West v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.

Hammond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1957 Humble Oil, the appellee, leased a filling station in Prince George’s County from the Wests, the appellants, under a lease which, as extended, ran until 1972. In 1965 the State condemned 31% of the land area of the station and Humble attempted to reduce the monthly rental of $375 by 31%. The Wests would not agree and in 1968 Humble stopped paying any rent.

After giving notice of their intention so to do, the Wests on June 21, 1968 instituted a landlord’s complaint in the People’s Court for Prince George’s County and recovered a judgment for $1,125, representing three months’ rent, and an order entitling them to repossess the property. Humble appealed to the Circuit Court and twenty-one months later, on March 23, 1970, upon a trial de novo the People’s Court judgment was affirmed. Humble paid the judgment and vacated the premises. Thereupon the Wests, relying on Code (1968 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 53, Landlord and Tenant, subtitle Tenants Holding Over, §§ 1-8, particularly § 4 (which provides for an appeal bond calling on the tenant, if unsuccessful on appeal, to pay not only “all rent in arrear” but also “all loss or damage which the landlord ¹⁹² * * * may suffer by reason of said tenant’s holding over, including the value of said premises during the time he shall so hold over * * *”), sued Humble for its use and occupation of the filling station for the twenty-one months between the People’s Court judgment and the affirmance by the Circuit Court, claiming a fair rental value aggregating $46,200, plus interest of $2,772 and $5,000 attorney’s fee, less $2,962.50 rental paid by Humble. Judge McCullough held that the Wests could not rely on § 4 of Art. 53 since Humble was a tenant when the People’s Court proceeding was filed and that they were bound by the statutes codified under the subtitle “Landlord Complaint Procedure” of Art. 53, being §§ 39N to 39R of Art. 53, particularly § 39R, under which the appeal bond is made to cover only “all costs and damages mentioned in the judgment, and such other damages as shall be incurred and sustained by reason of said appeal” and in which there is the following limiting language: “the aforesaid bond shall not affect in any manner the right of the lessor to proceed against said tenant * * * for any and all rents that may become due and payable to the lessor after the rendition of said judgment.” Humble was granted a summary judgment which limited its liability to the Wests to $5,912.50, being twenty-one times $375 or $7,875 less $2,962.50, the total of the payments Humble figured it owed and had paid the Wests during the twenty-one month period. We think Judge McCullough travelled the direct legal route to reach the right judicial terminus. Some cases have held that, under an appeal procedure which calls for a trial de novo, the taking of the appeal annuls the judgment appealed from unless the controlling statute provides otherwise and other cases have held that a de novo appeal merely suspends the judgment until the final hearing in the appellate court and, if the appeal is dismissed or the judgment affirmed, the original judgment is restored to full force and effect. 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 358.

The result in the present case is the ¹⁹³ same whatever view is taken since the matter is controlled by statutes which, as we see it, reflect the common law philosophical differences between the cases of tenants who, since they hold over after the expiration of a prior lease, occupy and use the premises without an express agreement as to rent, and cases of tenants whose landlords seek to void their leases calling for a specified rent, and are successful only after the passage of an extended period of time. In 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant § 211 at 1491-2, the author says that at common law a tenant wrongfully holding over had no liability for rent because the obligation to pay rent flows from a contract and ordinarily there is neither a contract to pay rent after the term nor a reservation of rent then to accrue. On the other hand, it often has been held that a tenant holding over without legal justification is liable in assumpsit for use and occupation for the period of the holding over. In § 212 of Tiffany, op. cit. at 1495, it is said: “It seems to be immaterial, for most purposes, whether the landlord brings an action of tort for damages from holding over, or an action for use and occupation, which, as stated in the preceding section, he has the right to bring.” See also § 306 d at 1872.

In § 318 b Prof. Tiffany says: “The language of the English