relevant, intrinsic evidence of the crime of conspiracy,” and “the probative value of this outweighs any unfair prejudice.” At trial, Ms. Merritt testified that, when she and appellant left their apartment the day of the robbery, appellant said he “wanted some money.” Ms. Merritt understood appellant to mean that he “wanted to rob somebody.” Appellant argues on appeal that the court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence because it permitted Ms. Merritt “to suggest that she knew [ajppellant to have committed other robberies.” The State disagrees, arguing that this evidence did not constitute other crimes evidence, and, in any event, it was relevant to the crime of conspiracy.

Finally, the State contends, “even assuming the testimony was admitted in error, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was merely cumulative to other evidence to the same effect.” We agree that the evidence was not other crimes evidence, but rather, it was admissible to show agreement between appellant and Ms. Merritt, a critical element to the charge of conspiracy. See Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 146 , 767 A.2d 844 (2001) (“[CJonspiracy is necessarily a specific intent crime; there must exist the specific intent to join with another person in the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.”). And, because the evidence was highly probative to establish the element of one of the crimes charged, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the admission of the evidence did not unfairly prejudice appellant. C. Evidence of Drug Use Appellant next argues that the circuit court erred in allowing testimony that appellant used drugs following Mr. Pitcairn’s robbery and murder. 10 He contends that this con ⁴⁵⁷ stituted other crimes evidence, and the court erred in admitting the post-crime drug use as proof of motive, asserting that “use of drugs did not, in an of itself, make it any more likely that he committed the robbery absent evidence that he had a special financial need caused by drug use.” The State contends that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in admitting evidence that appellant “shared in the proceeds of the robbery.” It asserts that the evidence was properly admitted as: (1) evidence intrinsic to the crime of robbery and probative of the crime itself; and (2) evidence of motive.

In arguing that evidence of appellant’s post-crime drug use was inadmissible other crimes evidence, appellant ignores the first basis for the court’s ruling, that the evidence was “intrinsic or relevant to the actual crime itself’ and “probative of the crime itself.” The court explained: [The evidence] shows [appellant’s] connection to the crime as he had a connection to the proceeds and what was purchased with the proceeds. And that he, immediately after the proceeds were converted to drugs, that he was able to take the drugs, and also shows a relationship with Mr. Cosby and could complete the picture of the post-crime activity and [appellant’]s relation with Mr. Cosby. And therefore, I find that again its probative value under Rule 5-403 outweighs its unfair prejudice to [appellant]. Alternatively, the court found that the evidence was admissible as other crimes evidence because it was probative of motive, it could be “proven by clear and convincing evidence,” and “the probative value outweighs any unfair prejudice to [appellant].” We agree with the court that the evidence was admissible on either ground.

Initially, the evidence was intrinsic to the ⁴⁵⁸ crimes charged. See Silver v. State, 420 Md. 415, 435-36 , 23 A.3d 867 (2011) (evidence that was “intertwined and part of the same criminal episode” did not “engage the gears of ‘other crimes’ evidence law,” even though it may “ ‘show some possible crime in addition to the one literally charged’ ”) (quoting Odum v. State, 412 Md. 593, 611 , 989 A.2d 232 (2010)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1039 , 181 L.Ed.2d 765 (2012). Evidence that appellant shared in the proceeds of the robbery and drugs obtained with cash received from use of Mr. Pitcairn’s credit card, shortly after the robbery, was probative of appellant’s participation in the robbery. Alternatively, the circuit court properly admitted the testimony pursuant to an “other crimes” analysis.

Rule 5-404(b) provides as follows: (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Pursuant to this Rule, “[propensity evidence, or evidence suggesting that because the defendant is a