Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Bowen

ELDRIDGE, J. This is another case involving an attempted appeal, under the so-called “collateral order” doctrine, from an interlocutory order rendered by a trial court. Like the result in numerous similar collateral order doctrine cases decided by this Court in recent years, the attempted appeal in this case will be unsuccessful. 1 ²⁹⁰ I. The facts relating to the appealability issue in this case are not extensive. Most of the factual detail set forth in the briefs and record extract concern matters which we shall not reach, namely the merits of the plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action and the defenses advanced by the defendants. This litigation began on October 13, 2006, when 16 former merit system employees of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against the WSSC and certain officials of the WSSC. 2 The 16 plaintiffs had been employed in the Information Technology Department of the WSSC.

The event giving rise to this lawsuit was the WSSC’s “restructuring” of the Information Technology Department, whereby approximately 80 merit system positions in the Department, including the positions held by the 16 plaintiffs, were abolished, and new non-merit system positions were created. 3 The WSSC then terminated the employment of the 16 plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that, “after abolishing the plaintiffs’ positions, the WSSC spent millions of dollars on training the new, younger contract workers who replaced the plaintiffs.... ” The complaint went on to state that “the real purpose behind the abolishment ... was: (1) for defendant WSSC to avoid paying costly retirement benefits to the plaintiffs who were nearing retirement age; (2) and to unlawfully create a new class of WSSC workers outside of the protections of the merit system, where they could be hired and fired at will without the statutory protections that the WSSC workforce is entitled to under Art. 29, §§ 11-101 et seq.” ²⁹¹ The complaint further alleged that most of the plaintiffs “would have been eligible for retirement within the next few years” and that, because of their ages, most of the plaintiffs “have been unable to find comparable employment elsewhere.” The plaintiffs also asserted that WSSC violated its own procedures and regulations by not terminating “the least senior employee ... first” and by failing to reemploy the plaintiffs “in preference to any eligible person who is not an employee of the WSSC....” In addition to claiming that the WSSC violated its own procedures and regulations, the plaintiffs contended that the restructuring violated the merit system provisions applicable to WSSC and contained in Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol., 2008 Supp.), Article 29, § 11-102 et seq. The plaintiffs also claimed that the restructuring violated Article 29, § lili 0, relating to layoffs by WSSC, violated the prohibition against age discrimination set forth in Article 29, § 1-107, and violated Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief restoring the plaintiffs to their former merit system employment. They did not seek monetary damages. WSSC on January 3, 2007, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The principal ground for the motion was that “the lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity.” The motion continued: “Abolishing the ... positions Plaintiffs and others occupied was accomplished through a budgetary process spelled out by the Maryland General Assembly, and approved by WSSC’s Commissioners, the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Budget and Management, and by the County Councils of Prince George’s and Montgomery Counties.

Eliminating public-sector jobs under these circumstances constitutes legislative activity to which the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity squarely applies.” WSSC’s motion also contended that the complaint failed to state a claim and that WSSC did not violate its own proce ²⁹² dures and regulations. Attached to WSSC’s motion were 45 exhibits, consisting of numerous governmental documents, minutes and agenda of meetings, affidavits by government officials, memoranda written by government personnel, and letters between government personnel. The plaintiffs’ opposition to WSSC’s motion set forth in detail the reasons underlying the plaintiffs’ contentions that the restructuring violated WSSC’s own procedures and regulations as well as Article 29 of the Maryland Code and Articles 19 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The plaintiffs’ opposition also challenged the applicability of “legislative immunity” under the circumstances of this case.

In addition, the plaintiffs disputed WSSC’s assertion that the restructuring was approved by the County Councils of Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties. A Circuit Court hearing on WSSC’s motion took place on June 1, 2007. After argument by counsel for each side, the Circuit Court orally denied WSSC’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. On June 29, 2007, WSSC filed a notice of appeal from the June 1st oral ruling by the Circuit Court.

Sometime thereafter, the plaintiffs filed in the Court of Special Appeals a motion to dismiss the interlocutory appeal. In July 2007, WSSC filed in the Circuit Court a motion to stay all proceedings in the case while the appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals. The motion was prompted by earlier interrogatories and document requests served on WSSC. WSSC had not responded to those interrogatories and document requests.

WSSC’s motion indicated that its purpose was to stay all discovery during the pendency of the appeal. In addition, on July 23, 2007, the plaintiffs sent to the defendants’ counsel a notice to take the deposition of one of the individual defendants. The Circuit Court on August 8, 2007, denied the motion for a stay pending appeal. Nevertheless, WSSC continued its refusal to comply with discovery requests, and the plaintiffs on August 22, 2007, filed a motion for sanctions. ²⁹³ On September 4, 2007, the Court of Special Appeals granted the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss WSSC’s appeal on the ground that the June 1, 2009, ruling was not a final judgment.

Two days later, on September 6, 2007, WSSC filed a notice of appeal from the Circuit Court’s August 8th order denying the motion for a stay pending appeal. On the following day, September 7, 2007, WSSC filed in the Court of Special Appeals a “Motion for Stay Pending Appeal.” This motion was denied by the Court of Special Appeals on September 19, 2007. Next, WSSC on October 15, 2007, filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, presenting the following two issues: “Petitioners seek review of the following two questions: 1. Are local government councils and commissions, such as the WSSC, entitled to absolute legislative immunity for a decision to restructure a department pursuant to the legislative budget review process set forth at Art. 29, §§ 11-102 and 11-103? 2.

Do the top officials of a local commission have the right to appeal an interlocutory order denying their defense of absolute legislative immunity under the collateral order doctrine?” This Court granted the certiorari petition on December 13, 2007. WSSC v. Bowen, 402 Md. 355 , 936 A.2d 852 (2007). We shall answer the certiorari petition’s second issue in the negative and hold that the June 1, 2007, interlocutory ruling was not appealable. Consequently, we shall not express any opinion with regard to the first issue in the certiorari petition. 4 ²⁹⁴ II.

The exercise of appellate jurisdiction in Maryland is normally dependent upon a final judgment rendered by the trial court. See, e.g., Hudson v. Housing Authority, 402 Md. 18, 24 , 935 A.2d 395, 398 (2007)(“The general proposition in Maryland is that ‘to be appealable an order or judgment ordinarily must be final’ ”); County Commissioners for St. Mary’s County v. Lacer, 393 Md. 415, 424 , 903 A.2d 378, 383-384 (2006)(“0rdinarily, appellate review is available only after the entry of a final judgment where all claims against all ²⁹⁵ parties are resolved. * * * The fundamental objective of this principle is ‘to prevent piecemeal appeals and to prevent the interruptions of ongoing judicial proceedings’ ”); St Joseph’s Medical Center, Inc. v. Cardiac Surgery Associates P.A., 392 Md. 75, 84 , 896 A.2d 304, 309 (2006)(“As this Court has emphasized on numerous occasions, very recently by Judge Raker for the Court in Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 323 , 884 A.2d 1215, 1219 (2005), ‘[t]he general rule as to appeals is that, subject to a few, limited exceptions, a party may appeal only from a final judgment’ ”). The “exceptions” to the final judgment principle were recently summarized in St. Joseph’s v. Cardiac Surgery, supra, 392 Md. at 84 , 896 A.2d at 309 : “Moreover, under Maryland law, the ‘few, limited exceptions’ to the final judgment rule number only three. Judge Wilner for the Court in Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615 , 881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005), explained: ‘[W]e have made clear that the right to seek appellate review of a trial court’s ruling ordinarily must await the entry of a final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties, and that there are only three exceptions to that final judgment requirement: appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute; immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602; and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.’ ” See also St. Mary’s County v. Lacer, supra, 393 Md. at 424-425 , 903 A.2d at 383-384 .

It is undisputed that the Circuit Court’s June 1, 2007, riding denying WSSC’s immunity defense was not a final judgment, was not an appealable interlocutory order under any statute, and was not appealable under Maryland Rule 2-602. The issue, as pointed out in the beginning of this opinion, is whether the ruling was appealable under the collateral order doctrine. This Court, in numerous opinions, has described and delineated the requirements of the collateral order doctrine. ²⁹⁶ For example, Judge Harrell for the Court, in St. Mary’s County v. Lacer, supra, 393 Md. at 428 , 903 A.2d at 386 , explained the collateral order doctrine as follows: “This doctrine treats a ‘narrow class’ of interlocutory orders as final judgments regardless of the posture of the case. In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 326 , 783 A.2d 673, 685 (2001); Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 315 , 529 A.2d 356, 358 (1987).

This reprieve from the final judgment requirement, however, is a ‘very narrow exception.’ ” Pittsburgh Corning v. James, 353 Md. 657, 660 , 728 A.2d 210, 211 (1999). “The collateral order doctrine permits an appeal from an order that satisfies the following four requirements: (1) it must conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) it must resolve an important issue; (3) it must be completely separate from the merits of the action; and (4) it must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Moreover, the “ ‘four elements of the test are conjunctive in nature and in order ... to fall within this exception to the ordinary operation of the final judgment requirement, each of the four elements must be met.’ ” Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 563 , 914 A.2d 783, 792 (2007), quoting In Re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306, 327 , 783 A.2d 673, 686 (2001). In Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 376 Md. 53, 64 , 827 A.2d 115, 121 (2003), we characterized the collateral order doctrine as follows (footnote omitted): “The collateral order doctrine is based upon a judicially created fiction, under which certain interlocutory orders are considered to be final judgments, even though such orders clearly are not final judgments. The justification for the fiction is a perceived necessity, in ‘a very few ... extraordinary situations,’ for immediate appellate review.” Time after time, this Court’s opinions have emphasized that the collateral order doctrine is extremely narrow and that it is applicable only under extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., ²⁹⁷ Hudson v. Housing Authority, supra, 402 Md. at 25, 935 A.2d at 399 (The doctrine encompasses “a ‘narrow’ class of interlocutory orders in ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ”); St. Joseph’s v. Cardiac Surgery, supra, 392 Md. at 85 , 896 A.2d at 310 (The doctrine applies “under extremely limited circumstances”); Nnoli v. Nnoli, supra, 389 Md. at 329 , 884 A.2d at 1223 (“The collateral order doctrine is a very narrow exception to the final judgment rule, and each of its four requirements is very staidly applied in Maryland. * * * [It is inapplicable if the] case does not present an extraordinary situation”); In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 634 , 820 A.2d 587, 591 , cert. denied, 540 U.S. 948 , 124 S.Ct. 398 , 157 L.Ed.2d 279 (2003)(“[T]he doctrine may be entertained only in extraordinary circumstances”).

The interlocutory ruling, from which the appeal in the case at bar was taken, was the Circuit Court’s June 1, 2007, oral ruling denying the defendants’ claim of immunity from suit. We shall assume arguendo that the first three requirements of the collateral order doctrine were satisfied. The issue debated by the parties, and the issue that we shall focus upon, is whether the fourth requirement of the doctrine was met, namely whether the ruling denying the immunity claim would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The issue of WSSC’s claimed immunity from an adverse judgment would clearly be reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.

If a final judgment is entered against WSSC, and if WSSC is actually immune from suit under the circumstances, the judgment will be reversed on appeal and the trial court will be directed to dismiss the action. Consequently, in this respect, the fourth requirement of the collateral order doctrine is