Hegmon v. Novak

ADKINS, Judge. We must decide in this appeal whether the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County erred when it signed an order transmitting to the circuit court the issue of whether a testator was under undue influence when she signed a will, although the petition to caveat the will only alleged that the testator was mentally incompetent. In the course of this decision, we are called upon to decide whether the 1990 amendment to Maryland Rule 6-434(d), allowing amendments to orders transmitting issues to the circuit court, changes the common law rule that an order transmitting issues is a final judgment subject to immediate appeal. ⁷⁰⁶ FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Alfred Fishgrund (“Fishgrund”) died on January 15, 1998, while a resident of Montgomery County. His February 22, 1995 last will and testament was admitted for probate on March 2, 1998.

Rudolph Hegmond, appellant, was appointed as the personal representative of the estate. Olga Novakova, (“Novakova”) the sister of Fishgrund, died on July 14, 1998. On August 28, 1998, Peter Novak, appellee and personal representative of Novakova’s estate, filed a petition to caveat the will of Fishgrund. In the petition, appellee alleged that the will was without legal effect because it was executed by Fishgrund when he was mentally disabled and incompetent to execute a valid will, and because the will was not properly witnessed.

On October 20, 1998, appellee filed a petition to transmit issues pursuant to Rule 6^434. The petition sought the transmission of three issues: the two issues outlined in the petition to caveat, and a third issue — whether Fishgrund’s will was the result of undue influence by appellant or others. On February 19, 1999, after a hearing, the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County granted the petition, and transmitted three issues to circuit court. Appellant then filed this appeal.

DISCUSSION Appellant argues that: 1) the order transmitting the issues is immediately appealable; and 2) the issues included in the order should be limited to only those issues alleged in the petition to caveat. Appellee asserts that: 1) the order transmitting issues is not a final judgment; and 2) the orphans’ court did not err in transmitting the undue influence issue to the circuit court, although it was not specifically addressed in the petition to caveat the will. We first address the appeala-bility issue. I. Appellant contends that in caveat proceedings, when issues have been framed by an orphans’ court and transmitted to the ⁷⁰⁷ circuit court, the order of transmission is “final” and immediately appealable.

Appellee argues that such an order is not appealable, because it is not a final order, and bases its argument on the 1990 amendment adding subsection (d) to Rule 6-434. “Appellate jurisdiction ... is [ordinarily] limited to review of final judgments.” Anderson v. Anderson, 349 Md. 294, 297 , 708 A.2d 296 (1998); see Md.Code (1974, 1998 RepLVoL), § 12-301 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”). Maryland appellate courts are ordinarily restricted by both Maryland statute and common law to considering only those cases where final orders have been entered. When examining final orders, a court must resolve two questions: whether a final order is necessary for review in the particular case, and, if so, whether the action taken constituted a final order. CJ section 12-501 provides: “A party may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a final judgment of an orphans’ court.” CJ § 12-501; see also CJ § 12-502.

A final judgment is defined as: “a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action by a court, including an orphans’ court, from which an appeal ... may be taken.” Id. at § 12 — 101(f). A judgment generally is considered “final” if it determines and concludes the rights involved, or denies the appellant the means of further prosecuting their rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. This Court and the Court of Appeals have often been called upon to interpret the above-mentioned statutes. In Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), the Court of Appeals pointed out that it had “consistently stated that a judgment or order of a court is final when it determines or concludes the rights of parties or when it denies the parties means of further prosecuting or defending their rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” Id. at 5-6 , 432 A.2d 1319 ; see also McCormick v. 9690 Deerco Rd., 79 Md.App. 177, 182 , 556 A.2d 292 (1989). “The purpose [of the finality rule] ‘is to combine in one review all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final ⁷⁰⁸ judgment results.’ ” Sigma Reprod.

Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 668 , 467 A.2d 483 (1983) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 , 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). The language of the statute defining final orders has been interpreted as providing that “appeals shall be taken only from final orders or decisions [of orphans’ courts], those actually settling the rights of the parties.” Hall v. Coates, 62 Md.App. 252, 255 , 489 A.2d 41 , (1985) (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Collins v. Cambridge Maryland Hosp., Inc., 158 Md. 112, 116 , 148 A. 114 (1930)). To constitute a final judgment within the meaning of the C J Article, the Court of Appeals has held that an order must have three attributes: (1) it must be intended as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy; (2) it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties; and (3) the clerk must make a proper record of the order or judgment in accordance with the dictates of Rule 2-601.

See Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767 (1989); see also Albert W. Sisk & Son, Inc. v. Friendship Packers, Inc., 326 Md. 152, 159 , 604 A.2d 69 (1992). In 1990, the Court of Appeals adopted the present Rules 6-101 through 6-501. Subsection (d) of Rule 6-434 states in pertinent part: “Upon petition, the orphans’ court may amend, supplement or modify issues previously transmitted to a circuit court.” Appellee suggests that the adoption of subsection (d) overrules any previous right to appeal any order transmitting issues from the orphans’ court. Specifically, appellee relies on Kao v. Hsia, 309 Md. 366 , 524 A.2d 70 (1987), for the argument that, because an orphans’ court is freely allowed to amend, modify, or supplement the issues, there is no right of appeal of the issues transmitted.

We would agree with appellant’s argument if the criteria for a final judgment in the context of an appeal from an order transmitting issues from an orphans’ court were the same as that for other orders. The Court of Appeals has made clear, however, that it is not. ⁷⁰⁹ “Finality” for purposes of an appeal from an orphans’ court transmittal of issues assumes a different meaning than any other final judgement. The Court of Appeals in Schlossberg v. Schlossberg, 275 Md. 600 , 343 A.2d 234 (1975), explained the difference: Our [previous] decisions ... engrafted the word ‘final’ upon the clause ‘all decrees, orders, decisions and judgments, made by the orphans’ court,’ as set forth in Art. 5 § 64.... [W]e cannot construe the dictum [in a previous case] as requiring, in caveat proceedings that before such an order can be appealable it must be ‘ “one which finally settles some disputed right or interest of the parties”,’ or be ‘so far final as to determine and conclude the rights involved in the action, or to deny to the party seeking redress by the appeal the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceedings.’ We hold that the use of the term ‘a final judgment’ as used in [CJ], § 12-501 was not intended to overrule or modify our antecedent decisions delineating the nature of orders in caveat cases which are final and appealable. We conclude that our [previous] holdings are still viable and determinative of the appealability of orders passed by the Orphans’ Courts in such caveat proceedings.

Thus, the ‘final judgment’ of an Orphans’ Court are those judgments, orders, decisions, etc. which, in caveat proceedings, finally determine the proper parties, the issues to be tried and the sending of those issues to a court of law. Id. at 612, 343 A.2d 234 (citations omitted). In applying this unusual definition of a ‘final judgment’, Schlossberg relied on the 1930 decision of the Court of Appeals in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Hanna, 159 Md. 452 , 150 A. 870 (1930). The Court in Safe Deposit reasoned: The order here appealed from determined the proper parties to the caveat proceeding, determined the issues to be tried, and directed that they be sent to a court of law.

No tribunal other than this court has jurisdiction to review such an order of the orphans’ court. In no appeal from the result of a trial, in a court of law, of the issues transmitted from ⁷¹⁰ the orphans’ court could this question be here reviewed. It could form no part of the record in the lower court. Id. at 455 , 150 A. 870 .

In a case following Safe Deposit, the Court of Appeals clarified that the practice of allowing appeals from an order that might otherwise be considered interlocutory, is based on the limited nature of the circuit court’s jurisdiction once the issues are transmitted to it: The court of law to which they have been transmitted has no concern whatever with anything that transpired in the orphans’ court in connection with the framing of such issues .... ‘Its province was simply to submit to the jury the determination of the issues without reference to the question whether they were properly presented by the proceedings in the orphans’ court.’ ... If either party had desired to raise any question as to the form of the issues, the propriety or regularity of the proceeding in which they were framed, or the sufficiency of the pleadings to support them, it should have done so by appealing from the order granting them ... for it could have been raised in no other way. Holland v. Enright, 169 Md. 390, 395 , 181 A. 836 (1935)