Attorney Grievance v. Ficker

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robin Keith Annesley Ficker Misc. Docket AG No. 17, September Term, 2020. Attorney Discipline – Competence & Diligence – Candor Before Tribunal & Misrepresentation – Supervision of Non-Lawyer Assistant – Disbarment. Disbarment is the appropriate sanction where an attorney with a lengthy disciplinary history of similar ethical violations failed to appear for the scheduled trial of a client, and made false statements to that court concerning whether he had reviewed and signed a continuance motion that had been prepared, signed, and filed by his office manager and that contained a materially false statement concerning the position of the opposing party.

Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 19-301.1, 19-301.3, 19-303.3(a), 19-305.3(a)- (b), 19-308.4(a), (c)&(d). Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAE20-15282 Argued: December 2, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 17 September Term, 2020 _____________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ROBIN KEITH ANNESLEY FICKER _____________________________________ Getty, C.J., *McDonald Watts Hotten Booth Biran Gould, JJ. _____________________________________ Opinion by McDonald, J. _____________________________________ Filed: March 3, 2022 *McDonald, J. now retired, participated in the Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal hearing and conference of this case while an Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. active member of this Court; after being recalled 2022-06-07 14:55-04:00 Pursuant to MD Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Respondent Robin K.A. Ficker has been disciplined for professional misconduct on eight occasions, both in this Court and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

Beginning in 1990, when the Attorney Grievance Commission filed the first set of charges against Mr. Ficker, those occasions arose, variously, from his failures to appear in court on dates scheduled for his clients’ trials, failures to adequately prepare for his clients’ cases, failures to supervise the lawyers whom he employed to work on his clients’ cases, lack of candor to the court, and, in one instance, failure to safeguard client property. Four disciplinary proceedings resulted in published opinions. In all, three generations of Bar Counsel have brought charges and 27 members of this Court have deliberated whether a particular sanction for Mr. Ficker’s repeated infractions would deter further such practices and thus protect those who seek out his services. The Court’s prior deliberations resulted in private reprimands, public reprimands, and indefinite suspensions of Mr. Ficker from the practice of law.

Here, once again, the Commission has charged Mr. Ficker with a slate of violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”). In this case, the charges all stem from a situation in which Mr. Ficker failed to appear for a trial in the District Court sitting in Prince George’s County; assured the trial judge that his office had contacted his absent client about the trial date without a basis to believe that assurance to be true; and made contradictory statements as to whether he had personally signed a continuance motion that contained misstatements and that in fact had been signed and filed by his office assistant (a disbarred former attorney). While a missed court date by an over-scheduled attorney who relies on office staff to meet the demands of a busy schedule or a good faith fumble in the filing of a continuance motion would not typically result in disbarment, the circumstances of Mr. Ficker’s cases are far from typical. Mr. Ficker has consistently failed to comply with elementary standards of the legal profession that are intended for the protection of clients and for the efficient administration of justice in our courts.

The sanctions that the Court has imposed on Mr. Ficker in the past have apparently not had the desired effect. The process must come to an end. Mr. Ficker has forfeited the privilege of practicing law in Maryland and will be disbarred. I Mr. Ficker’s Disciplinary History Mr. Ficker has been a member of the Maryland Bar since June 1973.

His lengthy disciplinary history since his admission may be unique in the annals of the bar. This Court has previously observed that his misconduct regarding a single client “cannot be viewed in a vacuum.”1 So, too, the violations currently at issue must be considered in the context of Mr. Ficker’s persistent failure to operate his law practice in compliance with the rules of professional conduct. It has been said that “what’s past is prologue.”2 We begin with a review of Mr. Ficker’s past misconduct. 1 Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13, 32 (1998). 2 William Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act II, sc. 1. 2 This is Mr. Ficker’s fifth appearance before this Court as a respondent in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 319 Md. 305 (1990) (Ficker I); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13 (1998) (Ficker II); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 399 Md. 445 (2007) (Ficker III); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 454 Md. 76 (2017) (Ficker IV).

In addition to those proceedings, Mr. Ficker has twice been the subject of private reprimands by the Commission, as well as reciprocal disciplinary proceedings in the federal district court.3 Ficker I In Ficker I, this Court determined that Mr. Ficker violated the rules of professional conduct in his representation of two clients during the 1980s. In one case, a woman had been charged with driving while intoxicated. 319 Md. at 308-09 . Mr. Ficker agreed to represent her at her trial in the District Court. However, he did not enter his appearance in the case, as required by the Maryland Rules, and did not appear for the trial, apparently because he failed to record the trial date on his calendar.

Unrepresented, the client pled guilty to the charge. 3 As recounted in this opinion, Mr. Ficker may have the unique distinction of having violated three iterations of the rules of professional conduct. At the time he was admitted to the Maryland Bar, the ethical rules were contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Maryland Rules, Appendix F (1971). In 1987, this Court adopted the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”).

Maryland Rule 1230, Appendix (1987). The MLRPC were amended from time to time over the years. Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive change in Title 19, Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. The rules have retained their previous numbering in a modified format, e.g., former MLRPC Rule 1.1 is now MARPC Rule 19-301.1.

For ease of reference and as permitted by the rules, we use the shorter designations of the MLRPC in this opinion. See Maryland Rule 19-300.1(22). 3 The second case also involved a client charged with drunk driving and facing trial in the District Court sitting. 309 Md. at 309-11. Mr. Ficker went to court on the initial trial date but did not enter his appearance, again contrary to the Maryland Rules. The trial was continued at the State’s request because the arresting officer was not on hand, but Mr. Ficker did not receive notice of the new trial date because he had not entered his appearance.

When the case came up again for trial, his unrepresented client was able to explain the situation to the court, and the trial was continued again. This time, Mr. Ficker received actual notice of the new trial date from the client’s mother. He had another matter scheduled for that date in a different court, and he prepared a motion for another continuance of the trial, but his continuance motion never reached the District Court because he had put the wrong zip code on the envelope. Mr. Ficker simply assumed that the continuance motion would be granted and did not appear for the client’s trial.

Although the District Court judge offered to grant the client yet another continuance, the client elected to proceed pro se and pled guilty to the charge.4 In the ensuing disciplinary proceeding, this Court concluded that Mr. Ficker had violated rules of professional conduct regarding neglect of matters entrusted to an attorney, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and lack of diligence. The Court also found that Mr. Ficker had habitually violated a court rule requiring an attorney to enter an 4 Mr. Ficker represented the client without charge in a de novo trial of the charges in the circuit court. The client was convicted again and ordered to pay a fine nearly double that imposed in the District Court. 319 Md. at 311 . 4 appearance in a case – which was itself another violation of the applicable ethical rules.5 In considering the appropriate sanction for these violations, the Court noted that the hearing judge in the disciplinary proceeding had opined that Mr. Ficker now understood “that he cannot again take the filing or approval of his motions for granted” and found that Mr. Ficker had “learned his lesson” with respect to his ethical lapses. The Court issued a public reprimand.6 319 Md. at 323 .

Ficker II Before long, the Commission had received eight complaints regarding Mr. Ficker’s conduct between 1988 and 1992 and once again initiated disciplinary proceedings. During the pertinent time, Mr. Ficker was operating three law offices (in Bethesda, College Park, and Frederick) and handled an estimated 750-850 cases per year, primarily serious traffic violations. 349 Md. at 17 . He employed an ever-changing cast of two or three associates and one non-lawyer office assistant. One of his former associates testified that Mr. Ficker would routinely assign a case the day before trial to an associate who had neither seen the case file nor met the client.

Because the case file often did not include the police report, the associate would only learn the facts of a case through discussions with the prosecutor or the police officer on the morning of trial. Id. at 18 . 5 At the time of these violations, the ethical rules were governed by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 6 One judge would have imposed a 30-day suspension. 5 The Court ultimately determined that Mr. Ficker had violated various provisions of the MLRPC with respect to four clients. One client faced charges including driving while intoxicated in Washington County. 349 Md. at 25-29 . Mr. Ficker requested a jury trial on behalf of that client, but failed to show up for the trial in the circuit court.

The court found him in contempt and fined him $1,000.7 As it turned out, Mr. Ficker had assigned that case to a new associate who had started that same week and had never tried a case before a jury (a fact of which Mr. Ficker claimed to be unaware). The associate received the case file the day before the scheduled trial and was under the impression that his assignment was to go to the District Court and request a jury trial. The associate never entered his appearance in the case, and the client was expecting Mr. Ficker to appear on his behalf. Concluding that “[t]he deficiency here was in failing to supervise the associates ... exacerbated by the manner in which cases were assigned to them,” the Court found Mr. Ficker in violation of Rules 1.1 and 5.1 for failure to ensure that a subordinate lawyer could provide competent representation to the client.

Id. at 28-29 . Mr. Ficker was found to have committed similar violations as to a second client who had also been charged with an alcohol-related driving offense. 349 Md. at 29-32 . This would be a second offense for this client, and a jury trial was requested. While Mr. Ficker and two of his associates had entered their appearances in the case, neither Mr. Ficker nor any of his associates was present when the case was called for trial.

Mr. Ficker was 7 The court struck the contempt finding upon a motion for reconsideration, and Mr. Ficker donated the amount of the fine to the Washington County Library. 349 Md. at 26 n.2. 6 occupied in another court at the time, and a third associate, who had no familiarity with the case and who had been scheduled to be in another court, was sent to represent the client.8 This Court concluded that Mr. Ficker had violated Rule 5.1 (responsibilities of supervising attorneys), noting that the case “cannot be viewed in a vacuum” and that the confusion as to the client’s representation was caused by Mr. Ficker “assigning too many cases to too few lawyers, mostly at the last minute.” 349 Md. at 32 . The Court observed that Mr. Ficker “essentially operated his practice like a taxicab company, with [his office manager] as the dispatcher.” Id. It characterized those practices as “unacceptable,” observing that Mr. Ficker’s client was faced with the “prospect of either falling on his sword or going to trial with a lawyer he never hired and who knew little or nothing about his case.” Id. Three additional violations stemmed from Mr. Ficker’s representation of a third client in the District Court sitting in Montgomery County.

That client, with Mr. Ficker’s advice, pled guilty to driving while intoxicated. 349 Md. at 33-35 . The client’s sentencing was postponed for approximately two months so that he could be evaluated for a special treatment program for repeat offenders. Under the process then in place – of which Mr. Ficker was aware – a defendant’s attorney was required to initiate the evaluation, after which there would be an interval of several weeks for a screening report to be produced for sentencing. Mr. Ficker made one unsuccessful attempt to initiate the evaluation 8 The client ultimately chose to proceed with that attorney, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, and received a jail sentence suspended in favor of probation and a fine. 349 Md. at 29 . 7 immediately after his client’s guilty plea.

However, his office did not try again until days before the sentencing, and the delay resulted in a postponement of the sentencing. The Court found that Mr. Ficker’s lack of diligence violated Rule 1.3 (diligence) and “constituted a knowing disobedience of the judge’s instruction to have his client evaluated in time for sentencing” in violation of Rule 3.4(c). 349 Md. at 35 . As a result of these violations, Mr. Ficker also violated Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).9 Finally, the Court concluded that Mr. Ficker violated the rules of professional conduct in his representation of a fourth client. 349 Md. at 35-42 . That client, who had been charged with driving while intoxicated and several related offenses that were scheduled for two separate trials, responded to a targeted solicitation from Mr. Ficker and scheduled a meeting with him at Mr. Ficker’s office.

Mr. Ficker failed to show up for the meeting. The client provided Mr. Ficker’s office assistant with the two court notices and his own detailed statement of facts. The assistant assured the client that Mr. Ficker would move to consolidate the cases. Mr. Ficker entered his appearance but did not file a motion to consolidate.

When the first case involving the lesser charges was called for trial, no one from Mr. Ficker’s office appeared in court. The client ended up paying the fine specified in the tickets. This Court noted that the explanation Mr. Ficker provided in the disciplinary 9 Ultimately, the client missed the belated appointment, later showed up in court under the influence of alcohol, and was sentenced to 179 days incarceration without ever being evaluated for the treatment program. 8 proceeding for his failure to appear was inconsistent with his testimony in a collateral case regarding a payment dispute. Id. at 37 n.4.

Mr. Ficker did appear for the trial of the second set of charges against the client, but was “wholly unprepared.” 349 Md. at 39 . He had never had any significant discussion with the client and had never spoken at all with the client’s wife (who had been present at the time of the alleged offense) or with any of the officers involved in the case. Mr. Ficker told the client that his best option was to request a jury trial in circuit court. The client agreed to this approach and paid Mr. Ficker an additional fee.

This Court questioned whether Mr. Ficker had even read the detailed statement of facts that the client had left with his office assistant. It noted that Mr. Ficker’s “modus operandi” was to “wait until the morning of trial to learn the facts of the case from last-minute courtroom interviews with police officers, prosecutors, and other witnesses” – a practice the Court found to be at odds with an attorney’s obligation to provide competent representation. Id. In the end, Mr. Ficker never received the notice of the new trial date, which was sent to the wrong address.

As a result, neither he nor his client appeared for trial, and a bench warrant was issued for the client. The client ultimately pled guilty and received probation before judgment and a $200 fine. This Court concluded that Mr. Ficker violated three provisions of the rules of professional conduct in his representation of this client: (1) his failure to adequately prepare for trial violated Rule 1.1 (competence); (2) his lack of a system for checking on the status of cases, instead relying entirely on court notices, violated Rule 1.3 (diligence); and (3) his failure to appear as a result of his inadequate calendaring system violated Rule 9 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). 349 Md. at 39-42 . In concluding that Mr. Ficker had failed to adequately keep track of his cases, the Court observed that an “attorney cannot sit blithely by in blissful ignorance, as though the case doesn’t exist.

There are slips between the cup and the lip; things do get lost in the mail or misdirected … the lawyer does have a duty to his or her client to remain diligent, and that duty is not discharged by placing the file in indefinite hibernation.” Id. at 42 (emphasis in original). In the aggregate, the Court found that Mr. Ficker had committed nine violations of the MLRPC with respect to these four clients. The Court concluded that Mr. Ficker “was running a high-volume operation without adequate managerial safeguards” and that, “as a result, clients were not afforded competent representation.” 349 Md. at 43 . Most of the violations occurred after he had been sanctioned – and all occurred after he had been charged – in Ficker I. It appeared that Mr. Ficker had not in fact “learned his lesson” from the earlier disciplinary proceeding.

As a sanction, the Court suspended Mr. Ficker from the practice of law indefinitely but allowed him to apply for reinstatement after 120 days. As a condition to reinstatement, the Court required, among other things, that Mr. Ficker put in place “systems and procedures” to ensure that the number of cases did not exceed the capacity of his firm, that cases were assigned within the firm in a reasonable and timely manner, that files were reviewed periodically so that the responsible lawyer could stay abreast of their status, and that messages and information regarding cases were promptly brought to the attention of the responsible lawyer. Id. at 44 . Mr. Ficker’s law license was reinstated in August 1998. 10 1998 Private Reprimand Subsequent to Ficker II, in August 1998, the Commission issued a private reprimand to Mr. Ficker – an alternative to a disciplinary proceeding in this Court that is no longer available under the rules – for a violation of Rule 1.1 (competence).

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 399 Md. at 447 n.1. 2002 Private Reprimand In January 2002, the Commission issued another private reprimand to Mr. Ficker for a violation of Rule 1.4 (communication with client). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 399 Md. at 447 n.1. Ficker III After Mr. Ficker had been reinstated to the Maryland Bar, this Court found in Ficker III that Mr. Ficker had committed eight violations of the ethical rules with respect to three different clients. Mr. Ficker was retained to represent the first client in separate trials of charges of driving under the influence and related offenses in Anne Arundel County. 399 Md. at 448-51 .

Mr. Ficker entered his appearance and filed a motion to consolidate trial of the charges, but then failed to advise the client whether the motion had been granted and had no further involvement in the client’s case. At the time, there was no formal system for assigning cases within Mr. Ficker’s office. One of Mr. Ficker’s associates contacted the client the day before the trial. Although the State’s Attorney’s office had already informed Mr. Ficker’s office in writing that the client had two prior convictions, the associate did not learn about the second conviction – on the basis of which the State offered a plea that would likely result in jail time for the client – until the day of trial.

The associate 11 had not previously discussed the possibility of jail time with the client. The client ultimately accepted the plea deal and served 10 days in jail. The Court concluded that Mr. Ficker had violated Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication with client), and 5.1 (responsibilities of supervising attorney). Id. at 450 .

The second client had been charged with stalking, telephone misuse, and harassment. 399 Md. at 451-52 . Mr. Ficker did not enter his appearance in her case until nearly three months after she had retained him. As a result, he was not aware that her trial had been postponed or that the court, believing that the defendant was unrepresented, had scheduled a proceeding for the original trial date to inform her of her right to counsel. The client appeared in court that day, but Mr. Ficker did not.

Mr. Ficker told the client that there had been a “misunderstanding” and “her case had not been entered on the firm’s trial calendar.” Id. at 451 . The trial judge granted the client a further postponement but complained to Bar Counsel about Mr. Ficker’s conduct. This Court concluded Mr. Ficker had violated Rules 1.3 (diligence) and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Id. at 452 .

The third client contacted Mr. Ficker approximately a week before his scheduled trial on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. 399 Md. at 452-54 . Mr. Ficker collected a fee from the client and deposited it into his operating account. He immediately entered his appearance in the case, even though there was no way he or any other attorney in his office would have been able to attend the trial. After his request for a continuance was denied, Mr. Ficker asked a former associate to appear for him and ask for reconsideration of the continuance motion.

That motion was denied, and a warrant was 12 issued for the client, who also had not appeared in court. This Court concluded that Mr. Ficker had violated Rules 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) and 1.15(a) (safeguarding client property). Id. at 454-55 . In devising its sanction in Ficker III, the Court stated that Mr. Ficker’s conduct had demonstrated “an inexcusable lack of concern … for the welfare of his clients” and “an unwillingness, after four warnings, to make the necessary improvements to his office management.” 399 Md. at 455 .

The Court indefinitely suspended Mr. Ficker from the practice of law once again, this time allowing him to apply for readmission after one year. The Court indicated that, if Mr. Ficker were to seek reinstatement, he should “be prepared to demonstrate that he will have in place specific and reliable systems and procedures necessary to ensure that the problems that have plagued his practice for the past seventeen years do not recur.” Id. at 455-56 . Dissenting from the sanction, one member of the Court opined that “[i]f disbarment is not warranted in this case for these types of issues, with a respondent with this history, it will never be warranted.” Id. at 456 (Cathell, J., concurring and dissenting). A year and a half later, Mr. Ficker appeared in this Court in connection with his petition for reinstatement from that suspension.

He was subject to extensive questioning by members of the Court about the reform of his office procedures, and professed to be committed to improving the management of his law office.10 The then-Bar Counsel 10 Petition for the Reinstatement to the Practice of Law of Robin K.A. Ficker, Misc. AG No. 83 (Sept. 2007 Term) (December 4, 2008) (webcast available at https://mdcourts.gov/coappeals/webcasts/webcastarchive2008term (https://perma.cc/Y54T-V6W2)). 13 consented to the petition, but noted that Mr. Ficker had a “sword … hanging over his head” and would likely lose his law license if he found himself before the Court in another disciplinary proceeding. On December 8, 2008, Mr. Ficker was reinstated. In re Reinstatement to Practice of Law of Ficker, 406 Md. 577 (2008).

Ficker IV Mr. Ficker was again the subject of disciplinary action in 2017 in Ficker IV. 454 Md. at 76-77 . That case arose when Mr. Ficker entered his appearance in 2015 in the District Court in Howard County on behalf of a client charged with theft. The trial was scheduled for 9 a.m. on the same date that Mr. Ficker had another matter scheduled for 8 a.m. in the District Court in Montgomery County. Mr. Ficker did not appear for the trial in Howard County, and arrived at that court only after the trial judge placed two calls to Mr. Ficker’s office.

Mr. Ficker maintained that he had instructed his office assistant, Jason Kobin, a former associate who had been disbarred,11 to notify the District Court in Howard County that he would be delayed. However, that court had no record that it had received that information. In the resulting disciplinary matter, Mr. Ficker admitted to the underlying facts in a Joint Petition for Reprimand by Consent filed by Bar Counsel. That petition, which was granted by this Court, recognized that he had violated Rule 8.4(d) by failing to appear punctually in the District Court in Howard County and Rule 5.3(d) by failing to follow that rule’s procedures for employing a disbarred former lawyer as a nonlawyer. 11 See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kobin, 431 Md. 392 (2013) (per curiam disbarment order), 432 Md. 565 (2013) (opinion explaining reasons for disbarment).

As we shall see, Mr. Kobin plays a role in the current case as well. 14 Reciprocal Discipline and Application for Readmission in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland As a result of Mr. Ficker’s suspension from the Maryland Bar in Ficker II, Mr. Ficker had also been suspended from the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland since 1998. In 2017, while Ficker IV was pending in this Court, Mr. Ficker applied pro se to the federal district court for reinstatement to that bar. In a written report on his petition, a three-judge panel emphasized Mr. Ficker’s “cavalier approach” and lack of candor: Of particular note, Ficker misrepresented in his reinstatement petition that he had not been charged with a crime or previously found in contempt. Aside from the falsity of these representations, it demonstrates to the Panel that Ficker appreciates the relevance of such issues in reaching whether he is fit for reinstatement.

Undeniably however, Ficker has been charged with crimes on more than one occasion, convicted at least once, and held in contempt twice, but offers little explanation for why he nonetheless meets the moral qualifications for reinstatement to practice in this Court. Equally troubling is Ficker’s sworn testimony before the Panel. Ficker admitted that he was untruthful in his reinstatement petition, and was so without regard for the responsibility of an attorney to research adequately the matters put before the Court and his duty of candor to the tribunal. Ficker’s cavalier approach to his testimony, his searching for explanations on the stand, and his oddly jocular demeanor, convince this Panel that Ficker treated his reinstatement petition with the same lack of diligence that has plagued his representation of clients for decades.

In re Ficker, 2018 WL 9600450 at ⁵-6 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2018). The Chief Judge of the federal district court ultimately adopted the panel’s recommendation to deny the reinstatement petition and also imposed an additional indefinite suspension from the 15 practice of law before the federal district court as reciprocal discipline relating to Ficker IV. In re Ficker, 2018 WL 9597499 at¹ (D. Md. Sept. 7, 2018). II The Most Recent Alleged Violations by Mr. Ficker A. Procedural Context On June 24, 2020, the Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action alleging that Mr. Ficker violated the following rules of professional conduct: Rule 1.1 (competence), Rule 1.3 (diligence), Rule 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), Rule 5.3 (responsibilities regarding non-attorney assistants), and Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (misconduct).

The alleged violations all relate to Mr. Ficker’s representation of Stephon Sauls in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Prince George’s County. In accordance with Maryland Rule 19-722(a), this Court designated Senior Judge Dwight D. Jackson to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the alleged violations. The hearing judge held a hearing via Zoom on May 20, 2021 and issued a memorandum opinion. The hearing judge found clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Ficker had committed all of the alleged violations.

The hearing judge also identified five aggravating factors and one mitigating factor related to the sanction to be imposed. Mr. Ficker filed exceptions to several of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and each of his conclusions of law. Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions. We held oral argument on December 2, 2021 to consider Mr. Ficker’s exceptions and the appropriate sanction. 16 B. Facts We accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.

Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B). The stipulated facts, the hearing judge’s findings of fact, and other undisputed matters in the record provide the basis for the facts which follow. Mr. Ficker’s exceptions to the findings of fact are considered with the findings to which they relate. 1. Mr. Ficker’s Current Law Practice Mr. Ficker currently works as a solo practitioner out of a law office in College Park.

He handles serious traffic cases and some low-level criminal cases, the vast majority of which are in the District Court. He has employed Mr. Kobin as his office manager since Mr. Kobin’s disbarment in 2013. Mr. Ficker and Mr. Kobin work alongside each other in the same room. Both men testified at Mr. Ficker’s hearing that they “constantly” discuss matters, that they seek to resolve Mr. Ficker’s scheduling conflicts, and that they keep track of his schedule with a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.

As a matter of practice in place before February 2019, Mr. Ficker had authorized Mr. Kobin to prepare, sign, and file motions for continuances on his behalf. Mr. Kobin was expected to seek the consent of the Assistant State’s Attorney handling the particular case prior to filing such a motion. 2. Representation of Stephon Sauls On October 15, 2018, Stephon Sauls hired Mr. Ficker to represent him in three separate traffic cases in the District Court sitting in Prince George’s County. Mr. Sauls agreed to pay Mr. Ficker a flat fee of $399 per case.

This disciplinary proceeding arises from the second of those cases, in which Mr. Sauls was charged with driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle on a highway without a required license or authorization. 17 Scheduling of the February 7 Trial Mr. Sauls had previously failed to appear for a court date in this case in November 2017, and the District Court had issued a bench warrant for him as a result. Although Mr. Sauls had not yet paid Mr. Ficker for this case,12 Mr. Ficker entered his appearance as counsel for Mr. Sauls on November 2, 2018. On November 30, 2018, the court granted Mr. Ficker’s motion to quash the bench warrant, and it reset the case for trial on February 7, 2019 at 8:45 a.m. in the District Court location in Hyattsville. Scheduling Conflict and Delegation of Continuance Motion At least two weeks prior to the February 7 trial date, Mr. Ficker became aware that he had other cases scheduled that morning in both Washington County and Montgomery County.

Mr. Ficker instructed Mr. Kobin to prepare continuance motions for the cases in Montgomery County and Prince George’s County and to seek consent from the prosecutors handling the respective cases. On February 6, 2019, Mr. Kobin prepared and signed Mr. Ficker’s name to a one- page “Line of Appearance and Consent Motion for Continuance” (the “continuance motion”) in the Sauls case and filed it with the District Court in Prince George’s County. Mr. Ficker had neither reviewed the motion nor signed it. Mr. Kobin had signed the filing without indicating in any way that he had signed it on Mr. Ficker’s behalf.

The filing indicated that the “Duty State’s Attorney, Mr. Palisano” had consented to the requested 12 Mr. Sauls had paid the fee for the first case in which Mr. Ficker had represented him in the District Court in Prince George’s County. That traffic case was placed on the stet docket in October 2018. 18 continuance. While an attorney named Michael Palisano had once worked in the State’s Attorney’s Office, he had left the office in June 2018 and was not involved with the Sauls case. Mr. Kobin had filed the continuance motion using an old template without actually contacting anyone in