Chavis v. Blibaum & Assoc. Moore v. Peak Mgmt.

Larry S. Chavis, et al. v. Blibaum & Associates, P.A.; Bryione K. Moore, et al. v. Peak Management LLC, No. 30, September Term, 2020. Opinion by Biran, J. CONSUMER PROTECTION – MARYLAND CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION ACT – The Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (the “MCDCA”), Md. Code Ann., Commercial Law (CL) § 14-202(8) (2013 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), provides: “In collecting or attempting to collect on an alleged debt a collector may not: … [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court erroneously dismissed Petitioners’ claims under CL § 14-202(8) (and corresponding claims under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (the “MCPA”)) based on Respondents’ collection of post-judgment interest at a rate of 10%, instead of the applicable legal rate of 6%. The Court rejected the distinction that some courts have drawn between “methods” of debt collection and “amounts” of debts sought to be collected, when assessing a claim under CL § 14-202(8).

A plaintiff is not precluded from invoking § 14-202(8) when the amount claimed by the debt collector includes sums that the debt collector, to its knowledge, did not have the right to collect. CONSUMER PROTECTION – MCDCA, CL § 14-202(8) – “WITH KNOWLEDGE” ELEMENT – The Court of Appeals held that, in order to prevail under CL § 14-202(8), a plaintiff must show that a debt collector acted with actual knowledge or with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the existence of the claimed right. Although § 14-202(8) does not impose strict liability on a debt collector for a mistake of law, neither does a debt collector escape liability under § 14-202(8) whenever, in the absence of controlling authority, the collector makes a mistake of law. In the situation where the law concerning the claimed right is unsettled, a debt collector’s reckless mistake of law violates CL § 14 202(8); a non-reckless mistake of law is not a violation.

A debt collector’s mental state in claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a right is a question of fact. CONSUMER PROTECTION – MCDCA – WRIT OF GARNISHMENT – The Court of Appeals held that Petitioners could not state a viable claim under CL § 14-202(8) based on Respondents’ inclusion of the cost of the filing fee for a writ of garnishment in the amount sought to be garnished. APPELLATE PRACTICE – REMAND – CLASS CERTIFICATION – When Petitioners in the case against Respondent Peak Management LLC filed their first motion for class certification, the circuit court had already dismissed Petitioners’ MCDCA claim (and their claim under the MCPA based on the alleged violation of the MCDCA). Given the possibility that the circuit court would have granted a motion for class certification, had the MCDCA and MCPA claims been before it at the time it ruled on the motion, the Court of Appeals held that, upon remand, Petitioners shall be permitted to file a new motion for class certification.

Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. 03-C-18-010602 Circuit Court for Baltimore City IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Case No. 24-C-17-000033 OF MARYLAND Argued: March 5, 2021 No. 30 September Term, 2020 LARRY S. CHAVIS, ET AL. v. BLIBAUM & ASSOCIATES, P.A. BRYIONE K. MOORE, ET AL. v. PEAK MANAGEMENT LLC Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Biran, JJ. Opinion by Biran, J. Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act Getty, J., dissents. (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-08-27 14:00-04:00 Filed: August 27, 2021 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk In Ben-Davies v. Blibaum & Assocs., P.A., 457 Md. 228 (2018), this Court answered a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland regarding the correct legal rate of post-judgment interest where a landlord has obtained a judgment against a residential tenant for breach of contract. We held in Ben-Davies that “where a landlord sues a tenant for breach of contract based on a residential lease, and the trial court enters judgment in the landlord’s favor against the tenant and the judgment includes unpaid rent and other expenses, a post-judgment interest rate of 6% applies[.]” Id. at 275 .

Petitioners Bryione Moore, Albert Grantham, Patricia Grantham, Sharone Crowell, Larry S. Chavis, Laronda Green, and Cassandra Reid rented residential properties managed by Respondent Peak Management LLC (“Peak”) or another entity. After Petitioners defaulted on their leases, Peak or another entity engaged Respondent Blibaum & Associates, P.A. (“Blibaum”), a law firm, to file suit against Petitioners in the District Court of Maryland for breach of contract. Blibaum obtained judgments against Petitioners that included amounts of unpaid rent, and subsequently attempted to collect on the judgments by garnishing Petitioners’ wages.

In the requests for writs of garnishment, Blibaum included post-judgment interest at a rate of 10% as well as post-judgment court costs (the filing fees for the writs of garnishment). This collection activity occurred before we issued our opinion in Ben-Davies. Several of the Petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against Peak in which they claimed, among other things, that Peak violated the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (the “MCDCA”), Md. Code Ann., Commercial Law Article (“CL”), Title 14, Subtitle 2, and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (the “MCPA”), CL, Title 13, by obtaining writs of garnishment that charged post-judgment interest at a rate of 10%, rather than 6%, and by including post-judgment court costs (i.e., filing fees for the requests for writs of garnishment) in the amounts sought to be garnished. Several of the Petitioners filed a similar lawsuit against Blibaum in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

In the Baltimore City case, Peak moved to dismiss the MCDCA and MCPA claims, and the circuit court granted that motion. After that ruling, Petitioners moved for class certification with respect to the sole claim remaining at that time, which was for unjust enrichment. The circuit court denied the motion for class certification after holding a hearing. Petitioners then filed a second motion for class certification and requested a hearing.

The circuit court denied the second motion for class certification without a hearing. The circuit court subsequently ruled on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, resolving the unjust enrichment claims as to the named plaintiffs. Meanwhile, in the Baltimore County case, Blibaum filed a motion to dismiss all claims, which the circuit court granted. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals consolidated the two cases for decision and held that both circuit courts properly dismissed the MCDCA and MCPA claims.

With respect to the case against Peak, the court also affirmed the denial of the second motion for class certification. Petitioners sought further review in this Court. Respondents argue that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals with respect to the MCDCA and MCPA claims should be affirmed because Petitioners impermissibly 2 seek to hold them liable for collecting certain amounts from Petitioners, rather than challenging the methods Respondents used to collect those debts. In addition, Respondents contend that, prior to this Court deciding Ben-Davies, it was impossible for a debt collector to have the requisite knowledge under the MCDCA that the collector lacked the right to charge post-judgment interest at a rate of 10%.

Respondents also argue that they were permitted to include the post-judgment court costs to obtain the writs of garnishment in the total amounts subject to garnishment. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the circuit courts incorrectly dismissed the MCDCA and MCPA claims to the extent Petitioners alleged violations of those statutes based on Respondents’ collection of post-judgment interest at a rate of 10%. However, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Respondents did not violate the MCDCA (or the MCPA) by including the costs of the filing fees to obtain the writs of garnishment in the amounts to be garnished.1 1 Given our disposition of the MCDCA and MCPA claims, we will not decide whether the circuit court erred by denying Petitioners’ second motion for class certification of the unjust enrichment claim in the case against Peak without first holding a hearing. As discussed below, on remand, the plaintiffs in that case will be permitted to file a new motion for class certification, which the circuit court shall deem to be an initial motion for class certification. 3 I Background2 A. Bryione K. Moore, et al. v. Peak Management LLC 1.

Pertinent Allegations Peak is a Maryland limited liability company that manages real estate properties and self-storage facilities throughout the greater Baltimore area. Peak retained Blibaum to collect debts owed by Petitioners and to pursue legal remedies to aid in debt collection. Petitioners Moore, Albert Grantham, Patricia Grantham, Crowell, and Chavis signed residential leases with Peak. Each of these Petitioners subsequently defaulted on their lease with Peak.

Blibaum filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland against each Petitioner for breach of contract, seeking damages for the default and breach of lease, and obtained a judgment. When entering the judgment in each case, the District Court of Maryland ordered post-judgment interest “at the legal rate.” The judgment did not set forth a specific rate of post-judgment interest. When Petitioners failed to satisfy the judgments entered against them, Blibaum requested and obtained writs of garnishment to collect the judgments. When requesting the writs of garnishment, Blibaum stated on the District Court’s “Request for Writ of Garnishment” form that it applied post-judgment interest at a rate of 10% to the money judgments it had obtained on behalf of Peak.

Applying post- judgment interest at a rate of 10% was the standard practice of Blibaum as Peak’s agent. It 2 Like the Court of Special Appeals before us, we consolidate the appeals of both cases for decision. We shall summarize the pertinent allegations and procedural history of the two cases separately. 4 was also standard practice for Blibaum, on behalf of Peak, to include post-judgment costs (i.e., the filing fees to obtain the writs of garnishment) in the requests for writs of garnishment. 2. Related Federal Case Prior to filing her complaint against Peak in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Moore sued Blibaum in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 , et seq., the MCDCA, and the MCPA, through Blibaum’s work as Peak’s collection agent.

Bryione K. Moore v. Blibaum & Assocs., P.A., Civ. No. 1:16-cv-3546-JFM, 2017 WL 462508 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2017) (Memorandum). The federal district court dismissed the complaint on February 2, 2017, following which Moore appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On July 19, 2017, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Moore v. Blibaum & Assocs., P.A., 693 F. App’x 205 (4th Cir. 2017). On remand, the district court certified a question to this Court concerning the proper rate of post-judgment interest on a judgment obtained against a tenant for breach of contract. As stated above, we answered the certified question in Ben-Davies, holding that the legal rate of post-judgment interest on a judgment for unpaid rent obtained in a breach of contract action is 6%. Ben-Davies, 457 Md. at 275 . 3.

The Class Action Lawsuit Against Peak in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a. Motions to Dismiss On January 4, 2017, Moore filed a putative class action lawsuit against Peak in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Granthams, Crowell, and Chavis were added as 5 named plaintiffs in subsequent amended complaints. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment (Count I), and also brought claims under the MCDCA, CL § 14-202(8)3 (Count II), and the MCPA, CL §§ 13-303(5)4 and 13-301(14)(iii)5 (Count III), and for common law unjust enrichment (Count IV).

Petitioners alleged that Peak knowingly or recklessly charged and collected post-judgment interest at a rate of 10% instead of at the maximum legal rate of 6% under Maryland Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings (CJ) § 11-107(b) (2013 Repl. Vol.).6 Petitioners also claimed that, through the writs of garnishment, Peak collected or attempted to collect costs in excess of the amount of costs actually awarded in the judgment. Peak moved to dismiss the operative complaint on March 31, 2017. On April 19, 2017, the circuit court granted Peak’s motion to dismiss the MCDCA and MCPA claims (Counts II and III), but denied the motion as to the request for declaratory judgment 3 Under CL § 14-202(8), “[i]n collecting or attempting to collect on an alleged debt a collector may not: … [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” 4 Under CL § 13-303(5), a person “may not engage in any unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practice … in … [t]he collection of consumer debts.” 5 Under CL § 13-301(14)(iii), “[u]nfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practices include any…violation of a provision of: Title 14, Subtitle 2 of this article, the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act[.]” Therefore, a violation of the MCDCA also constitutes a violation of the MCPA. 6 Under CJ § 11-107(b), “[t]he legal rate of interest on a money judgment for rent of residential premises shall be at the rate of 6 percent per annum on the amount of the judgment.” Under CJ § 11-107(a), except in cases involving loans of money (as described in CJ § 11-106), “the legal rate of interest on a judgment shall be at the rate of 10 percent per annum on the amount of judgment.” 6 (Count I) and the unjust enrichment claim (Count IV).

In granting dismissal on the MCDCA claim, the circuit court reasoned that there was no dispute that the “right” to collect the debt existed, rendering the alleged collection of post-judgment interest at a rate (10%) in excess of the correct legal rate (6%) a dispute only as to the amount of the debt, which did not affect the existence of that right. The circuit court also dismissed the MCPA claim, as the dismissal of the MCDCA claim eliminated the basis for an MCPA violation. After another amendment to the complaint, a stay of the case pending this Court’s decision in Ben-Davies, the lifting of the stay following the issuance of Ben-Davies, and more motions practice, the circuit court in July 2018 dismissed all claims except for the unjust enrichment claim. b. Motions for Class Action Certification On May 14, 2018, Petitioners filed their first motion for class certification and requested a hearing.

Peak opposed the motion for class certification. On August 10, 2018, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the pending motion for class certification. Petitioners sought to certify the following class: “All natural persons against whom Peak Management LLC obtained a judgment that was not satisfied prior to January 4, 2014, in a lawsuit brought in Maryland by Blibaum & Associates, LLC on behalf of Peak Management LLC and who have since satisfied that judgment.” The circuit court denied the motion for class certification in a written opinion dated September 10, 2018. On December 18, 2018, Petitioners filed a second motion for class certification and request for a hearing.

Petitioners based their second motion for class certification on new information 7 they learned through deposing Gary Blibaum, Esq. The circuit court denied the second motion for class certification without a hearing by order dated January 11, 2019. c. Motion for Summary Judgment The circuit court having refused to certify the case as a class action, Petitioners stood as the only plaintiffs in the complaint. On March 8, 2019, Peak filed a motion for summary judgment on the sole remaining claim for unjust enrichment.

Peak argued the unjust enrichment claim failed as a matter of law for each Petitioner because they either failed to satisfy the judgment against them and therefore did not pay excess interest (Moore and Crowell) or satisfied the judgment and had since been reimbursed by Peak for the excess interest they had paid (the Granthams and Chavis). Petitioners cross-moved for summary judgment. After conducting a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment on April 15, 2019, the circuit court granted Peak’s motion for summary judgment as to Moore and Crowell, but denied the motion as to the Granthams and Chavis. The court then granted Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment as to the Granthams and Chavis, and awarded those plaintiffs restitution of $16.14 and $67.97, respectively.

Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal on May 7, 2019. B. Larry S. Chavis, et al. v. Blibaum & Associates, P.A. On October 22, 2018, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, several of the Petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit against Blibaum in the Circuit Court 8 for Baltimore County.7 Petitioners initially asserted two claims: (1) violation of the MCDCA, CL § 14-202(11)8; and (2) reasonable attorney’s fees for a violation of the MCPA based on the alleged violation of the MCDCA. Blibaum moved to dismiss the complaint on December 11, 2018. Prior to a ruling on the pending motion to dismiss, Petitioners filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint on January 4, 2019.

While reasserting the two original claims, Petitioners added a third claim in the amended complaint for a violation of CL § 14-202(8). The alleged wrongful conduct underlying each claim was Blibaum’s charging of post- judgment interest at a rate of 10% instead of 6%. Petitioners also claimed that Blibaum collected or attempted to collect costs, i.e., filing fees charged for obtaining writs of garnishment, in excess of the amount of costs actually awarded in the judgments. On January 11, 2019, Blibaum moved to dismiss the amended complaint.

Blibaum argued that the CL § 14-202(11) claim failed because that provision did not become effective until October 1, 2018 – well after any alleged harm occurred – and the General Assembly did not intend for the statute to have retroactive effect. In addition, Blibaum sought dismissal of the § 14-202(8) claim on the grounds that, as a matter of law, Blibaum did not use an improper debt collection method or knowingly collect or attempt to collect Petitioners alleged that Blibaum’s principal place of business is located in 7 Baltimore County. 8 Under CL § 14-202(11) (2013 Repl. Vol., 2018 Supp.), a debt collector may not, when collecting or attempting to collect a debt, “[e]ngage in any conduct that violates §§ 804 through 812 of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.” 9 excessive post-judgment interest and/or an unauthorized charge through wage garnishment. On April 11, 2019, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Blibaum’s motion to dismiss.

On April 18, 2019, the court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice. On April 26, 2019, Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal. C. Appeals The Court of Special Appeals consolidated the cases against Peak and Blibaum for decision. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decisions of the circuit courts.

Chavis v. Blibaum Assocs., P.A., 246 Md. App. 517 (2020). The intermediate appellate court held that “[t]he MCDCA, and in particular § 14-202, is meant to proscribe certain methods of debt collection and is not a mechanism for attacking the validity of the debt itself.” Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court viewed Petitioners’ MCDCA claim regarding the charging of excess post-judgment interest as a challenge to the amount of debt owed, rather than as a challenge to a method of debt collection. Id. at 530.

The court added that “the parties’ legal disagreement” concerning the correct rate of post-judgment interest – “that was ultimately resolved by the Court of Appeals – does not result in a cognizable claim under the MCDCA.” Id. at 531 n.4. The Court of Special Appeals then considered whether a judgment creditor may include the filing fee for a writ of garnishment in the amount it seeks to collect through the garnishment. Petitioners argued that the cost of the filing fee for the writ of garnishment was not a cost “actually assessed in the cause” when the judgment was ordered, as required 10 by CL § 15-605(c). Id. at 531.

The intermediate appellate court disagreed and held that “CL § 15-605(c) refers to the order that a judgment creditor must follow when it receives payments from a garnishee. It does not restrict the types of costs that a creditor is entitled to receive.” Id. at 532. Important to the court was that Blibaum properly used and completed the published and approved District Court of Maryland form to request a writ of garnishment, which explicitly included a line for “[t]otal court costs, including this writ.” Id. at 531-32. With respect to the Peak case, Petitioners also challenged the circuit court’s denial of the second motion for class certification without a hearing.

Petitioners argued that Maryland Rule 2-231(d) requires the court to hold an evidentiary hearing if one is requested. The intermediate appellate court rejected that argument. After examining the plain language of Maryland Rule 2-231(d), the court stated that “[c]ritically, the circuit court held an extensive hearing” on Petitioners’ first class certification motion. Id. at 540.

In addition, the court noted that Petitioners had “made a tactical decision to file the first motion for class certification prior to discovery.” Id. Under such circumstances, the intermediate appellate court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the second motion for class certification without a hearing. According to the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioners were not “entitled to a hearing each time they file the same motion” and “cite[d] no authority in support of their contention that they are entitled to multiple hearings on each of their motions for class certification.” Id. 11 On July 30, 2020, Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. On October 6, 2020, we granted their petition.

Chavis v. Blibaum & Assocs., P.A., 471 Md. 100 (2020). Petitioners present two questions for review, which we have rephrased as follows: I. Did Petitioners properly state a claim under the MCDCA, CL § 14- 202(8), based on: (a) Respondents’ collection of post-judgment interest at a rate of 10% prior to this Court’s decision in Ben-Davies; and/or (b) Respondents’ inclusion of filing fees to obtain the writs of garnishment in the amounts sought to be garnished?

II

Under Maryland Rule 2-231, where a circuit court has previously denied a motion for class certification after holding a hearing, does the circuit court abuse its discretion by denying a subsequent motion for class certification without conducting another hearing? II Standard of Review A defendant may seek dismissal of a complaint under Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2) if the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Whether a motion to dismiss was properly granted or not by a trial court is a question of law we review de novo, with no deference given to the trial court. Barclay v. Castruccio, 469 Md. 368, 373 (2020); see also Reichs Ford Road Joint Venture v. State Roads Comm’n, 388 Md. 500, 509 (2005). In our review, we “must assume the truth of, and view in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, all well-pleaded facts and allegations contained in the complaint, as well as all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from them, and order dismissal only if the allegations and permissible inferences, if true, would not afford relief to the plaintiff, i.e., the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted.” RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Maryland, Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643 (2010). 12 An appellate court ordinarily reviews a trial court’s decision regarding class certification for abuse of discretion.

Creveling v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 376 Md. 72, 90 (2003). However, “whether the trial court used a correct legal standard in determining whether to grant or deny class certification is a question of law that we review de novo.” Id.

III Discussion A. Petitioners’ Claims Under the MCDCA and the MCPA The MCDCA applies to any “person collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt arising out of a consumer transaction.” CL § 14-201(b) (defining “collector”). During the period relevant to this case, the MCDCA prohibited nine categories of conduct relating to debt collection: In collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt a collector may not: (1) Use or threaten force or violence; (2) Threaten criminal prosecution, unless the transaction involved the violation of a criminal statute; (3) Disclose or threaten to disclose information which affects the debtor’s reputation for credit worthiness with knowledge that the information is false; (4) Except as permitted by statute, contact a person’s employer with respect to a delinquent indebtedness before obtaining final judgment against the debtor; (5) Except as permitted by statute, disclose or threaten to disclose to a person other than the debtor or his spouse or, if the debtor is a minor, his parent, information which affects the debtor’s reputation, whether or not for credit worthiness, with knowledge that the other person does not have a legitimate business need for the information; 13 (6) Communicate with the debtor or a person related to him with the frequency, at the unusual hours, or in any other manner as reasonably can be expected to abuse or harass the debtor; (7) Use obscene or grossly abusive language in communicating with the debtor or a person related to him; (8) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist; or (9) Use a communication which simulates legal or judicial process or gives the appearance of being authorized, issued, or approved by a government, governmental agency, or lawyer when it is not. CL § 14-202 (2013 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.).9 We have described the MCDCA, along with the MCPA, as “remedial consumer protection … statutes,” the “overarching purpose and intent” of which “is to protect the public from unfair or deceptive trade practices by creditors engaged in debt collection activities.” Andrews & Lawrence Prof’l Servs., LLC v. Mills, 467 Md. 126, 132 (2020); see also Spencer v. Hendersen-Webb, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 582, 594 (D. Md. 1999) (noting the MCDCA’s “remedial aim”); Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 719 , 9 The General Assembly added two categories of prohibited conduct – new subsections (10) and (11) – to § 14-202 in 2018, after the conduct at issue in these cases had occurred. 2018 Md. Laws, Ch. 731, § 1; Ch. 732, § 3.

The new provisions make it a violation of § 14-202 to: (10) Engage in unlicensed debt collection activity in violation of the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act; or (11) Engage in any conduct that violates §§ 804 through 812 of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. CL § 14-202 (2013 Repl. Vol. 2018 Supp.). 14 732 (D. Md. 2011) (same). A violation of the MCDCA also constitutes a per se violation of the MCPA as an “unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practice.” CL § 13-301(14)(iii).

Petitioners allege that Respondents violated CL § 14-202(8) by collecting excess post-judgment interest and by including post-judgment court costs (i.e., filing fees to obtain the writs of garnishment) in their requests for writs of garnishment. Under § 14-202(8), a debt collector may not “[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist.” To prove a claim under this provision of the MCDCA, a complainant must establish two elements: (1) the debt collector “did not possess the right to collect the amount of debt sought”; and (2) the debt collector “attempted to collect the debt knowing that [it] lacked the right to do so.” Mills v. Galyn Manor Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 239 Md. App. 663, 677 (2018) (quoting Barr v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 303 F. Supp. 3d 400, 420 (D. Md. 2018)) (cleaned up), aff’d sub nom. Andrews & Lawrence Prof’l Servs., LLC v. Mills, 467 Md. 126 (2020). The circuit courts granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss Petitioners’ MCDCA and MCPA claims, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed those dismissals.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Petitioners pled viable claims under the MCDCA (and, therefore, the MCPA as well) based on Respondents’ collection of post-judgment interest at a rate of 10%. However, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Respondents’ inclusion of the cost of the filing fees for the writs of garnishment in their requests for writs of garnishment, as a matter of law, did not violate CL § 14-202(8). 15 1. Post-Judgment Interest Petitioners argue that the circuit courts erroneously dismissed the MCDCA claims to the extent they alleged violations of CL § 14-202(8) based on Respondents’ charging post-judgment interest at a rate of 10%, as opposed to 6%. To resolve this claim of error, we must interpret § 14-202(8).

When we interpret a statute, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the actual intent of the General Assembly. Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274 (2010). We begin this inquiry by examining the plain meaning of the statutory language. Agnew v. State, 461 Md. 672, 679 (2018).

If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry ordinarily comes to an end, and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction. Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275 . However, we do not analyze statutory language in a vacuum. Matter of Collins, 468 Md. 672, 689-90 (2020). “Rather, statutory language ‘must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.’” Id.

(quoting Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276 ). “Where the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or its meaning is not clear when considered in conjunction with other statutory provisions, we may glean the legislative intent from external sources.” In re R.S., 470 Md. 380, 403 (2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Whether the statutory language is clear or ambiguous, it is useful to review the legislative history of the statute to confirm that interpretation and to eliminate another version of the legislative intent alleged to be latent in the language.” Id. (cleaned up). 16 We presume that the General Assembly intends its enactments to operate “as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276 . “[C]onsideration of the consequences of alternative interpretations of the statute grounds the analysis.” In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 255 (2020). In each case, we must give the statute in question a reasonable interpretation, “not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276 . a. Respondents Did Not Have the Right to Charge Post-Judgment Interest at a Rate in Excess of the Legal Rate of 6%.

Petitioners first contend that Respondents did not possess the right to charge post- judgment interest at a rate of 10%, which exceeds the maximum legal rate by 4% under Ben-Davies, 475 Md. at 275. According to Petitioners, Ben-Davies establishes that Respondents caused the writs of garnishment to include an unauthorized charge, in violation of CL § 14-202(8). Respondents cannot and do not dispute that, under Ben- Davies, they collected excess post-judgment interest, but rather argue that Ben-Davies does not render their conduct actionable under the MCDCA. According to Respondents, the intent of the MCDCA is to address prohibited “methods” of debt collection, not to provide a mechanism for challenging the amount of the debt.

Thus, Respondents argue, Petitioners’ claim concerning post-judgment interest is an impermissible attempt to contest the amount of a debt, rather than a permissible challenge to a method of collection. We agree with Petitioners. 17 Petitioners and Respondents both rely upon Allstate Lien & Recovery Corp. v. Stansbury, 219 Md. App. 575 (2014), and Mills v. Galyn Manor Homeowner’s Ass’n, 239 Md. App. at 663 , to support their arguments. Both of these cases discussed Fontell v. Hassett, 870 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Md. 2012), a case in which the federal district court drew the distinction between “methods” and “amounts” that the Court of Special Appeals invoked in this case and upon which Respondents rely in urging affirmance. We shall discuss Fontell, Allstate, and Mills in turn.

In Fontell, the plaintiff sued her homeowner’s association (HOA) and others in federal court, asserting claims under the FDCPA, the MCDCA, the MCPA, and other statutes. As to the MCDCA, the plaintiff challenged the validity of her underlying debt to the HOA. According to the plaintiff, the defendants’ collection activities violated § 14-202(8) because the assessment the defendants attempted to collect from her had already been paid in full by her condominium association (a different entity than the HOA), and thus the assessment against the plaintiff was not valid. Fontell, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 405 .

The federal district court ruled that the plaintiff’s MCDCA claim was not viable. The court reasoned that § 14-202 “is meant to proscribe certain methods of debt collection and is not a mechanism for attacking the validity of the debt itself.” Id. The court further explained that the MCDCA “proscribes certain conduct, (1) through (9), by a collector in ‘collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt….’ In other words, the [MCDCA] focuses on the conduct of the debt collector in attempting to collect on the debt, whether or not the debt itself is valid.” Id. (first emphasis in the original; second emphasis added by the court).

Specifically as to § 14-202(8), the court opined that the prohibition on 18 claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist only “makes grammatical sense if the underlying debt, expressly defined to include an alleged debt, is assumed to exist, and the specific prohibitions are interpreted as proscribing certain methods of debt collection rather than the debt itself.” Id. The court found further support for its interpretation of § 14-202(8) by “considering that the other eight practices proscribed by the statute refer to specific coercive or abusive methods of enforcing a debt.” Id. According to the court, § 14-202(8) “makes sense within the context of the other proscribed practices only if it is also read to proscribe certain methods of debt collection, such as enforcing a right collateral to the debt in order to pressure the debtor to pay the debt, rather than collection of the debt itself.” Id. at 406 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the plaintiff challenged the validity of her underlying debt, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the court’s prior grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the MCDCA claim.

See id. at 402, 405-06. In Allstate, a vehicle repair shop placed a “garageman’s lien” upon a vehicle it had repaired and included a $1,000 processing fee in the lien amount. 219 Md. App. at 577 . The vehicle owner claimed that the processing fee was not authorized by statute and, therefore, its inclusion in the lien was a violation of the MCDCA. Id.

The repair shop contended it had the right to include the processing fee in the lien and cited Fontell for the proposition that the MCDCA “addresses the method of debt collection, as opposed to a challenge to the amount of the underlying debt.” Id. at 590-91 . The Court of Special Appeals first analyzed and interpreted the “garageman’s lien” statutory scheme and concluded that Title 16 of the Commercial Law Article and the plain 19 language of CL § 16-202(c) do not authorize “cost of process” fees to be included in a “garageman’s lien.” Id. at 589-90. Because the repair shop was not statutorily authorized to include the processing fee in the lien, the intermediate appellate court rejected the repair shop’s argument that the vehicle owner was challenging the amount of the underlying debt. Id. at 591.

Unlike the plaintiff in Fontell, the vehicle owner never “disputed that he owed the underlying debt.” Id. Instead, the vehicle owner challenged “the method of collecting the debt, i.e., ... including [processing] fees as part of the lien.” Id. Thus, distinguishing Fontell, the court held that the repair shop “did not have a right to include processing fees in the lien” and affirmed the jury’s verdict that the repair shop violated the MCDCA by including the processing fees in the lien. Id.

In Mills, the Court of Special Appeals relied upon Allstate to reach the same conclusion regarding the filing of liens by an HOA after the expiration of the statute of limitations and the alleged imposition of fines not authorized by the HOA’s governing documents. 239 Md. App. at 678-81 . The HOA, like the repair shop in Allstate, contended that the MCDCA claim of the homeowners failed because the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the underlying debt instead of a method of debt collection. Id. at 679 . The intermediate appellate court examined Allstate and concluded that the homeowners’ MCDCA claim was sufficiently similar to the MCDCA claim concerning the processing fee in Allstate to warrant the same result.

Id. The court reasoned that the challenge to the validity of the right to file liens after the passage of the relevant statute of limitations was a contest of the HOA’s methods of collection rather than a dispute about the validity of the underlying debt. Id. The court examined and cited Barr favorably in 20 support of its analysis with emphasis on the Barr Court’s observation that an MCDCA claim survives dismissal when the complainant claims “that the amounts [the debt collector] sought to collect exceed[ed] the amount owed as a result of the debt collector’s inclusion of an unauthorized charge.”10 Id. at 678-79 (quoting Barr, 303 F. Supp. 3d at 420 ).

Therefore, the court vacated the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on the MCDCA claim, remanded the case, and directed the circuit court “to determine, in light of [Allstate] and Barr, whether there is any dispute of material fact as to whether [the HOA] had the right to collect each debt, and if not, whether [the HOA] knew that it did not have such right.” Id. at 679-80. In this case, however, the Court of Special Appeals reached a different result than it did in Allstate and Mills. The intermediate appellate court, after analyzing its decisions in Allstate and Mills, determined that the dispute over Respondents’ collection of post- judgment interest in excess of the legal rate was distinguishable from the collection of an 10 In Barr, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland examined and interpreted CL § 14-202(8) to assess what a complainant needs to establish to prevail on an MCDCA claim. In Barr, the complainants alleged that the defendant violated § 14-202(8) by sending notices claiming the Barrs “owe[d] more than is actually due and which [did] not give [the Barrs] credit for the sums paid,” despite the Barrs making payments in accordance with the terms of a revised loan modification agreement. 303 F. Supp. 3d at 420 .

The federal district court stated that a party can succeed on an MCDCA claim by demonstrating the debt collector “acted with knowledge as to the invalidity of the debt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, the federal district court, citing Allstate, observed that the validity of a debt may become disputed if a debt collector seeks to collect an amount that exceeds the amount owed “as a result of the debt collector’s inclusion of an unauthorized charge.” Id. The federal district court dismissed the MCDCA count in Barr because the complainants neither disputed the validity of the underlying debt nor claimed that the alleged excess charges were the “result of the debt collector’s inclusion of an unauthorized charge.” Id. 21 unauthorized processing fee through a lien in Allstate, 219 Md. App. at 590-91 , and the filing of liens after the passage of the relevant statute of limitations and collection of fines not authorized by an HOA’s governing documents in Mills, 239 Md. App. at 678-80 .

Chavis, 246 Md. App. at 530 . The Court of Special Appeals deemed it critical to the holdings in Allstate and Mills that the creditors in those cases pursued the collection of fees “that it did not have the right to collect.” Id. (emphasis in original). The intermediate appellate court further reasoned that neither Allstate nor Mills “suggests that a debtor may use the MCDCA to challenge the amount of a debt, which the creditor had a right to collect.” Id.

(emphasis in original). In the court’s view, what mattered was that Respondents were entitled by law to charge some amount of post-judgment interest; Petitioners’ challenge to the 10% post-judgment rate, therefore, contested the amount of the debt owed by Petitioners rather than Respondents’ method of debt collection. Id. Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissals of Petitioners’ MCDCA (and MCPA) claims.

Id. We disagree with the Court of Special Appeals’ and the federal court’s distinction between “methods” of debt collection and “amounts” of debts sought to be collected, when assessing a claim under CL § 14-202(8). Neither § 14-202(8) nor the prefatory language in § 14-202 contains the word “method.” Rather, the statute prohibits a debt collector from engaging in certain conduct when “collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt.” The broad reach of the statute is indicated by the use of the phrase “alleged debt” – the conduct proscribed by the statute could concern both valid debts and invalid ones. Although it is 22 not inaccurate to say that § 14-202 deals with methods of debt collection,11 it is more accurate to describe the statute as regulating the conduct of a person while engaged in debt collection.

For example, the statute sets restrictions on the time and manner in which a debt collector communicates with a debtor, the other individuals whom the debt collector may contact about the debt, and the kind of statements a collector may make in those communications. Moreover, the type of conduct addressed in § 14-202(8) differs from the conduct proscribed in the other subsections. Unlike the other subsections, § 14-202(8) speaks to “right[s]” claimed by a debt collector, as opposed to the types of communications or disclosures a collector may use in the course of collecting or attempting to collect a debt. In other words, § 14-202(8) gets at the substance of a claimed right, while the other subsections are more concerned about matters of process.

In short, nothing in the MCDCA generally, or in § 14-202 specifically, warrants an interpretation of § 14-202(8) that limits its applicability to “methods” of debt collection. To the contrary, the remedial nature of the MCDCA requires that we interpret § 14-202(8) broadly to reach any claim, attempt, or threat to enforce a right that a debt collector knows does not exist. See Andrews & Lawrence Prof’l Servs., 467 Md. at 162 ; see also Washington Home Remodelers, Inc. v. State, 426 Md. 613, 630 (2012) (as to the MCPA). Thus, we hold that a plaintiff may invoke § 14-202(8) when the amount claimed by the 11 Subsection 14-202(9) prohibits use of a communication that simulates legal or judicial process from a government agency, which might be regarded a “method” for collecting a debt. 23 debt collector includes sums that the debt collector, to its knowledge, does not have the right to collect.12 The application of this rule to these cases is straightforward.

In Ben-Davies, this Court held that “where a landlord sues a tenant for breach of contract based on a residential lease, and the trial court enters judgment in the landlord’s favor against the tenant and the judgment includes unpaid rent and other expenses, a post-judgment interest rate of 6% applies pursuant to CJ § 11-107(b).” 457 Md. at 275 . Thus, there is no dispute that the legal rate of post-judgment interest applicable to the request for writs of garnishment at issue in these cases is 6%. Nor did the judgments issued by the District Court of Maryland in the underlying breach of contract cases otherwise provide Respondents with the right to charge post-judgment interest at a rate of 10%. When the District Court of Maryland granted the judgments against Petitioners in the underlying cases, the District Court ordered post- judgment interest at the “legal rate.” (Emphasis