Johnson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance

GREENE, J. Jaedon Johnson is a minor child whose father, Jermal Thomas, was killed in an automobile accident on March 6, 2002. Mr. Thomas, riding in a car driven by Damon Gaither, was killed by the negligent actions of Mr. Gaither. 1 Mr. ⁸⁵ Gaither had no automobile insurance. Mr. Thomas was insured by Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company (“Hartford”) and his policy provided uninsured motorist coverage of $20,000. Jaedon’s mother, Tammika Johnson, was insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) and her policy provided uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $25,000.

On October 2, 2002, Jadeon filed a Complaint against Mr. Gaither (Wrongful Death), Hartford (Breach of Contract), and Nationwide (Breach of Contract). The counts against Mr. Gaither and Hartford were resolved with the dismissal of the complaint against Mr. Gaither and the payment of $20,000 from Hartford. Jaedon continued to pursue his claim for uninsured motorist coverage under his mother’s policy, and on June 19, 2003, he filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Nationwide. On July 2, 2003, Nationwide filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

On July 28, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City held a hearing on the matter, granted Jaedon’s motion, and issued an order which states, in pertinent part: [T]he plaintiffs motion is hereby GRANTED and the defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company’s contract is determined to provide underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $5,000.00 to Jaedon Johnson, in addition to the $20,000 in benefits available under the insurance policy of the decedent, Jermal Thomas. This issue is controlled by the Court of Appeals’ alternative holding in Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 708-713 , 589 A.2d 944 (1991), notwithstanding the language of Md.Code Ann. [Ins. Art.] § 19-509(c)(2).

Nationwide appealed and on October 6, 2004, the Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion, reversed the Circuit Court. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 159 Md.App. 345 , 859 A.2d 279 (2004).

The Court of Special Appeals held that Jaedon’s claim for the wrongful death of his father (Mr. Thomas) was not covered under his mother’s Nationwide policy because Mr. Thomas was not an insured under that policy. Jaedon filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we ⁸⁶ granted. Johnson v. Nationwide, 384 Md. 581 , 865 A.2d 589 (2005). The question before us is whether § 19-509 of the Insurance Article requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage for the wrongful death of a person who was not an insured under the policy.

We hold that § 19-509 does not require an insurer to provide such coverage. FACTS Jadeon lived with his mother at the time of Mr. Thomas’s accident. Mr. Thomas did not live with Ms. Johnson, nor was he ever married to Ms. Johnson. Mr. Thomas was not an “insured” on Ms. Johnson’s Nationwide policy.

Ms. Johnson was the only named “insured” under her policy. The Nationwide policy issued to Ms. Johnson provides, in pertinent part: We will pay compensatory damages, including derivative claims, which are due by law to you or a relative from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury suffered by you or a relative, and because of property damage---- “You” and “Your” mean the policyholder and spouse if living in the same household. “Relative” means one who regularly lives in your household and who is related to you by blood, marriage or adoption (including a ward or foster child). A relative may live temporarily outside your household. “Insured” means one who is described as entitled to protection under each coverage. STANDARD OF REVIEW As stated in Md. Rule 2-501(f), “[t]he court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Whether summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law, and we must determine whether the trial court was legally ⁸⁷ correct in doing so.

Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 343 Md. 185, 204 , 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996). In the present case, the parties agree that there are no factual disputes. Rather, the application of case law and the interpretation of a particular section of the Insurance Article were the only questions before the trial court, and they are the only questions now before us. As such, it is clear that our review is de novo.

See Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 , 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002) (noting that where the order of the trial court “involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review”). DISCUSSION No one argues that Mr. Thomas was a named insured on Ms. Johnson’s Nationwide policy and Jaedon is not arguing that the policy itself requires coverage. Rather, Jaedon argues that § 19-509(c)(2) of the Insurance Article requires Nationwide to pay the benefits sought. Section 19-509(a)(l) of the Insurance Article defines “uninsured motor vehicle” as a motor vehicle, “the ownership, maintenance, or use of which has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an insured [.]” Md.Code (1997, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 19-509(a)(l) of the Insurance Article.

(Emphasis added.) 2 We note that the motor vehicle involved in the present case was not an “uninsured motor vehicle” as defined by § 19-509(a)(l), in relation to Ms. Johnson’s Nationwide policy, because Mr. Thomas was not an insured under that policy. Nonetheless, Jaedon is attempting to collect uninsured motorist benefits for the death of Mr. Thomas under Ms. Johnson’s Nationwide policy. In support of this attempt, Jaedon relies on Section 19-509(c) of the Insurance article, which provides: ⁸⁸ In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, each motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State after July 1, 1975, shall contain coverage for damages, subject to the policy limits, that: (1) the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle; and (2) a surviving relative of the insured, who is described in § 3-904 of the Courts Article, is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because the insured died as the result of a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. Md.Code (1997, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 19-509(c) of the Insurance Article.

(Emphasis added.) As we have so often stated, “the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). To begin with, we must consider the plain language of the statute. As noted in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567 , 683 A.2d 512 (1996), “we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry there also.” Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 578, 683 A.2d at 517 ; see also Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 , 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (“If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.”). Moreover, “[w]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to ‘reflect an intent not evidenced in that language.’ ” Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 579, ⁸⁹ 683 A.2d at 517 (quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993)).

Considering the plain language of § 19-502(c)(l), 3 Jaedon cannot recover under that section for the wrongful death of his father, Mr. Thomas. The words of the statute require each motor vehicle liability insurance policy to include coverage for that policy’s insured for bodily injuries sustained by that policy’s insured, in a motor vehicle accident involving the use of an uninsured motor vehicle. Jaedon’s argument that “the only requirement for Jaedon’s recovery under his mother’s policy is that Jaedon be a survivorship [sic] of an ‘insured’ under the statute ...” (emphasis added), is illogical. To interpret the statute that way would mean that the legislature was requiring every policy to provide uninsured motorist coverage to an unknown number of people, not named in the policy, who are related to (but not living with) someone who is protected by the policy, in the event that those unknown people should be involved in an accident with an uninsured motor vehicle.

We can only describe this construction of the statute as convoluted. Our goal in interpreting statutes is to give them their “most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used.” Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429 , 701 A.2d 419, 422 (1997). We will avoid constructions that are “illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.” Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). Moreover, we will not engage in a “ ‘forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.’ ” Nesbit v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 76 , 854 A.2d 879, 885 (2004) (quoting Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 166, 181 , 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001)).

In ⁹⁰ our view, § 19-506(c)(l) requires that the insurance policy provide coverage to the insured for his or her own bodily injuries. Considering the words of § 19-509.(c)(2), it is similarly not possible for Jaedon to recover under that section because it only requires the insurance policy to provide coverage to surviving relatives for the death of the insured. Although Jaedon is a surviving relative of Mr. Thomas, Mr. Thomas was not an insured under the Nationwide policy through which the uninsured coverage is sought. That fact prohibits Jaedon from recovering under that policy through the use of Section 19 — 509(c)(2), which plainly states that surviving relatives of the insured may recover for the death of the insured.

Jaedon relies on Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, 322 Md. 689 , 589 A.2d 944 (1991) to support his position. In Forbes , we held that Art. 48A, § 541(c)(2), the predecessor to § 19-509(c)(l), encompassed wrongful death claims. Forbes, 322 Md. at 701 , 589 A.2d at 949 . Section 541(c)(2) provided, in pertinent part, that every policy issued must contain coverage “for damages which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle.” Md.Code (1957, 1991 Rep.

Vol.), Art. 48A, § 541(c)(2). Carol and Robin Forbes were married but not living together when Carol Forbes was killed in an automobile accident involving an uninsured motor vehicle on September 22, 1984. Forbes, 322 Md. at 692 , 589 A.2d at 945 . Carol had lived with her husband and children (Connie and George) until August 4, 1984, when she moved out.

Id. On August 27, 1984, she also moved the children out of the family home and into her new apartment, without the consent of Robin. Id. The Forbeses never discussed divorce and Carol did not change her address with the Motor Vehicle Administration or for voter registration when she moved out of the family home.

Id. In addition, Robin and Carol Forbes owned a Chevrolet station wagon ⁹¹ which was titled in both their names and was insured by Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company (Harleysville). Forbes, 322 Md. at 693 n. 1, 589 A.2d at 946 n. 1. While only Robin was designated in the policy as “named insured,” both Carol and Robin were listed on the declaration page of the policy as operators of the vehicle.

Id. Robin filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against his uninsured motorist carrier, Harleysville and against the tortfeasor. Forbes, 322 Md. at 692-93 , 589 A.2d at 945 . Among other things, Robin made claims on behalf of himself, Connie, and George for the wrongful death of Carol.

Forbes, 322 Md. at 693 , 589 A.2d at 946 . The Circuit Court granted summary judgment