Hamilton v. Hamilton

Barnes, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question on this appeal is whether the Chancellor abused his discretion in denying the motion of Mary C. Hamilton (the appellant) to set aside a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii. On January 22, 1965 the Circuit Court for Carroll County awarded C. Harold Hamilton (the appellee) a decree of divorce on the ground of constructive desertion. The appellant was served with summons in the divorce action.

She consulted counsel in regard to the divorce but did not retain his services. She answered the bill for divorce by a document drawn up by herself in proper person. The case was originally set for a hearing on November 11, 1964 but was later postponed to January 22, 1965. The appellant had notice of when the hearing was to be held and she expressly stated in letters to the appellee dated November 16, 1964 and January 18, 1965, copies of which she sent to the Circuit Court, that she would not appear at the hearing to contest the proceedings.

She stated in her letter of November 16th: “I will let the giving and getting of a Divorce A Vinculo * * * be up to the conscience of the Court.” After Mrs. Hamilton failed to appear at the proceedings for divorce and a decree was entered against her, she retained counsel and within a thirty day period—before the decree became enrolled—she filed a motion- to set it aside pursuant to Maryland Rule 625. She contends that the decree should be set aside because she was not represented by counsel and was not fully apprised of the nature of the hearing. She did not know that she could be precluded from contesting the divorce which was granted after she did not appear at the proceedings. The appellant alleges, moreover, that she possesses a meritorious defense to her husband’s claim of constructive desertion.

In Ryan v. Johnson, 220 Md. 70 , 150 A. 2d 906 (1959) we quoted with approval from Clarke Baridon v. Union Co., 218 Md. 480, 483 , 147 A. 2d 221, 223 (1958) where Judge Hammond, for the Court, said: “After the judgment properly was entered, the question of whether it should or should not be vacated in ²⁴³ whole or in part was within the sound discretion of the 1 trial court for the ensuing thirty days. The decisive point no longer was whether there existed a genuine dispute as to a material fact, but rather whether the court was satisfied that there had been shown a reasonable indication of a meritorious defense or other equitable circumstances that would justify striking the judgment—that is, whether the court entertained a reasonable doubt that justice had not been done.” When a motion is made to set aside an unenrolled decree the trial court possesses an extremely broad power of revision and must exercise its discretion liberally “lest technicality triumph over justice.” Eshelman Motors v. Scheftel, 231 Md. 300, 189 . A. 2d 818 (1963). The trial court’s discretion is not restricted in regard to setting aside an unenrolled decree as it is where, the decree has become enrolled, after which it may then only be revised on grounds of fraud, mistake or irregularity.

Maryland Rule 625a. In the case of an enrolled decree even a pos-, sible error in the entry of a summary judgment may not constitute such a mistake as would warrant setting it aside. Rhodes Co. v. Blue Ridge Co., 218 Md. 329 , 146 A. 2d 771 (1959). See Tasea Investment Corp. v. Dale, 222 Md. 474, 160 A. 2d 920 (1960) and Newark Trust Co. v. Trimble, 215 Md. 502 , 138 A. 2d 919 (1958).

While there is a strong public policy in favor of sustaining the finality of divorce decrees (Leatherbury v. Leatherbury, 233 Md. 344, 196 A. 2d 883 (1964)), this policy would not operate in regard to an unenrolled decree before parties could have changed their position and relied on it to their detriment. Cf. Pryor v. Pryor, 240 Md. 224 , 213 A. 2d 545 (1965) and cases cited therein. We hold that the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion in