Wantland v. State

Gilbert, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The mutilated body of twelve year old Donnie Henley was found on the grounds of the Berger Mansion 1 in Clinton, Prince George’s County, Maryland. It was evident that the youth had sustained multiple stab wounds, including one characterized as the "coup de grace, ” at the point where the skull joins the neck. It was also apparent from the autopsy that the youth’s anal orifice was abnormally dilated.

The medical examiner was of the opinion that the dilation of Donnie’s anal canal was consistent with penetration in the act of anal intercourse. Young Henley’s body was found on Sunday, June 18,1978, at approximately sixteen to eighteen hours after he met his untimely death. Death was fixed by the medical examiner, Dr. Hormez Guard, at about 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., Saturday, June 17, 1978. Following the discovery of the Henley boy’s maimed corpse, the Prince George’s County Police Department investigated in order to ascertain the identity of the person or persons who had snuffed out the young man’s life.

The results of the police inquiry, as reflected in the transcript of the trial, disclosed that a number of witnesses placed a Charles Milton Wantland in the vicinity of the area where the deceased was last seen alive. Several witnesses reported that they had seen Henley in the company of the appellant at approximately 3:30 p.m. on Saturday, June 17, ⁵²⁹ 1978. The police discovered on the mansion grounds a pile of burned clothing, an identifiable portion of which matched the witnesses’ description of what Wantland was wearing on Saturday, June 17, 1978. Three cigarette butts, all of the same brand that Wantland smoked, were found at a point approximately 40 feet from where the body was discovered.

One of the butts, according to the testimony of an F.B.I. agent, bore traces of saliva indicating that an individual of Wantland’s blood type had smoked the cigarette. Wantland was questioned as to his knowledge of Henley’s activities. Subsequently, Wantland was charged with the offense of first degree murder, a sexual offense of the first degree, and carrying, openly, a deadly and dangerous weapon. At trial the State introduced three oral statements made by the appellant.

The substance of the statements was that Wantland knew Donnie and had previously had homosexual relations with him. 2 The police were informed by Wantland that he was so drunk on the date of the homicide that he remembered nothing of it, but he felt he had committed the crime. According to the officers, Wantland said he must have used a knife from his apartment as the weapon. Five knives were recovered from Wantland’s residence; all were introduced into evidence by the State as exhibits. The medical examiner testified that one of the knives could have been used in the perpetration of the homicide.

Despite laboratory tests, no trace of blood was found on Wantland’s clothing or the knives. A jury, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Levin, J.), convicted Wantland of murder in the first degree (Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 407); a first degree sexual offense (Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 464); and carrying openly a deadly weapon with the intent to injure (Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 36 (a)). Judge Levin imposed sentences of life, life and three years, all to be served consecutively. ⁵³⁰ Wantland asserts to us that Judge Levin erred in six respects, namely: 1. admitting into evidence illegally obtained incriminating pre-trial statements; 2. admitting into evidence an in-court identification that was based on an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup; 3. permitting the prosecutor to make improper opening comments to the jury; 4. denying a motion for judgment of acquittal inasmuch as the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions; 5. admitting into evidence irrelevant evidence; 6. allowing the medical examiner to give improper testimony. We shall address each of the issues that Wantland raises in the same order they have been put to us.

I. — THE PRE-TRIAL STATEMENTS — During the course of the investigation into young Henley’s death, Corporal David R. Hatfield was assigned to "find anybody [in the area concerned] that could ... [furnish] either [a] positive or negative response ... [as to the identity of] a possible suspect....” Wantland, described in the transcript as "the caretaker or occupant of the Berger Mansion” 3 was one of the persons that Hatfield was to interview with respect to the identity of the suspect. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on Sunday, June 18, 1978, Hatfield and another police officer went to the Berger Mansion where they found Wantland. The officers requested that Wantland accompany them to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (B.C.I.). The avowed purpose for requesting Wantland to accompany them was to learn what Wantland knew about the crime.

Wantland went with the officers. ⁵³¹ When the trio arrived at the B.C.I. facility, Wantland was taken to an "Interview Room” at sometime shortly after 11 p.m. No restraints were placed upon him, and he was not given the Miranda warnings. Hatfield, during the next five hours, succeeded in getting Wantland to make a six page statement. The statement was suppressed by the circuit judge on Wantland’s motion. 4 Hatfield left the Interview Room at the conclusion of the interview, around 3:30 a.m., June 19, 1978.

Corporal T.R. Tucker entered about one-half hour thereafter. Tucker informed Wantland that he, Wantland, was under arrest for the murder of Donnie Henley. Tucker related to the court that he "read .. . [Wantland] a waiver of rights form” and recorded Wantland’s answers to the questions printed thereon. Wantland was then handed the form to read and sign.

The printed form declared that Wantland understood the Miranda warnings. With respect to the question of whether Wantland was willing to make a statement without the presence of an attorney, Wantland responded, "No.” Notwithstanding Wantland’s express negative reply to the Miranda litany, Tucker recounted, Wantland continued to talk. The officer questioned Wantland in order to determine whether Wantland was willing to make a statement even though counsel was not present. According to Tucker, Wantland answered that he wanted to talk.

Prior to any conversation regarding the offenses forming the gravamen of this appeal, Wantland was permitted to use the toilet facilities, as well as to purchase some cigarettes. Upon returning to the Interview Room, Wantland explained to the officer the reason for the negative response to the question on the waiver of rights form relative to counsel. He related that at the time of a prior arrest, "he made a statement to the police and it was in error and it was admitted at the time of trial. ..Wantland made clear that ⁵³² his objection was to making a written statement. Wantland apparently was of the belief that in order to be admissible as evidence a statement had to be in writing.

Tucker did nothing to alter or correct Wantland’s misbelief, but, instead, acting on the appellant’s desire to "talk,” began his interrogation. The trial court denied Wantland’s attempt to suppress that statement. The third oral statement was taken the following afternoon by Corporal M.K. Morrissette. Morrissette told the court that he was assigned to take Wantland to the Prince George’s County Hospital so that a physician could take samples of the appellant’s saliva and blood.

While at the hospital, Wantland complained to Morrissette that no one would listen to appellant. Morrissette suggested that he would take a statement following the medical procedure. At the completion of the sampling, Wantland was transported back to B.C.I. by Morrissette. There, prior to any questioning, Wantland was again advised of his Miranda rights.

Appellant responded that he was willing to make a statement to the officer without benefit of counsel. It was clear from subsequent remarks that Wantland made the oral statement under the misconception that it could not be used against him. The circuit judge, over objection, admitted the statement into evidence. The fourth and final statement was made by appellant to Corporal Rowzie, the coordinator of the investigation.

Rowzie told Judge Levin that on July 5, 1978, he went to Prince George’s County Detention Center in order to speak to Wantland. Before there was any contact between Rowzie and the appellant, an unidentified correctional officer explained to Wantland that he was entitled to have his attorney present during any interview with the police officer. A form entitled "Detainee Waiver,” the text of which purported to be a waiver of that right, was presented to Wantland, who signed the form. Rowzie recounted that he then advised the appellant of the full panoply of Miranda.

Wantland was asked if he understood those rights, and he replied in the affirmative. According to the officer, the appellant then stated that he ⁵³³ already had an attorney, but that he did not desire the attorney’s presence during the interview. That, of course, is precisely what he waived when he signed the form presented to him by the guard. Rowzie questioned the appellant and took an oral statement which was admitted, over objection, at trial. — THE LAW — Appellant asserts that each of the three statements that were received into evidence should have been suppressed because: a) The State failed to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver since Wantland did not know that an oral statement could be used against him; b) Each of the statements was the product of the failure of police to respect his right of cut off of questioning, a right he had asserted to Corporal Tucker; and c) Each of the statements was the fruit of the poisonous tree, i.e., they grew out of the illegal statement to Hatfield (and appellant, assuming that the Tucker and Morrissette statements were illegal avers that those statements taint the succeeding statements).

Additionally, Wantland assails the statement to Corporal Rowzie on the basis that he did not knowingly waive his right to counsel, even assuming Miranda compliance. — MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND ITS SIBLINGS — In 1966, in the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court engrafted upon the Fifth and Sixth Amendments the prophylactic warnings now entitled "Miranda rights.” The effect of Miranda is that before any in-custody statement made by an accused in response to interrogation is admissible into evidence, the prosecution must first demonstrate that the accused was advised of the ⁵³⁴ rights articulated and specified in the Miranda case and knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. The burden is on the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of evidence that Miranda rights were given and waived by the accused. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S. Ct. 619 , 30 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1972); Mulligan v. State, 18 Md. App. 588 , 308 A.2d 418 (1973). When a suspect stands upon the constitutional guarantees delineated in Miranda , the police must respect that decision.

Miranda makes manifest that: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.

At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.” (Footnote omitted.) 384 U.S. at 473-74 , 86 S. Ct. at 1627-28 , 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723 . Notwithstanding Miranda’s seeming proscription of further interrogation, the Supreme Court, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 , 96 S. Ct. 321, 326 , 46 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1975), said that "literal interpretations [of that language] would lead to absurd and unintended results.” Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court in Mosley , observed ⁵³⁵ that "a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity... Ibid.

Thus, "the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends ... on whether his 'right to cut off questioning’ was 'scrupulously honored.’ ” 423 U.S. at 104 , 96 S. Ct. at 326 , 46 L. Ed. 2d at 321 . On the other hand, an accused may decline to rely upon the safeguards afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Consequently, the police may interrogate him. When that is alleged to be the situation, "[a] heavy burden rests upon the ... [State] to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege[s]....” Miranda, supra at 475 , 86 S. Ct. at 1628 , 16 L. Ed. 2d at 724 .

"The courts must presume that a defendant not waive his rights; [so that] the prosecution’s burden [of showing a waiver] is great....” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S. Ct. 1755, 1757 , 60 L. Ed. 2d 286, 292 (1979). See also Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 , 100 S. Ct. 652 , 62 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1980). Waiver is not a matter of form, but rather one of fact weighed in the light of the totality of the circumstances. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S. Ct. 2560 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1979).

See also North Carolina v. Butler, supra. At any suppression hearing, the State must carry the onus of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Lego v. Twomey, supra; Mulligan v. State, supra. (a) The substance of appellant’s first contention is that he did not know that an oral statement could be used against him in court.

His misunderstanding, he says, precluded his having made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Much the same contention as that now made by Wantland was advanced to the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State ⁵³⁶ v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35 , 243 A.2d 240 (1968). There, a defendant made an oral statement which was transcribed by a detective. When the transcription was completed, the accused was asked to affix his signature thereto, but he requested that he not do so until his attorney could read it.

The statement