Morris v. Prince George's County

ADKINS, Judge. Article 73B, § 32(a), Maryland Code (1957,1988 Repl.Vol., 1989 Cum.Supp.), declares: If a member transfers from a retirement or pension system operated on an actuarial basis where accumulated contributions are deducted on all earnable compensation to a retirement or pension system where accumulated contributions are deducted on all earnable compensation, the member shall receive service credit in the system into which the member transfers for and in the amount of benefits accumulated in the system from which the member transfers. The transfer of credit shall occur upon the ⁶⁰⁰ deposit, within 1 year of the member’s transfer, of the total accumulated contributions to the member’s credit in the annuity or other corresponding fund of the system from which the member transferred to the fund of the system into which the member transferred. The case before us involves two contributory retirement or pension systems, each operated on an actuarial basis.

The question is whether, under § 32(a), a transferee carries with him, to the second system, his actual years of service in the first system for the purpose of computing eligibility for retirement, or carries the years of service in the first system merely for the purpose of computing mandatory benefits under the second. Appellants Daniel Morris (Morris) and Eric Olsen (Olsen) contend for the former construction; appellees Prince George’s County and Trustees, Prince George’s County Police Pension Fund, (collectively the County) argue for the latter. We read the statute in light of the legislative policy favoring “portability” of retirement benefits and conclude that Morris and Olsen are entitled to credit for their actual years of service in the first system in order to compute their eligibility for retirement from the second. I. We summarize the factual backdrop of the controversy.

When Morris joined the Prince George’s County Police Department in 1982, he had spent 11 years as a deputy sheriff in Prince George’s County. During the nine years immediately prior to his move to the police department, he contributed to the Maryland State Retirement System (MSRS). Olsen had spent eight years as a deputy sheriff (during all of which he contributed to MSRS) when he became a Prince George’s County policeman in 1984. In 1987, the Prince George’s County Pension Plan Administrative Review Board decided that neither man could count his actual years of service as a deputy sheriff for the purpose of computing the date upon which he would become ⁶⁰¹ eligible for retirement from the police department.

That decision stemmed from provisions of the Prince George’s County Police Pension Plan that require 20 years of services as a police officer before one becomes eligible for retirement under that plan. 1 Aggrieved by that ruling, Morris and Olsen sought declaratory relief from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, but the court agreed with the board. 2 When the two potential retirees appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a writ of certiorari before any proceedings were had in that court. Morris v. Prince George’s County, 317 Md. 609 , 565 A.2d 1033 (1989).

II

Whether Morris and Olsen will be eligible to receive retirement benefits in the last decade of the twentieth century or whether they will have to wait until the early years of the twenty-first depends on the interpretation of § 32. That interpretation also will decide matters of fiscal importance both to individuals like Morris and Olsen and to pension plan administrators. An actuary estimated that “the increase in the present value of benefits under the Police Pension Plan as of July 1,1988” would be $40,675 for Morris and $36,250 for Olsen, if they prevail on their contention as to dates of eligibility for retirement. Additionally, should appellants succeed, they will become eligible to retire after somewhat shorter total service than if they had remained deputy sheriffs.

In that job, eligibility does not occur until after 25 years of service or attainment of the 60th birthday. ⁶⁰² The trial judge avoided all these possibilities by applying what he took to be the plain language of § 32. He noted the use of the phrase “creditable service” in § 11 of Article 73B as referring both to time spent in employment and to the amount of monetary benefits earned. But when he turned to the somewhat similar phrase “service credit” in the critical clause of § 32(a) — “the member shall receive service credit ... for and in the amount of benefits accumulated in the system from which the member transfers” — he said only the monetary benefits meaning could have been intended. He reasoned: There is nothing in Article 73B to indicate that [the bifurcated use of “creditable service”] was what the legislature had in mind.

It is more reasonable to conclude that service credit can refer either to a credit of years toward retirement or to credit for purposes of determining amount of retirement allowance. Indeed, the latter conclusion squares much more comfortably with a “plain language” reading of Section 32(a). This is especially evident if the “and in the amount of” clause is removed, leaving “member shall receive service credit for ... benefits accumulated____” It is anomalous to suggest that the legislature would intend to give credit for time served but state only that the credit was “for benefits accumulated.” Given the dual role of “creditable service” in Section 11, the language “for benefits accumulated” implies that service credit is being used for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of calculating benefits of members in the transferee system [emphasis in original]. The judge concluded that while it “may be more equitable to have a member’s time credit follow him when he transfers,” it was “reasonable to conclude that the Legislature meant what it said in Section 32; that ‘benefits’ follow a member when he leaves MSRS, but that any credit for time is a matter to be determined elsewhere” [emphasis in original].

He believed that the so-called “plain language” rule of statutory construction not only constrained him to come ⁶⁰³ to the result he reached, but also prevented him from searching beyond the statutory language in an effort to determine legislative purpose. He wrote: “Where the language of a statute has a plain and unambiguous meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to reflect the intention of the legislature in enacting the statute. Saunders v. [Unemp. Comp.

Board], 188 Md. 677 , 53 A.2d 579 (1947).” The judge violated the normal process of statutory construction by deleting from the statute the words “and in the amount of” in order to support his interpretation. What is more important, he misapplied the “plain language” rule. He also failed to view the statute in the full context of statutory language and in the light of its legislative history. As we shall see, that history displays a legislative purpose that illuminates the language of § 32 and requires it to be read in a way quite different from the trial judge’s exegesis.

III

There is no doubt that the beginning point of statutory construction is the language of the statute itself. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98 , 570 A.2d 1235, 1237 (1990). Obviously, “ ‘what the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal.’ ” ANA Towing v. Prince George’s Co., 314 Md. 711, 715 , 552 A.2d 1295, 1297 (1989) (quoting Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987)). When we look at the statutory language, we attempt to give effect to all the words in the statute.

Dep’t of Assess. & Tax. v. Belcher, 315 Md. 111, 121 , 553 A.2d 691, 696 (1989). And sometimes it may not be necessary to go further than the scrutiny of statutory language, for the language itself may be sufficiently expressive of the legislative purpose or goal. Davis v. State, 319 Md. 56, 61 , 570 A.2d 855, 858 (1990). But our endeavor is always to seek out the legislative purpose, the general aim or policy, the ends to be ⁶⁰⁴ accomplished, the evils to be redressed by a particular enactment.

Department of Environment v. Showell, 316 Md. 259, 270 , 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989); Harford County v. Edgewater, 316 Md. 389, 397 , 558 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1989); Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 66 , 553 A.2d 667, 669 (1989). In the conduct of that enterprise, we are not limited to study of the statutory language. The plain meaning rule “ ‘is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining a legislative intention____’ ” Spratt v. State, 315 Md. 680, 684 , 556 A.2d 667, 669 (1989) (quoting Darnall v. Connor, 161 Md. 210, 215 , 155 A. 894, 896 (1931)). The “meaning of the plainest language” is controlled by the context in which it appears.

Matter of Diane M., 317 Md. 652, 658 , 566 A.2d 108, 110 (1989). Thus, we always are free to look at the context within which statutory language appears. War-field v. State, 315 Md. 474, 499-500 , 554 A.2d 1238, 1251 (1989); State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 618 , 566 A.2d 88, 90 (1989). Even when the words of a statute carry a definite meaning, we are not “precluded from consulting legislative history as part of the process of determining the legislative purpose or goal” of the law.

Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 92 , 548 A.2d 837, 843 (1988). 3 IV. We turn, then, to § 32(a) and the clause upon which ostensibly rides the fate of Morris and Olsen: “the member shall receive service credit in the system into which the member transfers for and in the amount of benefits accumulated in the system from which the member transfers.” The critical words are “service credit” and “benefits.” ⁶⁰⁵ Neither term is expressly defined in Article 73B. Section 1(10) of that article, however, does contain a definition of “creditable service” that quite clearly has to do with the way in which years of service are computed in order to determine eligibility for retirement. See also, e.g., §§ 9, 85, 115, and 144, all of which deal with the extent to which various periods and types of employment may be applied toward eligibility for retirement.

In some of these sections, e.g., § 9(4), the phrase “service credit” is used in reference to years of service: “On request of a member, the board of trustees may modify or correct his prior service credit upon proof that, through no fault of the member, the period of prior service as stated on the statement of service is found to be incorrect or inaccurate” [emphasis supplied]. Compare this to § ll(l)(a): “Any member may retire ... [when the member] shall have attained the age of [60] or shall have rendered [25] years of creditable service as an employee ” [emphasis supplied]. It thus appears that “creditable service” and “service credit” may both refer to much the same thing: a period of employment that can be counted towards eligibility for retirement. This period of employment is a benefit.

The fact that “creditable service” also is used, as in § 11(3), to determine the amount of a retirement allowance does not restrict the phrase to the area of monetary benefits alone. The trial judge, as we have seen, recognized this dual use of the word but thought that the conjunction of “service credit” and “benefits accumulated” in § 32(a) required him to conclude that “service credit is being used for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of calculating benefits of members in the transferee system.” In reaching that decision, we believe he read “benefits” in an unduly narrow fashion. The County assures us that the judge’s concept of “benefits” was correct because statutory terms should be given their ordinary and natural meaning in the absence of legislative definition. Washington Nat’l Arena v. Comptroller, 308 Md. 370, 375 , 519 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1987).

Citing Web ⁶⁰⁶ ster’s Third New International Dictionary 204 (1976), it asserts that the “ordinary and natural meaning” of the word “benefit” is “a cash payment or service provided for under an annuity, pension plan, or insurance policy.” The difficulty is that the definition quoted by the County is Webster’s definition 3c. Definition 2a shows the word as synonymous with “ADVANTAGE, GOOD” — words that have a considerably broader connotation, and one that is not restricted to monetary payment. See Random House Dictionary of the English Language 194 (2d ed. 1987), which defines “benefit” as, among other things: 1. something that is advantageous or good; an advantage.... 2. a payment or gift, as one made to help someone or given by a ... public agency. If time served as a deputy sheriff can be counted towards eligibility for retirement as a police officer, it is certainly “[s]omething that is advantageous ...; an advantage____” The debate about the meaning of “benefits” is illustrative of the dangers of the mechanical application of dictionary definitions to words in a statute.

A dictionary is a starting point in the work of statutory construction, but not necessarily the end. See Comment, Jurisprudence by Webster’s: The Role of the Dictionary in Legal Thought, 39 Mercer L.Rev. 961, 966 (1988). “[Dictionaries provide possible meanings, not dispositive resolutions,” id. at 963, because statutes are more than just “ ‘a series of Webster’s definitions strung together.’ ” Id. at 962 (quoting L. Carter, Reason in Law 51 (1979)). In other words, while the “ordinary and natural meaning” canon of construction can be helpful when properly used, it cannot always be relied upon to give the complete answer to a problem of interpretation. Words have many meanings.

To determine the most appropriate one in given circumstances requires more than a glance at a dictionary. It requires careful study of the context in which the word is used. “Benefits” is a word used frequently in Article 73B. For example, the captions for §§ 11, 86, 117, and 145 all include ⁶⁰⁷ or consist of that word. 4 It is significant that each of these sections commences, not with a listing of monetary allowances available upon retirement, but with a statement of when one is eligible to retire. Section ll(l)(a) is typical: Any member may retire upon written application to the board of trustees setting forth at what time he desires to be retired, provided that such member at the time so specified for his retirement shall have attained the age of sixty (60) or shall have rendered twenty-five (25) years of creditable service as an employee.

This suggests that the General Assembly in at least some circumstances uses the word “benefits” to comprehend that “advantage” otherwise described as “eligibility to retire.” It is true, of course, that the same word also is used to refer to the allowances available on retirement. See, e.g., § 49(a) (“The amount of benefit payable on account of the death of an officer ... ”). Sometimes the payments are referred to as “allowances” (e.g., § 11(3), (5), and (7)); sometimes as “benefits” (e.g., § 11(4) and (6)). This demonstrates only that “benefits,” like “service credit,” may have more than one meaning in Article 73B.

A further look at context, this time in terms of legislative history, will tell us how the terms are used in § 32(a). Although Maryland had pension or retirement laws before 1941, Chapter 877 of the Acts of that year may be ⁶⁰⁸ viewed as the actual beginning of MSRS in its present form. 5 See Article 73B, § 2, as enacted by Ch. 377. A 1944 report of the Legislative Council discussed the various State and local retirement systems that then existed and canvassed the desirability of allowing various groups of employees to enter the State system. C. Everstine, Pensions for County and Municipal Employees, Research Report No. 24 to the Legislative Council (1944).

Two years later, the Legislative Council recommended a bill “[t]o provide for reciprocity among the pension systems for State teachers, City of Baltimore teachers, and State employees, [and] to permit members of one system to transfer credits to another.” Legislative Council Report to the General Assembly of 1947 at 7 (1946). This recommendation, it seems, was embodied in Chapter 664, Acts of 1947. 6 Section 25, as enacted by Chapter 664, was the predecessor to present § 31. This provision authorizes transfers between public retirement or pension systems “operated on an actuarial basis.” Chapter 664’s § 26 was the forerunner of § 32(a). After providing for notice to the member’s original system and a request for refund of contributions, it directed that [u]pon [the member’s] entry into the [transferee] retirement system and the deposit of such accumulated contributions in the annuity savings fund or other corresponding fund [of the transferee system], within one year of the date of such refund, he shall receive prior service credit in the system to which he has transferred for all service rendered prior to January 1, 1926, if any, provided he was in the service at any time during the calendar year 1925, and membership service credit for all continuous ⁶⁰⁹ service since January 1, 1926, [or for other specified periods of service].

Chapter 664 also enacted the forerunner of present § 33, former § 27: Upon becoming a member of the retirement system to which he has transferred, such person shall thereafter pay the rate of contribution applicable to a new entrant at his attained age and be eligible for such pension and annuity as is provided by law in such retirement system, including the credits for previous service in the retirement system from which he has transferred as provided in Section 26 of this sub-title, with the condition, however, that if he retires on a retirement allowance in the system to which he transferred within five years after the transfer, the benefits payable with respect to the service credit in the system from which the transfer was made shall not be greater than those which would have been payable with respect to such service, had he remained in such system. We see in these provisions an early response to the problem of pension “portability,” perhaps foreshadowed by the 1944 report to the Legislative Council,