In Re Adoption of Sean M.

BERGER, J. This case concerns the stepparent adoption of a minor child, Sean M. (“Sean”). Appellant William H., Sean’s purported father (“Father”) filed an objection to the stepparent adoption, but did so beyond the time provided by the juvenile court’s show cause order. Appellant Jeffrey K.

(“Stepfather”) moved to strike the late objection, and the Circuit Court for Queen ⁷²⁸ Anne’s County granted the motion. Following the order to strike, Father filed motions to alter and amend judgment and to stay adoption proceedings, both of which the circuit court denied. This timely appeal followed. Father presents two issues for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: I. Whether a natural parent’s failure to file a timely objection to a proposed independent adoption, as directed in a show cause order, constitutes an irrevocable consent to the adoption.

II

Whether the statutory scheme resulting in an irrevocable deemed consent to an independent adoption offends the due process rights of the parent. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Sean, the minor child who is the subject of this case, was born on June 16, 2009, to Moira K., his mother (“Mother”). Mother and Father, an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Maryland, were in a romantic relationship during April through November of 2008.

Shortly after Sean’s birth, on July 14, 2009, Mother filed a custody action against Father in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, alleging that “William [H.] is the natural father of the minor child.” Mother sought sole legal and physical custody of Sean. In his answer to the complaint, Father denied that he was Sean’s natural father, and the custody case was ultimately dismissed by the agreement of the parties. ■ Since his birth, Sean has resided exclusively with Mother. Since Mother and Stepfather’s marriage on October 16, 2010, Sean has resided with both Mother and Stepfather. Additionally, Stepfather has been involved with Sean’s life on a daily basis since Sean was born.

Mother asserts that, as of the time the instant action was filed, Father had not been involved with Sean since his birth, had not attempted to establish paternity, and had not attempted to assert any parental ⁷²⁹ rights. 1 Having been involved with Sean since his birth and intending to remain in a parental role, Stepfather filed a Petition for Stepparent Adoption of a Minor on March 30, 2011. Mother consented to Stepfather’s adoption of Sean, and filed a Consent to Adoption without Termination of Parental Rights. The Petition for Stepparent Adoption stated in paragraph 7: That the natural father of the minor child has not been identified; no persons alleging to be the natural father of the minor child have come forward; and no natural father is listed on the minor child’s birth certificate. However, in July, 2009 the natural mother of the minor child, Moira ... filed a Complaint for Custody against William ...; case number C-09-142875 in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland.

The Complaint and case was [sic] dismissed by the parties on or about January 21, 2010---- The Petition for Stepparent Adoption also noted that, “the natural father of the child is not joining in the present petition.” In paragraph 10, the Petition stated: That if William ... is the natural father of the minor child, he has abandoned his parental rights to the minor child, Sean, for the following reasons: I. He denied that he is the natural father of the minor child in his Answer to Complaints which was filed under oath with this Honorable Court....

II

He has not exercised any parental rights since the minor child’s birth; III. He has not attempted to make any contact with the minor child, has not contacted the minor child by telephone, letters, cards, gifts, or in any way made an effort to see the minor child since birth; IV. He has not attempted to contribute financially or otherwise to the support and maintenance of the minor child. ⁷³⁰ The Petition further states, in paragraph 12, that “[i]t is in the best interests of the minor child, Sean, that the parental rights of William ..., or any other person who may allege to be the natural father of the minor child, be terminated.” Along with the Petition, Stepfather, through counsel, filed a Line requesting that the court file “a Show Cause Order and Notice of Objection to William ..., who is the person suspected of being the natural father to the minor child to be adopted in the above captioned matter.” On April 15, 2011, the court issued a show cause order and notice of objection to Father, and Father was properly served by personal service on April 29, 2011. The show cause order stated, in pertinent part (emphasis in original): RELATIONSHIP TO POTENTIAL ADOPTEE: [Purported] FATHER You are hereby notified that: 1.

A Petition has been filed for the adoption of Sean ..., who was born on June 19, 2009 in Queen Anne’s County, Maryland. 2. If you wish to object to the adoption(s), you must file a notice of objection with the Clerk of the Court at Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County ... within thirty (30) days after this Order is served on you. For your convenience, a form notice of objection is attached to this Order. WHETHER THE PETITION REQUESTS ADOPTION OR GUARDIANSHIP, IF YOU DO NOT MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED ABOVE, YOU HAVE AGREED TO A TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS.

The Form Notice of Objection, which was provided to Father along with the show cause order, stated, in pertinent part: Instructions to the person served with the show cause order. IF YOU WISH TO OBJECT, YOU MUST MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE ⁷³¹ STATED IN THE SHOW CAUSE ORDER. You may use this form to do so. You need only sign this form, print or type your name, address, and telephone number underneath your signature, and mail or deliver it to the court at the address shown in paragraph 2 of the show cause order.

IF THE COURT HAS NOT RECEIVED YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE DEADLINE STATED, YOU HAVE AGREED TO A TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS. Any objection to the show cause order was required to be received by the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County by Tuesday, May 31, 2011. 2 Father’s objection, however, was not received by the court until Wednesday, June 1, 2011, one day after the thirty-day deadline. 3 Stepfather, through counsel, filed a Motion to Strike Late Notice of Objection on June 13, 2011, arguing that the objection should be stricken as untimely. The parties filed various responses to the Motion to Strike, and the court held a hearing regarding the motion on August 8, 2011. The Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County granted Stepfather’s Motion to Strike Late Notice of Objection and further ordered that the adoption proceed in the normal course, as uncontested.

In his order, the circuit judge stated: Title 9 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure applies. Specifically, 9-107(b), applies and it sets forth that any notice of objection to an adoption or guardianship shall be filed within 30 days after the show cause order is served. In this case, the show cause order, which complies with the rules and the forms, was served by personal service. It was served on ⁷³² April 29th of 2011.

Notice of objection was filed in this court on June 1st 2011. By my calculations and I think its also been stated here today, that is two days late. 4 Quite simply, the Court is to determine whether 9-107 is mandatory. I have heard no reason that would create good cause to exceed the rule. There has been no indication of any disability or of any other reason, its just a late filing and because of that, I find that the motion to strike is appropriate and I’ll strike the notice of objection. 5 Thereafter, Father filed a motion to Alter and Amend Judgment on August 18, 2011, and filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Adoption Proceeding on August 24, 2011.

The court denied both motions on September 12, 2011. This timely appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW In child custody and termination of parental rights cases, this court utilizes three interrelated standards of review. In re Adoption of Victor A., 386 Md. 288, 297 , 872 A.2d 662, 667 (2005) (citing In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 , 819 A.2d 1030, 1051 (2003)).

The Court of Appeals described the three interrelated standards as follows: We point out three distinct aspects of review in child custody disputes. When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of [Rule 8-131(c) ] applies. [Second,] if it appears that the [court] erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court ⁷³³ views the ultimate conclusion of the [court] founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the [court’s] decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. In re Yve S., supra, 373 Md. at 586 , 819 A.2d at 1051 .

We review the trial court’s conclusions as to matters of law de novo. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Audrey B., Adriana H., and Eric H., 186 Md.App. 454, 463 , 974 A.2d 965, 970 (2009) (quoting Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175 (2006) (“[W]here an order [of the trial court] involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, [the appellate court] must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.”)). There is no factual finding at issue involved in this appeal; the issue at stake is an order of the trial court involving the interpretation of Maryland statutory law. Accordingly, we review the trial court’s conclusion regarding the effect of Father’s untimely objection de novo.

DISCUSSION Summarizing the contentions of the parties, Father first argues that his failure to file a timely objection to the proposed independent adoption within the required time period does not constitute an irrevocable consent to the adoption. Stepfather responds that Father concedes that he did not timely file a notice of objection, and that under the reasoning of various cases construing the same thirty-day objection period within the context of CINA cases, Father’s deemed consent is irrevocable. Second, Father argues that even if his failure to file a timely objection is considered a deemed consent under Maryland law, the deemed consent scheme is unconstitutional because it violates his constitutional right to enjoy the society of his child. Stepfather responds that, under existing law, the Maryland statutory scheme is constitutional and violates no constitutional right of Father.

We address each of Father’s contentions in turn. ⁷³⁴ I. Father’s first argument is that his failure to file a timely objection to the proposed independent adoption within the required time period is not an irrevocable consent to the adoption. Father argues that the case law construing the thirty-day objection period is within the context of Child in Need of Assistance (“CIÑA”) and guardianship proceedings, and is therefore irrelevant to an independent adoption where the child is not CINA. 6 Additionally, Father argues that the trial court should have established his paternity before proceeding with the adoption. We find neither argument persuasive, as discussed below. A. Statutory construction and applicability of guardianship-related case law Father is correct that we have not previously addressed the issue of deemed consent in the context of independent adoptions.

We, however, disagree with Father’s argument that the existing case law is entirely inapplicable. We believe that prior cases construing the same thirty-day objection period in the context of guardianship proceedings are relevant to independent adoptions as well, inasmuch as the language is nearly identical. We begin our analysis of the thirty-day objection period by examining the language of the statute and implementing rules. When presented with an issue of statutory construction, we keep in mind the following principles: Our predominant mission is to ascertain and implement the legislative intent, which is to be derived, if possible, from the language of the statute (or Rule) itself.

If the language is clear and unambiguous, our search for legisla ⁷³⁵ tive intent ends and we apply the language as written in a commonsense manner. We do not add words or ignore those that are there. If there is any ambiguity, we may then seek to fathom the legislative intent by looking at legislative history and applying the most relevant of the various canons that courts have created. Audrey B., supra, 186 Md.App. at 462-63 , 974 A.2d at 970 (quoting Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571-72 , 880 A.2d 343 (2005)).

The procedures governing independent adoptions are found in §§ 5-3B-01 to 5-3B-32 of the Family Law Article and their implementing rules. Section 5-3B-15 provides that, after a petition to adopt is filed, the court must issue a show cause order “on each of the prospective adoptee’s living parents who has not consented to the adoption.” Md.Code (1984, 2006 RepLVol.), § 5-3B-15 of the Family Law Article (“FL”). 7 The court may only enter an order for adoption if each of the prospective adoptee’s living parents consents, either in writing or “by failure to timely file notice of objection after being served with a show cause order.... ” FL § 5-3B-20. The implementing rules regarding adoptions and guardian-ships are found in Maryland Rules 9-101 through 9-113. Md. Rule 9-105 sets forth the requirements for show cause orders, including when show cause orders are required to be filed and the content of such orders.

Md. Rule 9~105(a) states that a show cause order is required in public agency guardianships, public agency adoptions, private agency guardianships, and independent adoptions. There are various requirements concerning the contents of a show cause order, and regardless of the type of proceeding, all show cause orders must include language substantially similar to the following: “IF YOU DO NOT MAKE SURE THAT THE COURT RECEIVES YOUR NOTICE OF OBJECTION ON OR BEFORE THE STATED DEADLINE, YOU HAVE ⁷³⁶ AGREED TO A TERMINATION OF YOUR PARENTAL RIGHTS.” Md. Rule 9-105(e). Father does not dispute that he was served with a show cause order and that the show cause order he received is consistent with the requirements of Md. Rule 9-105. Md. Rule 9-107 sets forth the time period in which a parent may file a notice of objection to an adoption or guardianship proceeding, and states: “any notice of objection to an adoption or guardianship shall be filed within 30 days after the show cause order is served.” There is no dispute that Father was properly served, or that his notice of objection was not timely filed.

The show cause order was personally served on Father on April 29, 2011. Father filed his notice of objection on June 1, 2011, one day beyond the deadline proscribed in Md. Rule 9—107(b)(1). Father does not argue that there was anything unclear about the language of the show cause order, nor does he give any reason why he failed to file a timely objection. The dispute, rather, revolves around the effect, if any, of Father’s untimely objection.

It is well settled that, in the context of guardianship cases, failure to file a timely objection serves as an irrevocable deemed consent to termination of parental rights. See In re Adoption/Guardianship of Chaden M., 189 Md.App. 411 , 984 A.2d 420 (2009) (“[A] failure to timely file a notice of objection amounts to a consent to guardianship ... Moreover, a deemed consent is irrevocable.”) (citing In re Adoption/Guardianship of Audrey B., supra, 186 Md.App. at 465-76 , 974 A.2d 965 ); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, 344 Md. 458, 486 , 687 A.2d 681, 694 (1997) (concluding there was no right to revoke a deemed consent under prior statute). The Court of Appeals first addressed this issue in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, supra, 344 Md. 458 , 687 A.2d 681 .

In that case, the Court considered five cases in which the State sought guardianship of a child. Id. The Court considered whether the circuit court had authority to consider an objection filed after the time specified in the show cause ⁷³⁷ order and, if a parent failed to file a timely objection and was therefore deemed to have consented, whether the parent may thereafter revoke that deemed consent. Id. at 464 , 687 A.2d at 684 . 8 The Court concluded that the circuit court did not have the authority to entertain untimely objections, and that a deemed consent was irrevocable.

Id. at 496 , 687 A.2d at 699 . The Court noted that a termination of parental rights may be entered upon “the voluntary, affirmative consent of the natural parents.” Id. at 477-78 , 687 A.2d at 690-91 . Alternatively, “in cases in which the parent does not affirmatively consent to the guardianship ... the court, upon the filing of a [guardianship] petition, [must] enter and serve upon the parent a show cause order informing the parent of the petition ... The order explains in plain language that the parents have the right to object to the guardianship but that, if they wish to object, they must file their objection with the court by the date set forth in the order.” Id.

Thus, the Court concluded that a failure to object within the required time period served as a statutory deemed consent. Id. at 479 , 687 A.2d at 691 . The Court then turned to the issue of revocability of deemed consents, and concluded that deemed consents were irrevocable. In 93321055, as in the instant case, the parents had been served with show cause orders but failed to file timely objections.

Id. at 466-74 , 687 A.2d at 685-89 . The circuit court had accepted the late-filed objections. Id. The Court of Appeals found that, although the statute provided a ⁷³⁸ period for parents to revoke their explicitly granted consent, there was no such right to revoke a deemed consent because a deemed consent is “a consent ... arising by operation of law, not by volition, and it is not within the power of the parent to revoke it.” Id. at 486 , 687 A.2d at 694 .

The Court noted that “the revocation period allowed under § 5-317(e) ... is clear, fixed, and easily ascertained. The certainty of the period is essential for DSS and the court to know what, if any, right to notice and participation the parent retains. That certainty would not exist if a right to revoke is attached to the ‘deemed’ consent under § 5-322.” Id. at 485, 687 A.2d at 694 . The Court of Appeals, therefore, concluded that circuit courts do not have authority to entertain late-filed objections and that deemed consents arising as a result of failure to object are irrevocable.

Id. at 496 , 687 A.2d at 699 . The underlying statute governing the deemed consent process for guardianships has since been amended, but the basis for finding that failure to file a timely objection constitutes an irrevocable deemed consent remains. In In re Audrey B., we found “nothing in the amended statute that causes us to believe that the rationale applied by the Court in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, supra does not continue to apply with equal force to the 2005 revisions to Maryland’s guardianship and adoption laws.” 186 Md.App. at 476 , 974 A.2d at 978 . We held, “there remains no right to revoke a statutorily deemed consent entered by operation of law.” Id.

As a matter of statutory construction, we see no reason why the rationale of In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, supra, 344 Md. 458 , 687 A.2d 681 , and In re Audrey B., supra, 186 Md.App. 454 , 974 A.2d 965 , should not apply to independent adoption cases as well. The statutory language regarding failure to object as deemed consent in guardianship proceedings is found in FL § 5-320, which provides, in pertinent part: (a) Consent and acquiescence or best interests.—A juvenile court may grant guardianship of a child only if: ⁷³⁹ (iii) 1. Each of the child’s living parents consents: A. in writing; B. knowingly and voluntarily, on the record before the juvenile court; or C. by failure to file a timely notice of objection after being served with a show cause order in accordance with this subtitle.... FL § 5-320 (emphasis added).

Therefore, failure to file a timely notice of objection serves as a statutory deemed consent in guardianship proceedings. See In re Audrey B., supra, 186 Md.App. at 476 , 974 A.2d at 978 . Moreover, a statutory deemed consent due to failure to file a timely notice of objection is irrevocable. Id. at 476 , 974 A.2d at 978 .

Father is correct that we have not yet construed the statute governing failure to object in independent adoption proceedings. The language of the statute, however, is substantially similar to that governing guardianships, and we see no reason why the rationale of Audrey B. should not apply. Section 5-3B-20 of the Family Law Article, governing authority to grant independent adoptions, provides, in pertinent part: A court may enter an order for adoption only if: (l)(i) 1. Each of the prospective adoptee’s living parents consents: A. in writing; or B. by failure to timely file notice of objection after being served with a show cause order in accordance with this subtitle....

FL § 5-3B-20 (emphasis added). The relevant language here is identical to the language of § 5-320, and we find no basis to conclude that the legislature intended the language of § 5-3B-20 be given different effect than the language of § 5-320. Moreover, the committee note to § 5-3B-19, now renumbered as § 5-3B-20, 9 indicates that the legislature, in its 2005 ⁷⁴⁰ revisions to the adoption and guardianship statutes, intended that a failure to file a timely objection serve as a deemed consent to an independent adoption. The committee note provides: This section is derived from former FL SECTION 5-317(c)(2), as it related to adoption under this subtitle, and revised to clarify that failure to respond to a show cause order is deemed to be consent.

Committee Note, 2005 Md. Laws, ch 464 § 3, p. 2718 (emphasis added). The committee note applies exclusively to § 5-3B-20, entitled “Authority to grant adoption.” This section pertains solely to independent adoption, and the committee note explicitly indicates that the legislature intended that failure to respond to a show cause order serve as a deemed consent in the context of independent adoptions. Additionally, the Maryland Rules governing the thirty-day objection period also provide support for the conclusion that failure to respond to a show cause order constitutes a deemed consent in the context of independent adoptions. Md. Rule