West v. State

OPINION ELDRIDGE, Judge. In this case, the petitioner, Michael West, is seeking to overturn his convictions in the State of Maryland for first-degree rape 1 and first-degree sexual offense 2 on the ground ¹⁵³ that the State lacked territorial jurisdiction to prosecute him for these offenses. West and a male accomplice abducted a woman in Prince George’s County, Maryland, and drove her across the state line into the District of Columbia, where both men coerced the victim into engaging in sexual conduct. We shall hold that, since the sexual conduct occurred in the District of Columbia, the State of Maryland did not have territorial jurisdiction to prosecute West for first degree rape and first degree sexual offense.

I. During the evening of October 17, 1997, Michael West and Jamahl Higgs approached a 1991 Honda Accord automobile parked in front of the home of Gregory Tolson in Adelphi, Prince George’s County, Maryland. Tolson was also the owner of the automobile. Inside the car, on the back seat, Tolson and his girlfriend were having sexual relations. West tapped on the window of the car with a 9mm Ruger handgun, and he ordered Tolson to get out of the vehicle.

Tolson reluctantly complied, and he pleaded with West and Higgs to “let my girl go.” West then directed Tolson to give him his wallet and car keys, and Tolson handed over these items. Tolson’s girlfriend, meanwhile, remained in the back seat of the car. After taking Tolson’s keys, West and Higgs entered the car themselves, with Higgs sitting in the driver’s seat and ¹⁵⁴ West in the front passenger’s seat. Higgs proceeded to drive away with the woman still in the back seat.

About a block away from the scene of the abduction, Higgs stopped the car at the side of the road, and traded places in the vehicle with West. Higgs sat in the front passenger’s seat, and West then started driving. He drove across the state line into the District of Columbia. At some point, the woman “realized they were on 16th Street in D.C.” and she “asked the men whether they intended to hurt her or let her go.” They responded, “Just do what we say.

We’re not going to hurt you.” At a stoplight in the District of Columbia, West climbed into the backseat and Higgs began to drive. West demanded that the woman engage in sexual intercourse with him. The woman protested, and West brandished his gun and threatened to harm her if she did not comply. West then engaged in vaginal intercourse with the woman.

Subsequently, Higgs stopped the car and switched places with West. West resumed driving the car, and he ordered the victim to perform fellatio on Higgs. The woman again protested. West then extended his arm into the rear passenger compartment as he was driving, and forced the victim to perform fellatio by pushing her head down.

Both of these sexual assaults occurred within the District of Columbia. The automobile came to a stop a few blocks beyond the site of the second assault upon the woman, and while still in the District of Columbia. West and Higgs directed the victim to get out of the car. She requested that the men return her purse, but they refused to do so.

The victim exited the car, and her assailants sped away. Within a few minutes, she received help from a nearby security guard. The police were then notified, and the victim was transported to D.C. General Hospital, where she was released a few hours later. Subsequently, based upon the above-summarized acts in the District of Columbia, West was charged in the District of Columbia Superior Court with first degree sexual abuse while armed, first degree sexual abuse, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during a violent offense.

He was found ¹⁵⁵ guilty of these offenses and received sentences of 12 years to life for first degree sexual abuse while armed, 7-21 years for armed robbery, and 5-15 years for the firearm offense. The record before us does not indicate what sentence, if any, was imposed on the other sexual abuse verdict, and does not disclose whether the District of Columbia sentences were to run consecutively or concurrently. On June 26,1998, West was indicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on charges of kidnapping, carjacking, two counts of first degree assault, armed robbery, robbery, and two counts of using a handgun in the commission of a felony. In November 1998, a separate indictment in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County charged West with first degree rape and first degree sexual offense.

All of the charges in the Prince George’s County indictments, like the District of Columbia charges, were based on the events during the evening of October 17, 1997. Both of the Prince George’s County indictments were tried together before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. At the close of the prosecution’s case, West moved to dismiss the first degree rape and first degree sexual offense charges, arguing that the State of Maryland lacked territorial jurisdiction to prosecute him on these charges because the rape and the sexual offense occurred in the District of Columbia. The trial judge denied the motion, relying upon the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion in State v. Jones, 51 Md. App. 321 , 443 A.2d 967 (1982), vacated with directions to dismiss the appeal because there was no final judgment and therefore no appellate jurisdiction, Jones v. State, 298 Md. 634 , 471 A.2d 1055 (1984).

The trial judge also gave the jury an instruction on territorial jurisdiction, to which West objected. 3 ¹⁵⁶ The jury found that Maryland had territorial jurisdiction over all of the above-mentioned charges, and it found West guilty of each offense. West was sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree rape and a consecutive term of life imprisonment for the first degree sexual offense. He also received prison sentences of 30 years for kidnapping, 30 years for carjacking, 25 years for each of the first degree assault offenses, 20 years for armed robbery, and 20 years for each of the handgun offenses. The sentences for kidnapping, carjacking, armed robbery, and each of the handgun offenses were all consecutive.

The only concurrent sentences were the two 25-year sentences for first degree assault. No sentence was imposed upon the robbery verdict because of merger. West appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to establish Maryland territorial jurisdiction over the first degree rape and first degree sexual offense charges. West alternatively argued that, if a jury issue on territorial jurisdiction over these two offenses were presented, the trial court’s instruction on territorial jurisdiction was erroneous.

The Court of Special Appeals rejected West’s contentions and affirmed. West v. State, 136 Md.App. 141 , 764 A.2d 345 (2000). The intermediate appellate court primarily relied upon its earlier opinion in State v. Jones, supra, 51 Md.App. 321 , 443 A.2d 967 . While acknowledging that its opinion in Jones was a “departure” from the “traditional ... analysis” of territorial jurisdiction, the Court of Special Appeals seemed to rely on the idea that the “common law” does “evolve,” West v. State, 136 Md.App. at 148 , 764 A.2d at 349 . ¹⁵⁷ West filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, arguing (1) that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish Maryland’s territorial jurisdiction over the rape and first degree sexual offense charges and (2) that, alternatively, if there were sufficient evidence for a jury issue regarding Maryland territorial jurisdiction over these two offenses, the trial judge’s instruction was erroneous.

This Court granted the certiorari petition, West v. State, 363 Md. 661 , 770 A.2d 169 (2001). We shall reverse the rape and sexual offense convictions because the undisputed evidence shows, as a matter of Maryland common law, that the Circuit Court lacked territorial jurisdiction over these two offenses. Consequently, we need not consider the second issue concerning the jury instruction.

II

Preliminarily, we shall briefly discuss the reliance, by both the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals, upon the latter court’s opinion in State v. Jones, supra, 51 Md.App. 321 , 443 A.2d 967 , vacated with directions to dismiss the appeal, 298 Md. 634 , 471 A.2d 1055 . A Court of Special Appeals’ opinion underlying a judgment, which is reversed or vacated in its entirety by this Court on another ground, may, depending upon the strength of its reasoning, constitute some persuasive authority in the same sense as other dicta may constitute persuasive authority. Nonetheless, analytically the intermediate appellate court’s opinion is only dicta because it no longer supports or reflects a viable appellate judgment. See, e.g., Eastgate Associates v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 704 , 350 A.2d 661, 665 (1976).

Accordingly, such an opinion is not a precedent for purposes of stare decisis. As shown by the opening paragraph in this Court’s Jones v. State opinion, 298 Md. at 635 , 471 A.2d at 1056 , the territorial jurisdiction issue in that case was deemed to be a sufficiently important question of Maryland law so as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari, but the issue would remain unresolved because the Court of Special Appeals lacked jurisdiction in the case. Under these circumstances, the interme ¹⁵⁸ diate appellate court’s opinion in Jones was in no manner an authoritative precedent, and the courts below in this case should not have viewed it as such.

III

We shall now address the merits of the territorial jurisdiction issue. Judge Cathell for the Court in State v. Butler, 353 Md. 67, 72-73 , 724 A.2d 657, 660 (1999), described territorial jurisdiction as follows: “Territorial jurisdiction describes the concept that only when an offense is committed within the boundaries of the court’s jurisdictional geo graphic territory, which-generally is within the boundaries of the respective states, may the case be tried in that state. * * * We said in Bowen v. State, 206 Md. 368, 375 , 111 A.2d 844, 847 (1955), that ‘an offense against the laws of the State of Maryland is punishable only when committed within its territory. A person cannot be convicted here for crimes committed in another state.” ’ See also the recent discussion of the territorial jurisdiction concept by Judge Raker for the Court in State v. Cain, 360 Md. 205, 212-215 , 757 A.2d 142, 145-147 (2000). Moreover, when the “evidence raises a genuine dispute” over Maryland’s territorial jurisdiction, “territorial jurisdiction becomes an issue the State must prove,” and it must prove it “beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Butler, supra, 353 Md. at 79, 81 , 724 A.2d at 663, 664 .

Criminal offenses consist of multiple elements, and issues of territorial jurisdiction typically arise in this State when one or more elements of an offense take place in Maryland and one or more elements occur in another jurisdiction. The common law rule concerning territorial jurisdiction, which is adhered to in Maryland, does not permit prosecution of an offense in every jurisdiction in which any element of the offense takes place. Instead, the common law rule generally focuses on one element, which is deemed “essential” or “key” or “vital” or the “gravamen” of the offense, and the offense may be prosecuted ¹⁵⁹ only in a jurisdiction where that essential or key element takes place. 4 In State v. Cain, supra, 360 Md. at 214-215 , 757 A.2d at 146-147 , Judge Raker for the Court explained: “It is sometimes stated that each offense has, for jurisdictional purposes, one key act or omission and that this element must have taken place in the state where prosecution is instituted. Professors LaFave and Scott state: ‘At common law (that is, in the absence of a statute) jurisdiction over crimes is limited ... by the notion that each crime has only one situs (or locus), and that only the place of the situs has jurisdiction.

In other words, the common law picked out one particular act (or omission) as vital for the determination of the place of commission (i.e., the situs) of each of the various crimes and gave jurisdiction to that state (and only that state) where the vital act or result occurred. Generally, it may be said that the situs of a crime at common law is the place of the act (or omission) if the crime is defined only in these terms, and the place of the result if the definition of the crime includes such a result.’ “1 WAYNE R. LaFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.9(a), at 180 (1986). “The essential element of the crime of theft by deception, at least for jurisdictional purposes, is the accused’s obtaining control of the subject property.” See, e.g., State v. Butler, supra, 353 Md. at 78 , 724 A.2d at 662 (“our courts consistently have recognized that in order to satisfy the territorial jurisdiction requirement, the crime, or ¹⁶⁰ essential elements of it, must have occurred within the geographic territory of Maryland,” emphasis added); Wright v. State, 339 Md. 399 , 406 663 A.2d 590, 593 (1995) (“jurisdiction over a theft offense exists in this state if the defendant was subject to a duty to account