DuBois v. City of College Park

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question of whether an action for declaratory judgment instituted by three registered voters of the City of College Park, seeking a declaration that the councilmanic districts of the city were unconstitutionally apportioned, was properly dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs were not “bona fide residents of College Park” and therefore lacked standing to maintain the action. The action was brought in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. It was alleged that the plaintiffs, Renee DuBois and David Johnson, are students at the University of Maryland, residents of College Park, and registered to vote ⁵²⁷ in city elections pursuant to the city charter.

Later, Zachary Kinney, who was also alleged to be a student at the University of Maryland, a resident of College Park and a registered voter of the city, was added as a party plaintiff. The plaintiffs claimed that the 1970 College Park census shows that the present councilmanic districts, established in 1967, are unequally apportioned and that the city, although having had an adequate opportunity to do so, has failed to reapportion the districts. It was alleged that, as a result of this malapportionment, the votes of the plaintiffs and those similarly situated are debased and they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The action was brought by the plaintiffs in their own behalf and on behalf of all those University of Maryland students similarly situated.

The basis of the plaintiffs’ complaint, as developed at trial, is that the population figures upon which the councilmanic districts are apportioned exclude students residing on the campus of the University of Maryland, with the result that the two “student” districts contain two to three times the population of the “non-student” districts. The City of College Park, while contending that the districts are constitutionally apportioned on the basis of population figures including only bona fide residents of College Park, argued primarily that the plaintiffs did not have standing to maintain the action and were not proper representatives of the class which they purported to represent. Although the city did not attempt to controvert the allegation that the plaintiffs were duly registered voters of the City of College Park, it did present evidence, over the plaintiffs’ objections, that the plaintiffs actually resided in areas other than College Park and therefore should not have been allowed to register as voters of College Park. At the conclusion of the trial and submission of legal memoranda, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of standing.

The court reasoned that, under the criteria set forth in Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490 , 325 A. 2d 392 (1974), none of the plaintiffs were actually domiciled in College Park and therefore were not injured by the alleged ⁵²⁸ malapportionment. Additionally, the court found that although two of the plaintiffs, Kinney and Johnson, lived in districts which, “if their contentions prevail, are underrepresented,” the third plaintiff, Renee DuBois, lived in a district which was overrepresented. Therefore, the court found that even if Renee DuBois were domiciled in College Park, she would not be injured by the apportionment scheme and would not have standing to challenge the city's districting. Finally, the court held that the suit could not be maintained as a class action because the plaintiffs, as non-residents, were not members of the class they purported to represent: those students of the University of Maryland who are residents of College Park and eligible to vote in city elections.

The circuit court did not consider the merits of the case, i.e., whether the districts were malapportioned. The plaintiffs took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and this Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the case prior to any decision by the Court of Special Appeals. The plaintiffs contend that the fact that they are duly registered to vote in city elections pursuant to the College Park charter is sufficient to confer standing. They contend that the city cannot challenge their status as qualified voters in this proceeding by introducing evidence that they are not residents of College Park when the city has, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the city charter, registered them as voters.

Because standing in an action challenging the constitutionality of apportionment of voting districts is premised upon the plaintiffs’ status as registered voters, and because the city did not deny, but in fact admitted, that the plaintiffs are registered voters, the plaintiffs argue that the circuit court should not have gone behind the plaintiffs’ status as voters. It is urged that a court must find that, at this time, the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the city’s apportionment scheme. We agree. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204-208 , 82 S. Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), in determining whether voters have ⁵²⁹ standing to challenge the constitutionality of apportionment of state legislative districts, the Supreme Court stated that the question of standing depends upon whether the party has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Relying upon its prior cases, the Court held that “voters” who reside in allegedly malapportioned legislative districts sustain a “legally cognizable injury” and therefore have standing to maintain an action challenging the apportionment scheme.

In the instant case, the city does not deny that the plaintiffs are registered voters of the City of College Park. As far as the record discloses, the city never instituted proceedings to have the plaintiffs’ names removed from the registration lists, and the order in this case does not, and indeed cannot, affect the status of the plaintiffs as eligible voters. The plaintiffs, therefore, are still registered “voters,” eligible to participate in College Park elections and thus, in view of Baker v. Carr, supra, would appear to have standing to maintain this action, Moreover, the city charter provides procedures for the removal from the registration lists of those voters who were either improperly registered or who subsequently become ineligible, Although the city has not affirmatively sought to have the plaintiffs adjudicated as ineligible to vote, it in essence argues that the plaintiffs are not eligible to vote because they do not meet the residency requirement of § 14 of the City of College Park Charter, However, our prior eases indicate that where a statutory remedy is available to challenge the qualifications of voters on the registration lists, that statutory remedy is the exclusive method for challenging the qualifications of registered voters. The registration lists, in the absence of allegations of fraud on the part of election officials, are conclusive evidence of the qualifications of voters, and the qualifications of voters may not be challenged in collateral proceedings.

Lee v. Sec. of State & Mahoney, 251 Md. 134 , 246 A. 2d 562 (1968); Moore v. Bay, 149 Md. 286, 292-295 , 131 A. 459 (1925). ⁵³⁰ In Lee v. Sec. of State & Mahoney, supra, the plaintiff, challenged the right of a candidate to run in a general election as an independent. The challenge was based upon the contention that the Board of Supervisors of Elections had improperly reopened the voter registration books, during which time the candidate changed his party affiliation from Democrat to “decline.” To be eligible to run as an independent, the candidate must be registered as a “decline.” This Court agreed that the Board, because of a misinterpretation of the election laws, had improperly reopened the registration books and allowed the candidate to change his party affiliation. However, the Court refused to declare the candidate ineligible despite the improper voter registration and affirmed the trial court’s action dismissing the voter’s challenge. The Court noted that the election code set forth administrative and judicial procedures by which the voter registration lists could be challenged and that the plaintiff had failed to follow these procedures.

The Court held that the statutory procedures provided the exclusive remedy for the correction of the voter registration lists. Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the statutory remedy need not be followed since the purpose of the challenge was not to correct the voter registration lists but rather to have the candidate declared ineligible to run as an independent. In rejecting this argument, the Court pointed out that the eligibility of the candidate to run as an independent depended upon his status as a registered “independent” voter, and that this could be raised only pursuant to the statutory procedures, 251 Md. at 141 . In Moore v. Bay, supra, two unsuccessful candidates in a municipal election challenged the validity of that election on the ground that some registered voters participating in the election did not possess all of the qualifications required by the city charter and therefore were not legally qualified to vote.

After stating that the validity of the election turned upon the question of the effect to be given to the registration lists, this Court held that the election was valid because it was the intent of the election laws “to make the final registration lists of voters conclusive evidence of those ⁵³¹ entitled to vote at the ensuing municipal election.” Moore v. Bay, supra, 149 Md. at 296 . In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the local election law, which incorporated by reference consistent provisions of the state election laws, provided a comprehensive plan for the maintenance of registration lists. Thus, the local election law required that the city clerk enter on the registration lists only those applicants who satisfied the clerk by proof, under oath, that they met the qualifications of voters set forth in the city charter. The registration lists so compiled by the clerk were then to be reviewed by city officials and “ray person [who] should feel himself aggrieved by the action of the clerk in registering .. . the name of any person” could obtain a hearing before the city council to contest the registration.

An appeal from the determination of the city council could be taken to the circuit court.