Watters v. State

McAULIFFE, Judge. Ronald Gene Watters was convicted in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County of murder in the first degree and related offenses, and was sentenced to life without parole. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Watters v. State, 84 Md.App. 230 , 578 A.2d 810 (1990).

We granted Watters’ petition for certiorari to consider whether the trial court improperly denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial following exclusion of the public from the voir dire and selection of jurors. The murder for which Watters was convicted was highly publicized in the Salisbury area. The victim, Lisa Renee Taylor, had disappeared on her way home from her parents’ house. Her body was found months later, badly decomposed, in a wooded lot near Salisbury State University.

Because of extensive media coverage given the case at the ⁴² time the body was discovered and just before trial, voir dire of prospective jurors was somewhat protracted. Without the knowledge or consent of the trial judge or the parties, a deputy sheriff excluded the public, including members of defendant’s family and possibly representatives of the press, from the courtroom during voir dire and jury selection — a process that consumed the entire first morning of trial. Acting on his own, the deputy allowed only prospective jurors, witnesses, and courtroom personnel to enter the courtroom. 1 After jury selection, and following a luncheon recess during which the defendant learned of the courtroom closure, his counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming that the defendant had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. He alleged: [I]t was brought to my attention during lunch recess that the bailiffs, members of the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office, excluded members of the public from being present in the courtroom this morning during jury selection.

Furthermore, it was brought to my attention they excluded members of the news media from being here. At a hearing on the motion, the deputy who had closed the courtroom testified that he had ordered the exclusion “[bjecause of the nature of the number of people involved in the case and the courtroom would not handle all the persons who wanted to get into the courtroom.” The deputy admitted, however, that there were “some seats” available, but he could not estimate how many. 2 Counsel for the defendant proffered his recollection as follows: ⁴³ My recollection of the — and I would put testimony from the witness stand in the record from the sheriffs and the bailiffs if necessary — but there was plenty of room on the left-hand side of the courtroom for spectators, members of the news media, to be present. The courtroom was not full, although certain portions of it were full where certain jury panels were seated together. The prosecutor did not challenge defense counsel’s recollection.

He stated simply, “I don’t know who gave the instructions to close the courtroom.” Defense counsel then produced the testimony of Lillian Trotter, the defendant’s mother. Ms. Trotter stated that she, her aunt, and her two sisters arrived at the courthouse at 9:30 a.m., and sought admission to the courtroom. She and her party were denied admission even though she identified herself as the defendant’s mother. She was not admitted until 1:30 p.m., following the luncheon recess.

The trial judge denied the motion for mistrial, stating “it was done as a matter of court security because of the crowded conditions of the courtroom, and it is not denying him his right to a public trial.” The defendant argues that the closure did not satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirement that any closure must be narrowly tailored and serve an overriding governmental interest. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819 , 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). He contends there was no overriding interest because the deputy admitted there were still seats available, and that it was not narrowly tailored because access could have been limited rather than precluded. The defendant also notes that closure continued for the entire morning of trial, and encompassed the entire voir dire and jury selection process.

Moreover, the defendant says, he is entitled to relief for a ⁴⁴ violation of his right to a public trial without demonstrating specific prejudice. See Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. at 49 , 104 S.Ct. at 2217 . The State argues that the standard proposed by the defendant applies only when a court is determining whether to grant a party’s motion to close a trial. The State further contends that the appropriate test for this case, where the courtroom was closed by a deputy sheriff without the judge’s knowledge, is merely whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.

The State contends the denial of the motion was within the trial judge’s discretion because a mistrial need be granted only when there is a manifest necessity due to extreme circumstances. The State urges us, as a reviewing court, to defer to the trial court’s determination that there was no manifest necessity in this case. See Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 422 , 583 A.2d 218 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 117 , 116 L.Ed.2d 86 (1991); Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 516 , 495 A.2d 1 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093 , 106 S.Ct. 868 , 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986). The State contends that even if the closure here was improper, the error was de minimus, and not of constitutional magnitude.

I. The Supreme Court has ardently protected a criminal defendant’s right to a public trial 3 and has addressed the circumstances which may justify infringement of this right and the standard by which these factors must be balanced. See Waller v. Georgia, supra, and Press-Enter ⁴⁵ prise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., supra. The Court in Press-Enterprise held that under the First Amendment, a trial could be closed only to protect an overriding governmental interest through a narrowly tailored order. 464 U.S. at 510 , 104 S.Ct. at 824. The Waller Court noted that the express rights of a defendant under the Sixth Amendment were at least as extensive as the implied rights of the public and press under the First Amendment, and thus applied the same test to a Sixth Amendment challenge to closure. 467 U.S. at 46 , 104 S.Ct. at 2215.

Under present law, therefore, whether objection to closure is made by the defendant or the press, the public may only be constitutionally excluded from a trial, including voir dire, pursuant to a narrowly tailored order necessary to protect an overriding state interest. The circumstances at this trial did not present a compelling need for excluding members of the defendant’s family as well as the press and the public. The record, although lacking in desirable particulars, establishes that there were seats available during the voir dire and jury selection. Moreover, even if the State could show that under the circumstances then prevailing the government had a legitimate interest in preventing overcrowding, it could not show that the exclusion of all persons was a narrowly tailored means of protecting that interest.

There was no effort to ensure that petitioner’s family could be present while the jury was selected, nor was there apparently any effort to admit representatives of the press. There was not even an attempt to fill the remaining seats impartially. Rather, after the venirepersons and witnesses had taken their places, the empty seats were left vacant, notwithstanding the early arrival of the defendant’s family members and their request for admission. The closure of the courtroom under these circumstances violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. ⁴⁶ II.

The defendant, relying on Waller v. Georgia, supra, argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of this violation because he is not required to prove specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee. The State answers that it would be absurd to require a new trial for every accidental, technical violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, and that where the violation is de minimus a new trial should not be required. Put another way, the State says that not every closure is of constitutional dimension. Each argument has merit.

Our task, therefore, is to determine whether the violation in this case may properly be classified as de minimus and undeserving of constitutional protection, or as a significant violation of the Sixth Amendment carrying with it a presumption of prejudice to the defendant and therefore requiring the granting of appropriate relief. In Press-Enterprise, the Supreme Court recognized the historically public character of the jury selection process, noting that it “enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.” 464 U.S. at 508 , 104 S.Ct. at 823 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-71 , 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2823-24 , 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980)). Although Press-Enterprise was decided on the basis of a First Amendment challenge to a trial closure, and thus primarily addressed the harm to the press and public, the harm to a defendant resulting from a closed trial was recognized in Waller : The central aim of a criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly, and “[o]ur cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.” Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. at 46 , 104 S.Ct. at 2215 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 , 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2905 , 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979)). With respect to ⁴⁷ the more concrete benefits to the defendant of a public trial, the Waller Court observed that “[i]n addition to ensuring that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages