Wilkes v. State

CATHELL, Judge. This case concerns whether police officers’ use of a K-9 inspection for controlled dangerous substances (CDS) during a routine traffic stop improperly extended the traffic stop beyond what is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Petitioner, Timothy Johnson Wilkes, 1 was charged by criminal information filed on October 30, 1996, with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, bringing 28 grams or more of cocaine into the State, and related charges. On January 27, 1997, a pretrial hearing was held before the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County concerning petitioner’s motion to suppress the drug evidence.

The motion was denied. Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial and the case was postponed. On April 1, 1997, petitioner entered a plea of “not guilty” and the case proceeded on an agreed statement of facts with the State pursuing only the second count. Petitioner was convicted of bringing 28 grams or more of cocaine into the State in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, section 286A.

On May 21, 1997, petitioner was sentenced, as a repeat offender under Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, section 293, to a forty-year prison sentence, dating from' September 18,1996. On May 23,1997, an appeal was filed with the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion filed ⁵⁶¹ on October 20, 2000, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction. 2 Petitioner presented two questions for which we granted certiorari: 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err by ruling that the police had not improperly extended the traffic stop of Mr. Wilkes in order to permit a K-9 dog inspection of his car? 2.

Was there probable cause for the search of Mr. Wilkes? We hold that the police did not improperly extend the traffic stop in order to permit a K-9 dog inspection of his car and that there was probable cause for the search of petitioner. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I. Facts The case sub judiee involves a relatively routine traffic stop.

Petitioner was stopped for driving 63 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone on U.S. Route 301 in Queen Anne’s County. During the traffic stop a search was conducted and 57.5 grams of cocaine were seized from petitioner’s pants cuff. Three Maryland State Troopers testified as follows about the traffic stop at the suppression hearing. Trooper First Class Antonio Graham (Trooper Graham) of the Maryland State Police testified that during the early morning hours of September 18, 1996, he was operating a stationary radar gun at the intersection of Route 301 and Route 302 in Queen Anne’s County.

At approximately 1:52 a.m., he observed two vehicles, a tractor-trailer followed by a Ford Escort with North Carolina license plates, traveling southbound in the fast lane on Route 301. The radar gun registered that the truck was traveling at a rate of speed of 64 miles per hour and the Escort at 63 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Trooper Graham then turned on the ⁵⁶² headlights of his patrol car and began to follow the two vehicles. At this time, the Escort moved into the slow lane and pulled along the side of the truck in what Trooper Graham believed to be “an attempt to avoid [him].” He pulled up behind the Escort, activated his emergency equipment, and the Escort pulled over to a stop on the slow shoulder of southbound Route 301, approximately a half mile south of Route 302.

The tractor-trailer apparently continued to speed south on Route 301. Trooper Graham radioed the State Police Barracks in Centreville to advise them that he had just made a traffic stop. He then exited his police cruiser, approached the driver’s side window of the Escort, and began conversing with its sole occupant, petitioner. Trooper Graham informed petitioner that he had been stopped for exceeding the posted speed limit, to which petitioner responded that he may have been traveling a little fast because he was tired.

Trooper Graham then requested to see petitioner’s driver’s license and vehicle registration card, which petitioner provided to the officer. Petitioner had a North Carolina driver’s license and was named as the owner of the vehicle on the registration card. At this point, Trooper Graham began to ask petitioner a number of questions: After he provided the driver’s license and registration I continued-well, I struck up a conversation with [petitioner], ascertaining where he was coming from, where he was going. He advised me that he was coming from New York, and he was en route back to home in Rocky Mount, North Carolina.

General conversation I had, what was going on in New York, what was he up in New York for. He was coming from a family reunion in New York. I asked him how long he had been in New York. [Petitioner] advised me he was in New York for approximately two days. While talking to [petitioner], it’s a small vehicle, it’s a hatchback vehicle, while talking to him I observed some air fresheners in the vehicle.

And that’s about it. I believe it ⁵⁶³ was a coat, like a leather coat or something on the back seat. Trooper Graham also testified that he did not see any luggage in the Escort. Returning to his patrol car, he radioed the Centreville Barracks to request that they conduct a check on petitioner’s driver’s license and registration, as well as for any possible outstanding warrants.

According to Trooper Graham, this was routine procedure. He also indicated that it sometimes takes longer to complete such status checks on out-of-state licenses. 3 Trooper Graham then returned to the Escort and asked petitioner whether the address on the driver’s license was current and petitioner replied that it was accurate. 4 The record indicates that at this point the Centreville Barracks had not yet provided the requested information concerning petitioner and his vehicle. Trooper Graham returned to his patrol car and began to issue petitioner a warning citation for driving 63 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. As he began writing the warning, he decided to match the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) on the registration card number to the VIN actually located on the Escort.

He again approached the Escort and asked petitioner to open the vehicle door so that he could compare the VIN displayed on the registration card with the VIN plate on the car door. 5 When the car door opened, Trooper Graham detected an unusual odor, that he was unable to recognize, coming from the ⁵⁶⁴ vehicle. He testified that although he could not identify the odor, it was not the type he would commonly associate with air fresheners. He then compared the two VIN’s and found that they did indeed match. At this point, Troopers First Class Charles Prince (Trooper Prince) and Robert M. Penn, Jr. (Trooper Penn) of the Maryland State Police, arrived on the scene simultaneously, but in separate police cruisers.

Both of the backup troopers exited their vehicles and started to approach the Escort. Trooper Graham walked from the Escort, met the two troopers halfway between the Escort and his police cruiser, and informed them of the events concerning this traffic stop as follows: I told them that I had stopped him for speeding and told them that he advised me he was coming from New York going to North Carolina, but I didn’t locate any luggage or type of clothing that would support he was in New York for two days. I also told them that I could detect an odor coming from his vehicle and that he had a large number of little trees and type of air fresheners in his vehicle and the odor coming from the vehicle was not that of the trees or the other little baggies of air fresheners 6 that he had in the vehicle. Trooper Graham testified on cross-examination that from the time when he first radioed in the traffic stop up to the time ⁵⁶⁵ when the two backup troopers arrived on the scene, approximately five minutes had elapsed.

Based on Trooper Graham’s suspicions, Trooper Prince, a licensed trained handler of K-9’s with the Maryland State Police, decided to scan the Escort for illegal drugs with his assigned narcotics dog, “Sage.” At this point, Trooper Graham returned to his vehicle to finish filling out the traffic stop documents. Trooper Penn approached the Escort, advised petitioner that Trooper Prince and Sage were going to conduct a scan of the Escort, and he informed petitioner that he needed to exit his vehicle. Trooper Penn testified that petitioner exited the vehicle and he, as a safety precaution, conducted a “pat down” of petitioner’s outer garments in the area around his waist and did not find any weapons or contraband. Petitioner and Trooper Penn remained in an area in front of the Escort while Trooper Prince and Sage performed a scan of the vehicle.

Two scans of the perimeter of the Escort were performed. On both scans, Sage alerted to the presence of drugs at the driver’s side door of the Escort. Trooper Prince testified that: K-9, as always, I started at the left rear bumper, counterclockwise scanned the vehicle. K-9 Sage came up on the driver’s door and showed a noticeable change.

When I say noticeable change, his mouth closed up, he intensively searched the driver’s door area, tail started wagging. His ears stood up a little bit and he aggressively searched that area of the driver’s door, and gave a very solid alert, sitting down, almost immediately, once we targeted a certain area of the driver’s door. It was a very hard, very fast response. Through my training and working with the dog I have come to know the dog.

The alert he gave at that time told me that there was a strong, strong presence of one of the narcotics which he is imprinted on. K-9 Sage is imprinted on four narcotics, cocaine, heroin, marijuana and hashish. ⁵⁶⁶ At this time I took the dog away from the vehicle, I did a second scan to try and get the dog to finish scanning the entire vehicle. Again, when he came up on the driver’s door, he again showed a noticeable change, [I] could not get him away from the door, and he again gave a very hard solid response to that door. When he alerts, the way he alerted that time told me there was a very strong odor of whatever narcotic he was smelling at that time.

Trooper Penn testified that after Sage alerted twice at the driver’s side door of the Escort, he informed petitioner that the dog had alerted to the car for the presence of narcotics and that he was going to be detained. Trooper Penn handcuffed petitioner, placed him in the front passenger seat of his police cruiser, and locked the door. After Sage’s alert, the three troopers conducted a search of petitioner’s Escort. 7 During the search of petitioner’s Escort, the troopers found numerous air fresheners in unusual locations. 8 Both Trooper Graham and Trooper Prince testified that they found a white powder substance located around the gear shift of the vehicle, which they believed to be cocaine. 9 ⁵⁶⁷ Trooper Graham retrieved a field cocaine test kit from his police cruiser, returned to petitioner’s vehicle, collected a small portion of the white powder, and conducted a field test on it. The test came back positive for cocaine. 10 At this time, Trooper Graham went to Trooper Penn’s vehicle and informed petitioner of the results of the test. 11 During the search the troopers also found an electronic pager, a car phone, and what appeared to them to be a “drug ledger” containing names, telephone numbers, and dollar amounts logged into it.

The troopers conducted a more thorough search of the Escort but failed to find any more illegal contraband. After the troopers completed the search of the Escort, Trooper Prince left the scene to continue his routine patrol, Trooper Graham returned to his police cruiser to finish filling out the paperwork relating to the traffic stop, and Trooper Penn returned to his vehicle to conduct a more thorough search of petitioner’s body. Although it is not entirely clear exactly when Trooper Graham was radioed the results of the status check concerning petitioner’s driver’s license, registration, and possible warrants, it was not completed until after the cocaine had been discovered in petitioner’s car. When he did receive the information, he learned that there was an outstanding warrant in New York for a person with a name similar to petitioner’s. 12 Trooper Graham explained: Yes, some information had come back but it was a discrepancy between the name that [petitioner] had given us ⁵⁶⁸ and the information that he was finding in the computer, the dispatcher, in the barrack, the information relaying to us was this subject was possibly wanted in New York on charges, but there was a few things that were not matching up to confirm that it was definitely this individual and things that were matching up saying that it was, so we was pretty much trying to get that squared away. ...

I don’t have an exact time when it came back, there was a discrepancy, like I said, between what was found in the computer or his alias and what was on the driver’s license, so it was taking a little longer and with out-of-state plates it takes longer. And Trooper Penn testified: I think that — the license came back valid but then I think there was a question because a routine procedure that we utilize is we’ll check his driver’s license, we’ll check to see if he is wanted, and in most cases if some indicators are present, we’ll check to see if he has any past criminal history, so I did a thorough investigation on the roadside. While Trooper Graham was attempting to resolve the matter, Trooper Penn was conducting a more thorough search of petitioner during which he discovered a large brown paper bag tucked in the cuff of the right leg of petitioner’s nylon sweat pants. When he asked petitioner what was in the bag, petitioner replied that he had just picked it up off the ground.

Trooper Penn opened the bag and discovered what appeared to be a large amount of crack cocaine and seven individually sealed bags of suspected marijuana. When Trooper Penn asked petitioner whether there were any more drugs in the car, petitioner replied, “[Tjhat’s it.” A subsequent laboratory test confirmed that the substance in'the bag was 57.5 grams of cocaine. Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress the items found in the Ford Escort, on his person, and his statements to the state troopers. The motion was denied.

At a subsequent bench trial, petitioner was convicted of transporting 28 grams ⁵⁶⁹ or more of cocaine into the State of Maryland in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, section 286A. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. We agree with the holding of that court — the police did not improperly extend the traffic stop in order to permit a K-9 dog inspection of his car. Additionally, we hold that there was probable cause for the search of petitioner.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

II

Discussion In our review of the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to suppress, we are limited to the record of the suppression hearing. See Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 431-32 , 769 A.2d 879, 883 (2001); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282 , 753 A.2d 519, 524 (2000); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368 , 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999); In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 488 , 701 A.2d 691, 693 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1140 , 118 S.Ct. 1105 , 140 L.Ed.2d 158 (1998). We review the facts found by the trial court in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in the case at bar, the State. See Rowe, 363 Md. at 431-32 , 769 A.2d at 883 .

We extend great deference to the fact finding of the suppression court and accept the facts as found by that court unless clearly erroneous. See Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183 , 571 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 83-85 , 771 A.2d 389, 393-94 (2001). We will review the legal questions de novo and based upon the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and the applicable law, we then make our own constitutional appraisal. Id.; see Rowe, 363 Md. at 431-32 , 769 A.2d at 883 ; Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 413-14 , 765 A.2d 612, 615 (2001); Cartnail, 359 Md. at 282-83 , 753 A.2d at 524-25 ; Ferris, 355 Md. at 368 , 735 A.2d at 497 ; In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. at 489 , 701 A.2d at 693 .

Petitioner contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress the items recovered in his vehicle, on his person, and his statements to the police. Specifically, he posits that the ⁵⁷⁰ troopers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the traffic stop past the time necessary to issue him a warning citation, and thus, the canine search of his vehicle was a violation of his constitutional rights. In addition, petitioner contends that Sage’s alert for the presence of drugs did not create probable. cause to handcuff, search, and arrest him. a. The troopers did not improperly extend the traffic stop Petitioner’s contention that the troopers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the traffic stop past the time necessary to issue him a warning citation, and thus, that the canine search of his vehicle was a violation of his constitutional rights, has little merit.

The record establishes that the traffic stop was not so extended. The K-9 unit arrived on the scene and conducted the scan of petitioner’s Escort prior to Trooper Graham receiving radio verification of the validity of petitioner’s driver’s license, vehicle registration card, and warrants check. The traffic stop was ongoing at the time the K-9 scan was employed. At the suppression hearing, there was no evidence that the police extended or delayed the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to reasonably complete the actions needed to resolve the initial purpose for the stop.

A reasonable inference from the evidence in the record is that the K-9 scan occurred while the initial reason for the traffic stop was still being investigated. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. As its plain language indicates, the Fourth Amendment protects the public from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. ⁵⁷¹ 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 550-51 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1875 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 , reh’g denied, 448 U.S. 908 , 100 S.Ct. 3051 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1980).

There is no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. at 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 ; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). It is clear that, as in the case of pedestrians, searches and seizures of motorists who are merely suspected of criminal activity are to be analyzed, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, under the framework established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 . 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (applying Terry analysis to stop of vehicle suspected of transporting drugs); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (applying Terry analysis to stop of vehicle suspected of transporting illegal aliens).

In determining whether there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has stated: The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Reasonableness, of course, depends “on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 , 95 S.Ct. 2574 , 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 , 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 , (1977); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 , 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); Stokes, 362 Md. at 412 -13 n. 7, 765 A.2d at 615 n. 7. ⁵⁷² We recently had the opportunity to summarize several Supreme Court holdings concerning the Fourth Amendment as it relates to traffic stops in Ferris, 355 Md. at 369 , 735 A.2d at 497 -98: The Supreme Court has made clear that a traffic stop involving a motorist is a detention which implicates the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (analogizing the degree of intrusiveness of the usual traffic stop to the degree of restraint imposed by the typical Terry stop).

It is equally clear, however, that ordinarily such a stop does not initially violate the federal Constitution if the police have probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a traffic violation. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has also made it clear that the detention of a person “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion). Because it is not disputed that Trooper Graham, at least in significant part, properly stopped petitioner for exceeding the speed limit, the initial seizure was justified.

Thus, the threshold issue before us concerns the rule of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Royer, supra—whether the traffic stop was longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S.Ct. at 1878 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (“The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”). We noted in Ferris, 355 Md. at 372 , 735 A.2d at 499 : Once the purpose of [the traffic] stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 , 103 S.Ct. at 1325-26 .

Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which ⁵⁷³ implicates the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. In Ferris , a state trooper issued a traffic citation to the driver and returned his driver’s license and registration, then asked the driver to exit the vehicle and continued a line of questioning. The trooper eventually searched the vehicle and discovered a large amount of marijuana. We concluded that the traffic stop came to an end upon the trooper’s delivery of the citation and return of Ferris’s driver’s license and registration and that the continued questioning, which resulted in the discovery of the illegal drugs, amounted to a second seizure, which was unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion.

Ferris is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In the case sub judice, the initial justified detention was not concluded at the time the K-9 dog twice alerted to the presence of narcotics in the car. We do not need to consider whether petitioner consented to a continuing intrusion or whether Trooper Graham at the time of the K-9 scan had a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, because the purpose of the traffic stop was not completed at the time the scan was conducted on petitioner’s Escort. No warning or citation had been issued prior to the K-9 scan.

At that point, it was a single, continuous stop — there was not an end of one stop and the beginning of another. We also find this case in line with our decision in Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1 , 668 A.2d 22 (1995). In Gadson , a prospective visitor to the House of Correction in Jessup, Maryland, was stopped in his truck at a guard booth approximately a quarter of a mile from the prison. At the guard booth, a state trooper 13 informed Gadson that he was going to perform a K-9 scan.

Gadson objected and requested permission to leave the area. The trooper denied the request, conducted a K-9 scan during which the drug dog alerted to ⁵⁷⁴ the presence of narcotics, discovered marijuana in the truck, and arrested Gadson. We held that: The articulated purpose of the detention at issue in this case was to prevent illegal drugs from entering the House of Correction. Once Gadson agreed to turn back from the guard booth, that purpose was wholly accomplished.

Therefore, further detention could only be justified if [the trooper] possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion that Gadson had engaged in criminal activity. Because there was no proper basis for such suspicion, the detention of Gadson was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.... Id. at 20-21 , 668 A.2d at 32 . The rule of law espoused in Gadson holds true today — once the initial purpose for a stop is fulfilled, a continued detention is only permissible if justified by additional independent reasonable articulable suspicion. 14 However, the facts involved in Gadson are distinguishable from the case sub judice because, as we have indicated, supra, the initial purpose for the stop of petitioner’s Escort was not completed and was still ongoing at the time the K-9 scan was conducted.

In the case at bar there was no further unjustified detention as there was in Gadson . The Court of Special Appeals has had the opportunity to consider factually similar cases. In McKoy v. State, 127 Md.App. 89 , 732 A.2d 312 (1999), the Court of Special Appeals dealt with a case with facts almost identical to those in the case sub judice and came to the same conclusion as we do in the case at bar. In that case, the police officer had not yet completed writing the traffic citation when the K-9 unit arrived on the scene, conducted a K-9 scan, and alerted for drugs.

As that court stated: Trooper Nolan had not completed writing the citations for [the driver] at the time the K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle, and he had not yet received a response ⁵⁷⁵ to his request regarding the validity of appellant’s license 15 at the time of the scan. Trooper Nolan did not detain appellant and [the driver] any longer than reasonably necessary to determine whether [there was] a valid license. Id. at 101 , 732 A.2d at 318 ; see In re Montrail M., 87 Md.App. 420, 436-37 , 589 A.2d 1318, 1326-27 (1991) (K-9 search of a vehicle, which detected narcotics, while awaiting results of computer check on driver’s license and vehicle registration, was permissible), aff’d 325 Md. 527 , 601 A.2d 1102 (1992). In Pryor v. State, 122 Md.App. 671 , 716 A.2d 338 , cert. denied, 352 Md. 312 , 721 A.2d 990 (1998), the relevant facts were almost identical to those of the case at bar except in Pryor , the driver who was stopped for exceeding the speed limit was detained and forced to wait on the scene for the K-9 unit to arrive.

The Court of Special Appeals expounded the rule of law noted in Florida v. Royer, supra, by stating that a person stopped for a minor traffic violation “cannot be detained at the scene of the stop longer than it takes — or reasonably should take — to issue a citation for the traffic violation that the motorist committed.” Pryor, 122 Md.App. at 674-75 , 716 A.2d at 340 . 16 The Court of Special Appeals held that waiting for the K-9 unit to arrive amounted to an unjustified second detention. See Graham v. State, 119 Md.App. 444, 456 , 705 A.2d 82, 88 (1998) (detention of the passenger for twenty-five minutes between the initial stop of the vehicle and the arrival of a canine officer and drug-sniffing dog was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment when purpose of stop satisfied within first five minutes); ⁵⁷⁶ Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 662, 673 , 660 A.2d 1068, 1073 (1995) (after the police officer learned that the license and registration were in order, the additional brief delay, which was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, was entirely unjustified); Snow v. State, 84 Md.App. 243, 267 , 578 A.2d 816, 827 (1990) (the purpose underlying the initial traffic stop had been realized when the officer issued the warning, and there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to support the second act of detaining the driver for the K-9 scan of the vehicle). Neither an unjustified extension of the traffic stop, nor such a second detention were present in the case sub judice. In determining whether this traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment by extending beyond the initial purpose of the stop, it is helpful if we again consider the facts and circumstances of the case at bar in their entirety as presented on the record during the suppression hearing.

As we noted, supra, Trooper Graham had probable cause to make the initial traffic stop. His actions throughout the duration of the traffic stop were legally permissible, albeit thorough. From the time Trooper Graham pulled petitioner’s car over to the side of the road to the time the K-9 arrived was approximately five minutes. The scan occurred shortly thereafter.

In any event, the trooper was not constrained by any set time limit. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected imposing rigid time limitations on traffic stops. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 , 105 S.Ct. at 1575 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 . In that case, the Supreme Court noted that as “[m]uch as a ‘bright-line’ rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” Id.

The Supreme Court continued: In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their