West v. State

¹⁹⁹ MURPHY, Chief Judge. Appellant West was charged in two criminal informations in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with robbery, assault with intent to rob, simple assault, and three counts of theft. The court (Ross, J.) found West guilty under a general verdict and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. We must consider several questions relating to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment and whether a new trial on one or more of the theft counts should be ordered.

I From the transcript of West’s trial, and the accompanying record, we draw our essential facts. About 6:30 in the evening on June 5, 1985, shortly after she left a drugstore in Baltimore City, Carmen Guilford was the victim of a purse snatching. In her own words: “I purchased a money order for the amount of two hundred and sixty-nine dollars from the drugstore and I stopped in the liquor section for a can of beer, my son was with me. Then I walked down Park Heights Avenue and I was going across Park Heights Avenue where the elementary school is there where the incident happened.

As we were walking across the field a man just snatched my purse from my hand and he ran, that’s when I noticed my pocketbook was gone when he ran.” Asked if she had an opportunity to see the person who took her purse, Guilford responded: “No, I just got the description from the bank, he was wearing a blue sweat suit with a hood over his head, I couldn’t see him from the front. Q Did your son give a description to you? A My son said that he had seen him.” ²⁰⁰ When Guilford’s son testified, he was asked to make a courtroom identification of the purse snatcher. West was then present in the courtroom.

The following colloquy occurred: “Q Did you see the fellow? A I seen his face. Q Is he present today? A No. Q You don’t see him?

A No.” The pharmacist who sold Mrs. Guilford the money order was called by the State as a witness. He testified that about twenty minutes after the sale Mrs. Guilford returned to the drugstore. As a result of his conversation with her he checked the money order’s receipt number. “Some time after” that, the pharmacist testified, “two young men came into the store and requested that the money order be cashed.” The pharmacist identified West as the young man who had possession of the money order. When West told the pharmacist that he wished to cash the money order, the pharmacist responded that he would not cash the money order because it had been reported stolen.

West and his partner then ran from the store, leaving the money order. When West returned the next day to claim the money order the pharmacist called the police. A policeman arrived while West was still in the store. The policeman testified that when he asked West how he had obtained the money order, West responded first that he had purchased it, then that he had found it, and still later that it had been given to him.

The policeman arrested West. Testifying on his own behalf, West denied that he ever gave the policeman conflicting stories and insisted that he had purchased the money order at the drugstore from someone other than the pharmacist. He purchased the money order, he testified, to give to a Mr. Brown. When Mr. Brown demanded cash, said West, he returned to the drugstore to reconvert the money order to cash. ²⁰¹ At the close of the evidence, Judge Ross rendered his verdict as to all counts of both informations; he said: “The verdict is guilty.

I have no doubt in my mind that the Defendant indeed snatched the purse and was in possession of the unexplained stolen pocketbook. It seems just incredible and inconsistent with the testimony of the State’s witness and neither of them had any reason to fabricate.” The court imposed a ten year sentence on the robbery count, and merged the other convictions into the greater offense. The first of the two informations had charged West with robbery, assault with intent to rob, assault, theft of property valued at $300 or greater, and theft of property valued at less than $300. In both theft charges the items allegedly stolen were Mrs. Guilford’s pocketbook and its contents, which in addition to the $269 money order included about $16 in cash, a “walker radio with earphones,” and Mrs. Guilford’s identification.

These two theft charges differed only as to whether these items altogether valued less or more than $300. The second criminal information had charged West with a single count of theft under $300, and referred only to the $269 money order. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals West contended that the trial court was clearly erroneous in convicting him. He argued that the snatching of Mrs. Guilford’s purse was not accompanied by sufficient force to constitute robbery.

Citing Raiford v. State, 52 Md.App. 163, 447 A.2d 496 (1982), rev’d in part on other grounds, 296 Md. 289 , 462 A.2d 1192 (1983) as dispositive, the court in an unreported opinion rejected West’s contention. Rejecting also West’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the one who snatched Mrs. Guilford’s purse, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The proffered evidence against West fits into two categories. The first is evidence probative of his involvement in ²⁰² the purse snatching incident; the second is evidence concerning West’s actions at the drugstore.

As will be shown, the distinction between the two categories is crucial, for although the theft count in the second criminal information can be supported by the drugstore evidence alone, all counts in the first information require the sufficiency of both categories of evidence to satisfy the burden of proof necessary for conviction. II As in the Court of Special Appeals, West, on two grounds, attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. The first, aimed at invalidating the inference that he was involved in the purse snatching incident, attacks all five counts of the first criminal information. The second is directed specifically at the robbery count.

West asserts that even assuming arguendo he was the purse snatcher, the evidence does not establish all elements of the crime of robbery. We turn first to this argument. Robbery retains its common law definition in Maryland, though the penalty for this crime is fixed by statute. See Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 486.

We have defined the offense as the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, by violence or putting in fear, see Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 792 , 490 A.2d 1277 (1985); Hadder v. State, 238 Md. 341, 354 , 209 A.2d 70 (1965); or, more succinctly, as larceny from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear, see Ledvinka v. Home Ins. Co., 139 Md. 434, 439 , 115 A. 596 (1921); see also Raiford v. State, 52 Md.App. 163, 169, 447 A.2d 496 (1982); Harrison v. State, 3 Md.App. 148, 152 , 238 A.2d 153 (1968). We focus here on the requirement that the larceny 1 be accompanied ²⁰³ by violence or putting in fear. West contends that the evidence does not establish this element, since, he asserts, Mrs. Guilford was never put in fear, nor was she the victim of actual violence.

The requirement that the larceny be accompanied by violence or putting in fear has ancient origins in the common law. In William Hawkins’ Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, published in 1724, in the chapter entitled “Of Robbery,” it is said: “Sect. 2. Larceny from the Person of a Man either puts him in Fear, and then it is called Robbery; or does not put him in Fear, and then it is called barely, Larceny from the Person. Sect. 3.

Robbery is a felonious and violent Taking away from the Person of another, Goods or Money to any Value, putting him in Fear.” John Latrobe’s Justice’s Practice under the Laws of Maryland, published in 1826, is evidence of the early adherence in Maryland to this requirement, for Section 1252 of that authority states: “Open and violent larceny from the person, or robbery, is the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another, of goods or money to any value, by violence, or putting him in fear. The putting in fear distinguishes it from other larcenies. 4 Blac.Comm. 242.” Id. at 284 . Merely affirming the antiquity of this requirement, of course, leaves unanswered the question of the degree of violence or putting in fear that is requisite. We have not previously considered this precise question.

A number of cases decided in the Court of Special Appeals, however, provide a framework for making the necessary determination of degree. Cooper v. State, 9 Md.App. 478 , 265 A.2d ²⁰⁴ 569 (1970) is particularly apposite. The prevailing view among other jurisdictions also points to a clear answer. Before turning to these cases, we note as background that many English cases from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries support West’s position.

For example, in Steward’s Case, when a gentleman’s hat and wig were snatched from his head without force, this was held to be larceny only. 168 Eng.Rep. 247-48 n. 3 (1690). In The King v. Macauley, 168 Eng.Rep. 246 (1783), a boy was carrying a bundle down a street when the defendant ran past him and snatched it suddenly away. The court stated: “The evidence in this case does not amount to a robbery; for although the prisoner snatched this bundle from the boy, it was not with that degree of force and terror that is necessary to constitute this offense.” A similar case is The King v. Baker, 168 Eng.Rep. 147 (1783). In Cooper , the evidence showed that the appellant, who had been convicted of robbery, had stuck his hand into the pocket of one Jack Glazer, grabbed Glazer’s money and ran.

According to an eyewitness, the pockets of Glazer’s bermuda shorts “sort of stuck open,” revealing the money. Glazer, who was “high” from drinking at the time of the incident, testified that he felt the appellant’s hand reach “all the way in” his pocket and that the incident “happened in a few seconds and it startled me.” On these facts the court held that the crime was larceny, not robbery. The court correctly set forth the applicable law concerning robbery: “The violence may be actual as by the application of physical force, or it may be constructive as by intimidation or placing the victim in fear. Where, as here, it is clear that the victim was neither intimidated [n]or put in fear, there must be evidence of actual violence preceding or accompanying the taking.

Actual violence, it is said, implies personal violence; if there is any injury to the person of the owner in the taking of the property, or if he resists the attempt to rob him, and his resistance is overcome, there is sufficient violence to make the taking ²⁰⁵ robbery, however slight the resistance.” Id. 9 Md.App. at 480 , 265 A.2d 569 (citations omitted). As to the degree of force used, the court in Cooper said that it was immaterial “so long as it is sufficient to compel the victim to part with his property. In other words, sufficient force must be used to overcome resistance and the mere force that is required to take possession, when there is no resistance, is not enough, i.e., the force must be more than is needed simply to move the property from its original to another position; there must be more force than is required simply to effect the taking and asportation of the property. Thus, it is not robbery to obtain property from the person of another by a mere trick and without force, or to pick another’s pocket without using more force than is necessary to lift the property from the pocket; nor is it robbery to suddenly snatch property from another when there is no resistance and no more force, therefore, than is necessary to the mere act of snatching.” Id.

(citations omitted). Two other pertinent cases decided by the Court of Special Appeals present facts that, in contrast to those in Cooper , show sufficient violence or putting in fear to support a robbery conviction. In Williams v. State, 7 Md.App. 683 , 256 A.2d 776 (1969), the victim testified that she began screaming from fear when the appellant approached her and that when the appellant grabbed her pocketbook, her bag of money and the pocketbook dropped to the ground. The court held this was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to find that the victim resisted the taking and that her resistance had been overcome.

Id. at 686 , 256 A.2d 776 . In Raiford, supra, the victim testified that as she was preparing to enter his car she felt something on her shoulder. Turning around, she saw that the appellant had ripped the shoulder strap bag off of her shoulder. The appellant then fled with the purse.

The court held on these facts that the purse snatching was accompanied by sufficient force to constitute robbery. The court reasoned that the necessary ²⁰⁶ resistance to the taking need not emanate entirely from the victim, but can arise also from the attachment of the article stolen to the victim’s person or clothing. There, the fact that the victim’s shoulder strap was ripped from her arm clearly showed the requisite resistance to the taking. 52 Md.App. at 169-70 , 447 A.2d 496 . Cases from other jurisdictions recognize that a mere snatching of an object from the possession of another may involve the requisite element of force to constitute robbery.

See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 112 Ky. 689 , 66 S.W. 633 (1902); In re Michael G., 117 Misc.2d 264 , 458 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 , aff'd, 97 A.D.2d 794 , 468 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1983) (stating that “the focus in this factual situation must be on the actions of the respondent in exposing the victim to serious risk of injury,” not on the presence or absence of victim resistance); Commonwealth v. Brown, 506 Pa. 169 , 484 A.2d 738, 741-42 (1984). The prevailing view, however, appears to be that the mere snatching or sudden taking away of the property from the person of another does not constitute sufficient force, violence, or putting in fear to support a robbery conviction. See, e.g., People v. Patton, 76 Ill.2d 45 , 27 Ill.Dec. 766 , 389 N.E.2d 1174 (1979); Jones v. State, 467 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Crim.App.1971); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 8.11(d) (student ed. 1986); C. Torcía, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 479 (14th ed. 1981); Annotation, Purse Snatching as Robbery or Theft, 42 A.L.R.3d 1381 (1972, Supp.1987). The State attempts to liken the facts sub judice to those in Raiford and to distinguish them from those in Cooper .

We, however, are of the view that the present facts are most similar to the Cooper fact situation and that the governing principles are the ones enunciated in that case. As in Cooper , the victim here was never placed in fear; she did not resist; she was not injured. The only force applied was that necessary to take the pocketbook from her hand. Unlike the purse in Raiford, no shoulder strap attached Mrs. Guilford’s purse