Walter J. Crismer & Son, Inc. v. Seal

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question of whether certain facts are sufficient to estop an employer from raising the defense of limitations to a late claim for workmen’s compensation. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission (the Commission) and the trial judge each held the facts did constitute estoppel. We shall reverse that finding.

Code (1964 Repl. Vol.), Art. 101, § 39 (a) requires the filing of claims by employees with the Commission within sixty days after the date of the accidental injury for which compensation is claimed with the further provision “that failure of an employee to file a claim for compensation within two years from the date of the accident shall constitute a complete bar to any claim under [that] article.” The employer here relies upon the failure to file within two years. Claimant seeks to get within the exception provided in § 39 (c) which states: ⁴³⁹ “When it shall be established that failure to file claim by an injured employee * * * was induced or occasioned by * * * facts and circumstances amounting to an estoppel, claim shall be filed * * * within one year from the time when the facts and circumstances amounting to an estoppel cease to operate and not afterwards.” The appellee, James F. Seal, Jr., (the claimant) was injured on April 12, 1965. He reported the injury to his employer who sent him to the company physician for treatment.

A report was duly filed by the employer with the Commission. Treatment by the company physician and two specialists apparently continued up to November 12, 1968, the date of hearing before the Commission. The claimant’s bills have all been paid by the employer or its insurer. Claim was not filed until September 27, 1968.

The claimant relies as a basis for estoppel upon the medical attention provided by the employer and insurer and “the fact that the employer or insurer gave no notice to employees of their rights and liabilities under Article 101” with specific reference to the fact that there was “no posted notice of the limitations on filing a claim”. On the issue of estoppel the Commission held: “The Commission * * * finds that the employer and insurer have furnished continuous medical treatment unto the claimant since the time of the accidental injury; and that the employer and insurer are estopped from raising the issue of limitations.” The trial judge affirmed the Commission’s action upon the authority of Bay shore Industries v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167 , 192 A. 2d 487 (1963). In that case the estoppel was based upon a direct threat by the employer to bar the employee from future employment if he filed a claim. No such factor is involved here.

Therefore, the case is not applicable. The matter of medical treatment was covered in Grif ⁴⁴⁰ fin v. Rustless Iron & Steel Co., 187 Md. 524 , 51 A. 2d 280 (1947). Chief Judge Marbury said for the Court: “The mere fact that appellant was being treated by a physician paid by the appellee would not estop the latter from imposing the defense of limitations to a late claim. The sole basis for estoppel, therefore, are the two conversations appellant had with the plant engineer.” Id. at 529-30 .

The Court then went on to hold that the statement of the plant safety engineer, “We are going to look after you,” was not sufficient to constitute an estoppel since he had no power to bind the employer. The fact that a part of the