Wilson v. State ex rel. Davis

Bowie, C. J., delivered the opinion of this Court: The questions presented by the record in this case, arise upon three demurrers. The first, filed by the appellants to the nar., (which was overruled by the Court below,) involves the description or kinds of vessels included in the Act of 1838, ch. 375, entitled: “An Act to prevent the transportation of people of color upon railroads or in steam boats.” The demurrer to the 4th plea raises the question, of what is the true construction of the words, “to be transported,” in the first section of said Act ? And the demurrer ⁸ to the 5th plea, whether an 'actual escape of the slave transported, was necessary to sustain the action under that section. The demurrers to the pleas being sustained, and that to the nar. overruled, the defendant appealed.

It would be superfluous to recapitulate the rules for the construction of statutes, laid down in the text books, and •repeated in innumerable adjudged cases. The compendium of the law on this subject, in 10 Md. Rep., 277 , furnishes a sound and safe precedent. “The words of the Act are first to be resorted to, and if these are plain in their import, they ought tobe followed. The most eminent judges have expressed regret, that this cardinal rule has been departed from and statutes construed to embrace cases not within the letter, rather presuming what the Legislature meant, than gathering their intent from the language of the law; and this has been done generally, in order that a particular grievance might not go unredressed, when the lawmakers had not made special provision for such cases.” Ld. Tenterden said in 6 B. & C., 475, “There is always danger in giving effect to what is called the equity of the statute; it is much safer and better to rely on and abide by the plain words, although the Legislature might have provided for other cases had their attention been directed to them.” Again, in 13 Md. Rep., 189 , this Court construing the Act now under consideration, used the following language: “The Act must be interpreted by the language employed, which cannot be construed so as to aid that defence, without ascribing to the Legislature an intention not apparent from the letter.” The transportation of slaves, without written permission, was the Act against which this Legislation was directed.

The reasons for passing the lavo, are set out in the preamble.” * * * * “It is true, that statutes are not always to be interpreted by their letter. Sometimes cases not within the words are held to be within the Act, and other cases are by construction taken without the operation of the law, though, cover- ⁹ Ad by tbo language, according to the intent and design of the Legislature to be collected from the whole Act, with •reference also to the mischief or cause of making the law.” Regarding the evil to bo remedied by tbe Act, as declared by this Court in 13 Md. Rep., to he the transportation of Alavés without written permission, and looking to its lam giiage alone, we cannot doubt that tho first section, both In its letter and spirit, applies to the transportation of any slave without the written permission of his owner on any railroad chartered by the State, or any steam boat, tow boat or other vessel navigating the waters of this State, however propelled or moved. Tho enacting clause expressly