Collins v. State

ALPERT, Judge. THE CLERK: Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye, anyone having business with the Circuit Court for Howard County, please come forward, His Honor’s court is now in session, The Honorable Guy J. Cicone presiding. THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. Be seated, please.

And you will rise when I come in. MR. COLLINS: Man, f... you. THE COURT: What’d you say?

MR. COLLINS: I said f... you. ¹⁷⁹ THE COURT: Is that what you said? All right. Uh, take account of this.

Let’s go with the motion. Thus began the trial of appellant Daniel Dennis Collins upon charges of kidnapping, rape, robbery, assault with intent to murder and several related offenses. Collins was found guilty of all charges against him. Throughout the course of his trial and sentencing, Collins engaged in speech and conduct so noisy, offensive and disruptive that it became difficult (if not impossible) to carry on either proceeding with him present.

At trial, Collins was handcuffed, gagged, and then removed from the courtroom. His sentencing was cut short when he lunged for counsel and was dragged out of the hearing by deputy sheriffs. A hearing to “clarify” that sentence was conducted two days later in Collins’s absence. On appeal, Collins raises two issues: I. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial because Collins’s repeated outbursts in the presence of the jury denied him a fair trial?

II

Whether the sentencing “clarification” resulted in an illegal sentence? At 6:30 p.m. on January 5, 1985, Joann C. returned to her townhouse in Columbia after stopping for groceries on her way home from work. As she got out of her Volvo sedan, Joann noticed a young, slightly-built black male walking toward her about two houses away. Getting a “feeling that he was up to no good,” Joann got back in her car and locked the door.

As she tried to start the car, the young man smashed through her window, pounced on her, and slashed at her clothing with a knife. The assailant threatened to kill Joann if she moved or tried to call out. At knife-point, the young assailant forced Joann to drive toward Baltimore City. When she screamed for help at a nearby car, he pushed her into the back seat and began to drive.

At a stop light, Joann sprang from the back seat, leaped out of the door and fell onto the street. The assailant drove off with her car. Joann identified Daniel Collins as the person who ¹⁸⁰ had broken into her car, attacked her, forced her to drive, and then stole her vehicle. Soon after Joann C. was attacked, a Volvo sedan forced Lisa K. off Route 29 and onto the shoulder of the road.

As she got out to inspect the damage to her car, the Volvo drove up and a young, slightly-built black male stepped out. He came up behind Lisa, grabbed her with one hand, and stuck a knife to the back of her head. The young assailant forced Lisa over the guard rail, down a hill, and forcefully raped her while holding the knife to her throat. After the rape, the assailant otherwise physically and sexually assaulted Lisa.

When she screamed, he spit in her face, took her jewelry and coat, walked up the hill, and drove away. Lisa discovered that, in addition to being raped, she had been cut about the head by her assailant. Alone, she drove herself to the hospital. Lisa K. identified Daniel Collins as the person who had run her off the road, raped, and robbed her.

Collins was tried for the attacks upon Joann C. (case number 13796) and Lisa K. (case number 13795) jointly. I. Trial on the Merits At his trial, Collins disrupted every phase of the proceedings at which he was present.

Soon after the jury was seated and the prosecuting attorney, Ms. O’Donnell, began her opening remarks, Collins began to shout a continuous stream of obscenities. At the conclusion of the State’s opening, a recess was taken. After the recess, Collins indicated through counsel that he no longer wished to be present at his trial and that he wished to discharge his attorney. Both requests were denied.

At that point, the jury was brought back into the courtroom. The following exchange took place in their presence: MR. COLLINS: Eh, man, he ain’t my lawyer, he ain’t representing me. I don’t want that s... to said.

Let that slate for the record, punk. ¹⁸¹ THE COURT: He will remain in this courtroom to assist you. MR. COLLINS: I don’t want him, man. I don’t want his g_. d... assist he ain’t assist me.

I told him I didn’t want these m_____f______cases tried together. Defense counsel, Mr. Willemin, then approached the bench with the prosecutor and requested that his client be excluded from the courtroom. After discussing the need for an in-court identification of Collins by the State’s first witness, constitutional problems attendant to excluding a defendant from his trial and alternatives to excluding Collins, the court denied defense counsel’s motion. The jury was then sent out of the courtroom and the court sought and received an assurance of good behavior from Collins: THE COURT: Let me finish.

If you’re gonna continue to be disruptive, not even to permit your own attorney to make his opening statements, I’m gonna remove you from the courtroom and have you brought in only for the purpose of identification. Now what is your choice? Now I’m asking you if you’re going to be disruptive when he makes his opening statements and questions witnesses? MR.

COLLINS: Nah, I’m gonna sit back and enjoy this show. Y’all go on and do y’all thing. The State examined Joann C., its first witness, without disruption by Collins. During cross-examination, however, Collins interrupted his attorney to ask the court to excuse him from the courtroom, “ ’cuz, uh ... the man railroad me, man.” At the bench, the court instructed counsel to continue and “if he starts to raise a ruckus, we’ll excuse him.” Further into this cross-examination, Collins began to beat on the trial table, to sing 1 and to hum.

Although warned ¹⁸² by the court to “quiet down," Collins continued to be disruptive throughout and until the end of Joann’s cross-examination. When counsel concluded, an early luncheon recess was granted because of Collins’s behavior. After the recess, the court again warned Collins to calm down. The jury was then brought back into the courtroom.

At the bench, defense counsel made the third motion to excuse Collins. For the third time, the motion was denied, again, because of the need to have Collins identified by the State’s next witness. When Collins continued to beat on the furniture, the court instructed a deputy to handcuff Collins, which the deputy did in the presence of the jury. The second witness, Lisa K., was sworn and started to testify.

Immediately, Collins began to shout at her, which prompted the court to order him gagged. At that point, pandemonium broke out in the courtroom with the jury looking on: MR. COLLINS: I said, uh, hello. THE COURT: Wrap, wrap his mouth.

MR. COLLINS: Wrap it up, wrap it up. Wrap, wrap, wrap, wrap, wrap. THE COURT: Get some cotton.

Let’s wrap his mouth. MR. COLLINS: You ain’t gonna put your dirty tie in my mouth, now, man. (Unintelligible few words).

Them m_____f ..... homosexuals. (GUARDS AND DEPUTIES ATTEMPTED TO RESTRAIN THE DEFENDANT) Better get ’em. Uh oh. Especially this big one____ THE COURT: Has anyone gone to get ...

MR. COLLINS: Ohhh. THE COURT: ... what I’ve asked for? GUARDS AND DEPUTIES IN UNISON: Yes.

Yes, Your Honor. Yes. MR. COLLINS: The jolly green giant got me.

Help, help. God, I can’t move at all. Goddamn, he’s gripping—you holding them d..._ tight, too. MS.

O’DONNELL: Lisa, stay calm. THE WITNESS: (Crying) I’m all right. MS. O’DONNELL: You’re, you’re, you’re safe. ¹⁸³ THE WITNESS: All right.

THE COURT: Now don’t get scared. MS. O’DONNELL: You’re safe. THE COURT: Please don’t get scared.

MR. COLLINS: Oh, that b___. ain’t scared. F... you talking about getting scared? All these m...... f...... giants, and you telling mother—I’m the one scared.

F... is you talking about? Don’t be scared. Them m_____f......... you crackers a trip. Boy.

I ain’t even gonna give you no (unintelligible word), pimp. MR. WILLEMIN: We’re getting the stuff, Your Honor. THE COURT: You’re getting what?

MR. WILLEMIN: We’re getting the, uh, apparatus. THE COURT: Make sure it’s sanitary. MR.

WILLEMIN: It will be. (Counsel approached the bench and the following ensued.) MR. WILLEMIN: Your Honor, at this time ... uh, of course, you know I've asked a number of times that the man be excluded from the courtroom. And I can understand that, but at this point, after this lengthy outburst and after the fact that he’s been surrounded by deputies and, and the type of comments that he’s making which I hope the record’s picking up.

THE COURT: Sure. MR. WILLEMIN: Uh, I believe I have— I believe it’s impossible for him at this time to receive a fair and impartial trial before this jury. And I would ¹⁸⁴ ask the Court—well, this— is the only jury that we’ve had to this (inaudible).

I would ask Your Honor to grant a mistrial in this case at this time. MS. O’DONNELL: Your Honor, this behavior is at the, uh—is being in no way prompted by the State, but by the defendant. It is, I would agree, uh, probably prejudicial to him.

However, Your Honor, that is a situation that is not the fault of the State. And this case would have to be tried sooner or later by, by a jury. I would ask—I would join in the request now that he be removed from the courtroom until the identification portion of the testimony. THE COURT: No, if they can stuff his mouth, then he—no, let him be identified by this young lady.

And then we’ll remove him from the courtroom. We have to have him as an identification. And I don’t want to interrupt your thoughts in interviewing this young lady. MR.

WILLEMIN: Let me say for purposes of the record that ... THE COURT: Yes, yes. MR. WILLEMIN: ... at this time, in the ...

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Willemin. MR. WILLEMIN: ... presence of the jury, there are five deputies and Department of Corrections officials surrounding the defendant, plus one court personnel. All in the presence of the jury, all endeavoring to put a gag in Mr. Collins’s mouth. ¹⁸⁵ (DEFENDANT ATTEMPTING TO TALK THROUGH GAG) MR.

WILLEMIN: And I again would renew my motion for mistrial. THE COURT: Okay. Denied. MR.

WILLEMIN: Thank you, sir. (Counsel returned to the trial tables and proceedings in open court resumed.) (pause) [Struggle with Collins continuing] THE COURT: (after pause) And your first name is Louisa? THE WITNESS: Lisa. THE COURT: Lisa.

I’m sorry. THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. (pause—defendant being gagged) THE COURT: You want a glass of water? THE WITNESS: No, I’m all right.

(long pause while defendant being gagged) (Counsel approached the bench and the following ensued.) MR. WILLEMIN: Your Honor, will you excuse the jury. They aren’t— MS. O’DONNELL: Please, Your Honor.

MR. WILLEMIN: Looks like it’s gonna take some more time. THE COURT: How long’s it gonna take? (loudly) Sheriff, how long is this gonna take?

(no response) THE COURT: Where’s the Sheriff? THE DEPUTY: Yes, Your Honor? THE COURT: Huh? THE DEPUTY: Dave went out to look for tape?

THE COURT: Well how long is this gonna take? MR. WILLEMIN: They, they need to find, apparently, some tape, Your Honor. THE DEPUTY: Rick McCauley’s getting ... ¹⁸⁶ MR.

WILLEMIN: Your Honor, I would ask that the jury be excused. THE DEPUTY: ... DUCT TAPE. THE COURT: Oh, members of the jury, you’re excused, please.

And I think I’ll excuse myself. THE CLERK: Stand, please. 2 (RECESS) After the recess, before the jury was reseated, Collins was taken out of the courtroom. Counsel renewed his motion for mistrial; again, the motion was denied. The trial proceeded.

Later that day, Collins was brought back into the courtroom for two short periods of time to be identified by witnesses. On both occasions he became abusive and was ushered out again. During the balance of his trial, Collins refused repeated invitations to return to the courtroom although he returned for a short time when the jury was instructed. During most of his voluntary absence, Collins viewed his trial on a closed circuit television in a courthouse cell.

Finally, Collins returned to the courtroom, without incident, to receive his verdict. Collins’s appeal presents a new twist to the argument typically advanced by a disruptive defendant excluded from the courtroom. Generally, such defendants contend that they were deprived of a fair trial by being removed. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970).

In the case sub judice, Collins argues that he was deprived a fair trial because he was not removed (or, at least, not removed soon enough). Collins submits that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing requests to remove him from the courtroom before he disrupted the trial and antagonized and prejudiced the ¹⁸⁷ jury. 3 Collins argues that the effect of this prejudice was to deny him his constitutional right to a fair trial and that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for a mistrial. Fifteen years ago, we noted that American courts had tew precedential guiaeposts m dealing with disruptive courtroom behavior by an accused. Jones v. State, 11 Md.App. 686, 689 , 276 A.2d 666 (1971).

Since that time, the path has become better marked. The trial judge, in keeping with his obligation to assure the swift and proper administration of justice, may take such precautions as may be necessary to carry out his duty. Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 443, 451 , 340 A.2d 396 cert. denied, 276 Md. 741 (1975). The choice of precautions taken is within the sole discretion of the trial judge who is best able to assess the urgency of the situation before him.

See, Id. This view was articulated by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 at 343-44 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 at 1061: We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant like Allen: (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.

The Allen decision, however, offers little guidance in dealing with a disruptive defendant before his conduct reaches the point that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. In Jones, supra, we suggested that before ¹⁸⁸ Allen-type sanctions are employed, the trial judge should excuse the jury from the courtroom, admonish the defendant, and warn him that any further disruption may result in the imposition of an appropriate sanction. 11 Md.App. at 694 , 276 A.2d 666 . The preference for admonition before expulsion has been expressed elsewhere: Public confidence in the trial process requires that removal of defendants be limited to cases urgently demanding that action be taken, that it be done only after explicit warning, that there be a standing opportunity for the defendant to return to the courtroom, and that the burden that absence creates for the defense be kept to the unavoidable minimum. A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 6-8.8, commentary at 6.44 (2d ed. 1986).

Due regard for a defendant’s right to be present at trial, to confront witnesses against him, and to assist in the presentation of his defense requires that the trial judge resist expelling a disruptive defendant until “absolutely necessary for the trial to proceed in an orderly fashion.” Jones, 11 Md.App. at 694 , 276 A.2d 666 . We see no reason for the trial judge to be less solicitous of these rights merely because the motion to remove the defendant originates from defense counsel. The Rules specifically provide that a defendant “shall be present at all times when required by the court.” Rule 4-231(a). The record shows that when Collins first interrupted the trial, a recess was taken.

Soon thereafter, the trial judge excused the jury, warned Collins that he might be excluded and received an assurance of good behavior from the defendant. It was only after Collins reneged on this assurance that the court employed Allen-Yike sanctions, first handcuffing, then gagging, then excluding Collins. Thus, the sequence of precautions followed the Jones guidelines quite closely. ¹⁸⁹ We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s refusal to exclude Collins sooner than he did. The essence of Collins’s defense was that the victims had misidentified him.

In-court identification was, therefore, important to the State’s case and, once completed, Collins was permitted to leave the courtroom. Had he been excluded earlier and brought back solely for identification, the timing of his reappearance might jeopardize the credibility of the in-court identification. In any event, Collins’s bizarre behavior in front of the jury was consistent with his defense that he was an escapted mental patient who happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. In the case at bar, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Collins before the second victim identified him.

Consistent with the American Bar Association standards set forth above, Collins’s absence from the courtroom was kept to an unavoidable minimum. Nor can we say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Collins’s motion for a mistrial. The decision whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and, in those cases involving a question of prejudice which might infringe upon the right of a defendant to receive a fair trial, the exercise of that discretion denying a mistrial will not be reversed on appeal “unless it is clear that there has been prejudice to the defendant.” Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 429 , 326 A.2d 707 (1974). While Collins’s behavior quite probably offended some jurors, we cannot say that it undermined the confidence of their verdict. 4 The evidence against Collins was compelling and his defense of misidentification was shot when both victims positively identified him as their assailant.

A well-behaved Daniel Collins would not likely have received a different ¹⁹⁰ verdict. Again, Collins’s behavior tended to support his defense that he was an escaped mental patient caught in a police dragnet. We are loath to permit defendants to generate mistrials through vile and offensive behavior which affronts the dignity of our courts. The trial court was better situated to assess the prejudical effect, if any, of Collins’s antics.

We perceive no abuse of discretion in its decision to deny defendant’s motion. 5 II.