Weaver v. Prince George's County

Menchine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Lynda Lee Weaver and others 1 (Weaver) filed a bill of complaint against Prince George’s County, Maryland (County), seeking a declaration that Chapter 925 of the Laws of Maryland 1976 (enabling act) and Section 75-5 through 75-13 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Prince George’s County as amended by CB 77-1976 (County bill) are unconstitutional and void. The enabling act authorized and empowered the governing body of Prince George’s County to impose a local multifamily occupancy tax on rentals arising in certain multifamily dwelling units. The County bill, pursuant to the power and authority thereby granted, imposed a monthly tax of 4% upon rents charged for the use and occupancy of such multifamily residential units.

After hearing, the chancellor passed the following order: “ORDERED that Chapter 925 of the Laws of Maryland (1976) is declared a constitutional act of ¹⁹¹ the Maryland legislature, and that County Bill 77-1976, as codified in Sections 75-5 through 75-13 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Prince George’s County, Maryland (1963 Edition and 1967 Supplement), is declared a constitutional act and that the County Council had a reasonable basis for passing the legislation and that the legislation as passed is constitutional, valid and in full force and effect with the exception of the provisions of County Bill 77-1976, 75-6(e) ‘This term shall not include quarter’s allowance or similar military housing allowances’ which sentence is declared as an ultra vires act on the part of the governing body of Prince George’s County, and shall be deemed excluded from said Bill and declared void., and it is further, ORDERED that the matter be, and the same hereby is, declared to be a Class Action, and the decision rendered herein shall be binding on all tenants living in apartments, owners and agents who own or manage said apartments and corporate officers of such corporate owners and agents within Prince George’s County, Maryland, and it is further ORDERED that the Plaintiffs shall pay the costs of these proceedings as taxed by the Clerk of the Court.” Weaver has appealed from the order declaring that the enabling act is constitutional in its entirety and that the County bill is constitutional and binding in its major aspect. County has appealed from the order “declaring that the exclusion of military quarters allowance from the category of housing subsidy constituted an ultra vires act.” County, as appellee, argues alternatively: 1. That Weaver’s claim to a declaratory judgment is foreclosed by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; or 2. The enabling act and County bill do not: (a) impair the obligation of contracts under United ¹⁹² States Constitution Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 2 ; (b) violate the provisions of Article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 3 County, as appellant, argues that the County bill’s provisions excluding quarters allowances to military personnel from the federal or state housing subsidy exemptions authorized by the ordinance were not ultra vires.

(CB 77-1976 §§ 75-5, 75-6e, 75-7c) 4 ¹⁹³ Weaver, as appellant, argues: 1. That collateral estoppel did not arise out of the prior litigation, because such litigation lacked both identity of parties and identity of subject matter; and 2. That the statute and ordinance impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of United States Constitution Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 (see footnote 2, supra) in that (a) the obligations of tenants were increased and (b) the rights of landlords were enlarged. 3. That the statute and ordinance is violative of Article 15 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (see footnote 3, supra).

The chancellor held that prior litigation created conditions whereby the doctrine of collateral estoppel in substantial measure barred constitutional attack upon the enabling act and the County bill by complainants in the subject case. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we disagree and are compelled to reverse for error of law. In such circumstances this Court ordinarily would be required to remand to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to permit that court to address the substantive constitutional issues. Counsel for all parties have, however, submitted the case to this Court for final adjudication and judgment upon the facts set forth in the record, pursuant to Maryland Rule 1075 c. 5 We shall, accordingly, pass upon all questions of fact and law arising in the case and enter final judgment thereon. ¹⁹⁴ Collateral Estoppel The complainants in the subject case are: (1) tenants in multifamily residential units in Prince George’s County, Maryland, including military personnel receiving quarters allowances lesser in amount than the rental charges for their rented premises; or (2) limited partnership owners of 428 rental multifamily residential units in Prince George’s County, Maryland; or (3) management agents for owners of rental multifamily residential units in Prince George’s County; or (4) officers of corporate owners or agents of owners of rental multifamily residential units in Prince George’s County.

The action was instituted as a class action under Maryland Rule 209. 6 Pursuant to the provisions of § c of that Rule the chancellor required publication of notice of the ¹⁹⁵ pendency of the litigation in three Prince George’s County newspapers of record as designated by § 1008 of the County Charter and required the posting of such notice upon the Court House door. The Prior Litigation The litigation suggested as giving rise to the operation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel barring prosecution of the subject action is a cause entitled Landon Court Tenant Association and others 7 against Prince George’s County, Maryland and the County Executive (Landon Court). The prior litigation had sought a declaration that Chapter 897 of the Laws of Maryland 1975 (earlier enabling act) and CB 93-1975 (earlier County bill) were unconstitutional and void. The constitutionality of the earlier enabling act and the earlier County bill was upheld by the chancellor.

The complainants in Landon Court, having reserved the issues for consideration of the Court in Banc, Maryland Rule 510, were thereby foreclosed from further appeal after affirmance by the latter tribunal. Constitution of Maryland, Article IV, Section 22. County argues that the final order of the Court in Banc in Landon Court declaring Ch. 897 of the Laws of Maryland 1975 and CB 93-1975 to be constitutional gave rise to collateral estoppel by judgment as to the enabling act and the County bill now at issue in the subject case. In Davis v. Frederick County, 25 Md. App. 68 , 334 A. 2d 165 (1975), we said at 74 [168]: “In Maryland the doctrine of res judicata, or estoppel by judgment, consists of two branches, direct estoppel by judgment and collateral estoppel by judgment.” In either case the bar of the doctrine does not arise unless there is identity of subject matter and identity of parties in ¹⁹⁶ prior litigation concluded on its merits in a court of competent jurisdiction.

DeMaio v. Lumbermen’s Mutual, 247 Md. 30, 34 , 230 A. 2d 279, 281 (1967). Identity of Subject Matter The declaration in Landon Court sustained the constitutionality of the earlier enabling act and the earlier County bill. A comparison of that statute and that ordinance with the enabling act (Ch. 925 of the Laws of Maryland 1976) and the County Bill (CB 77-1976) that are attacked in the subject proceedings demonstrates the absence of an identity of subject matter in the subject litigation. Differences in the Enabling Act The legislative authority to Prince George’s County conferred by the subject enabling act granted the following entirely new rights to the County: 1.

The right to provide that “the operator or owner of a multifamily residential unit shall... be personally liable for the remittance of all taxes due at intervals as set by the governing body”; (Ch. 925 § (c)(1)) 2. The right to provide that “the operator or owner of a multifamily residential unit . . . shall have the same right in respect to collecting the tax from the lessee or in respect to non-payment of the tax by the lessee, as if the tax were a part of the rental fee charged and payable when the same is due”; (Ch. 925 § (c)(2)) 3. The right to provide “for the payment of reasonable costs, in such amounts and in a manner as set by the governing body, to the owner or operator of a multifamily residential unit for the collection and remittance .of this tax”; (Ch. 925 § (c)(4)) 4. The right to provide “for enforcement or collection of this tax against the landlord or the tenant at law or in equity”; (Ch. 925 § (c)(7)) 5.

The right to provide “for the Director of Finance ... to collect the tax . . . and to make, adopt and amend such rules and regulations as are reasonably necessary and proper to fully collect this tax.” ¹⁹⁷ Other differences, minor in character, related, in sum, to changes in the amounts of money giving rise to a tenant’s liability for or exemption from the authorized tax. Differences in the County Bills The subject County bill enacted by Prince George’s County to implement the subject enabling act made the following entirely new changes in the law: 1. Imposed personal liability upon landlord for the tax collected or to be collected (CB 77-1976-8 b, c, d), but holds harmless any landlord who acted in good faith to collect the tax, (CB 77-1976 § 75-8 e) and establishes standards for determination of “good faith” (CB 77-1976 § 75-6 c). 2. Defined housing subsidy to exclude quarters allowance to military personnel (CB 77-1976 § 75-6 e). 3.

Required detailed monthly reports by landlord to Director of Finance (CB 77-1976 § 75-8 h). 4. Authorized inspection of landlords’ records at County’s expense (CB 77-1976 § 75-8 k). 5. Imposed a civil penalty upon landlord for refusal to collect tax (CB 77-1976 § 75-9 b). 6. Allowed landlord a credit from collected rent to compensate for cost of collection and remittance (CB 77-1976 § 75-10 a). 7.

Provided procedures to permit landlord or tenant to obtain refunds for taxes “erroneously or mistakenly paid.” (CB 77-1976 § 75-11). 8. Empowered Director of Finance to make rules and regulations. (CB 77-1976 § 75-12). Other new provisions of lesser substantive significance included: (a) Elimination of exemption previously allowed to persons under the age of eighteen years (CB 77-1976 § 75-6 d). ¹⁹⁸ (b) Elimination of particular reference to benefits derived from Federal Civil Service in definition of gross income.

(CB 77-1976 § 75-6 d). (c) Exemption of all persons who are permanently and totally disabled. (CB 77-1976 § 75-6 h). (d) Inclusion of single recorded condominium units in definition of single family residence.

(CB 77-1976 § 75-6 k). (e) Definition of “tenant.” (CB 77-1976 § 75-61). (f) Decrease in age of entitlement to and increase in amount of income giving rise to exemptions. (CB 77-1976 § 75-7 c (5)).

(g) Change of collection agent for the tax from the County Executive to the Director of Finance. (CB 77-1976 § 75-8 a). (h) Providing detailed procedures for determination of a tenant’s right to exemption. (CB 77-1976, § 75-8 g).

In Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 599-601 , 92 L. Ed. 898 , 907, 68 S. Ct. 715, 720-21 (1948), it was said: “And so where two cases involve income taxes in different taxable years, collateral estoppel must be used with its limitations carefully in mind so as to avoid injustice. It must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first proceeding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged. Tait v. Western Maryland R. Co. (US) supra. If the legal matters determined in the earlier case differ from those raised in the second case, collateral estoppel has no bearing on the situation.

See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Commissioner (CCA 2d) 161 F2d 93. And where the situation is vitally altered between the time of the first judgment and the second, the prior determination is not conclusive. See State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 US 154, 162 , 89 L ed 812, 818, 65 S Ct 573 ; 2 Freeman, Judgments 5th ed ¹⁹⁹ (1925) § 713. As demonstrated by Blair v. Commissioner, 300 US 5, 9 , 81 L ed 465,469,57' S Ct 330, a judicial declaration intervening between the two proceedings may so change the legal atmosphere as to render the rule of collateral estoppel inapplicable.

But the intervening decision need not necessarily be that of a state court, as it was in the Blair Case. While such a state court decision may be considered as having changed the facts for federal tax litigation purposes, a modification or growth in legal principles as enunciated in intervening decisions of this Court may also effect a significant change in the situation. Tax inequality can result as readily from neglecting legal modulations by this Court as from disregarding factual changes wrought by state courts. In either event, the supervening decision cannot justly be ignored by blind reliance upon the rule of collateral estoppel.

Henricksen v. Seward (CCA 9th Wash) 135 F2d 986, 988, 989, 150 ALR 1 ; Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett (CCA 1st Mass) 147 F2d 63, 68, 69; Commissioner v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp. (CCA 4th) 152 F2d 225, 227, 162 ALR 1200 ; Corrigan v. Commissioner (CCA 6th) 155 F2d 164, 165; and see West Coast L. Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrig. Dist. (CCA 9th Cal) 114 F2d 654, 661, 662, 44 Am Bankr NS 91; contra: Commissioner v. Western U. Teleg.

Co. (CCA 2d) 141 F2d 774, 778. It naturally follows that an interposed alteration in the pertinent statutory provisions or Treasury regulations can make the use of that rule unwarranted. Tait v. Western Maryland R. Co. supra ( 289 US 625 , 77 L ed 1408, 53 S Ct 706 ).” See also Annotation 162 ALR 1204 , et seq., particularly 1210-14; Annotation 150 ALR 5 , et seq. Compare State Tax Commission v. Bullis School, 218 Md. 558 , 147 A. 2d 849 (1959).

We regard the changes of substance and procedure effected by the subject enabling act and the subject County ²⁰⁰ bill to be so extensive in character as to cause the doctrine of collateral estoppel to be inapplicable in the subject litigation. State Tax Commission v. Bullis School, supra, at 563 [852]. Weaver further suggests that because of the absence of actual identity of parties, coupled with the circumstance that in Landon Court no notice was given to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the persons on whose behalf the action [was] brought” (Rule 209 c), the prior