Harford County v. Edgewater Partnership

³⁹¹ ADKINS, Judge. I In April 1985, petitioner Hanson Partnership (Hanson) submitted to the Harford County Department of Planning and Zoning an application for approval of the location of a proposed integrated community shopping center. Throughout lengthy subsequent proceedings that application was ardently opposed by respondent, Edgewater Partnership (Edgewater), the owner of an existing shopping center not far from Hanson’s proposed location. On 14 April 1987 Hanson seemed to have achieved its goal; the Harford County Board of Appeals approved its request. 1 The Circuit Court for Harford County (Baldwin, J.) affirmed.

Edgewater, however, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, raising a number of issues, none of which were decided by that court. Instead, the intermediate appellate court dismissed the appeal on its own motion. But the grounds for dismissal produced the paradoxical result that the appellant whose appeal before that court was dismissed emerged as the victor. This outcome was achieved because the Court of Special Appeals believed the circuit court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. 2 Edge- ³⁹² water Partnership v. Harford Cty., 76 Md.App. 561 , 547 A.2d 1065 (1988).

That conclusion followed from the appellate court’s construction of § A274-5.B.(3)(c) of the Harford County Code: 3 (3) A zoning request shall automatically be considered to have been denied in the event that: * * * (c) The case is remanded to the Hearing Examiner for additional testimony and a decision is not rendered by the Council/Board within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of the conclusion of the hearing before the Council/Board. The Hearing Examiner shall file his/her supplemental or amended opinion within fifteen (15) calendar days from the conclusion of the hearing on the remand [emphasis supplied]. As we shall see, this case was remanded by the Board to a hearing examiner. That occurred on 12 August 1986.

On 11 December the hearing examiner issued a supplemental decision recommending approval of Hanson’s application. The Board held a hearing on that recommendation on 7 April 1987, and on 14 April issued a written decision adopting the hearing examiner’s recommendations. But in the view of the Court of Special Appeals, the Board’s action came too late. Although the issue of the construction of § A274-5.B(8)(c)’s 90-day provision (like that of subject-matter jurisdiction) had been raised by no party in either ³⁹³ the circuit court or the Court of Special Appeals, the latter read the Code as requiring the 90-day period run from the date of the remand—12 August 1986.

By that reading, the 90 days had expired in November 1986, long before the Board’s April 1987 decision. Under the County Code provision, failure of the Board to render a decision on the zoning request within the 90 days meant that the request was automatically denied at the beginning of the 91st day. On that date began the 30-day time period within which to note an appeal to the circuit court. See Md. Rule B4.a.

But no appeal was taken until after the Board’s April 1987 decision. Consequently, the appeal to the circuit court was untimely and that court, held the Court of Special Appeals, had no jurisdiction to decide it. The statutorily-deemed denial of Hanson’s application became final on 11 December 1986, 30 days after the statutory automatic denial date of 11 November. Thus, Edge-water prevailed.

At Hanson’s behest we granted the writ of certiorari primarily to determine the proper construction of § A274-5.B.(3)(c) of the Harford County Code. 4 314 Md. 508 , 551 A.2d 874 (1989). We shall assume, without deciding, that a “deemed denied” provision like that contained in § A274-5.B.(3)(c) deprives the tribunal affected by it of power to act after the “deemed” date, and that the “deemed” date becomes the date from which time for appeal runs. See Scherr v. Braun, 211 Md. 553, 561 , 128 A.2d 388, 391 (1957) (under predecessor of Md.Code (1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 2B, § 175(e)(3), decision of liquor board is automatically affirmed if court fails to decide appeal within ³⁹⁴ 30 days after record has been filed in court); Pearce v. Board of Liq. Comm’rs, 228 Md. 515, 524 , 180 A.2d 651, 655 (1962) (after same 30-day period has passed, court no longer has power to act); Robinson v. Montgomery County, 66 Md.App. 234, 242 , 503 A.2d 275, 278 , cert. denied, 306 Md. 119 , 507 A.2d 631 (1986) (Montgomery County Code provided that a motion to reconsider an agency decision was “deemed denied” 10 days after motion was filed; time for appeal from automatic denial ran from statutory denial date and after that date agency no longer had power to act).

We do not agree, however, with the intermediate appellate court’s construction of § A274-5.B.(3)(c). Since the merits of Hanson’s zoning application also are encompassed within our grant of certiorari, and since we believe the circuit court did not err when it affirmed the Board on the merits, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand with direction that the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County be affirmed. II Our excursion into the depths of § A274-5.B.(3)(c) will be aided by a map of sorts—an outline of general procedures to be followed in Harford County, with respect to applications like that filed by Hanson. An application for an integrated community shopping center must be filed with the Department of Planning and Zoning.

Harford County Code §§ 267-7.B.(1), 267-9.D., A274-1.B. Within five days of the receipt of the application, the department must process and forward the application to a hearing examiner. Id. § A274-1.B.; see also § A274-1.C. The hearing examiner schedules a public hearing and gives notice of it as required by the Harford County Charter. Id. § A274-2.A. The Charter prescribes notice once a week for two consecutive weeks in two newspapers published in the county, the second notice to be published at least 14 days before the hearing. Charter § 704(b).

Procedures for the public hearing are established. Code § A274-3. The hearing examiner may require briefs. Id. ³⁹⁵ § A274-4.A.(12).

The examiner must file a decision no later than 30 days after closing the record, § A274-4.A.(12), and that decision is final unless request for final argument is made within 20 days of that filing. Id. §§ 267-9.F., A2744.B. The concept of fina,! argument is central to the Harford County scheme, for it is by request for final argument that matters are brought before the Board, and thus become subject to various dismissal or “deemed denied” provisions. Request for final argument may be made by a Board member, the applicant, the People’s Counsel, or an aggrieved party who appeared at proceedings before the hearing examiner. Id. §§ 267-9.G., A274-5.A.(1).

When a request is made, the applicant must obtain a transcript of the proceedings before the examiner and deposit it and hearing advertising costs with the Secretary of the Board. Id. § A274-5.A.(4), -5.B.(1). If the transcript is not filed and the fees not paid within 90 days of the date of request for final argument (or within an extension of the 90-day period), the application, is dismissed without prejudice. Id. § A274-5.A.(5).

But if those prerequisites are met, final argument must be scheduled and heard within 90 calendar days of the date when the last requirement was met Id. § A274-5.B.(1)(c). If final argument has been requested, and the prerequisites have been met, but for some reason the Board does not hear final argument, the application “shall automatically be considered to have been denied.” Id. § A274-5.B.(3)(a). That result also occurs if the “Council/Board does not render a decision within the ninety-calendar day period.” Id. § A274-5.B.(3)(b). 5 ³⁹⁶ Following final argument, the Board may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand the hearing examiner’s recommendation. 6 Id. §§ 267-9.H., A274-5.E. If there is a remand, the applicant must deposit $50 with the secretary of the Council “to cover the additional cost of advertising, as may be required____” Id. § A274-5.G. Failure to deposit the fee within 10 days of the date of notice of remand results in dismissal of the application without prejudice to the applicant. Id.

If there is a remand, as we have seen, the application is automatically denied if “the Council/Board” does not render a decision “within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of the conclusion of the hearing before the Council/Board.” Id. § A274-5.B.(3)(c). As noted previously, Hanson initiated the process above described on 5 April 1985, when it submitted to the Department of Planning and Zoning its application for approval of the location of a proposed integrated community shopping center. On 21 May 1986, after 10 separate hearings conducted between 19 June 1985 and 26 February 1986, the hearing examiner recommended denial of the application. Hanson requested final argument before the Board.

That occurred on 12 August 1986. The Board remanded to the hearing examiner for further testimony and analysis. The examiner held additional hearings in early October. On 11 December 1986, the examiner issued a supplemental decision recommending approval of Hanson’s application.

It was now Edgewater’s turn to request final argument before the Board. The Board held a hearing on 7 April 1987 and a week later issued a decision adopting the hearing examiner’s favorable recommendation. Edgewater’s appeal to the circuit court did not meet with success, but, as ³⁹⁷ we have recounted, it prevailed in the Court of Special Appeals. That result, as we have pointed out, depended on the latter court’s reading of the 90-day provision contained in § A274-5.B.(3)(c).

We now explain why that reading was incorrect. Ill What we must determine is whether the 90-day period under § A274-5.B.(3)(c) runs from the date the Board of Appeals concluded its hearing on the hearing Examiner’s supplemental decision (7 April 1987) or, as the Court of Special Appeals held, from the date of the conclusion of the Board’s hearing preceding the remand to the hearing examiner (12 August 1986). When interpreting statutory language we must consider “ ‘the purposes of the enactment, the ends to be accomplished, [and] the consequences that may result from one meaning rather than from another...." Scherr, 211 Md. at 561 , 128 A.2d at 391 (quoting Upshur v. Baltimore City, 94 Md. 743, 757 , 51 A. 953, 958 (1902)). Results that are unreasonable, illogical, or that are at odds with the legislative purpose should be avoided.

Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 516 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987). Essentially, the present language of what is now § A274-5.B.(3)(c) was adopted by Bill No. 79-2, introduced 6 February 1979. See n. 4, supra. Before the amendments embodied in that bill were adopted, the pertinent language read “if the case is remanded to the Hearing Examiner for additional testimony and a decision is not rendered by the Board within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of the Hearing Examiner’s supplemental or amended opinion then the application shall automatically be considered to have been denied by the Board.” This, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, would have required that the 90-day period in the present case run from 11 December 1986.

See Edgewater, 76 Md. at 566, 547 A.2d at 1068 . But the clear guidance supplied by that language was muddied by Bill No. 79-2, which struck out the reference to ³⁹⁸ the “Hearing Examiner’s supplemental or amended opinion” and substituted “conclusion of the hearing before the Council/Board.” 7 Thus was introduced the ambiguity with which we now must deal, for it is not at all clear whether the “hearing” means the one at which remand was ordered or the one held subsequent to remand, i.e., at final argument after receiving the examiner’s supplemental report. The Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that § A274-5.B.(3)(c) was subject to two “equally plausible” interpretations. Edgewater, 76 Md.App. at 565 , 547 A.2d at 1068 .

But a review of legislative history persuaded it that the 90-day period should be construed as running from the date on which the Board had ordered the remand (12 August 1986). It looked to the bill sponsor’s statement that the amendments were intended to “ ‘speed up the process for zoning decisions but giv[ing] the applicant sufficient time to proceed.’ ” Id. at 566 , 547 A.2d at 1068 [emphasis and brackets in opinion]. Giving weight only to the emphasized portion of this statement of legislative purpose, the appellate court concluded that [t]o adopt the other possible meaning ... would be to extend the zoning process to. some indeterminable future date 90 days beyond the date on which the Board determined, at its leisure, to consider the matter. Id. at 566-567 , 547 A.2d at 1068 .

This conclusion is wrong for at least three reasons. First, it is simply wrong to say that if the 90-day period runs from the post-remand final argument before the Board, the “zoning process [would extend] to some indeterminable future date 90 days beyond the date on which the ³⁹⁹ Board determined, at its leisure, to consider the matter.” As we pointed out in Part II of this opinion, the County Code requires that final argument be requested within 20 calendar days after the hearing examiner has made a decision; otherwise that decision becomes final. Code §§ 267-9.F., A274-4.B. Within 90 calendar days of the request for final argument, steps must be taken to perfect that request; if they are not, the application is dismissed. Id. § A274-5.A.(4)-(5).

Once the request is perfected, final argument must be heard within 90 calendar days. Id. § A274-5.B.(1)(c). Thus, the Board is not “at leisure” to postpone indefinitely the final argument hearing. Rather, it must