Newman v. Subsequent Injury Fund

CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Judge, Specially Assigned. Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.VoI.) Art. 101 (Workmen’s Compensation), § 33(c) provides inter alia: Whenever by statute, charter, ordinances, resolution, regulation or policy adopted thereunder, whether as part of a pension system or otherwise, any benefit or benefits are furnished employees of employers covered under § 21(a)(2) of this article[ 1 ] ..., the benefit or benefits when furnished by the employer shall satisfy and discharge pro tanto or in full as the case may be, the liability or obligation of the employer and the Subsequent Injury Fund for any benefit under this article. If any benefits so furnished are less than those provided for in this article the employer or the Subsequent Injury Fund, or both shall furnish the additional benefit as will make up the difference between the benefit furnished and the similar benefit required, in this article. (Emphasis added.) We are called upon to ascertain what the legislature intended by § 33(c) and to effectuate that intent by applying it to the following undisputed facts.

Della L. Newman, an employee of Prince George’s County, sustained a work-related injury. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission determined that she suffered an 80 percent industrial loss of the use of her body, 40 percent of ⁷²³ which was from a preexisting condition. The Commission awarded her permanent partial disability compensation in the amount of $89 for 400 weeks. The employer was ordered to pay the first 200 weeks and the Subsequent Injury Fund the remaining 200 weeks.

In the meantime, Newman had returned to work, carrying out the duties that she had performed before her injury. About two months later she elected to retire and became eligible for benefits in the amount of $77.82 per week under the county pension plan. About a year and a half after Newman’s retirement, the county stopped the payments ordered by the Commission on the ground that the retirement benefits were an offset against the disability award. Upon a hearing, the Commission denied the setoff.

On appeal to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the county and the Fund and granted them an “offset against any partial permanency award in an amount equal to [Newman’s] retirement pension benefits.” Newman looked to the Court of Special Appeals. It affirmed the circuit court. Newman v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 71 Md.App. 529 , 526 A.2d 631 (1987). We granted Newman’s petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve the question whether in the circumstances here Code, Article 101, § 33(c) operated to permit the setoff.

We have declared time and time again that when we seek to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, the primary source is the language of the statute itself. This language must be given its natural and ordinary signification, bearing in mind the statutory aim and objective. Boulden v. Mayor and Commissioners of the Town of Elkton, 311 Md. 411, 413 , 535 A.2d 477 (1988), citing In Re Ramont K., 305 Md. 482, 484 , 505 A.2d 507 (1986), and Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). If reasonably possible, a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless.

Prince George’s Co. v. White, 275 Md. 314, 319 , 340 A.2d 236 (1975). ⁷²⁴ We apply these principles to § 33(c). It is perfectly clear that the word “similar” in the phrase “the benefit furnished and the similar benefit required in this article,” near the end of the section, qualifies the provision at the beginning of the section as to the benefits furnished employees by employers. Neither as a matter of grammar nor of substance is there a “reasonable distinguishing purpose to suggest that [“similar”] was not intended to be implicit in the foregoing sentences.” Oros v. City of Baltimore, 56 Md. App. 685, 689 , 468 A.2d 693 (1983), aff'd on other grounds, City of Baltimore v. Oros, 301 Md. 460 , 483 A.2d 748 (1984). It follows that for the setoff to come into play, the two benefits received must be “similar.” Newman was awarded workmen’s compensation because of the impairment of the industrial use of her body as a result of her work-related injury.

On the other hand, it appears that she was entitled to the benefits under the retirement plan merely because she had elected to retire after attaining a prescribed age and 20 years service with the county. The payment of these benefits had no relation whatsoever to her injury and the disability resulting therefrom. Age and length of service were not a prerequisite for her entitlement to workmen’s compensation benefits; anatomical disability was not a prerequisite for her entitlement to the retirement benefits. In short, her retirement payments were an age and length of service benefit; her workmen’s compensation award was a disability benefit.

The two benefits were not similar and not comparable. Therefore, the offset provisions of § 33(c) were not applicable. We have had occasion to visit § 33(c) in the past, and although we have never addressed the precise question before us, the tenor of the section as reflected in our opinions is that the offsetting benefits be “similar” ones. In Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655 , 399 A.2d 250 (1979), we held that it was proper to offset disability pension benefits against workmen’s compensation benefits.

We observed: ⁷²⁵ Upon reading section 33 the scheme that unmistakably emerges is that the General Assembly wished to provide only a single recovery for a single injury for government employees covered by both a pension plan and workmen’s compensation. Id. at 659 , 399 A.2d 250 (emphasis added). In Feissner v. Prince George’s Co., 282 Md. 413 , 384 A.2d 742 (1978), we allowed an offset when county pension disability benefits and workmen’s compensation benefits were involved. Id. at 420-421 , 384 A.2d 742 .

In Mazor v. State, Dep’t of Correction, 279 Md. 355 , 369 A.2d 82 (1977), we applied the statute to an offset as to a State accidental disability pension and benefits under the workmen’s compensation laws. We stated: The cases cited by Mazor for the proposition that one may receive full workmen’s compensation benefits while receiving other disability payments are distinguishable because all of the cases involved a meshing of federal and state programs.