Drolsum v. Horne

THIEME, Judge. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County (Beck, J.) wherein the court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, thereby compelling a conveyance pursuant to the terms of an executed deed. FACTS In 1974, Alton and Helen Drolsum acquired from John D. Hannon residential property along Babylon Road in Carroll County. Reservation was made of a strip of land thirty feet wide for the subsequent conveyance to Carroll County for road purposes.

An unimproved driveway traverses the Drol-sum property and connects to a nearby parking area. A second, smaller unimproved lane, herein referred to as a “machinery lane,” lies adjacent thereto. The Drolsums allege that on 29 June 1990 a pickup truck registered to David Horne, a neighbor of the Drolsums, was driven down the machinery lane by either Horne or his brother-in-law, Phillip Jung, without the consent of the Drol-sums. On this basis, the Drolsums filed a civil complaint alleging trespass and seeking, inter alia, $10.00 in nominal damages, $200,000 in compensatory damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages from each defendant.

The Hornes maintained a mailbox on the strip of land originally reserved by the grantor for widening Babylon Road. In their third amended complaint filed on 24 October 1992, the Drolsums alleged a trespass against the Hornes as a result of the placement of said mailbox upon land claimed by the Drolsums and therein sought $10.00 in nominal damages, $200,000 in compensatory damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages. In actuality though, legal title to the land was held at that time still by Hannon. ⁷⁰⁷ On 9 February 1993, Hannon issued a supplemental deed to the Drolsums, extinguishing the reservation held by Hannon and granting the strip of land to the Drolsums. The result of this action by Hannon is that from the date of the supplemental deed forward, the Drolsums were to enjoy possession of the entire 1974 conveyance in fee simple.

The Drolsums timely recorded the deed among the land records of Carroll County. The record reflects that during the pendency of that action the Drolsums attempted to tamper with or remove the Hornes’ mailbox. 1 By order of the circuit court, on 19 August 1993, the Board of Commissioners of Carroll County (Carroll County) were joined to the action as necessary plaintiffs. Carroll County filed a motion to dismiss and included, in support thereof, the affidavit of Howard Noll, Chief of the Carroll County Bureau of Engineering, which reflected that the County then had no interest in the strip of land that was originally reserved by Hannon. The motion was denied.

Additional facts will be supplemented as necessary. Appellants present for our review the following issues, as paraphrased: 1. Whether the lower court erred in issuing an order compelling appellants to convey an interest in land to appellee, Carroll County. 2. Whether the Carroll County Board was properly joined as a necessary party to the instant action. 3.

Whether the lower court erred in granting appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment without a hearing. 4. WTiether the lower court erred in issuing, sua sponte, an injunction restraining appellants from removing appel-lees’ mailbox. ⁷⁰⁸ 5. Whether the lower court erred in denying appellants’ motion to compel disclosure to appellees’ telephone records. 6. Whether the trial court’s actions constitute prejudicial conduct to the extent that appellants’ right to due process was violated.

DISCUSSION The genesis of this appeal revolves around the Hornes’ erection of a mailbox that allegedly encroached upon the Drolsums’ property. To compound the harm, Mr. Horne or his brother-in-law, Phillip Jung, allegedly drove down a machinery lane owned by the Drolsums. 2 “Question - When should an attorney say “no” to a client? Answer-When asked to file a lawsuit like this one.” * * * “In our puzzlement as to how this case even found its way into court, we are reminded of the words of a romantic poet. ‘The [law] is too much with us; late and soon, Getting and spending, we lay waste our [judicial] powers: We have given our hearts away, a sordid Boon!’ (Wordsworth, The World Is Too Much With Us (1807) with apologies to William Wordsworth, who we feel, if he were here would approve.)” McDonald v. John P. Scripps Newspaper, 210 Cal.App.3d 100 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 473 (2 Dist.1989). The Drolsums have embarked on a hunt, seeking to capture the prey who has dared to cross them both in real estate and in principle. ⁷⁰⁹ I & H Before reaching the legal issues posed by this assertion, we think it necessary to address the issue of whether the Drol-sums’ had standing to bring a trespass action for the alleged trespassory placement of the Hornes’ mailbox.

At the time of the complaint, Hannon, not the Drolsums, had legal title of the reserved strip of land. Inasmuch as the Drolsums have conceded that this issue was not raised below, and thus not preserved for this Court’s review, we need not address it. See Maryland Rule 8-131(a). The product of this waived misjoinder is that the Drolsums were ultimately ordered to convey to the County the strip of land which was transferred to them via the supplemental deed.

The Drolsums submit that this was improper because in the County’s initial motion to dismiss, it expressed that it had no interest in the strip of land reserved by Hannon. This argument shoddily ignores the true error manifested by the ordered conveyance; that according to the terms of Hannon’s deed and supplemental deed, the County never had an interest in the strip of land. Our judicial oath to promote fairness and equity compels us to advocate for the just solution to this problem, though this analysis will likely be a matter of first impression to the Drolsums’ counsel. In interpreting a deed whose language is clear and unambiguous on its face, the plain meaning of the words used shall govern without the assistance of extrinsic evidence.

See generally Mims v. Armstrong, 31 Md. 87 (1869) (in construing a deed all words should be considered). Contained within the original deed executed by Hannon was the following language: Saving and Excepting, however, all that strip or portion of the afore described parcel that lies within a distance of thirty (30) feet of the centerline of the existing road bed of Babylon Road, said strip being hereby expressly reserved by [Hannon], his heirs and assigns, for [the] purpose of widening said road and the conveyance thereof to the County Commissioners of Carroll County ... All, however, with ⁷¹⁰ out any obligation and. with the absolute discretion of the seller____ (Emphasis added.) The supplemental deed extinguished the Hannon’s reservation by use of the following language: The purpose and effect of the instant supplemental deed shall be to modify the above-described deeds of May 6,1974, and May 23, 1974, so as to extinguish [Haimomj’s reservation of the thirty foot strip____ TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above-described 30-foot strip of ground ... to the proper use and benefit of the said ALTON RAYMOND DROLSUM and HELEN N. DROL-SUM, his wife, as tenants by the entireties.... (Emphasis added.) We think it unequivocally clear that Hannon held legal title to the reservation until such time as he conveyed to the Drolsums via the supplemental deed.

At no time whatsoever did Carroll County have title to the reserved strip of land. It was therefore error for the lower court to compel the conveyance as it did. The Drolsums aver that it was error for the lower court to grant the Hornes’ motion for summary judgment with respect to damages absent a hearing when one was duly requested in the original motion. In support of this position, they rely on Maryland Rule 2-311(f), which states in pertinent part: (f) Hearing — Other Motions. — ...

Except when a rule expressly provides for a hearing, the court shall determine in each case whether a hearing will be held, but it may not render a decision that is dispositive of a claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as provided in this section. Omitted from their