Blue v. Arrington

KRAUSER, C.J. Appellant Stinyard Blue, an employee of Baltimore City, was injured by a fellow employee, appellee Antonio Arrington, while both men were acting within the scope of their Balti ³¹³ more City employment. After receiving workers’ compensation for his injuries, Blue brought a negligence action against Arrington, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, for the same injuries. In response, Baltimore City filed, on Arrington’s behalf, 1 a motion to dismiss, relying on a provision of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”), which prohibits a local government employee from suing “a fellow employee for tortious acts or omissions committed within the scope of employment,” if the injury sustained by the local government employee is “compensable under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act.” Md.Code (1973, 2013 Repl.Vol.), § 5-302(c) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). The grant of that motion by the Baltimore City circuit court prompted this appeal, in which Blue presents three questions for our review: I. Does CJP § 5-302(e) of the LGTCA, by prohibiting local government employees from suing their co-employees individually for tortious acts or omissions committed within the scope of their employment, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights?

II

Does CJP § 5-302(c) of the LGTCA violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by denying him a remedy?

III

Does CJP § 5-302(c) of the LGTCA create a valid exception to Maryland Code (1991, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 9-902(c) of the Labor and Employment Article (“LE”), which generally allows an employee to bring a third-party suit against a co-employee? ³¹⁴ Because we conclude that CJP § 5-302(c) does not violate Blue’s equal protection rights or Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights by unreasonably restricting access to the courts and because Blue presented no argument in his brief supporting his contention that CJP § 5-302(c) is “ambiguous” when read in the context of the “larger statutory scheme embodied” in LE § 9 — 902(c), we affirm. Facts and Procedural History On July 5, 2011, Blue and Arrington were working for Baltimore City. On that day, Blue was performing his duties as a “Seasonal Maintenance Aide” on a garbage truck. In that capacity, he was “side mounted” on the outside of the garbage truck that Arrington was driving. “[W]hile talking on a cell phone,” Arrington “attempted to make a turn,” crushing Blue’s “legs and abdomen between a fence and a brick wall,” as he clung to the side of the truck.

Following that accident, Blue filed a claim, under the Maryland Worker’s Compensation Act, for which he received compensation for lost wages, medical expenses, and permanent disability. Thereafter, Blue filed a complaint, in the Baltimore City circuit court, against Arrington, alleging that Arrington “had a duty of care to operate his vehicle in a proper fashion and [had] breached this duty of care by failing to properly turn his vehicle while keeping a proper lookout for” Blue. The City, on behalf of Arrington, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that “[b]y statute, local government employees may not file an action against a negligent co-employee for tortious conduct in the scope of employment resulting in injuries which are compensable under the Worker’s Compensation Act.” Blue’s “exclusive remedy” for the injuries he sustained, the motion stated, was the remedy provided by the compensation statute. The circuit court agreed and granted Arrington’s motion to dismiss, whereupon Blue noted this appeal.

Discussion I. Blue contends that CJP § 5-302(c) violates his equal protection rights because that provision denies local government ³¹⁵ employees, as a class, the right to sue co-employees for tortious conduct, a legal right that is provided to nonlocal government employees by LE § 9 — 902(c) 2 . The Fourteenth Amendment states: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Maryland Constitution contains no equal protection clause, “the concept of equal protection is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24” of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. 475, 499 , 3 A.3d 421 (2010). There are three different standards of review that courts use in determining whether a legislative enactment violates the equal protection guarantees of those two constitutional provisions. The first standard is “[t]he general rule ... that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Under that standard, which is commonly referred to as the “rational basis” test, a classification will not be overturned “unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the court] can only conclude that the [governmental] actions were irrational.” Murphy v. ³¹⁶ Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 355 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471 , 111 S.Ct. 2395 , 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991)). “A statutory classification reviewed under the rational basis standard of review,” explained the Court of Appeals, “enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality and will be invalidated only if the classification is clearly arbitrary.” Id. at 356, 601 A.2d 102 .

The next, and most demanding, of these standards of review is the “strict scrutiny” test. It is employed by courts when “a statute creates a distinction based upon clearly ‘suspect’ criteria, or when that enactment infringes upon personal rights or interests deemed to be ‘fundamental.’ ” Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 272 , 932 A.2d 571 (2007) (quoting Att’y Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 705-06 , 426 A.2d 929 (1981)). Such suspect criteria includes, for example, race, national origin, and alienage, see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 (stating that “when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin,” it is “subjected to strict scrutiny”). Under this test, the state must demonstrate that, in creating classifications based on suspect criteria, the statute is “ ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.” Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist.

No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 , 127 S.Ct. 2738 , 168 L.Ed.2d 508 (2007). The third and final standard of review is the intermediate level of review known as “heightened scrutiny.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-44 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 . It is applied when the statute’s classifications under review are based on “quasi-suspect” criteria and requires more scrutiny than the deferential rational basis standard of review but does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights noted above. Id. at 440-41 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 .

An intermediate level of scrutiny has been applied, for example, to classifications involving sex (under the federal Constitution), 3 United States v. ³¹⁷ Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 , 116 S.Ct. 2264 , 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996); illegitimacy, Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 , 108 S.Ct. 1910 , 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988); the education of children of illegal aliens, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); and the right to practice law by former judges, Att’y Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 716-728 , 426 A.2d 929 (1981). To survive heightened scrutiny, the statute “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Murphy, 325 Md. at 358 , 601 A.2d 102 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976)). Because the classification at issue in the instant case does not burden a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class, nor infringe upon a fundamental right, we shall apply the rational-basis test in determining whether CJP § 5-302(c) violates the Equal Protection Clause or Article 24. In 1987, Senate Bill 237, known as the “Local Government Tort Claims Act” was enacted into law. 1987 Md. Laws, Ch. 594.

One of the principal purposes for the act was to “establish! ] a limit on the liability of the local governments of the State.” Id. A rational basis for imposing such limits on local governments’ tortious liability, limits that would not otherwise apply to nonlocal government employers, can be found in the following portion of the summary of the committee report for Senate Bill 237: In recent years, local governments have increasingly become targets for liability claims. Senate Bill 237 will ad ³¹⁸ dress the existing liability crisis for local governments and problems of increasing claims, higher judgments, larger settlements and the availability and affordability of insurance claims. Cities and towns may pay the bill for higher and higher