Jones v. Hurst

Adkins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ⁶⁰⁸ Under the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, (Code Art. 50, §§ 16-24), certain consequences ensue when an injured person releases one of several joint tort-feasors. One of those consequences may be a reduction in any judgment the injured person recovers against the remaining tort-feasor(s). Under § 19: A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid. Section 20 deals directly with contributions between joint tort-feasors.

It provides: A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor does not relieve him from liability to make contribution to another joint tort-feasor unless the release is given before the right of the other tort-feasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has accrued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share 1 of the released tort-feasor, of the injured person’s damages recoverable against all other tort-feasors. 2 But these provisions do not come into play unless the person released was a joint tort-feasor, one of "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property. . . .” Section 16 (a). Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613 , 133 A.2d 428 (1957). The question now before us is whether a statement in a joint tort-feasor release that the released person "shall be considered as joint tort-feasors ⁶⁰⁹ [sic]” is sufficient to implement the provisions of § 19, in the absence of a judicial determination of liability of that person, and despite an express denial of liability. The question is presented in the following factual context: On November 20,1976, an automobile owned and operated by the appellant, Beverly M. Jones, was struck in the rear by an automobile operated by the appellee, Zachary A. Hurst and owned by Henry M. Hurst.

Jones sued the Hursts for personal injuries received in the action. Zachary Hurst contended that the cause of the accident was brake failure. J ones filed a separate suit against General Motors Corporation and Park Circle Motor Company on this ground. 3 The two cases were consolidated for trial. Thereafter, on June 8,1981, Jones settled her case against General Motors. 4 The principal consideration for the release was an agreement by General Motors to provide a brake expert to defeat the brake failure defense.

The release, captioned ’’JOINT TORT-FEASOR RELEASE ”, referred to the accident of November 20, 1976, and to Jones’s action against General Motors. It said Jones "claimed the said General Motors Corporation to be legally liable” for the accident "for which liability is hereby expressly denied.” The release continued: I [Jones] further understand and agree that in any action or suit in which General Motors Corporation may be of [sic] has been joined as a defendant, any and all judgments recovered [sic] by me against any person, firm or corporation for any and all claims as aforesaid shall be reduced in the amount of the consideration paid for this release or to the extent of the pro rata share of the said General Motors Corporation if said pro rata share is greater than the consideration paid for this release [recited to be $10]; or in accordance with the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, ⁶¹⁰ Article 50, Sections 16-24 of the Maryland Code. I further agree that for the purpose of determining the amount of any judgments that may be recovered by me against any person, firm or corporation, except General Motors Corporation in the aforesaid action... that the said General Motors Corporation shall be considered as joint tortfeasors [sic] to the same extent and effect as if judgments had been rendered against them [sic] as joint tort-feasors [emphasis supplied]. The case against the appellee and Henry Hurst came on for trial on July 13, 1981, in the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City before Judge David Ross and a jury.

The General Motors release was offered. Following the close of evidence, a verdict was directed in favor of Henry Hurst. The jury brought in a verdict of $18,000 against Zachary Hurst and in favor of Jones. Judgment absolute was entered in that amount.

Invoking the release, and § 19 of Article 50, Zachary moved for a reduction of the judgment by one-half. Judge Ross granted the motion and reduced the judgment against Zachary to $9,000. This appeal followed. Jones relies chiefly on Swigert v. Welk, supra. 5 In that case, Newport was the injured party.

She was a passenger in Swigert’s car when that vehicle was struck by one operated by Welk. Newport sued Swigert who impleaded Welk. Welk produced a release from Newport, claimed this barred any suit against him, and obtained summary judgment in his favor. Swigert’s contention was that because there was a latent right of contribution between him and Welk, Welk should remain in the case for determination of his liability as a joint tort-feasor.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Swigert and reversed. The court reasoned that if Welk were a tort-feasor, the release would have brought him within what is now § 20 (then § 24) of Art. 50. Whether Welk’s joint tort-feasor status existed depended upon whether he was a person ⁶¹¹ "jointly or severally liable” to Newport. Section 16 (a) (then § 20 (a)).

Welk’s release expressly denied liability. Thus, Welk’s status as a joint