Harris v. Mayor of Baltimore City

COUCH, Judge. We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether certain benefits recoverable under the Workmen’s Compensation laws were properly reduced pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 101, § 64A(b), by the amounts of payments received by appellants through a Baltimore City pension plan under its Fire and Police Employees Retirement System (Retirement System). Baltimore City Code, Art. 22, §§ 29-41A (1979, 1983 Repl.Vol.). ⁶⁷¹ I The facts giving rise to the present controversy are uncontroverted and may be stated briefly. All of the appellants were firefighters employed by the City of Baltimore.

Each suffered an impairment of health as contemplated by Art. 101, § 64A. 1 Each filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (Commission) and was awarded permanent total disability compensation. However, each ⁶⁷² claimant’s award was reduced by the entire amount of retirement allowances received by that claimant under the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore City. The amount of retirement allowances receivable by covered employees consisted of pension payments, annuity payments and investment variable payments. The pension constitutes the actuarial equivalent of money provided by the employer, the City of Baltimore.

The annuity constitutes the actuarial equivalent of the accumulated contributions of the employee at the time of his retirement. The investment variable constitutes the excess investment earnings derived from both the pension and annuity funds. Feeling aggrieved, each of the three appellants appealed the Commission’s award to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which affirmed the Commission’s disposition of the claims. Similarly, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed in a reported opinion filed February 11, 1986.

Harris et al v. City of Baltimore, 66 Md.App. 397 , 504 A.2d 657 (1986). We granted certiorari to consider a question of public importance. For reasons herein stated, we affirm. II By Chapter 695, Laws of Maryland, 1971, the legislature provided that certain occupational diseases sustained by certain firefighters in the line of duty and as a result of their employment are to be presumed compensable.

See Art. 101, § 64A(a). It was further provided that such a claimant could receive certain benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation laws in addition to receiving those benefits recoverable under the retirement system in which the claimant was a participant at the time his claim was made. See Art. 101, § 64A(b). These provisions came to be present section 64A of Article 101 of the Annotated Code of Maryland.

Since its inception in 1971, the breadth of coverage provided by § 64A has been expanded and now includes state, municipal, Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, county and airport authority police offi ⁶⁷³ cers, as well as volunteer firefighters, fire fighting instructors and rescue squad members. 2 Of particular concern here, however, is the applicability and effect of subsection (b) of § 64A. In subsection (b), the legislature has provided in part that the benefits received by a covered claimant under the Workmen’s Compensation laws “shall be adjusted so that the total of all weekly benefits shall not exceed one hundred percent of the weekly salary which was paid to said fire fighter or police officer.” It is this unambiguous language that disposes of appellants’ contention. In resolving the question before us, we initially look to the language in the statute. If it is clear and unambiguous, then we need look no further.

Erwin and Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., Inc., 304 Md. 302, 309 , 498 A.2d 1188 (1985). In such a case, a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation. Doing so merely provides the clearest indication of the legislative intent and is thus the primary source for all statutory construction. State v. Berry, 287 Md. 491, 495 , 413 A.2d 557 (1980).

By its enactment of § 64A, the legislature has expressed its continued interest in providing wage-loss protection for the covered employees but, at the same time, recognized that an employee who sustains compensable injuries under the Workmen's Compensation laws experiences but one wage loss. This recognition by the legislature is in accord with that of the legal commentators and is consistent with similar provisions embodied in Article 101. The desirability for coordination of an overall system of wage-loss protection is aptly discussed in Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 97.00: ⁶⁷⁴ “Once it is recognized that workmen's compensation is one unit in an overall system of wage-loss protection, rather than something resembling a recovery in tort or on a private accident policy, the conclusion follows that duplication of benefits from different parts of the system should not ordinarily be allowed____” See also Mazor v. State Dep’t of Correction, 279 Md. 355 , 369 A.2d 82 (1977). Compare Art. 101, § 33(c). 3 We stated in Feissner v. Prince George’s County, 282 Md. 413, 420-21 , 384 A.2d 742 (1978): “We recently considered the offset provisions of § 33 in Mazor v. State, Dep’t of Correction, 279 Md. 355 , 369 A.2d 82 (1977), aff'g 30 Md.App. 394 , 352 A.2d 918 (1976); see also Nooe v. City of Baltimore, 28 Md.App. 348 , 345 A.2d 134 (1975), cert. denied, 276 Md. 748 (1976).

In Mazor, taking note of the fact that a majority of American jurisdictions provide for some form of setoff in the area of wage-loss legislation, we said: ‘[Workmen's compensation is one facet of an overall system of wage-loss protection, and ... the underlying principle of the system is to restore to the worker a portion of wages lost by physical disability, unemploy ⁶⁷⁵ ment, or old age. It follows that although two or more causes of wage loss may coincide, the benefits need not cumulate, for the worker experiences but one wage loss/ 279 Md. at 368 , 369 A.2d 82 (citation omitted).” A year later, we had occasion to discuss the offset provision of § 33 of Art. 101 in Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 659 , 399 A.2d 250 (1979). There we said through Judge Digges: “Upon reading section 33 the scheme that unmistakably emerges is that the General Assembly wished to provide only a single recovery for a single injury for government employees covered by both a pension plan and workmen’s compensation. Consequently, this section not only provides that when disability pension benefits exceed workmen’s compensation the latter shall be completely eliminated, but also directs that when pension benefits happen to be less than workmen’s compensation, the employer is required to furnish additional benefits which, when added to