Attorney Grievance Commission v. Worsham

McDonald, j. Among other things, an attorney is an “officer of the legal system and a public citizen.” 1 If this is a special role in a nation that prides itself on the rule of law, then it entails a special responsibility to abide by the law. It also means that, when acting as an advocate, a lawyer must advance only arguments that are good faith interpretations of existing law or good faith efforts to change existing law. Fraudulent conduct and frivolous argument to avoid a civic obligation are antithetical to the lawyer’s role.

Respondent Michael Craig Worsham carved out a practice that concentrated in the private enforcement of federal and state laws prohibiting unsolicited faxes and telephone calls—a role specifically provided in those statutes that augments public enforcement efforts and that is sometimes referred to as a “private attorney general.” 2 Mr. Worsham, however, proved to be less law-abiding in the conduct of his private affairs. As his practice grew more lucrative, he ceased to file income tax returns or pay income taxes. When detected, he attempted to justify his conduct with well-worn meritless arguments about the constitutionality and validity of the federal income tax—arguments that he repeated in his filings with us even after he had lost at every level in the federal courts and that, he ultimately conceded, had no bearing on his obligation to comply with State tax laws. We hold that the willful failure to file income tax returns and pay income taxes, when done with fraudulent intent, merits disbarment. ¹¹⁰ Background Procedural Posture In May 2013 the Attorney Grievance Commission (“Commission”) charged Mr. Worsham with violating numerous provisions of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and related Maryland Rules.

The alleged violations can be divided into two categories: (1) violations related to Mr. Worsham’s failure to file federal and State income tax returns and to pay income taxes for tax years 2005 through 2012; and (2) violations related to Mr. Worsham’s representation of four clients during the same time period. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), this Court designated Judge Angela M. Eaves of the Circuit Court for Harford County to conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the hearing judge issued a 91-page memorandum detailing her findings of fact and analyzing the application of the MLRPC and Maryland Rules to those facts. She concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Worsham had committed nearly all of the violations alleged by the Commission—including, specifically, violations of MLRPC 1.2(a) (scope of representation and allocation of authority between client and lawyer), 1.4 (communication), 1.5 (fees), 1.8 (conflict of interest), 1.9 (duties to former clients), 1.15 (safekeeping property), 1.16 (declining or terminating representation), 3.1 (frivolous claims and contentions), 8.1 (failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel), and 8.4 (misconduct), as well as Maryland Rules 16-606.1 (trust account record-keeping) and 16-607 (commingling of funds).

The hearing judge found that Mr. Worsham did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence anything that would mitigate the sanction we should impose. In November 2013, while this matter was pending before the hearing judge, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland temporarily suspended Mr. Worsham from his right to practice in that court. That action was a ¹¹¹ result of Mr. Worsham’s failure to file tax returns and pay taxes for 2006. The temporary suspension was later modified to an indefinite suspension with a right to reapply two years after the date of suspension.

Based on that court’s action, we granted the Commission’s motion to suspend Mr. Worsham pending resolution of this case. Following oral argument in this case in October 2014, we issued a per curiam order disbarring Mr. Worsham. We now explain the reasons for Mr. Worsham’s disbarment. As the hearing judge found, the evidence concerning the tax-related violations is overwhelming.

Because disbarment is the appropriate sanction for those violations under our case law, we need not reach the alleged violations arising out of Mr. Worsham’s representation of his clients. 3 See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kobin, 432 Md. 565, 585 , 69 A.3d 1053 (2013) (when a respondent has violated numerous provisions of the MLRPC, this Court need only refer to “those violations that, standing alone, warrant disbarment”). ¹¹² Facts The facts recounted in this section are derived from the hearing judge’s findings of fact and undisputed matters in the record. Mr. Worsham’s exceptions to the fact findings are noted and discussed below. Bar Admission and Legal Practice Mr. Worsham was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1998. He is also licensed in the District of Columbia.

During the period relevant to this proceeding, he operated a solo practice out of his home in Harford County focused on consumer rights under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act and its Maryland counterpart. 4 Tax-Related Misconduct and Intent Failure to File Returns and Pay Income Taxes Mr. Worsham filed returns and paid income taxes for the tax years 1988 through 2004. He apparently concedes, however, that beginning in 2005 and for the subsequent seven years, he neither filed federal and State income tax returns nor paid income taxes. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) did not immediately react to this deviation from his previous pattern of tax compliance but eventually detected that he had not been in touch and took action. Deliberate Attempt to Conceal Income from Federal and State Tax Agencies Evidence introduced at the hearing concerning Mr. Worsham’s relationships with clients and co-counsel indicated that he attempted to avoid notice by tax agencies.

In particular, Mr. Worsham was co-counsel for a class of plaintiffs in a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. When the case settled in 2012, the sums due counsel for the plaintiffs were forwarded to his co-counsel, Brian L. Bromberg, an attorney licensed in New York. Mr. ¹¹³ Worsham’s share of the attorneys’ fees and costs totaled $71,456.61. In connection with the distribution of counsel fees, Mr. Bromberg asked Mr. Worsham to provide him with a completed IRS Form W-9. 5 Mr. Worsham refused to provide a Form W-9 and instead insisted that a check totaling $71,456.61 “that is due to me for fees and costs” be made out to “Michael Worsham Attorney Trust Account.” Because Mr. Worsham refused to supply a W-9, Mr. Bromberg sent a check payable to Mr. Worsham for $51,448.75, which represented Mr. Worsham’s share, less the mandatory 28% federal tax withholding.

Mr. Bromberg also advised Mr. Worsham that a Form 1099 reporting the income would be filed with the IRS. Mr. Worsham responded by returning the check and filing a motion to enforce the settlement. In his motion, Mr. Worsham alleged that attorneys’ fees and costs, totaling $71,456.61 were due to him under the settlement agreement and that he was not obligated to provide a Form W-9 because the form did not have a federal Office of Management and Budget control number. Mr. Bromberg then filed an interpleader action and deposited the full amount ($71, 456.61) of Mr. Worsham’s share into the registry of the Circuit Court for Harford County.

He advised the court that he did so to avoid a possible violation of the tax laws when processing Mr. Worsham’s payment. 6 Before the hearing judge in this case, Mr. Worsham testified that he wished to deposit his share of the funds into his attorney trust account because, at the time, he believed that it included client funds. He testified that he later came to ¹¹⁴ understand that the funds did not belong in his trust account, but that he had never considered asking Mr. Bromberg for a check payable to his business account. The hearing judge found that Mr. Worsham “willfully, knowingly, and purposefully attempted to deposit his earned fees into his Maryland attorney trust account for the sole purpose of defrauding and hiding this income from the federal and state taxing authorities.” The hearing judge discounted Mr. Worsham’s testimony that he originally thought the sum included client funds as dishonest, noting that Mr. Worsham had referred to the funds at that time as “my fees and costs.” Tax Litigation with the IRS In September 2009, the IRS issued to Mr. Worsham a Notice of Deficiency alleging that he owed $6,357.00 in income taxes and penalties for tax year 2006 based on information from certain 1099 forms filed with the IRS. Mr. Worsham responded by filing a petition with the United States Tax Court challenging the Notice of Deficiency and arguing that the federal government did not have the authority to tax his earnings as income.

On September 28, 2010, after learning that the IRS had issued a subpoena to his bank for his account records in connection with that proceeding, Mr. Worsham sought to dismiss his petition in the Tax Court. That same day, he sent a fax to the bank indicating that the subpoena should no longer be valid as a result of his effort to dismiss the case and that the bank should not be required to produce his bank account records. The Tax Court subsequently denied his motion to dismiss and the bank evidently produced the records sought by the IRS. The Tax Court found that Mr. Worsham failed to report nearly $200,000 in taxable income for 2006 and found him liable for the related deficiency. 7 Worsham v. Comm’r of Internal Rev., T.C. Memo. 2012-219 , 2012 WL 3101491 (July 31, 2012).

The Tax Court also found by clear and convincing ¹¹⁵ evidence that the deficiency for 2006 was due to fraud and listed a number of factors on which it relied—Mr. Worsham’s pattern of failing to file tax returns in light of a previous history of tax compliance; the coincidence of the failure to file returns with the increasing profitability of his practice; his assertion of “tax-protester arguments” upon detection; his education, training, business experience, and intelligence; and his effort to prevent the IRS from obtaining his bank records by attempting to dismiss the Tax Court action. 2012 WL 3101491 , at ⁶-8. The Tax Court also found that Mr. Worsham had raised a “multitude of frivolous and groundless positions.” 8 The Tax Court did not sanction Mr. Worsham for taking those positions, noting that it was the first time he had made such arguments to that court, but warned him that repetition of those arguments in the future would likely result in the imposition of sanctions. Mr. Worsham appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Before the Fourth Circuit, Mr. Worsham did not deny that he had failed to pay income taxes, nor did he dispute the amount of the deficiency.

Instead, he reiterated his argument that the federal government lacked the authority to tax his earnings as income. The ¹¹⁶ Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in an unpublished opinion. Worsham v. Comm’r of Internal Rev., 531 Fed.Appx. 310 (4th Cir.2013) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 960 , 187 L.Ed.2d 786 (2014). The Fourth Circuit stated that it found Mr. Worsham’s argument that his earnings are not taxable income to be “meritless” and affirmed the Tax Court’s finding that Mr. Worsham failed to file a 2006 federal return with fraudulent intent.

Subsequent Efforts to Resolve Tax Deficiencies At the evidentiary hearing in this matter and at oral argument before this Court, Mr. Worsham contended that he was attempting to resolve his income tax liabilities. Although Mr. Worsham claimed to have satisfied the 2006 federal income tax liability that was the subject of the tax litigation after the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari, he failed to produce any documentation to support his testimony. He stated that he had sent a check to the State Comptroller in the amount of $7,000 to satisfy his State income tax liability for that year, but did not provide a copy of the check or any documentation that it represented his actual tax liability. With respect to tax year 2005, Mr. Worsham testified that he had forwarded a tax return and payment to the IRS the week before the hearing in this case, although he had not signed the form (and therefore had not attested under penalty of perjury that it was correct).

He did not produce a copy of the form or check. With respect to tax years 2007 through 2012, Mr. Worsham submitted letters written by him dated July 17, 2013 and July 28, 2013 indicating that he had sent several checks to federal and State tax agencies in satisfaction of his income tax obligations for that period, although he provided no proof, other than his testimony, that the checks existed or that the amounts satisfied his tax obligations. Moreover, although he said he had sent those checks three months before the disciplinary hearing, as of the time of the hearing he had not yet filed tax returns reporting his income for those years. Somewhat at odds with his assertions that he was assiduously attempting to comply with his tax obligations, Mr. ¹¹⁷ Worsham reiterated before us some of the same arguments found frivolous in the federal courts contesting his liability for federal income taxes.

As Mr. Worsham appeared to concede at oral argument, none of those arguments pertain to his liability for State income taxes. The Hearing Judge’s Findings as to Mr. Worsham’s Intent Based on the evidence presented to her, the hearing judge found that Mr. Worsham failed to file federal and State income returns and to pay income taxes “willfully, knowingly, and purposefully” for the tax years 2005 through 2012 9 and that he acted with intent “to defraud federal and state taxing authorities.” (Mr. Worsham excepts to this characterization of his intent—an exception that we will consider in some detail in the next section of this opinion). Mr. Worsham purposefully avoided contact with federal and State income tax agencies; he showed no intention of satisfying his tax obligations until he was detected; once the IRS notified him of the deficiency for 2006 he did not take any meaningful action and instead filed a frivolous petition; and thereafter attempted to thwart the IRS’ efforts to obtain information concerning his income by trying to dismiss his Tax Court petition and faxing a letter to his bank the same day advising the bank that it should not have to comply with an IRS subpoena. When Mr. Worsham did take steps toward compliance, that action was to file a 2006 return without attesting to its accuracy under penalties of perjury.

In addition to his frivolous petition in the Tax Court, Mr. Worsham filed a frivolous and groundless appeal with the Fourth Circuit. The hearing judge found that Mr. Worsham’s testimony at the hearing in this case was “at the best, not credible and at the worst, misrepresentations to the Court.” ¹¹⁸ Suspension by the Federal District Court Although not part of the hearing judge’s findings of fact, it is undisputed that, following the Fourth Circuit’s decision affirming the Tax Court with respect to his failure to file a 2006 federal tax return, Mr. Worsham was suspended from practice in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland as of November 7, 2013, with a right to reapply two years from that date. The panel of the federal district court noted the universal rejection by various courts of Mr. Worsham’s frivolous arguments disputing his obligations under the federal income tax law and concluded that “he has not completely accepted responsibility for his obligations to comply, truthfully and honestly, with established tax laws.... ” Mr. Worsham’s Exceptions Mr. Worsham filed multiple exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings related to his failure to file tax returns and pay income taxes, most of which relate to her finding that he acted with fraudulent intent. As always, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

See Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B). Applying that standard, we overrule Mr. Worsham’s substantive exceptions and explain why. 10 Description of Mr. Worsham’s Testimony Mr. Worsham asserts that the hearing judge misquoted or mischaracterized his testimony in her written memorandum when she concluded that he acted with fraudulent intent. He identifies five excerpts from the transcript. For the most part, they are instances in which the hearing judge paraphrased his testimony accurately, but sometimes used quotation marks for that paraphrase, although the paraphrase did not precisely match the transcript. 11 ¹¹⁹ First, the hearing judge stated that “when asked whether he had paid his taxes, [Mr. Worsham] replied ‘What taxes?

I pay gasoline taxes, sales taxes....’” According to the transcript, when asked to explain how he had paid taxes since 2005, Mr. Worsham stated “Well, there’s gasoline tax, there’s sales tax.” Second, the hearing judge found that when asked whether he had filed income tax returns for specific years, Mr. Worsham answered “I sent documents to the IRS.” The transcript demonstrates that Mr. Worsham answered: “I sent the IRS, I think it was about 15 pages altogether for 2005 that was all of the forms for 1040, for an S corporation, and a whole bunch of these schedules they have that my accountant and I worked out.” Third, the hearing judge found that, when asked whether he had reported income to the IRS and the Maryland Comptroller, Mr. Worsham replied “What is your definition of income?” The transcript indicates that Mr. Worsham’s statement was “You’re going to have to define income.” Fourth, the hearing judge found Mr. Worsham did not sign his 2005 tax return because “he could not affirm, under the penalties of perjury that the statements contained in the return were correct.” Mr. Worsham testified that he did not sign the return because he “could not sign under penalty of perjury what they want me to sign.” Finally, the judge quoted Mr. Worsham as stating that his personal tax matters have nothing to do with his ethical obligations under the MLRPC. In his opening statement, Mr. Worsham stated that “the tax issues are not related to my practice of law. I do not do tax law. I do not give advice on taxes at all, and it’s not related, then, to professional misconduct, if there is something amiss there.” At the end of the hearing, Mr. Worsham stated, “I said this in opening statement and I will say it again, that the tax issues are completely personal.

They’re not related in any way to clients or giving clients advice on taxes.... It’s not a professional conduct related [sic], and because the Tax Court is set up to allow a ¹²⁰ person to challenge a tax or alleged tax before payment, that is specifically in the administration of justice.... ” In each instance, the substance of Mr. Worsham’s testimony or opening statement was accurately described by the hearing judge. There is no basis for us to find that she mischaracterized his testimony or that it was clearly erroneous for her to conclude that his testimony was “absurd, and evasive to outright misrepresentations.” In addition to the substance of his testimony, the hearing judge’s assessment of his credibility was informed by other factors, such as witness demeanor, on which we defer to the hearing judge. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zimmerman, 428 Md. 119, 134, 137 , 50 A.3d 1205 (2012).

Mr. Worsham’s exception to the hearing judge’s credibility determination is overruled. Mr. Worsham’s Letter to his Bank Mr. Worsham states that the hearing judge erred in finding that his simultaneous filing of a notice of dismissal in the Tax Court and faxing of a letter to his bank that suggested it need not comply with the IRS subpoena was indicative of fraudulent intent. Mr. Worsham argues his notice of dismissal is not evidence of fraud because it ultimately helped delay the trial date in that case. Mr. Worsham further explains that his fax to the bank advising it to disregard the IRS subpoena for his bank records was sent with the altruistic intention of relieving the bank from the burden of complying with the subpoena.

Moreover, he asserts that, by its own terms, the letter reflected only Mr. Worsham’s opinion and did not direct the bank to take particular action. The hearing judge discounted Mr. Worsham’s testimony regarding his intent in sending the letter to the bank, as the hearing judge was entitled to do. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ross, 428 Md. 50 , 63 n. 6, 50 A.3d 1166 (2012), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 1723 , 185 L.Ed.2d 789 (2013); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Byrd, 408 Md. 449, 473 , 970 A.2d 870 (2009). The Tax Court’s decision to delay the date of trial in response to the notice of dismissal is not relevant to ¹²¹ Mr. Worsham’s intentions in seeking to dismiss that case.

The exception is overruled. Other Indicia of Fraud In support of her finding of fraud, the hearing judge noted that Mr. Worsham purposefully avoided all contact with State and federal tax agencies, showed no intention of fulfilling his obligation to pay income taxes, and failed to take any meaningful action following the Notice of Deficiency and instead filed a frivolous petition in the Tax Court. 12 Mr. Worsham disagrees with these findings and points out that he dealt with the IRS throughout his litigation in the Tax Court, that he sent letters to the IRS and the Maryland Comptroller in July 2013, and that he submitted a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to, and filed a declaratory judgment action against, the IRS in 2012. Mr. Worsham also argues that by filing a petition with the Tax Court, he delayed his obligation to pay income taxes for 2006 until the litigation ended in January 2014. Mr. Worsham’s contacts with the tax agencies beginning in October 2009, following the receipt of the Notice of Deficiency, were properly disregarded by the hearing judge in determining whether Mr. Worsham acted with fraudulent intent.

Actions taken in cooperation with authorities subsequent to the misconduct, and then only because it was detected, does not “serve to palliate the evil of his offense.” Attorney Grievance ¹²² Comm’n v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 658 , 745 A.2d 1086 (2000) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Casalino, 335 Md. 446, 452 , 644 A.2d 43 (1994)). Moreover, although “Repayment may mitigate the consequences of the illegal action,” it “does not mitigate the act itself and therefore does not erase a potential disciplinary violation.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tayback, 378 Md. 578, 593 , 837 A.2d 158 (2003) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 600 , 667 A.2d 659 (1995)). Mr. Worsham’s Tax Court petition, letters and alleged payments to the tax agencies, and the filing of his FOIA request and declaratory judgment action occurred subsequent to the detection of his misconduct and, in the case of the 2013 letters and alleged payments, occurred only after this disciplinary proceeding had begun. These subsequent actions are not a basis for finding that he acted innocently in failing to file returns and to pay taxes and do not mitigate the misconduct.

Affirmative Act of Fraud Mr. Worsham argues that the hearing judge erred in finding he acted with intent to defraud because the judge failed to find that he committed an affirmative act of fraud or misrepresentation and because he did not commit common law fraud. Mr. Worsham argues that the failure to file returns or pay taxes cannot constitute fraud, because a failure to do something is not an affirmative act. The hearing judge found that Mr. Worsham willfully failed to file returns and pay taxes, which is proscribed by 26 U.S.C. § 7203 and does not require an affirmative act of fraud. 13 ¹²³ Accordingly, proof of an affirmative act of concealment was not necessary to find Mr. Worsham engaged in criminal conduct. In addition to willfulness, the hearing judge found Mr. Worsham failed to file returns and pay taxes for 2005-2012 with fraudulent intent.

This reflected the Tax Court’s determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Worsham had failed to file a return or pay taxes for 2006 with fraudulent intent. Mr. Worsham’s actions, as well as his omissions, are relevant facts from which intent may be inferred. Moreover, Mr. Worsham’s attempt to deposit earned fees into his trust account in order to conceal that income from the IRS and his refusal to cash a check when the check would trigger the reporting of that income to the IRS, his refusal to provide a W-9 form or tax identification number, and his attempt to conceal the extent of his assets in his bank from the IRS are all affirmative acts that further support the hearing judge’s findings. Willfulness Mr. Worsham argues that in finding that he acted willfully, the hearing judge failed to consider the holding of Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 , 111 S.Ct. 604 , 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991), that a person’s good faith subjective belief that an obligation does not exist, even if that belief is not reasonable, negates willfulness.

Mr. Worsham argues he did not willfully fail to file returns or pay taxes because he had a subjective belief that federal income taxes were not due and that the federal government lacked the legal power to collect them, and that, even if those beliefs are not objectively reasonable, they negate a finding of willfulness. ¹²⁴ The Cheek decision provides little basis for concluding that Mr. Worsham’s misconduct was not willful; indeed, it supports the opposite conclusion. In Cheek , the Supreme Court distinguished between the failure to comply with tax laws resulting from a belief that provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional and a failure to comply resulting from innocent, even if objectively unreasonable, beliefs caused by the complexity of the tax code. A belief that provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional does not negate willfulness. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205-07 , 111 S.Ct. 604 .

Mr. Worsham repeatedly justified his failure to file a return and pay taxes based on his asserted belief that the federal income tax provisions are unconstitutional or otherwise invalid. He has not argued that he made a good faith attempt to comply with the law and that its complexity defeated him. Moreover, as he conceded at oral argument, his frivolous arguments as to the legality of the federal income tax and its application do not apply to the State income tax. To the extent Mr. Worsham’s arguments are directed at issues other than the validity of the federal income tax—such as his argument that wages should not be treated as income—Cheek requires only that the trier of fact have the opportunity to consider such arguments and weigh them against other evidence that demonstrates that the taxpayer knew that wages are treated as income and merely disagreed that this should be so.

See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202 , 111 S.Ct. 604 . Mr. Worsham had ample opportunity to present his position to the trier of fact, the hearing judge in this case, who rejected Mr. Worsham’s positions. The hearing judge assessed Mr. Worsham’s intent consistent with Cheek . Her finding of willfulness was not clearly erroneous.

Alleged Bias of the Hearing Judge Mr. Worsham asserts that Bar Counsel misrepresented to the hearing judge that he had failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel’s investigation into a complaint filed against him ¹²⁵ by one of his clients. Mr. Worsham argues that this misrepresentation prejudiced the judge against him on every issue and led to her unfavorable view as to his credibility. 14 Mr. Worsham’s allegation that the hearing judge disregarded some of his testimony because she must have been biased against him is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that she acted impartially when making the credibility determinations. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jordan, 386 Md. 583, 598 , 873 A.2d 1161 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 381 Md. 680, 701 , 852 A.2d 82 (2004). Even if the hearing judge’s finding that Mr. Worsham failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel as to one of the complaints against him had been erroneous, the existence of one erroneous finding does not render all other findings erroneous or show that the judge was biased.

Additionally, Mr. Worsham’s assertion that he fully cooperated with Bar Counsel—which he did not substantiate with any evidence other than his own testimony until after the hearing judge issued her findings of fact—is not the type of unimpeachable, unambiguous documentary evidence that could render the hearing judge’s credibility determination on all other issues “inherently incredible and unreliable.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 295 , 888 A.2d 344 (2005) (hearing judge’s credibility assessment is entitled to deference unless it is “so contrary to unexplained, unimpeached, unambiguous documentary evidence as to be inherently incredible and unreliable”). Thus, Mr. Worsham has not demonstrated that this one particular finding prejudiced the judge against him throughout the proceeding or that the hearing judge’s credibility determination was unreliable. ¹²⁶ Tax-Related Violations of MLRPC The hearing judge concluded Mr. Worsham’s misconduct related to his failure to file tax returns and pay income taxes violated MLRPC 3.1 (frivolous claims or contentions) and MLRPC 8.4(a) through (d) (misconduct). The hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Worsham’s attempt to prevent the reporting of his income by his co-counsel to the IRS violated MLRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d). Mr. Worsham excepted to all of these proposed conclusions of law.

We review the recommended