Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Administration

RAKER, Judge. In this appeal, we are called upon to determine whether Maryland Code (1977, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1996 Cum.Supp.) § 13-114(e) of the Transportation Article, 1 which governs registration and titling of vehicles that have been repossessed by a secured party, requires that a repossessed vehicle be titled in ⁴⁴¹ Maryland prior to the repossession in order for the Motor Vehicle Administration of the Maryland Department of Transportation (MVA) to issue a new certificate of title in the secured party’s name. Appellant Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union (Marriott) is a Maryland-based federal credit union with members nationwide. On August 4, 1994, Barbara Houston, a Texas resident and credit union member, borrowed $1700.00 from Marriott.

She secured the loan with a 1984 Chevrolet Camaro automobile. The most current certificate of title for the 1984 Chevrolet was issued by the State of Texas in the name of Thomas Arnold, a resident of Austin, Texas. Apparently, the car was never titled in Ms. Houston’s name and Marriott never perfected its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title. See Tex.

Transp. Code Ann. § 501.111 (a) (security interest in automobile perfected by notation on certificate of title). In late 1995, Houston defaulted on the loan and Marriott repossessed the vehicle in Texas on December 21, 1995. The automobile was then transported to Maryland because, according to Marriott’s counsel, Marriott was unable to get a new certificate of title in Texas.

Pursuant to § 13-114(e) and in accordance with its usual procedure, Marriott applied to the MVA for a new certificate of title, often called a repossession title or a “repo” title, for the repossessed Chevrolet. Marriott presented to the MVA the security agreement, the notices sent to Houston advising her of the redemption period and a copy of the condition report prepared by the repossessor, but the MVA refused to issue the repossession title. A representative of the MVA informed Marriott that the MVA would not issue a repossession title on the Chevrolet unless Marriott secured a court order directing the MVA to do so. Marriott then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.

In its complaint for declaratory relief, Marriott asked the circuit court to order the MVA “[t]o issue a Maryland title to a 1984 Chevrolet Camaro Automobile ... in the name of the Plaintiff, Marriott Federal ⁴⁴² Employees Credit Union” and, more broadly, “[t]o issue a repossession title in favor of the Plaintiff, Marriott Employees Federal Credit Union, for any vehicle repossessed by the Plaintiff that was not previously titled in the State of Maryland, ... provided that the Plaintiff supplies the Defendant with the certification as required by Transportation § 13-114(e) of the Annotated Code of Maryland.” At trial, Marriott portrayed the MVA’s refusal to issue a repossession title on the Chevrolet as an abrupt change in a long-standing administrative policy. According to Troy Cooper, the collection supervisor for Marriott, the MVA, over the past several years, consistently issued repossession titles in similar cases when presented with the documentation that Marriott had presented here. Marriott introduced a letter dated November 24, 1995, signed by James E. Hose, Director of the Vehicle Registration Division. The letter reads: Based on recent advice by the Assistant Attorney General, the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) will no longer process a request for a repossession title unless the vehicle is currently titled in Maryland.

In accordance with advice of counsel, unless a Maryland title has been issued, the secured party applying for title must secure a court order requiring the Administration to issue a title. ... Thank you for your cooperation and assistance with this change. 2 The MVA, on the other hand, insisted that there had been no change in policy. Although inconsistent with the November 24, 1995, letter, Rhonda Witt, Chief of Vehicle Registration, testified that the MVA will accept out-of-state repossessions and issue repossession titles as long as the foreign state’s repossession procedures have been fulfilled. Ms. Witt also stated that Marriott’s failure to present a Texas title in ⁴⁴³ the name of their debtor and with their lien noted on it precluded Marriott from obtaining a Maryland title.

The circuit court entered an order declaring that “Maryland Annotated Code, Transportation Article § 13-114(e) authorizes the Motor Vehicle Administration to transfer thereunder on its records the ownership of a vehicle that has been repossessed by a secured party only under the circumstance wherein a vehicle has a pre-existing title file with the Motor Vehicle Administration.” (emphasis added). Marriott appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari on our own motion before consideration by the intermediate appellate court. Section 13-114 addresses the titling and registration of automobiles that have been involuntarily transferred by way of, inter alia, judicial sale or disposition in a will.

Section 13-114(e) addresses one particular type of involuntary transfer— the transfer of the vehicle from the owner to a secured party pursuant to a repossession. 3 Section 13-114(e) provides: ⁴⁴⁴ (e) Vehicle repossessed by secured party.—(1) The Administration may transfer on its records the ownership of a vehicle that has been repossessed by a secured party, if the secured party submits to the Administration a certification that states: (i) That the secured party has a security interest in the vehicle; (ii) That, on the basis of the security agreement or other lawful basis, the secured party has a right to the possession of and title to the vehicle; (iii) That the secured party has possession of the vehicle; and (iv) Any other information that the Administration requires. (2) On submission of the certification to it, the Administration may issue a new certificate of title if it is satisfied that the secured party is entitled to one. (emphasis added). Ultimately at issue in this appeal is the phrase “transfer on its records the ownership of a vehicle that has been repossessed.” Specifically, we must decide whether the General Assembly intended this phrase to limit the applicability of § 13-114(e) to those repossessed vehicles that are titled in Maryland at the time of the repossession.

Marriott contends that the disputed phrase merely means that the MVA shall place such ownership on its records. The MVA, on the other hand, contends that “transfer on its records” requires an existing title record in Maryland before ownership can be transferred on the records to the secured party. Our task in this case is one of statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the intention of the Legislature.

State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133 , 669 A.2d 1339, 1340 (1996). Our search for legislative intent begins, and usually ends, with the words of ⁴⁴⁵ the statute at issue. Schuman, Kane v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119 , 668 A.2d 929, 931 (1995). When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature’s intent.

Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987). Sometimes the statutory language is susceptible of more than one meaning. When faced with an ambiguity, courts must consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words but also the meaning of words in light of the statute as a whole and within the context of the objectives and purposes of the enactment. Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995).

Common sense must guide us in our interpretation of statutes, and “we seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). Although this Court is not limited to the literal or usual meaning of statutory language, Romm, 340 Md. at 693 , 668 A.2d at 2 , the Court may not insert or omit terms to make a statute express an intention not reflected in the statute’s original form. Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 10-11 , 497 A.2d 142, 147 (1985); Police Comm’r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 419 , 379 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1977). The consistent and long-standing construction given a statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to great deference, Balto.

Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 305 Md. 145, 161-62 , 501 A.2d 1307, 1315 (1986), as the agency is likely to have expertise and practical experience with the statute’s subject matter. See, e.g., Sinai Hosp. v. Dept. of Employment, 309 Md. 28, 46 , 522 A.2d 382, 391 (1987); 2B N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 49.05, at 17 (5th ed. 1993). The weight given an agency’s construction of a statute depends on several factors—the duration and consistency of the administrative practice, the degree to which the agency’s construction was made known to the public, and the degree to which the Legislature was aware of the administrative construction when it reenacted the rele ⁴⁴⁶ vant statutory language.

Magan v. Medical Mutual, 331 Md. 535, 546 , 629 A.2d 626, 632 (1993). Other important considerations include “the extent to which the agency engaged in a process of reasoned elaboration in formulating its interpretation” and “the nature of the process through which the agency arrived at its interpretation,” with greater weight placed on those agency interpretations that are the product of adversarial proceedings or formal rules promulgation. Balto. Gas & Elec., 305 Md. at 161-62 , 501 A.2d at 1315 .

An administrative agency’s construction of the statute is not entitled to deference, however, when it conflicts with the unambiguous statutory language. Falik v. Prince George's Hosp., 322 Md. 409, 416 , 588 A.2d 324, 327 (1991). See generally 2A Singer, supra, § 45.12. The phrase under scrutiny in this case, “transfer on its records the ownership,” does not appear elsewhere in the Maryland Code and we find no reported opinions interpreting this language.

Section 13-114(e), and its precursors, have been part of the Maryland Code since 1970. Senate Bill 10 of the 1970 legislative session first introduced a provision dedicated exclusively to repossession titles, which was then codified as Art. 66/6, § 3-114(c). 4 1970 Maryland Laws, ch. 534, § 1, at 1337. Although this Court often looks to legislative history to guide us in our task of statutory construction, see Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15 , 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987), our search has uncovered no legislative history concerning Senate Bill 10 of the 1970 legislative session or concerning reenactment of the statutory language at issue in this case. Section 13-114(e) and its precursors have undergone only minor semantic changes since 1970, and the phrase “transfer on its records the ownership of a vehicle that has been repossessed” has remained unchanged throughout. ⁴⁴⁷ 5 There are at least two competing interpretations of the statutory language at issue in this case.

One interpretation is that by choosing the verb “transfer” in the phrase “transfer on its records the ownership of a vehicle that has been repossessed” the Legislature intended to require an existing title on the records in Maryland in order to issue a repossession title pursuant to § 13-114(e). Another interpretation construes the verb “transfer” merely to direct the MVA to enter on its records the issuance of a repossession title to the secured party, regardless of where the vehicle was titled before the repossession. We look to dictionary definitions of the verb “transfer” for insight into the legislative intent. Although dictionary definitions do not provide dispositive resolutions of the meaning of statutory terms, see Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 606 , 573 A.2d 1346, 1350 (1990), “dictionaries ... do provide a useful