Attorney Grievance v. Planta

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. William Clark Planta, Misc. Docket AG No. 62, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Battaglia, J. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT – Court of Appeals disbarred attorney who severely neglected clients’ cases by failing to timely appear, or failing to appear at all, and caused clients to be harmed by missing discovery and filing deadlines, resulting in the imposition of sanctions; misappropriated and mishandled client funds by failing to place fees in client-trust accounts and failing to return unearned fees upon the end of the representation; and demonstrated dishonest conduct by lying to the court about his tardiness at a hearing. Such conduct violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) 1.1 (Competence), 1.2 (Scope of Representation), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.15 (Safekeeping Property), 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), 3.2 (Expediting Litigation), 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney), 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters, 8.4(a) (Violating MARPC), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation) and 8.4(d) (Conduct that is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice).

Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No.: 463779-V Argued: December 5, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 62 September Term, 2018 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. WILLIAM CLARK PLANTA ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth Battaglia, Lynne, A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Battaglia, J. ______________________________________ Filed: Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-06-29 15:44-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk William Clark Planta (“Respondent”) was admitted to the Bar of this Court on June 24, 1998.

He maintained an office for the practice of law in Montgomery County at all times relevant to this opinion. The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”) asks us to disbar Respondent for violating certain of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”).1 On February 19, 2019, Petitioner, acting through Bar Counsel, filed against Respondent a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“PDRA”), in response to its investigation of the complaints of six of Respondent’s former clients, Raymond Boteler, Robert Huber, Darshna Patel, Nicarsia Jackson and Brandon Jackson (collectively “the Jacksons”) and LeeAnne Jeffreys. On February 26, 2019, we designated the Honorable Jill Cummins of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to hear this case. With respect to Respondent’s representation of Mr. Boteler, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating MARPC 1.1 (Competence),2 1 On February 15, 2019, Judge Jeannie Cho of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered a Temporary Restraining Order against Respondent, precluding him from practicing law in the State of Maryland, which, upon Bar Counsel’s motion, had been extended through April 18, 2019.

Following a hearing scheduled on June 19, 2019 regarding the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, at which Respondent did not appear, Judge Jill Cummins of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered an Order for Permanent Injunction which precluded Respondent from the practice of law in the State of Maryland pending our review. 2 MARPC 1.1 provides: An attorney shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. 1.2 (Scope of Representation),3 1.4 (Communication),4 1.5 (Fees),5 3 MARPC 1.2, in pertinent part, provides: (a) Subject to sections (c) and (d) of this Rule, an attorney shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. An attorney may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. An attorney shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.

In a criminal case, the attorney shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the attorney, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. 4 MARPC 1.4 provides: (a) An attorney shall: (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19-301(f) (1.0), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. (b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 5 MARPC 1.5 provides, in pertinent part: (a) An attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude any other employment of the attorney; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (continued . . .) 2 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property),6 (continued . . .) (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys performing the service; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 6 MARPC 1.15(a) provides: An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the attorney’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter.

Other property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the date the record was created. 3 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation),7 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)8 and 8.4(a), (c) and (d) (Misconduct).9 With respect to Respondent’s 7 MARPC 1.16, in pertinent part, provides: (a) Except as stated in section (c) of this Rule, an attorney shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; (2) the attorney’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the attorney’s ability to represent the client; or (3) the attorney is discharged. (d) Upon termination of representation, an attorney shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of another attorney, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The attorney may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. 8 MARPC 8.1 provides: An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 19-301.6 (1.6). 9 MARPC 8.4 provides, in part: It is professional misconduct for an attorney to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so (continued . . .) 4 representation of Mr. Huber, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating MARPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 1.16, 8.1 and 8.4(a), (c) and (d).

With respect to Respondent’s representation of Ms. Patel, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating MAPRC 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15(a), 1.16, 3.2 (Expediting Litigation),10 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney),11 8.1 and 8.4(a), (c) and (d). With respect to Respondent’s representation of the Jacksons, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating MARPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15(a), 1.16, 8.1 and 8.4(a), (c) and (d). With respect to Respondent’s representation of Ms. Jeffreys, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating MARPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.16, 3.2, 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal),12 3.4, 8.1 and 8.4(a), (c) and (d). (continued . . .) through the acts of another; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.] 10 MARPC 3.2 provides: An attorney shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. 11 MARPC 3.4, in part, provides: An attorney shall not: (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.] 12 MARPC 3.3, in pertinent part, provides: (a) An attorney shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the attorney[.] 5 Respondent was served with the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, our Order and the Writ of Summons on March 7, 2019.

On March 15, 2019, Bar Counsel propounded on Respondent interrogatories, requests for documents and admission of facts as well as genuineness of documents. Having received no response from Respondent, on April 30, 2019, upon request of Bar Counsel, the circuit court entered an Order of Default. Notice of the default was mailed to Respondent; Respondent did not file a motion to set aside the order of default or otherwise communicate with the court. The circuit court then granted Bar Counsel’s Motion for Sanctions by order entered on June 3, 2019, which resulted in the Petition’s averments being admitted and precluded Respondent from presenting any witnesses or documents at a hearing on the disciplinary matter.

A hearing took place on June 19, 2019, at which Respondent did not appear, resulting in the circuit court admitting Petitioner’s exhibits. On August 23, 2019, Judge Cummins entered her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to which neither party filed exceptions. Respondent failed also to offer any proposal of a sanction, unlike Bar Counsel who recommended disbarment; Respondent also failed to avail himself of the opportunity to appear and argue before us. We disbarred Respondent in a per curiam order issued December 6, 2019.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Planta, 466 Md. 434 (2019). In this opinion, we explain that decision. In our review of the record, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136 , 168– 69, 105 A.3d 533, 552 (2014). “Under our independent review of the record, we must 6 determine whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing evidence.”13 Id.

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 73 , 753 A.2d 17, 26 (2000)). “A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous if there is any competent evidence to support it.” Id. at 169 , 105 A.3d at 552 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 , 85 A.3d 117, 125 (2014)). FINDINGS OF FACT Judge Cummins accepted Petitioner’s exhibits, which included complaints from Respondent’s former clients, motions filed in the underlying cases and attempted communications with Respondent, among others, and based her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law upon the Petition and those exhibits. We frame the hearing judge’s findings of fact according to each client. 13 In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56 , 753 A.2d 17 (2000), we explained the clear and convincing evidence standard as follows: The requirement of “clear and convincing” or “satisfactory” evidence does not call for “unanswerable” or “conclusive” evidence. The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing, has also been said to be somewhere between the rule in ordinary civil cases and the requirement of criminal procedure—that is, it must be more than a mere preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt.

It has also been said that the term “clear and convincing” evidence means that the witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible, and that the facts to which they have testified are distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in due order, so as to enable the trier of the facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. Whether evidence is clear and convincing requires weighing, comparing, testing, and judging its worth when considered in connection with all the facts and circumstances in evidence. Id. at 79 , 753 A.2d at 29 . 7 Raymond Boteler Mr. Boteler had previously represented himself in a custody, visitation and child support case against his former wife, Isabelle Chahpoori, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. After having received an adverse ruling, resulting in his having to pay Ms. Chahpoori attorneys’ fees in the amount of $10,000.00, Mr. Boteler retained Respondent and Respondent’s law partner, Wanda Martinez, to represent him in an in banc review of that adverse decision.14 Under the agreement, Respondent’s hourly rate was $375.00 and Mr. Boteler was to pay an $8,000.00 retainer.

Before the hearing took place, as Judge Cummins found, Respondent had “negotiated a partial resolution” with Ms. Chahpoori’s attorney regarding child support but failed to review the proposed order before submitting it to the court. Following the in banc hearing, the panel reversed the award of attorneys’ fees and remanded the matter back to the Honorable Ronald Rubin of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Respondent failed to timely appear for the hearing on remand which had been scheduled for 9:30 a.m. on January 17, 2018. Judge Rubin ordered Respondent to appear at 2:00 p.m.

Mr. Boteler then traveled to Respondent’s office, but Respondent did not 14 Rule 2-551(a), the rule which permits in banc reviews, provides: When review by a court in banc is permitted by the Maryland Constitution, a party may have a judgment or determination of any point or question reviewed by a court in banc by filing a notice for in banc review. Issues are reserved for in banc review by making an objection in the manner set forth in Rules 2-517 and 2-520. Upon the filing of the notice, the Circuit Administrative Judge shall designate three judges of the circuit, other than the judge who tried the action, to sit in banc. 8 arrive until 1:00 p.m., after Mr. Boteler had already left to return to the circuit court. At approximately 2:00 p.m., Respondent and Mr. Boteler did appear before Judge Rubin, but Mr. Boteler had to leave to pick up his son.

Judge Rubin, after hearing arguments, ordered Mr. Boteler to again pay Ms. Chahpoori $10,000.00 in attorneys’ fees; Respondent failed to communicate the order to Mr. Boteler. Mr. Boteler called Respondent numerous times in the week following the hearing to inquire about its outcome, but never received a response. About nine days after the hearing, Respondent contacted Mr. Boteler to inform him of the outcome, stating that he would file an appeal after the order was entered. Over the course of the next few weeks, Respondent again failed to respond to Mr. Boteler’s request for updates.

Eventually, after Mr. Boteler had reviewed his case file, he learned that the time by which to file an appeal of Judge Rubin’s order had passed. Mr. Boteler eventually terminated Respondent’s representation and retained new counsel. Respondent, however, “failed and refused, despite repeated requests, to return Mr. Boteler’s file” including a copy of a hearing transcript paid for by Mr. Boteler, even though Mr. Boteler had paid Respondent $11,500.00. Judge Cummins also found that Respondent failed to deposit and maintain those funds in an attorney trust account until they were earned and noted that “Respondent failed to provide any legal services of value to Mr. Boteler and failed to provide any refund to Mr. Boteler.” Robert Huber Mr. Huber contacted Respondent by phone seeking representation in connection with a peace order that had been filed against him by a former domestic partner. 9 Respondent had informed Mr. Huber that he would represent him for a flat fee of $1,500.00 but would enter his appearance on Mr. Huber’s behalf for a cash payment of $500.00.

On the night before the peace order hearing, Respondent instructed Mr. Huber to meet him outside of his residence in Washington, DC to deliver the $500.00 appearance fee and original documents associated with his case, which Mr. Huber did; Respondent then also instructed Mr. Huber to meet him at his Rockville office the next morning to review the documents and prepare for the hearing. Mr. Huber and a friend arrived at Respondent’s office at 7:00 a.m. the next morning, as instructed, but Respondent did not arrive by the time Mr. Huber walked over to the District Court at around 8:15 a.m. At around 9:40 a.m. that morning, Respondent arrived at the District Court “wearing street clothes and unprepared for the hearing.” Judge Cummins also noted that Respondent did not have the case files that Mr. Huber provided the night before. The hearing was set to continue at a later date.

Mr. Huber, however, terminated the representation and requested the return of the documents he provided Respondent the night before. Over two months later, after having filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission, Mr. Huber received a copy of the charging documents from Respondent. Judge Cummins noted, however, that, as of March 14, 2019, eight months after Respondent’s termination, Mr. Huber had not received any of the other documents he provided Respondent nor a refund. She found that “Respondent failed to provide any legal services of value to Mr. Huber and failed to provide Mr. Huber a refund.” Darshna Patel 10 In early September of 2017, Ms. Patel had retained Respondent to represent her in a divorce from her husband, Sahill Saxena.

Mr. Saxena’s attorney, shortly thereafter, served Respondent with discovery requests about which Respondent failed to inform Ms. Patel. About a month later, Respondent filed an answer to the complaint on behalf of Ms. Patel, but failed to file a counter complaint, which, Judge Cummins found deprived “Ms. Patel of the ability to request a monetary award or attorney’s fees.” Mr. Saxena’s attorney reached out to Respondent on a number of occasions inquiring about the discovery requests but never received any response. In November of 2017, the circuit court ordered the parties to file a pretrial statement by March 2, 2018 and a joint marital property statement by February 23, 2018, as well as designate experts by January 19, 2018. Counsel for Mr. Saxena, in mid-November of 2017, not having received any responses to discovery, filed a Motion to Compel, to which Respondent failed to respond or notify his client.

A month later, in December of 2017, the court granted the Motion to Compel and ordered Ms. Patel to respond to discovery within ten days of the order. Respondent, however, once again failed to inform Ms. Patel of the court’s order or provide any responses to the discovery requests. In late January of 2019, counsel for Mr. Saxena filed a Motion for Sanctions based upon Respondent’s failure to participate in discovery. Before the deadline to designate experts, as Judge Cummins further noted, Ms. Patel had informed Respondent of the identity of her real estate appraisal expert.

Respondent, however, failed to designate any experts by the court’s deadline. In late February of 2018, Ms. Patel provided Respondent with the completed real estate appraisal, but he did not provide the appraisal to opposing counsel until April of 2018. In late February of 2018, 11 counsel for Mr. Saxena provided Respondent with a draft joint property statement for Ms. Patel’s consideration, which Respondent failed to communicate. In March of 2018, based upon Respondent’s failure to respond to any requests from opposing counsel, the court granted Mr. Saxena’s motion for sanctions ordering, in part, that Ms. Patel be prohibited from introducing any evidence not produced during discovery and awarding Mr. Saxena attorneys’ fees.

Respondent did not explain the significance of the court’s award of sanctions to Ms. Patel but did state that he would pay the attorneys’ fees awarded to Mr. Saxena. Nearly four months after the deadline established in the scheduling order and two months after the close of discovery, Respondent attempted to designate an expert witness, and, on the day before the hearing on the merits, he filed Ms. Patel’s marital property statement “along with an untimely expert witness designation.” On the day of the hearing, Respondent requested a postponement, citing his failure to timely submit pretrial and marital property statements; the court denied the request. The court also precluded some of Ms. Patel’s expert witnesses from testifying. The court granted the divorce and directed that the parties submit post-trial memoranda on the property issues, which Respondent also failed to do.

Respondent further failed to respond to Ms. Patel’s requests for information about the post-trial memorandum and failed to appear for three meetings he had scheduled with her. In August of 2018, Ms. Patel determined that Respondent had abandoned the representation and retained new counsel, who settled the case by the end of the month. Mr. Saxena’s new attorney filed a 12 Motion for Rule 1-341 sanctions against Respondent; Respondent failed to either respond or appear at the hearing regarding the proposed sanctions. Judge Cummins determined that Ms. Patel paid Respondent $7,000.00 for the representation.

He also failed to deposit and maintain her funds in an attorney trust account until earned. Throughout the course of the representations, as Judge Cummins noted, Respondent appeared about thirty minutes late to two separate court-mandated ADR sessions and appeared thirty minutes late to two separate hearings. Judge Cummins also found that he “failed to prepare Ms. Patel for trial and failed to discuss Mr. Saxena’s multiple settlement offers with Ms. Patel.” Thus, Judge Cummins concluded, “Respondent failed to provide any meaningful services to advance Ms. Patel’s interests and failed to provide Ms. Patel with a refund.” Nicarsia Jackson and Brandon Jackson In November of 201715 “Mr. Jackson and/or his mother, Ms. Jackson, paid the Respondent a retainer fee in the amount of $7,500” to represent Mr. Jackson in a child custody dispute with his daughter’s mother, Ms. Flood. In March of 2018, the Jacksons paid Respondent an additional $1,500.00.

Judge Cummins found that Respondent also failed to deposit or maintain the funds he received from the Jacksons in an attorney trust account until he earned them. That same month, Respondent appeared with Mr. Jackson for a settlement/status hearing, where the judge set the matter in for hearing on the merits 15 Judge Cummins stated that the fee was paid in 2018, although the record indicates that it was paid in 2017, which we shall use. 13 in May of 2018 and directed both parties to file pre-trial statements, which Respondent failed to do. At the merits hearing in May, Respondent appeared and requested a postponement, which the court denied. After two days of hearings, an additional day was set in July, where the Respondent again appeared and requested a postponement, which the court granted; the court rescheduled the hearing for September of 2018.

In August of 2018, however, Ms. Flood filed a “Motion for Protective Order” against Ms. Jackson, which was eventually transferred to the Circuit Court with a hearing scheduled later that month. Respondent, who had entered his appearance in the matter, failed to appear for the hearing. Judge Cheryl McCally of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County called Respondent’s phone and left him a message. Within forty-five minutes, Respondent returned the call stating that he had “been having on and off problems at [his] place with the electricity.

It went out again last night, all of it.” Judge McCally postponed the matter until September. Ms. Jackson attempted to communicate with Respondent prior to the protective order hearing but could not reach him. On the day of the hearing, Respondent appeared an hour late and had not discussed the case with Ms. Jackson. Judge Cummins noted that Respondent “was unprepared; he carried an empty briefcase, did not have any documents with him, and asked to borrow a pen and notepad from Ms. Jackson.” After hearing the arguments, the judge dismissed Ms. Flood’s request for a protective order and instructed the parties to contact chambers that afternoon to receive her decision regarding the custody matter.

Afterwards, Ms. Jackson made several attempts to contact Respondent to learn of 14 the judge’s custody determination, but he never responded, thus prompting Ms. Jackson to call chambers directly the next day. The custody matter had been continued again until March of 2019. On January 2, 2019, Ms. Flood’s attorney attempted several times to contact Respondent to notify him of her intent to file an Ex Parte Motion for Immediate Custody and Related Relief, which was filed on January 4, 2019. Without Respondent or Mr. Jackson present, the court granted the motion.

Judge Cummins concluded that: During the pendency of the representation, the Respondent failed to communicate with the Jacksons, failed to appear for scheduled meetings, routinely appeared late for Court, and appeared in court without any files, documents or paper – on several occasions, the Respondent borrowed paper and a pen from Ms. Jackson to take notes during hearings. Accordingly, she found that Respondent had “failed to provide any substantial services of value to the Jacksons and failed to refund” any of the money they had paid to retain him. LeeAnne Jeffreys In February of 2017, Ms. Jeffreys retained Respondent to represent her in filing for divorce from her husband in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Mr. Jeffreys answered the complaint and filed a counter-complaint.

In April of 2017, Mr. Jeffreys’ attorney served Respondent with discovery. In the two months that followed, counsel for Mr. Jeffreys contacted Respondent three separate times about receiving responses to the requests for discovery, to which he never replied. In June of 2017, Mr. Jeffreys’ attorney filed a Motion to Compel. Over the course of the next month, Respondent’s assistant emailed Ms. Jeffreys, first suggesting that discovery would be completed within thirty days and then asserting that the letters from 15 her husband’s attorney regarding discovery responses were “just pestering request[s] for discovery and, therefore, with not much content.” The circuit court granted the motion to compel and ordered Ms. Jeffreys to respond to discovery within ten days of the order.

More than ten days later, Respondent’s assistant emailed Ms. Jeffreys a copy of the order stating, “[o]ur office will work to address this order.” A month later, Ms. Jeffreys emailed draft discovery responses to Respondent. In December of 2017, having still not received responses to the discovery requests, counsel for Mr. Jeffreys filed a Motion for Sanctions. The following day, Respondent’s assistant emailed Ms. Jeffreys regarding the motion, stating that the overdue discovery was on her “front burner.” In late December, Ms. Jeffreys provided Respondent with additional documents to be included in her discovery responses. He, however, failed to respond to the motion for sanctions, and a hearing was scheduled for March 9, 2018.

Two days before the hearing, Respondent’s assistant emailed Ms. Jeffreys again informing her that the discovery dispute was “a waste of time.” At the hearing, the parties submitted a consent order whereby the court granted the motion for sanctions and ordered Ms. Jeffreys to pay $500.00 in attorneys’ fees and directed her to respond to discovery within fifteen days. Respondent failed to inform Ms. Jeffreys that she had to pay attorneys’ fees. In mid-April 2018, counsel for Mr. Jeffreys wrote Respondent and extended the discovery deadline until April 20, 2018. On April 19, 2018, Respondent’s assistant emailed Ms. Jeffreys and misrepresented that discovery requests had been received only the day prior.

Respondent then requested an extension, but, as Judge Cummins found, as of April 16 25, 2018, Respondent had failed to provide any discovery responses, the day on which opposing counsel filed a Renewed Motion for Sanctions. In May of 2018, the court granted Mr. Jeffreys’ Renewed Motion for Sanctions, ordered Ms. Jeffreys to pay $822.50 in attorneys’ fees and entered a judgment in the amount of $1,000.00 against Ms. Jeffreys. The court also ordered that she be precluded from introducing any evidence at trial not produced during discovery. A hearing on the merits was held in July of 2018, for which Respondent appeared an hour and a half late.

Respondent appeared unprepared, he did not have any files or documents with him and had to borrow a pad and pen from his client. At the hearing on July 16, 2018, Judge Cummins found that “Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to the [c]ourt that he was late because he had been admitted to the hospital with a stomach virus. The Respondent was not admitted to the hospital with a stomach virus in July 2018.” The hearing was continued the next day, when Respondent failed to timely appear again. Bar Counsel Investigations In response to Mr. Boteler’s complaint dated June 11, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent and requested that he provide a written response no later than July 5, 2018.

On August 16, 2018, Bar Counsel had not yet received a response, prompting her to write 17 to Respondent again, requesting that he respond by August 29, 2018, and a third time on September 11, 2018, requesting a response by September 24, 2018.16 In response to Mr. Huber’s complaint dated September 6, 2018, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent on September 14, 2018, providing him a copy of Mr. Huber’s complaint and requested a written response by September 28, 2018.17 In October of 2018, having received no response from Respondent, Bar Counsel investigators went to his home. Respondent answered the door and the investigators entered his apartment, wherein he acknowledged having received the previous letters sent by Bar Counsel, stating that he intended to respond to the Boteler and Huber complaints. On November 30, 2018, Mr. Saxena filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. Bar Counsel, again, wrote to Respondent and requested that he supply a response to the complaint by January 4, 2019.

On December 18, 2018, Ms. Patel also filed a complaint, and again, Bar Counsel wrote Respondent regarding the representation. On January 7, 2019, Respondent replied to a Bar Counsel email, stating, “[t]hank you. Iam in your debt and I won’t forget it. I think we e [sic] meeting at Nordstrom Rack in 15 minutes or so.

I’m on my way to get a cab now.” 16 The second and third letters Bar Counsel sent Respondent regarding the Boteler matter were sent by first class mail, certified mail and email, and none was returned as undeliverable. 17 The letter Bar Counsel sent Respondent regarding Mr. Huber’s complaint was done so by first class mail, certified mail and email, and none was returned as undeliverable. 18 On January 17, 2019, having received no response with respect to any of the complaints, Investigators again went to Respondent’s home, but he was not present. On January 28, 2019, Respondent