Giddins v. State

BATTAGLIA, Judge. Petitioner, Damont Isaiah Giddins, seeks review of the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment affirming the denial of his “Motion to Bar Retrial Following Mistrial (Double Jeopardy)” after the Circuit Court for Worcester County had granted Mr. Giddins’s motion for mistrial during direct examination of the State’s first witness. We granted certiorari in this case to answer the following questions: 1. Whether the trial court entered an order that was a “favorable termination,” tantamount to an acquittal of Petitioner, when it granted a mistrial and discharged the jury, ⁵ and thereafter the trial judge—in response to the Prosecutor’s specific assertion on the record that the “State [would] retry” Petitioner—exclaimed on the record from the bench that the Prosecutor had committed “misconduct” and that the State was barred from prosecuting Petitioner a second time? 2.

Whether the State’s Attorney’s avowal or motion to retry the Petitioner on the record, after the trial judge dismissed the jury and terminated original jeopardy, was sufficient to ripen the issue of double jeopardy for a determination? 3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by drafting a sua sponte letter to revise its judgment, reinstitute the prosecution, reschedule the matter and effectively order another judge to sit in review of itself, after it ruled that Petitioner could not be retried? Giddins v. State, 389 Md. 398 , 885 A.2d 823 (2005). We shall hold that the trial court’s granting of Mr. Giddins’s motion for a mistrial did not constitute an acquittal, thereby foreclosing retrial under principles of double jeopardy, because the judge was not ruling on the evidence.

Background On July 6, 2004, Damont Isaiah Giddins was on trial in the Circuit Court for Worcester County for two counts of possessing a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute in violation of Maryland Code (2002), Section 5-602 of the Criminal Law Article, 1 and two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of Maryland Code ⁶ (2002), Section 5-601 of the Criminal Law Article. 2 During the State’s opening argument, the following exchange transpired among the State, the Court, and Mr. Kurland, counsel for Mr. Giddins: THE STATE: What the case is about, briefly. In June of 2003, Detective Heiser, who is with the Ocean City Police Department, received information and began an investigation of drug distribution in the Ocean City, Northern Worcester County area. The target of that investigation— MR. KURLAND: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to approach the bench, please? * * * MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, the search and seizure warrant has never been evidence since I’ve been practicing law and probably ever since you’ve been practicing law. I think the State is now poisoning a well in telling them about a drug distribution that they’re never going to hear unless the State intends to call the informant into this courtroom to testify. This is improper.

It’s inexcusable, and I’m shocked that this seed has been planted. THE STATE: Your Honor, I am simply giving the jury background that they began an investigation. As a result of that investigation, they obtained a search warrant. I’m not going to go into the facts of what—how they obtained it, but this did not fall out of the clear blue sky.

They have to have— THE COURT: Well, there’s nothing wrong with that. THE STATE:—some brief prepatory remarks. MR. KURLAND: Your Honor— THE COURT: If that’s as far as you take it. ⁷ THE STATE: That’s correct.

MR. KURLAND: I’m not concerned about Mr. Collins, with all due respect, taking it anywhere. And I truly respect him. I’m worried about the police officers now coming in and testifying, based upon their investigation and a search and seizure warrant, that they’re going to testify— THE COURT: Here’s what we’ll do.

After opening statements, I usually give the jury a break. They’ve been out there a long time. At that point in time— THE STATE: I will instruct my officers. THE COURT: Is that okay?

He could do it himself. Or— MR. KURLAND: Judge, sometimes it’s very difficult now to cure a problem which shouldn’t have been broached to begin with. THE COURT: No, it isn’t.

MR. KURLAND: This jury now knows that there was an investigation— THE COURT: Well— MR. KURLAND:—there was a search and seizure warrant. And, Judge— THE COURT: There’s nothing wrong with that.

MR. KURLAND: I don’t see— THE COURT: If he was going to go into—he didn’t quite get there. But if he’s going to go into, you know, your client being a target of an investigation because he distributed to some informant or something, yeah, that’s—we got a real problem then. But he didn’t get there because you objected.

MR. KURLAND: Judge, I think this would be an appropriate point for you to admonish the jury and have [the State] start all over. THE COURT: What do you want me to admonish the jury about? ⁸ MR. KURLAND: About the search and seizure warrant and an investigation.

THE COURT: That’s coming in. They’ve got to say why they’re there. They’re going to say they have a search and seizure warrant. As far as the contents of the warrant, we’re going to have to depend upon—I’ll do it myself if you want me to.

I’ll bring the officers in and tell them myself. Mr. Kurland subsequently made a motion in limine to prevent the State from further mentioning the search and seizure warrant and the investigation, which the court denied. The State then continued its opening statement: THE STATE: We’ll start again. In June of 2003, Detective Heiser began an investigation of drug distribution in Worcester County of the Defendant.

MR. KURLAND: Objection again, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. THE STATE: The Defendant operates—or operated a retail store called Set It Off which is at the corner of Talbot and Baltimore Avenues in Ocean City, Maryland.

After a several-week investigation, the officers applied for and received a search warrant to search the Defendant and his store. MR. KURLAND: Objection, Your Honor. That’s— THE COURT: It’s noted.

It’ll be overruled. THE STATE: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead. THE STATE: On Wednesday of August 8th of 2003, officers of the Ocean City Police Narcotics Division executed that search warrant at the Set It Off store.

The Defendant was present. The officers will identify him. Officer Heiser, who’s seated there at the Defense table-or at the State’s table— MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, I’m going to object.

May we approach, please? THE COURT: All right. ⁹ MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, my theory in this case and the Defense’s theory in this case is that my client is not a distributor, and by the very nature of the fact that it was a large quantity of drugs doesn’t make him a distributor. Number two, the State has now planted this seed that there’s a major investigation going on down here, and as a result of that investigation, a search and seizure warrant is issued by an issuing judge and they go to his establishment.

Judge, this is grossly— THE COURT: What’s your suggestion, then, just so the record is clear on this? You don’t want any mention of the search and seizure warrant? MR. KURLAND: It’s already been mentioned, Judge.

This jury knows that there’s an investigation— THE COURT: So what do you want me to do about it? MR. KURLAND: Well, I don’t understand, honestly, why, if [the State] is admonished that we’re going to start all over, that he starts all over from the beginning again. THE COURT: Because I never said he couldn’t mention that there was a search and seizure warrant.

MR. KURLAND: But, Judge, an investigation with a search and seizure warrant now in August at a man’s place of employment — THE COURT: You’re making much more of this than what there is to it. MR. KURLAND: I don’t— THE COURT: Certainly they can say why they were there.

What are you supposed to do, remain silent as to why they were there? They just went in there and started searching? MR. KURLAND: Yes.

THE COURT: No way. MR. KURLAND: Yes. THE COURT: No way.

MR. KURLAND: But, Judge— THE COURT: If that’s an objection, it’s overruled. ¹⁰ MR. KURLAND: Why don’t we pick it up and the point that there’s a search and seizure warrant, not why there was a warrant, because it looks like— THE COURT: Because you can’t tell the State how to present their case any more than they can tell you. MR.

KURLAND: It gives the jury the impression that, as a result of this investigation, a search— THE COURT: That’s true. MR. KURLAND:—and now they found drugs. THE COURT: Well, that’s true, isn’t it?

MR. KURLAND: No, it’s not true, not as far as the distribution case is—count is concerned. THE COURT: Okay. I don’t understand your motion.

I mean, I think I understand it, but it’s something I’m totally unfamiliar with. They’re certainly entitled to say why they were there and why they searched. He’s not going to go into—I will not allow the particulars of some—because I’ve never had seen the search warrant. I assume maybe there was a controlled buy or something like that.

I don’t know. Or somebody had been there and seen drugs in the past. None of that is going to be allowed. But if it is, ask for a mistrial.

I’ll consider it. MR. KURLAND: I’m going to ask for a mistrial right now, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right.

That’s denied unless you want—I assume based on what you’ve already told me. MR. KURLAND: Based upon what I’ve told you. THE COURT: Okay.

That’s denied. Both the State and Mr. Giddins finished their opening statements, and the Court then took a recess, during which the judge instructed the police officers: THE COURT: Folks, there was a motion in limine made. There’s also a motion for a new trial. The Defense Counsel is concerned that when you testify that you’re going to go beyond more than saying that you were doing an investiga ¹¹ tion in Ocean City, and you applied for or granted a search and seizure warrant and served it.

What he specifically doesn’t want you to say is anything that’s within the confines of that search warrant. Bear in mind, I haven’t seen it all. But I assume there’s something in there about either some informant or a controlled buy or something—usually there’s something like that in there. None of that is to come in during this trial because that person is not here.

And if it does, of course it will be the subject of a motion for a mistrial. Does that satisfy you, Mr. Kurland? MR. KURLAND: Yes, it does, Your Honor.

Thank you. THE COURT: All right. Let me call—you can go on back out now. Let me call a couple cases here.

The court took up another matter before resuming the trial and bringing the parties back into the courtroom: THE COURT: Before the jury is brought back in, I just want to make it clear on the search warrant. I don’t see where it’s necessary to say—I don’t even know if this was a major one or not, but—a drug investigation. But just simply say, his investigation, he applied for a search and seizure warrant, and then you went in and you served it and take it from there. The jury returned to the courtroom and the State called its first witness, Detective Heiser: THE STATE: Would you state your name and employment, please.

DETECTIVE HEISER: Detective Heiser. I’m currently assigned to the Ocean City Vice Narcotics Unit. THE STATE: How long have you been so assigned? DETECTIVE HEISER: Two and a half years.

THE STATE: And pursuant to that—those duties, did you begin a drug investigation in June of last year? DETECTIVE HEISER: Yes, sir, I did. THE STATE: Who was the target of that investigation? MR.

KURLAND: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. ¹² MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, may we approach, please? THE COURT: Yes.

I thought we went through this. THE STATE: Your Honor, I asked him this in opening statement and the objection was overruled. THE COURT: Not about him being a target of the investigation. THE STATE: Well, as a result of that.

THE COURT: Well, it’s his objection. Yes, sir. MR. KURLAND: Your Honor, I’m going to renew my motion for a mistrial.

THE COURT: I’m going to grant it. THE STATE: Your Honor. THE COURT: I’m granting it. That is ridiculous what you just did.

Jesus, we’ve had now three discussions over this. The judge announced to the jury that he had declared a mistrial and released them. The proceedings, nevertheless, continued: THE STATE: The record may reflect, Your Honor, the State will retry. THE COURT: Now, here is the reason.

When you say that he’s the target of the investigation, what you’re doing is you’re considering all the facts that are in that search warrant which makes him the target of that investigation, not one bit of which, if it’s based upon hearsay, which it most certainly is going to be, is going to be admissible. And we had three discussions on this. I couldn’t believe you said it either. THE STATE: May I respond, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I was as shocked as Defense Counsel. THE STATE: We had three discussions on that, Your Honor, if I may, and all three times the Court overruled the Defense objection to exactly that. I advised the jury in opening statement that the man was the target of it, and the Court overruled his objection. THE COURT: No. Mr.—no, no.

You’re right on my ruling, but I only ruled, I specifically said what was going to ¹³ be admissible and what wasn’t, and you walked right up there and tell him that after two warnings, and as far as I’m concerned, it’s prosecutorial misconduct and you can’t retry him. THE STATE: Your Honor, the State will be noting an appeal to that. The proceedings in open court were then terminated. On July 8, 2004, the trial judge sent both the State and Mr. Giddins a letter to clarify that the comments he made at the conclusion of the trial regarding prosecutorial misconduct “were not meant to be an Order of this Court or the equivalent of an Order,” but that both parties were entitled to a hearing on the issue of “prosecutorial misconduct” before another judge, and that he was therefore directing the case to be set in for a hearing “in the event the State seeks to retry the Defendant.” On that same day, the State submitted a letter to the court requesting that the case be set in for retrial.

Mr. Giddins thereafter filed a “Motion to Bar Retrial Following Mistrial (Double Jeopardy)” about which another judge for the Circuit Court for Worcester County heard arguments on September 13, 2004. During the motions hearing Mr. Giddins argued that, under Maryland law, when the trial court grants a mistrial pursuant to the defendant’s request, normally double jeopardy does not come into play to bar retrial; however, where there was prosecutorial misconduct, double jeopardy will bar retrial. The State, in response, contended that prosecutorial misconduct, assuming it occurred, alone would not bar retrial. Rather, the State contended that the prosecutor 'would have had to have “deliberately goaded” the defendant into requesting a mistrial, and that, without proof of such goading, retrial was not barred.

The judge issued a written order on September 16, 2004, denying Mr. Giddins’s Motion to Bar Retrial Following Mistrial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that the State intentionally sabotaged a trial that was going badly, or had deliberately goaded Mr. Giddins into requesting a mistrial. ¹⁴ In a published opinion, the Court of Special Appeals iterated that a mistrial requested by the defendant normally does not constitute a bar to re-prosecution, even though the motion was precipitated by prosecutorial misconduct. Giddins v. State, 163 Md.App. 322 , 878 A.2d 687 (2005). This is because, as the Court of Special Appeals explained, the declaration of mistrial is, in itself, a sanction imposed upon the prosecution for its misconduct. Therefore, the intermediate appellate court noted, double jeopardy principles only will bar retrial in rare instances when the prosecution’s overreaching has amounted to a deliberate and intentional sabotage of a trial that is going badly, thereby goading the defendant into requesting a mistrial.

Based upon the findings of the motions judge, the Court of Special Appeals held that Mr. Giddins had failed to present any 'evidence that demonstrated deliberate goading and that the trial was far from going badly so that there would have been no reason for the prosecutor to have deliberately sabotaged it. Accordingly, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the denial of Mr. Giddins’s Motion to Bar Retrial. Before this Court, Mr. Giddins has abandoned his argument that a retrial was barred by prosecutorial misconduct and instead proposes that a retrial is barred on double jeopardy grounds because of the remarks made by the original trial judge when he declared a mistrial. 3 ¹⁵ Discussion The issue in the case sub judice, whether the remarks made by the trial judge in explaining his purpose for declaring a mistrial constituted an acquittal, requires us to construe the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Maryland common law. Whether principles of double jeopardy bar the retrial of Mr. Giddins is a question of law, and therefore we review the legal conclusion of the trial court de novo.

Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8 , 887 A.2d 602, 606 (2005); Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484, 490 , 864 A.2d 1006, 1009 (2004); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368 , 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999). Mr. Giddins relies on the plea of autrefois acquit 4 on the ground that, because the original trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial was in direct response to the State’s use of the phrase, “target of investigation,” it was a ruling on some of the evidence in the case and therefore constituted an acquittal, thereby barring under both the Fifth Amendment and Maryland common law’s prohibition against double jeopardy his retrial for the possession of and intent to distribute cocaine. Alternatively, Mr. Giddins claims that the trial judge’s statement constituted an order because it was based upon the State’s motion for mistrial and the judge intended for it to be a final disposition, as evidenced by his comment “you can’t retry him.” Therefore, even if it was not an acquittal per se, Mr. Giddins contends that it was the functional equivalent thereof. Mr. Giddins argues that, despite the lack of any ¹⁶ docket entry, the trial judge’s comments constituted an order because they were announced authoritatively in open court and that, even if the order was “egregiously erroneous,” it was still tantamount to an acquittal because it terminated the controversy in his favor.

His argument is supported, he submits, by the fact that the State had no recourse from the trial judge’s order under Maryland Code (1975, 2002 Rep. Vol.), Section 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings, and where there is no recourse, the order is effectively the equivalent of an acquittal. Moreover, Mr. Giddins maintains that, because the same issue was decided on July 6, 2004, between the same parties, and there was a judgment on the merits, the doctrine of res judicata prohibited the trial court from “redeciding” the issue by way of his letter dated July 8, 2004. Accordingly, Mr. Giddins argues that the July 6, 2004, trial was a final disposition of the charges against him in his favor and all subsequent proceedings would be violative of double jeopardy principles. 5 ¹⁷ Conversely, the State maintains that the original trial court’s comments were correctly determined by the Court of Special Appeals to have had no legally binding significance on the issue of double jeopardy because the judge had, at the time, made no findings of fact, made no pronouncement as to Mr. Giddins’s guilt or innocence, and there was no subsequent docket entry memorializing the comments.

Moreover, the State argues that, even if it were unclear from the record what was intended by the trial judge’s comments regarding prosecutorial misconduct, the judge’s letter dated July 8, 2004, rightfully clarified his intent. The State also contends that it was Mr. Giddins who requested the mistrial, and that this factor, coupled with the trial court’s failure to determine Mr. Giddins’s guilt or innocence, permits retrial of Mr. Giddins on the original charges. 6 In the present case Mr. Giddins moved for a mistrial; under these circumstances retrial normally is not barred by the proscription against double jeopardy, the exception being ¹⁸ where the prosecution has intentionally goaded the defendant into requesting the mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 670 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2086 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 421 (1982); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 273 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 , 91 S.Ct. 547, 557 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 556 (1971); Taylor, 371 Md. at 632, 810 A.2d at 972; Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225 , 240 n. 7, 539 A.2d 637 , 644 n. 7 (1988); Booth v. State, 301 Md. 1, 4 , 481 A.2d 505, 506 (1984); Tichnell v. State, 297 Md. 432, 439-41 , 468 A.2d 1, 5 (1983); Bell v. State, 286 Md. 193, 202 , 406 A.2d 909, 913 (1979). Mr. Giddins contends, however, that despite the fact that the mistrial was declared pursuant to his request, and that he has failed to convince the intermediate appellate court in his argument about prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court’s declaration constituted a resolution of some of the facts of the case, and therefore constituted an acquittal.

He bases his argument on the fact that, in the course of making the declaration, the trial judge specifically commented that certain facts found in the search warrant would not be admissible. Therefore, Mr. Giddins claims that the State is prohibited under both the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Maryland common law from re-prosecuting him. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects defendants in criminal prosecutions from multiple punishments and repeated prosecutions for the same offense, Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 , 118 S.Ct. 2246, 2250 , 141 L.Ed.2d 615, 623 (1998); Witte v. U.S., 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 , 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2204 , 132 L.Ed.2d 351, 361 (1995), and was extended to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment in the Supreme Court’s decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). An acquittal effectively bars retrial of a defendant because double jeopardy principles “forbid[ ] a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 , 9 ¹⁹ (1978); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 , 82 S.Ct. 671 , 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 , 24 S.Ct. 797 , 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904).

The Supreme Court has defined an acquittal as the “resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 468 , 125 S.Ct. 1129, 1134 , 160 L.Ed.2d 914, 923 (2005); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 , 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1853 , 155 L.Ed.2d 877, 886 (2003); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Company, 430 U.S. 564, 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1355 , 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 651 (1977). Consistent with the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, defendants who have been indicted and acquitted of an offense may interpose the plea of autrefois acquit, if later charged with the same offense, to bar re-prosecution. Kepner, 195 U.S. at 126 , 24 S.Ct. at 803 , 49 L.Ed. at 123 . The plea finds it genesis in the English common law, as explicated by Justice Day for the Supreme Court in Kepner v. United States, supra: At the common law, protection from second jeopardy for the same offense clearly included immunity from second prosecution where the court having jurisdiction had acquitted the accused of the offense.

The rule is thus stated by Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, quoted by Mr. Justice Story in United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. 39 Fed. Cas. No. 15,204: ‘The plea (says he) of autrefois acquit is grounded on this maxim, that a man shall not be brought into danger of his life for one and the same offense more than once. From whence it is generally taken by all our books, as an undoubted consequence, that where a man is once found not guilty, on an indictment or appeal, free from error, and well commenced before any court which hath jurisdiction of the cause, he may, by the common law, in all cases, plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent indictment or appeal for the same crime.’ The common law not only prohibited a second punishment for the same offense, but went further and forbid a second ²⁰ trial for the same offense, whether the accused had suffered punishment or not, and whether, in the former trial, he had been acquitted or convicted. And in as late a case as Wemyss v. Hopkins, L.R. 10 Q.B. 378, it was held that a conviction before a court of competent jurisdiction, even without a jury, was a bar to a second prosecution.

Kepner, 195 U.S. at 126-27 , 24 S.Ct. at 803 , 49 L.Ed. at 123 . In determining whether the defendant can successfully plead autrefois acquit, the essential inquiry is whether there has been a ruling on the evidence, as the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Smith v. Massachusetts, supra. In Smith , the defendant was charged with armed assault with intent to murder, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm; a firearm was defined statutorily as a weapon possessing a barrel of less than sixteen inches. At the conclusion of the State’s case, the defendant moved for an acquittal on the firearm count pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a) (2002) because the State had failed to prove that the gun barrel was less than sixteen inches.

The trial judge granted the motion because there was “not a scintilla of evidence” that the barrel of defendant’s weapon was sixteen inches or less. Id. at 465 , 125 S.Ct. at 1133 , 160 L.Ed.2d at 921 . Nevertheless, at the end of the defendant’s case, the prosecution argued that Massachusetts precedent permitted a victim’s testimony to suffice for establishing the length of the gun barrel and requested that the judge delay ruling upon the sufficiency of the firearm evidence until after the jury verdict, to which the judge agreed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith to address whether the trial judge’s initial ruling on the defendant’s motion constituted an acquittal, thereby barring submission of the firearms count to the jury under principles of double jeopardy.

Examining the requisites of Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a), the Supreme Court observed that Rule 25(a) requires the trial judge to enter a not guilty finding “ ‘if the evidence [was]