Collins v. State

COLE, Judge. We are asked here to decide whether an application for review of a sentence by a three judge panel filed within 30 days of reimposition of a previously suspended sentence is timely. The petitioner, Ray Collins, Jr., was charged in the Circuit Court for Howard County in a five-count indictment, Criminal No. 15137, with assault with intent to rape, kidnapping, third-degree sexual offense, assault, and battery. The jury returned not guilty verdicts on the first three charges and guilty verdicts for the assault and battery charges.

At the sentencing hearing on February 17, 1987, the circuit court ¹⁰⁵ (Nissel, J.) sentenced petitioner to 10 years, suspending all but 4 years with 5 years probation upon his release from prison. 1 Collins appealed his assault and battery convictions and posted an appeal bond in the amount of $20,000. 2 While out on bail, the petitioner was charged and convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Heller, J.) with possession of marijuana and PCP. He received a one year suspended sentence, and was placed on probation and ordered to pay court costs of $100.00. Upon learning of this subsequent conviction, the assistant state’s attorney for Howard County petitioned the court to revoke Collins’ appeal bond. The court granted the petition on October 27, 1987, and committed Collins to jail.

Thereafter, on March 1, 1988, in the Circuit Court for Howard County (Nissel, J.), a violation of probation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Collins in violation of his probation and apparently struck the order of suspension and reimposed the full sentence of ten years. 3 On March 4, 1988, Collins filed an application for review of sentence. The application was denied on March 8, based on the circuit administrative ¹⁰⁶ judge’s finding that the application was untimely, in that it was not filed within 30 days of the original imposition of sentence. Petitioner appealed and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.

Collins v. State, 77 Md.App. 456 , 550 A.2d 743 (1988). We granted the petition for certiorari and shall reverse. Petitioner argues that the circuit administrative judge interpreted the phrase “imposition of sentence” too narrowly. Relying on general principles of statutory construction, he contends that the statute provides two opportunities for review of sentence: either following imposition of the original sentence or following imposition of a suspended sentence.

Hence, Collins concludes, the lower court’s interpretation rendered sections of Rule 4-344(a), as well as portions of the Sentence Review Act, meaningless and, thus, was incorrect. The State counters by first asserting that this Court does not have jurisdiction and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. It premises this argument on the fact that the Sentence Review Act, Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, §§ 645JA to 645JG, makes no provision for appellate review. Moreover, Md.Code (1974,1989 Repl.Vol.) § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, only permits an appeal from a final judgment of a circuit court, not a “review panel.” And, notwithstanding the fact that Collins’ application was considered by the circuit administrative judge and not the panel, the State contends there is no statutory right to review his order denying the application for review.

Alternatively, the State contends that because the original sentence constitutes the only “true punishment,” it was the only sentence which could have been reviewed. The State also argues that the legislative intent to provide review of only the originally imposed sentence is reflected in the language of the statute. At the outset, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that the circuit administrative judge’s order denying the application was a final order and, therefore, ¹⁰⁷ appealable. As we stated recently in Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 84 , 548 A.2d 837 (1988), a judgment is final when it settles and concludes the rights of a party involved in the action, or denies a party the means of further prosecuting the suit.

Accordingly, the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal is denied. The issue presented in this case is whether Collins’ application was timely. To resolve this issue we must first determine whether the phrase “imposition of sentence,” includes imposition of both the original sentence and reimposition of a previously suspended sentence. Of course, our determination must be consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute.

In pursuit of that purpose, we find it unnecessary to look beyond the language of the statute, which is clear. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). Subsection (a) of Md. Rule 4-344 provides: Any application for review of a sentence under the Review of Criminal Sentences Act, Code, Article 27, §§ 645JA-645JG, shall be filed in the sentencing court within 30 days after the imposition of sentence or at a later time permitted by the Act. The clerk shall promptly notify the defendant’s counsel, if any, the State’s Attorney, and the Circuit Administrative Judge of the filing of the application.

In turn, the provisions of the Act pertinent to this case read as follows: § 645JA — Right to Review of Sentence. (a) Unless no different sentence could have been imposed or unless the sentence was imposed by more than one trial judge, every person convicted of a crime by any trial court of this State and sentenced to serve, with or without suspension, a total of more than two years imprisonment in any penal or correctional institution in this State shall be entitled to have the sentence reviewed by a panel of three or more trial judges of the judicial circuit in which the sentencing court is located. However, a ¹⁰⁸ person has no right to have any sentence reviewed more than once pursuant to this section. § 645JB. “Sentence of more than two (2) years” defined. For purposes of this subtitle, a sentence shall be deemed to be