Woods v. State

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Retired Specially Assigned Judge. A saga of revenge and murder for hire unfolds on this appeal. The principals are: Michael Kevin Boyd, the victim, and abuser of his wife, ⁵⁹⁶ Jody Boyd, who offered a contract for the murder of her husband to Michael Gregory Woods, who accepted the contract and assembled a hit team consisting of Donald Dare, and James Hayes, a youth 15 years of age, who turned State’s witness. Jody Boyd decided that the best solution to her marital problems, marked by physical abuse inflicted by her husband, was to have him killed.

She asked Woods to do the job, offering to pay him for his services out of monies she expected to receive upon her husband’s death. After mulling over the proposition, Woods agreed to perform the murder on the terms offered. He sought and obtained the assistance of Dare and Hayes. Time went by with nothing being done because the team could not settle upon the best way to fulfill the agreement.

Under pressure from Jody “to complete the job,” the team “came up with the idea to blow [the husband’s] car up with dynamite,” but “this attempt failed.” 1 The team “decided that the only for sure way to get rid of [the husband] was to shoot him.” They got a gun “suitable for the job” from Dare’s house and then “had to think of a way to shoot [the husband].” At first, they were going to shoot him when he arrived home from work, but “cancelled that plan” because “[t]here was too much daylight out.” Woods and Dare contacted Jody to get her thoughts on the matter. At her suggestion, arrangements were made to set the husband up by her persuading him to leave the couple’s apartment at 10:00 p.m. on a certain day to fetch something to eat from a fast-food store. The team went to the Boyds’ apartment complex on the agreed day shortly before the designated time. The husband left the apartment about 10:00 p.m. as planned.

Woods hid next to a truck that was parked near the ⁵⁹⁷ husband’s car. Dare hid nearby. Woods recounted the succeeding events: I then had to wait for him to come back. He came back approximately twenty minutes later.

He got out of his car and started walking towards the building. He walked about ten yards towards the building, which brought him full view where I could see him. He was approximately fifteen yards away when I fired. Hoping I was doing the right thing for Jody’s situation, I aimed the gun at him and squeezed the trigger a few times.

Woods ran back to Dare’s car in which the team had been driven by Dare to the murder scene. On the way Woods heard the husband scream. Hayes was to have the car “running and waiting for us.” Dare had already arrived back at the car. Dare drove the team to Woods’ house to “change and wash up.” They decided “the best thing to do was to burn our clothes.” The next day Woods burned his clothes.

The husband died. The cause of death was four gunshot wounds. Although in his statement to the police Woods said that he threw the gun into the Magothy River, a .32 caliber automatic handgun, recovered from Woods’ home, proved to be the weapon that fired the bullets that killed Michael Kevin Boyd. Woods was charged with the murder of Michael Kevin Boyd and with a spate of offenses related to the homicide and his contract with Jody Boyd.

The case came up for trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Woods opted not to be tried by a jury and placed his fate in the hands of the judge. The judge found him guilty of murder in the first degree (count 1 of the indictment); attempted murder (count 4); conspiracy to dynamite an automobile (count 6); and using a handgun in the commission of the felony of murder (count 7). The following sentences were imposed: 1st count — “to the term of [his] natural life without parole”; 4th count — “to a concurrent life term”; ⁵⁹⁸ 6th count — to a “period of one year concurrent”; 7th count — “to a period of five years ... consecutive to the first count.” I Woods claims that the sentence of life imprisonment without parole is illegal.

(A) The State suggests that the matter of the illegality of the sentence was not preserved for appellate review because Woods did not object when it was imposed. Md.Rule 8-131. We said in Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422 , 488 A.2d 949 (1985), that when the trial court has allegedly imposed a sentence not permitted by law, the issue should ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no objection was made in the trial court. Such review and correction of an illegal sentence is especially appropriate in light of the fact that Rule 4-345(a) ... provides that “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” Id. at 427 , 488 A.2d 949 .

We see no sound reason why we should not review the illegality of the sentence on this appeal. (B) The State did not seek to have Woods executed. But it did want him imprisoned for life without the possibility of parole. It so notified him.

As we have seen, the State obtained what it sought. (1) Woods urges that the legislature intended that a sentence of life without parole may be imposed only upon the sentencing proceedings set out in Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1988 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 413. The key to legislative “intent” is the purpose of the legislation, determined in the light of the statute’s language and context. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 516 , 525 ⁵⁹⁹ A.2d 628 (1987).

The legislative scheme shines bright and clear from the plain and unambiguous language of §§ 412 and 413 of Art. 27 and Maryland Rules 4-341 and 4-342 adopted to implement them as authorized by Art. 27, § 418((); illuminated by the legislative history of the statute. Review of these materials makes plain that the legislative intent was not what Woods would have it be. One of three sentences is authorized upon conviction of murder in the first degree: 1) death; or 2) imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole; or 8) imprisonment for life. Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 412(b).

See Md. Const., Art. Ill, § 60. 2 If the State seeks a harsher penalty than the basic imprisonment for life, it must so notify the defendant at least 30 days prior to trial. Art. 27, § 412(b). The notice may go only to the death penalty, or only to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, or to death and, in addition thereto, imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id.

If the State does not give notice that it is seeking a more severe penalty than life imprisonment, the court may proceed to sentence as it generally does in imposing a penalty authorized upon conviction of any other offense, except for mandatory sentences for crimes of violence as prescribed by Art. 27, § 643B or other statutes. When, however, the State gives notice that it is seeking a harsher sentence than life imprisonment, there must be a separate sentencing proceeding. If the notice goes only to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the separate sentencing proceeding is before the court — a jury is not involved. Maryland Rule 4-842(b) provides: ⁶⁰⁰ When a defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first degree and the State has given timely notice of intention to seek a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, but has not given notice of intention to seek the death penalty, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding as soon as practicable after the trial to determine whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for life without parole.

This is in accord with Art. 27, § 413(k)(5) and (8). 3 When a defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first degree and the State has given the required notice that a sentence of death is sought (be it the only sentence sought or be it sought in conjunction with a sentence of imprisonment for life without parole) so that the defendant may be subject to a sentence of death, the separate sentencing proceeding is much more elaborate. See Maryland Rule 4-343. The proceeding shall be conducted before a jury unless a jury sentencing is waived by the defendant. Art. 27, § 413(b).

Detailed prescriptions are set out in Art. 27, § 413 concerning evidence, argument and instructions, paragraph (c); consideration of aggravating circumstances (d); definitions (e); a finding that no aggravating circumstances exist (f); consideration of mitigating circumstances (g); weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances (h); the determination of the sentence (i); the statements required in the determination (j); and the imposition of the sentence (k). See Md.Rule 4-343(e). It is obvious that the legislature established two separate and distinct procedures for sentencing when a person is convicted of murder in the first degree — one when the person is subject to the death penalty and the other when he is not subject to execution but is subject to incarceration for life without parole. The former procedure calls for the ⁶⁰¹ proceedings set out in such fine detail and a jury unless a jury is waived.

The latter procedure is in the sound discretion of the trial judge. All references in Art. 27, § 418 to the elaborate proceedings are in the frame of reference of the death penalty. See, for example, paragraph (a); paragraph (c)(2); paragraph (f); paragraph (h)(2) and (3); and paragraph (k)(l), (2), (3), (4), and (6). The legislative history of H.B. 693, which was enacted as Acts 1987, ch. 237 and codified as Art. 27, §§ 412 and 413 supports our reading of the statutory text.

The bill added imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole as a penalty for first degree murder. It was “a compromise bill” favored by support from prosecutors, the Public Defender, and others. See Senate Judicial Proceeding Committee, Summary of Committee Report from the Committee Report System of the Department of Legislative Reference, 1987 General Assembly of Maryland at 3. The Report, over the signature of the Committee Chairman, observed: Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is needed as a sentencing option in first degree murder cases because there are people committing heinous crimes; for example, serial killers, who are not eligible for the death penalty.

In addition, a death penalty proceeding is a long, expensive process and a tremendous drain on resources. Life without parole would be less costly and would have the effect of preventing the defendant from killing again. Id. See also the “Bill Analysis” of H.B. 693 submitted by the Department of Legislative Reference to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee.

It is perfectly apparent that the legislature did not intend that the sentencing scheme of § 413 be utilized with respect to a sentence of life without parole. The contention of Woods to the contrary is without merit. (2) Woods declares that if the proceedings called for by § 413 do not apply to a sentence of life without parole, then ⁶⁰² the sentence is unconstitutional. At this point his argument becomes rather difficult to follow.

He concedes that his contention is not one “claiming that the penalty of life imprisonment for first degree murder without parole is, in and of itself, a constitutionally impermissible cruel and unusual punishment.” He states: Such is not the case for certainly, if the sentence of death is constitutionally permissible when suitably directed, limited and guided by objective consideration of both the offense and the offender, then a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be constitutionally permissible if similarly imposed. He explains that his point is that, in this case, where the State gave notice of intent to seek the sentence of life without parole and no other, the statute’s silence on the matter of direction, limitation and guidance in the request for and imposition of this sentence renders the sentence and the statutory authorization of the sentence constitutionally impermissible. He seeks to apply to a life sentence without parole the reasoning of cases which have held the death penalty to be unconstitutional.. “In short,” he states, the constitutional challenge in this appeal is limited to the factual setting of this case. We are not addressing the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment without parole when the State seeks the sentence as part of an alternative to the death penalty and a full death penalty sentencing hearing is held.

He continues: Nor does this appeal address the issue of imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in such a case on the basis of any procedural infirmity or a proportionality analysis. ⁶⁰³ when notified of the State’s intent to seek the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, [he] had to guess at the sentencing procedures if he was convicted of the crime of first degree murder. ⁶⁰² The essence of Wood’s complaint seems to be that when, as here, a life sentence without parole is imposed without following the procedures required for a sentence of death, it ⁶⁰³ is unconstitutionally void for vagueness 4 as offending due process of law. If it violates due process of law, Woods appears to reason it is cruel and unusual punishment. 5 As best we can understand Woods’ argument, he believes that the legislative scheme for the imposition of a life sentence without parole is vague because it is “ambiguous” or “arbitrary.” It is “ambiguous” or “arbitrary” because it lacks the guidelines provided for the death penalty. He avers that That, of course, is simply not so. Although limited here to a choice between life imprisonment or life imprisonment without parole, the judge otherwise would be guided by the same consideration and restrictions as in the imposition of any sentence other than the death penalty or a sentence required to be mandatory.

The discretion a judge may exercise in sentencing has long been firmly established and consistently applied. In the absence of statutory mandates, “[n]othing in the law requires that Guidelines sentences or principles be applied; they complement rather than replace the exercise of discretion by the trial judge.” Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 370 , 470 A.2d 337 (1984). We laid it all ⁶⁰⁴ out in Smith v. State, 308 Md. 162 , 517 A.2d 1081 (1986). We noted in Smith that “a sentencing judge is vested with virtually boundless discretion.” Id., 308 Md. at 166 , 517 A.2d 1081 , quoting Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480 , 425 A.2d 632 (1981).

We explained: The sentencing judge is accorded this broad latitude to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing — punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation. A sentence should be premised upon both the facts and circumstances of the crime itself and the background of the individual convicted of committing the crime. The strict rules of evidence do not apply at a sentencing proceeding____ Smith, 308 Md. at 166 , 517 A.2d 1081 (citations omitted). We looked to Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 , 69 S.Ct. 1079 , 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949): “A sentencing judge ... is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt.

His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant — if not essential — to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.” Smith, 308 Md. at 167 , 517 A.2d 1081 , quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 , 69 S.Ct. at 1083 . We cautioned, however: There are, of course, some restrictions piaced upon the judge presiding at the sentencing proceeding.

A sentence cannot violate any constitutional requirements such as the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment; the sentencing judge cannot be motivated by prejudice, ill-will or any other impermissible considerations; and the sentence itself cannot exceed any limitation set by statute. In addition to these limitations, the prosecution ⁶⁰⁵ must disclose to the defendant or counsel any information the State plans to present before the judge for consideration in sentencing. Such notice affords a defendant the opportunity to refute or discredit this information. Id., at 169-170, 517 A.2d 1081 (citations omitted).

See Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811 , 490 A.2d 1289 (1985). The legislature may, of course, circumscribe the judge’s discretion as it has done with respect to the death penalty. But the plain and unambiguous language of Art. 27, §§ 412 and 413 and Maryland Rules 4-341 and 4-342 leave no doubt that the legislature intended that the imposition of a life sentence without parole shall remain under traditional sentencing procedures. This scheme does not offend the federal Constitution, and the Maryland Constitution bestows upon the General Assembly the power over parole “in whatever manner the General Assembly may prescribe.” See note 2, supra.

(3) Woods contends: “It is entirely appropriate to look to the death penalty cases in the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of the Maryland statute____” Woods relies on the Supreme Court’s analysis of death penalty statutes but he asks this Court to ignore the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), 6 the justices clearly were compelled by the “uniquely and unusually severe punishment” of death. 408 U.S. at 305 , 92 S.Ct. at 2760 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart in his concurrence expressed the fundamental distinction: The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability.

It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic pur ⁶⁰⁶ pose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 , 92 S.Ct. at 2760 . See State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 624-625 , 530 A.2d 1223 (1987), quoting Justice Brennan dissenting in Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 , 102 S.Ct. 703, 705 , 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982).

In essence, Woods argues that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is relatively the equivalent of death itself. The Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 , 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), again drew the distinction: Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100 year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 , 96 S.Ct. at 2991 .

Furthermore, we observe that the Governor, upon due notice may pardon any person, convicted of crime, on such conditions as he may prescribe, or he may upon like notice remit any part of the time for which any person may be sentenced to imprisonment on such like conditions without such remission operating as a full pardon to any such person. Maryland Code (1957, 1986 Repl.Vol., 1988 Cum.Supp.), Art. 41, § 4-513. See § 4-516(b)(3)(ii) and § 4-514. But, [i]f eligible for parole ... an inmate serving a term of life imprisonment ... shall only be paroled with the approval of the Governor.

Code, Art. 41, § 4-516(b)(4). We note that the Governor may, upon due notice, “commute or change any sentence of death into penal confinement for such period as he shall think expedient.” Art. 41, § 4-513. See Md. Const., Art. II, § 20. But, of course, once a person has been executed, he is beyond the mercy of the Governor.

We do not agree ⁶⁰⁷ with the notion that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is, even relatively, the equivalent of death itself. The death penalty cases cited by Woods to support this view are simply inapposite. (4) At the penalty stage of the trial, the court conducted a separate sentencing proceeding. The judge had before him “a packet of documents.” Included in the packet were a booklet showing Woods’ participation “in a ministry program at the Anne Arundel Detention Center while he [was] incarcerated there,” and “two letters of recommendation or character-type references from officers at the ...

Detention Center on behalf of Mr. Woods.” The judge also had, and considered, a presentence investigation report from the Department of Parole and Probation, a letter from the Reverend Gerald Kurek of St. Mary’s Church “with regard to his involvement” with Woods, and a number of “individual character reference letters from friends and acquaintances” of Woods, “[a]ll of which speak very highly” of him. Defense counsel submitted two psychological reports of examinations made of Woods which tended to explain his actions. Woods’ father (who was subjected to vigorous cross-examination) and his mother testified under oath on behalf of their son, as did the minister of Lake Shore Baptist Church. Woods personally and through counsel made a statement and presented information in mitigation of punishment pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-342(e).

The prosecutor was heard. It is apparent that there was a plenary hearing separately conducted by the court on the matter of the sentence to be imposed. We conclude that the sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed on the conviction of Woods for murder in the first degree did not offend the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Maryland. It neither denied him due process of law nor subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment.

All the required procedures were followed by the court in imposing the sentence. The sen ⁶⁰⁸ tence is in accord with legislative enactments and the rules adopted by this Court. It is not contrary to the case law of this State. In short, the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole imposed on Woods was legal.

II Woods next attacks all of the judgments entered against him. The basis of his challenge is that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. 7 At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel limited the allegation of error to the matter of probable cause for Woods’ arrest. A detective of the Anne Arundel County Police Department, assigned to the Homicide Division, and designated as “the primary investigator” of Boyd’s homicide, testified as to the circumstances leading to the arrest of Woods. He was told by Mrs. Sherry Rutherford that she had overheard a conversation before the murder between Woods, Dare, and Jody Boyd “in reference to a quote unquote getting rid of her husband, Michael Boyd.” She gave the detective a description of Woods and informed him that Woods was an old boyfriend of a girl named Michele Madden.

The detective located Madden and one Greta Kemp who was a half-sister of Dare. Madden told him that before the murder she overheard Woods and Dare speaking with Jody Boyd “with reference to having [Jody’s] husband being taken care of — gotten rid of.” Madden also reported that Woods told Jody: “[H]e would take care of it.” He didn’t know how he was going to do it, but he would do this for Jody. Thereafter, before the murder, Woods called Madden to get Jody’s telephone number so he could contact Jody. Madden ⁶⁰⁹ told the detective that after the murder she and Kemp saw Woods and Dare who asked “if they ... had seen the newspaper articles related to this killing over in Glen Mar Apartments (the scene of Michael Boyd’s murder).” The detective was informed by Kemp that [s]he had heard from Michael Woods and from Donald Dare that [Woods] had in fact shot Michael Boyd.

He had also made comments that beforehand that he planned on assisting Jody Boyd by killing her husband for her, using the word — the terms “getting rid of” and things of that nature. The detective obtained Woods’ address from the Motor Vehicle Administration. Greta Kemp resided with Dare and Ms mother and stepfather, the parents of Greta. Mr. Kemp phoned the detective after the police had interviewed Greta and told the detective that he was missing a gun from his house, a thirty-two automatic from his closet and some other items, ammunition belonging to that gun.

In response to the phone call, the detective went to the Kemp residence “and obtained all the information about the missing weapon and the other missing items.” Mr. Kemp told the police that Woods and Dare were together in Dare’s car “an older model, dark blue Pinto hatchback.” Efforts made to obtain the tag number from the Motor Vehicle Administration were unsuccessful “because apparently it wasn’t registered under the make of that car.” The detective informed the hearing judge that the cause of Michael Boyd’s death was four gunshot wounds from a small caliber weapon. The police placed Woods’ residence under surveillance. The officers assigned to the stakeout were told “to look for a dark blue older model hatchback Pinto, tag unknown,” that Dare and Woods were together, and that Dare was expected “to drop Woods off at this location using this blue Pinto.” They were given the description of Woods. A short time later the detective was informed by the stakeout officers that they saw a man answering the description of Woods getting into a dark blue Pinto in front ⁶¹⁰ of Woods’ house.

The detective and the other officers followed the car and, “with the assistance of the uniformed division,” had the car pull over to the side of the road. There were four occupants in the car. 8 “[T]hey were all searched for officer protection.” A .22 caliber semi-automatic handgun was recovered from Woods’ rear pocket. The detective told Woods that he was under arrest, and he was taken to the Criminal Investigation Division in Crowns-ville. Defense counsel submitted.

He argued that the police should have obtained a warrant, but upon inquiry by the court he conceded that it did not matter that the police could have gotten a warrant but did not get one. He said: “I had to make that argument for the record.” The judge said: We’ve got oodles of evidence that a Michael Woods made the statements that he made and then we have the police finding a Michael Woods whose description meets the description given in an address not far from the scene, though Pasadena is an awful big place. And we have a person meeting the description of Michael Woods ... entering a vehicle next to or near the home of Michael Woods or the address of Michael Woods and the vehicle happens to be a vehicle which is the same description except for the tag that isn’t actually the same vehicle involved. I think it’s enough for probable cause.

We agree. The evidence Woods sought to suppress was obtained by the police after his arrest — a confession made upon a custodial interrogation, and the murder weapon, seized upon a warrantless search of his residence. As we pointed out supra, at the suppression hearing defense counsel limited the grounds for his motion to suppress this evidence to the ⁶¹¹ contention that the police lacked probable cause for Woods’ arrest. Woods puts it this way in his brief: [I]f the arrest was found to be invalid the later statement and seizure would be inadmissible and if the arrest was found to be validly effectuated then the pretrial motion to suppress would be denied.

Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 594B(c) provides: A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed or attempted and that such person has committed or attempted to commit a felony whether or not in the officer’s presence or view. The statute is declarative of common law rules of arrest without a warrant. Stevenson v. State, 43 Md.App. 120, 127 , 403 A.2d 812 (1979), aff'd, 287 Md. 504 , 413 A.2d 1340 (1980). As a general rule, whether an arrest for a felony without a warrant is constitutionally valid necessarily turns upon whether,