Jones v. State

HARRELL, Judge. I Carl Eugene Jones, Jr. (Petitioner) asks us to determine whether his day-of-trial request for a postponement to secure counsel and continue review of discovery responses was denied properly. In urging us to conclude it was not, he relies on two grounds. The first is that the trial court improperly exercised its discretion in denying Jones counsel, where, after a concededly knowing and voluntary initial waiver of counsel, Jones effectively elected to withdraw his waiver and requested coun ²⁷⁰ sel before trial began.

Second, Jones complains that, as of the day of trial, he had not had sufficient time to review discovery responses from the State and, therefore, the trial court improperly exercised its discretion in denying a postponement. In addition to these arguments, he also points to assertedly improper procedural consideration of his postponement request by the trial judge and the County Administrative Judge’s designee. II On 15 July 2003, Baltimore City police attempted to conduct a traffic stop on a stolen car being driven by Jones. Instead of stopping, Jones proceeded at a high rate of speed south on Interstate 95.

Pursuit continued through Montgomery County west on Interstate 495 to River Road. A police helicopter pilot observed Jones exit the car at this point, flag down another vehicle, forcibly remove its driver, and commandeer the vehicle. Two small children remained in the back seat of the second vehicle as the chase continued. The chase went on for nearly two hours, during which Jones drove erratically and at speeds up to 130 miles per hour.

Finally, he stopped the vehicle on the shoulder of Maryland Route 50 in Anne Arundel County, but refused to exit. Police officers broke the windows and forcibly removed him. Jones was charged in Montgomery County and Anne Arundel County with a number of crimes arising out of the incident, including kidnaping, carjacking, and assault. In his trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Jones, represented by counsel, was convicted of charges of carjacking and second degree assault.

He was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. While he was incarcerated in Montgomery County, the State commenced proceedings against him in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Jones, who represented himself in the Anne Arundel County proceedings, was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree assault, two counts of kidnapping, one count of resisting arrest, one count of reckless driving, and one count of failure to maintain a reasonable and prudent ²⁷¹ speed. Jones was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment and fines of $500 for each of the three driving offenses.

The 30-year term of imprisonment in the Anne Arundel County prosecution was to run consecutive to the 40-year term sentence from the Montgomery County prosecution. The present issues arise out of the Anne Arundel County proceedings. In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Jones’s initial appearance was before Judge Michael E. Loney on 22 November 2004. He was advised at that time of his rights pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-213(e). 1 The transcript of the proceeding notes in pertinent part the following: The Court: I just want to make sure today that you understand you have a right to be represented by an attorney on these charges.

If you cannot afford a lawyer the Office of Public Defender will represent you if you apply and also if you qualify. Have you made any arrangements for any attorney to represent you on these charges? Jones: As I indicated, I have been talking to an attorney in reference to this case. But, no, I haven’t retained one.

At his next appearance, a status conference on 7 January 2005 before the County Administrative Judge, the Honorable Joseph P. Manck, Jones again was advised of his right to counsel Tie transcript of the status conference reveals the following: ²⁷² The State: This Defendant is here today without an attorney. It is a very serious case he is facing____ I have told him I think a Public Defender would be very helpful for him to have today. He has told me several times that he does not want a Public Defender. For the record, if I could just hand him a Public Defender card.

The Court: What the State said is true, you certainly are entitled to have an attorney represent you. If you can’t afford one, the Public Defender may represent you, but it is your responsibility to contact them. An attorney can be very helpful and go over the whole case with you, preparing you for trial, preparing the whole case for trial, generally protect your constitutional rights and if necessary helping you at time of sentencing. I cannot stress enough how important it is to have counsel.

If you intend on representing yourself that is certainly your right, but please don’t minimize the fact that an attorney can be extremely helpful on these very serious offenses. Your trial date is scheduled for February 17th at 9:00, and if you come in here without counsel and without good reason for not having an attorney a judge could find that you waived your right and make you go forward without a lawyer. Do you understand all those rights, sir? Jones: Yes, sir.

On 17 February 2005, the first scheduled trial date, Jones, without counsel, appeared before a third judge, the Honorable Paul A. Hackner. He again was advised of his rights according to Maryland Rule 4-213 and found to have waived his right to counsel in accordance with Maryland Rule 4-215. 2 ²⁷³ The relevant colloquy between Judge Hackner and the parties was as follows: The State: Your Honor, just to catch the Court up to speed, I have spoken with Defendant, and the first thing I asked ²⁷⁴ him today was whether or not he wanted a lawyer to represent him. And he told me he had a lawyer, and I asked who it was and he said, “Me.” And I went on to discuss the matter with him further, and he reminded me that at the status conference that I talked to him then, that he said he didn’t have a lawyer, that he didn’t want a lawyer, and that I asked him to take a green Public Defender card. He reminded me that we had already had that conversation and that there was nothing more to talk about with respect to him getting a lawyer, so I just ask— and I know Judge Manck at the time of the status conference advised him of his rights, but perhaps just another advisement.

The Court: All right. Mr. Jones, is it your intention to proceed without a lawyer, or do you wish to have a lawyer represent you? Jones: Proceed without a lawyer, Your Honor. The Court: All right.

Now, I am going to ask you a whole bunch of questions to make sure that you are clear on what your rights are and that you knowingly and voluntarily are giving up your rights to an attorney. I am going to start by telling you I think it is a very serious mistake that you are making, because you are facing charges that could result in a significant amount of incarceration. And even though you might feel that you understand the issues and perhaps are able to represent yourself, I can almost guarantee you that you can’t. Even if you had a law degree it would be a bad idea for you to represent yourself.

But I am going to go through this process with you, and I hope that you will listen to me carefully and make an intelligent decision. How much education have you had? Jones: I’m a high school graduate. Also Baltimore International Culinary College graduate.

The Court: All right, and so I assume you can read and write? Jones: Yes, sir. ²⁷⁵ The Court: I presume that you have not had any legal training, is that correct? Jones: That’s correct. The Court: And tell me why you want to represent yourself?

Jones: I decided that I would like to represent me, myself, on this case because there’s a lot of motion issues in reference to this case. There’s a lot of double jeopardy in reference to this case, you know, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. The Court: So you think you know more about those issues than a trained attorney? Jones: No, I don’t.

The Court: So why do you want to be—if you have these good issues, then why do you want to take those issues and take the responsibility for addressing them without the advice of somebody who understands whether they are true issues or not? Jones: I totally understand that, Your Honor, and I came to the decision that—actually I came to the conclusion that I would prefer to represent myself. The Court: Do you understand that lawyers are specially trained and they understand those issues that you are addressing and they can recognize issues that perhaps you haven’t thought of and raise those in an effective way before the Court so that your likelihood of success on those issues is significantly greater than if you present them yourself? Do you understand that?

Jones: Yes, sir. The Court: And do you understand that an attorney can assist you in determining whatever defenses you might have and any mitigation that there might be in the event that you are found guilty? Do you understand that? Jones: Yes, sir. ²⁷⁶ The Court: Do you understand that an attorney can assist you in preparing and conducting the trial by cross-examining State witnesses, by calling witnesses for you on your behalf, by making legal arguments, by making presentation of facts that might be favorable to you?

Do you understand that, sir? Jones: Yes, sir. The Court: Do you understand that even if you decide to plead guilty or you are found guilty an attorney can assist you in obtaining a favorable disposition? Do you understand that?

Jones: Yes, sir. The Court: Do you understand also, sir, that if you are unable to hire a private attorney, the Public Defender or a Court-appointed [attorney] would be available to represent you? Do you understand? Jones: Yes, sir.

The Court: And that you would have a number of trial rights which you are going to still have, but you are not likely to be able to exercise them as effectively. Those are the rights to call witnesses on your behalf; the rights to confront and cross-examine those witnesses; the right to obtain witnesses by compulsory process, in other words, by subpoenas; the right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Those are the rights that you have, but an attorney could assist you in exercising those rights more effectively. Do you understand that?

Jones: I understand that part, Your Honor, but what I’m in limbo in reference to that part is the fact that why is it there is a difference from actually having a legal counsel on my behalf instead of me to present those same motions or to present those same issues. The Court: You have the right to present them just like I have a right to fix my toilet. I am just not as good as a plumber. That is all I am telling you. ²⁷⁷ Okay?

If I want to fix my toilet or try to tune my car, I can do it. But if that car blows up in my face because I don’t know what I am doing then it is my fault for not going to a mechanic, and that is what you are doing here. If this case blows up in your face you can’t go to the Court of Appeals and say, “Well, I’ve changed my mind. I decided I’m not as smart as a lawyer, and therefore I want a new trial.” It won’t happen.

Do you understand that? Jones: Yes, sir. The Court: Because the law applies to you just like it does for a lawyer, and the rules of evidence apply to you the same way. The Court can’t assist you in trying this case.

All I can do is do the same thing I would do if you were represented by counsel. Understand? Jones: Yes, sir. The Court: So understanding these rights, is it still your desire to give up the right to be represented by counsel and represent yourself?

Jones: As I indicated, Your Honor, I came to the conclusion I feel as though I’d like to represent myself. I had the opportunity to talk to a few attorneys. In Anne Arundel County and I decided that I want to represent myself in reference to this case. The Court: All right.

Before formal acceptance of his express waiver of counsel, Jones complained that the State had not provided him with discovery materials sought pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-263. 3 ²⁷⁸ He expressed a desire to view audio and video police communications and police notes relating to the charges. He assert ²⁷⁹ ed that he had not been provided these materials. Judge Hackner reset the trial for 10 May 2005 and ordered the State to provide complete discovery. Judge Hackner also instructed Jones on filling out subpoenas for documents in support of his defense.

After further discussion, the Court concluded by stating, “I find that [Jones] has knowingly, freely, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and he will represent himself.” Before the new trial date, Jones subpoenaed as a witness Rene Sandler, Esquire, his defense counsel in the Montgomery County proceedings. On 25 April 2005, he appeared before Judge Philip T. Caroom on a motion filed by Ms. Sandler to quash the subpoena. The record documents that on this occasion, Jones’s express waiver of counsel was revisited: The Court: [L]et me confirm the Court I think twice has advised you about your right to have an attorney initially in November on this case. You advised that you thought you were going to make arrangements for a private attorney, and then in January the Court advised you again and you were provided information on how to contact a Public Defender.

Since that time have you been making arrangements you think for a private attorney or a Public Defender, sir, or is it your choice that you want to go ahead and speak for yourself when you get to that trial date? Jones: Your Honor, first of all, I have talked to some private attorneys in reference to this case as the State already knows.... I decided that I’m ready to proceed by defending myself, Your Honor. Judge Caroom followed up with questions similar to those asked by Judge Hackner, inquiring to ensure Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel.

After finding that Jones had waived counsel, the court moved on to determine Ms. Sandler’s motion to quash the subpoena. Jones agreed that Ms. Sandler had no personal knowledge of the facts and all parties agreed that she should be excused from having to testify at trial. ²⁸⁰ Jones took advantage of the 25 April hearing to claim that he had not received any discovery. The State averred that it sent some discovery to him at the jail, but that there had been some problem with it getting to him because of an incorrect Department of Corrections (DOC) number. 4 The prosecutor proffered that she had sent “hundreds and hundreds of pages of discovery.” Jones admitted that he received police reports, but claimed he had not received audio and video discovery or medical reports. The State reported that the former had been sent the Friday prior to the hearing.

The prosecutor also represented that she subpoenaed the medical reports, but that the subpoena remained outstanding. Jones argued that he was prejudiced by the State’s failure to provide these discovery materials and therefore the case against him should be dismissed, claiming “with the passage of time and continuous confinement ... [h]ow can I prepare ... without the discovery?” Regarding the discovery situation, Judge Caroom opined: [a]s to discovery ... the State should not be permitted to use the tapes and medical records[ 5 ] in its case because of the delay in production of those to you. They can present anything based on ... the police reports____ That was disclosed to you apparently ... many weeks ago. However, as to the medical records and the actual audiotapes themselves, I would exclude those.

Unless, sir, if you want to put them in you can offer them. The court explained to Jones that, if he chose in his defense to submit partial information from the tapes, the State then may be able to offer other evidence to complete the “picture” created thereby. The court continued, [s]o you ought to be cautious in offering some part of it yourself. Now the other aspect, sir, that you are raising is if you think that you don’t have enough time to- complete ²⁸¹ preparation of your case because you haven’t had a chance to listen to the tapes yet.

You have not asked for a postponement. All you have asked is [that] the case be dismissed. I am denying your request to dismiss it. If you are asking for a postponement that would have to be considered by Judge Manck [the County Administrative Judge], and you need to make that request ASAP if you want to make it____ Any question about that, sir?

Jones: Not in particular reference to that. I’m crystal clear on that.... As the hearing continued, Jones questioned whether he had received all the police reports. He asserted that he had received only police reports from Montgomery County, but none from Anne Arundel County.

The court found it prudent to have what it called a “status conference and continued hearing” to determine what discovery materials he had received. The court scheduled this hearing for the following week (3 May 2005) and instructed the State that it would need to provide evidence showing that Jones had received all required discovery materials. If those materials had not been provided, postponement of trial or dismissal for failure to provide discovery materials would again be considered. Jones again appeared, without counsel, before Judge Ca-room on 3 May 2005.

He repeatedly declined to request a postponement in order to have more time to prepare for the trial, stating that he preferred to proceed to trial on 10 May 2005. The transcript of the hearing chronicles that the court again asked Jones if he should be representing himself. He reiterated that this was his choice. In reference to the discovery dispute, Jones elected that he would not need the audio, video, and medical records at trial.

Nonetheless, with regard to the delivery of 937 pages of written police reports, he made a “motion to dismiss for violation of discovery rules.” The State showed, and the court found, that Jones signed for and received piecemeal delivery at the jail of various discovery materials on the 11th, 13th, and 21st of April. Additionally, he received anew, in a single delivery on 28 April, the full 937 pages of police reports. The court, in denying Jones’s motion ²⁸² to dismiss, nonetheless urged him, “[t]he Court is not going to count it against you [if you ask] for a postponement.” The Court continued, “if this case is delayed a few extra days or even a few weeks extra, however much time you might like, it is not going to make a big impact.” “I will give you as much time as you want to prepare, or at least I think that if you asked for a postponement [the] Court would give you more time to prepare.” Jones expressed some concern over his inability to interview witnesses while he was incarcerated. The court responded: Well, sir, it is not the job of the Court to be a Defense lawyer for you and tell you how to arrange for witnesses to be interviewed and how to have them subpoenaed and so forth.

If you wanted a lawyer you were given the opportunity and the advice about how to make those arrangements ---- A lawyer could arrange to have another person go out and interview that person for you, an investigator. He or she ... could go out and interview them himself. But if you have some built in constraints in DOC I am not going to advise you on ... other methods that you might use. That would be up to you to figure out yourself if you are representing yourself.

Again, sir, if you think that more time would solve the situation I will give you a last opportunity today. You can still ask for more time. We will send the case upstairs and you can request that postponement and in all likelihood Judge Manck would grant it. Do you want to ask that, or do you want to go ahead in the position that you are in?

Jones: As of today, Your Honor, I am not postponing this trial date. Accordingly, the case remained scheduled for trial on 10 May 2005. On the morning of 10 May 2005, a hearing on Jones’s request for a postponement of trial took place before Judge Pamela L. North, designee of the County Administrative ²⁸³ Judge. The transcript of the hearing shows that she questioned Jones concerning his lack of an attorney.

The Court: Okay, and having considered what the charges are I see that you are here without an attorney today, is that right. Jones: Yes, ma’am. The Court: All right. Did you think of getting an attorney before today?

Jones: Yes, ma’am. I didn’t want one, Your Honor. Judge North asked Jones the same questions that Judge Hackner and Judge Caroom asked concerning his waiver of counsel. He shifted the verbal exchange to his ongoing complaints about the discovery situation.

He asked Judge North if he could have a continuance to review the discovery, claiming he hadn’t had a chance to go through the many pages. She asked: The Court: Okay. Sir, will the request for postponement have any bearing on ... whether or not you want to have an attorney represent you? Jones: Well, right now I haven’t made that decision, but I want to contemplate ... that decision in reference to ... my continuance.

The Court: Okay. All right. Well, sir, you do ... understand ... that you don’t have an unlimited time to decide whether you want an attorney or not. That decision has to be made between your initial appearance date and your trial date, and today is your first trial date.[ 6 ] Now I am not saying whether I would grant you a postponement or not, but I am just explaining to you that is the time period when you have to make the decision about wanting an attorney or not.

Because we expect all defendants to come into Court ²⁸⁴ knowing whether they want an attorney and actually having their attorney with them on the trial date. Judge North attempted to separate Jones’s decision to represent himself from his discovery complaint for seeking a trial postponement. She asked, “can we just decide the waiver of counsel issue first____ Is there any connection between the fact that you did not get to finish looking at all your discovery and whether or not you want an attorney?” Jones evaded a forthright response, stating that he “would like to keep [his] options open in reference to that.” The Administrative Judge’s designee allowed him to renew his claim that he had not received discovery properly. He reiterated that the' discovery problems raised previously entitled him to a postponement.

In response, the State pointed out that Judge Caroom, when Jones appeared before him on 25 April and 3 May, asked him if he would like a postponement and that he had declined to make such a request. The State argued that “these issues were all exhaustively litigated.” The State continued, “we have brought witnesses in from all over the State, from Montgomery County ..., Baltimore City, ... [and] Annapolis ...,” concluding that “[h]e is just trying to stall this trial, and it is a shameless tactic and you should consult with Judge Caroom and deny the Defendant’s postponement.” The exchange between the Judge, the prosecutor, ' and Jones continued, bouncing between waiver of counsel and the discovery situation. When further questioned about why he had not sought a continuance before Judge Caroom, Jones reiterated that he wanted to keep his options open. He continued, [a]s of today I’m stating for the records that I don’t have adequate time to go through this discovery.

That’s one. Two is the fact that I’m in limbo as far as getting some counsel[ ] in reference to these charges. I feel content with what I’m basically doing. But my whole point as far as today is concerned is that I would like ... a continuance. ²⁸⁵ Judge North questioned Jones as to whether he was consulting attorneys and whether he had funds to engage a private attorney.

He responded that he did consult with attorneys, but that he was indigent. She observed that he had had six months to apply for a Public Defender. When pressed on whether he needed an attorney, Jones again responded that he wanted to keep his options open. Judge North responded, “We can’t just postpone cases indefinitely as you can imagine and let people reconsider and reconsider their options.” After a brief recess, Judge North ruled on Jones’s request for postponement. [CJlearly Judge Caroom had asked repeatedly it appears ... whether or not Defendant would want a postponement and that you declined that and said numerous times—he made that request to you and you said no---- Now the State is disadvantaged.

They have all their witnesses here today. So I am not going to grant your request for a postponement. Evincing an incomprehension of what “No” means in any of its parts, Jones continued to press his arguments before her. Once again, he bounced between the discovery and counsel issues until Judge North stopped him and renewed her denial of his postponement request: The Court: Okay.

Your request is denied, sir. And part of the reason, sir, is that you had this opportunity at least on three occasions— Jones: Well, I’m not capable of representing myself. The Court: Three occasions on May 3rd you could have asked for a postponement. You said you didn’t need any additional time to prepare.

You knew you had 900 pages of discovery, and also the fact that ... you have answered my questions that you made no attempt to get a Public Defender ... you would be a lot better off with a Public Defender.... The trial proceeded the same day. Judge Paul G. Goetzke, the assigned trial judge, inquired of Jones if he wanted to ²⁸⁶ elect a jury or a bench trial. He responded that he wanted an attorney to represent him.

The court, however, finding that this issue had been considered and determined by Judge North, denied the request. Jones next asked that he be sent back to Judge North. This request also was denied. After explaining the characteristics of a jury trial in great detail, Judge Goetzke asked whether there was anything that he should know that would preclude Jones from making a knowing and intelligent decision about the mode of trial he wished.

Jones again asserted that he needed counsel. He averred that he was not capable of making a decision on the mode of trial. The court, however, determined that Jones was capable of making that decision based upon his education and mental and physical condition. After Jones insisted that he did riot have the capacity to make the decision and refused to make it, the court elected a jury trial for him in order to protect his fundamental right.

During the jury selection, Jones again asked for legal representation. His request was denied. Trial proceeded with Jones representing himself. Throughout the trial, he continued to protest that he needed legal representation.

At one point, he told the jury he had been forced to represent himself. In closing arguments, he emphasized to the jury that he had done a lot of things during the case that he didn’t know how to do; that he did not know how to defend himself. The trial took five days. At its conclusion, the jury convicted Jones of two counts of second degree assault, two counts of kidnaping, one count of resisting arrest, one count of reckless driving, one count of negligent driving, and one count of failure to maintain a reasonable and prudent speed.

He was acquitted of two counts of first degree assault and one count of second degree assault. At sentencing, Jones claimed that he finally had procured counsel, although counsel was not present and he admitted that he had not paid an attorney to represent him. Judge Goetzke responded, “[a]ll right, sir. You have been using this issue time and time ... again in your case, and that is an attempt to buy you—to get postponements in this case, because you show up at court without a lawyer and then you ask ²⁸⁷ for one.” Jones was sentenced to 30 years’ incarceration, as noted previously, and fines totaling $1500.00.

Jones, represented by an Assistant Public Defender in the Appellate Division of the Office of the State Public Defender, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, presenting four arguments for reversal: 1) he was improperly denied his right to the assistance of counsel; 2) his postponement requests were denied improperly; 3) the trial court failed to comply with the provisions of Maryland Rule 4-215; and 4) the trial judge erred in failing to merge for sentencing purposes the convictions for speeding and negligent driving into that for reckless driving. The intermediate appellate court decided the appeal in a reported opinion. Jones v. State, 175 Md.App. 58 , 924 A.2d 336 (2007). Of pertinence to the case as it reaches us, the intermediate appellate court determined that Jones expressly waived his right to counsel.

Jones, 175 Md.App. at 79 , 924 A.2d at 348 . The court next considered whether Judge Goetzke properly denied Jones the right to revoke his waiver of counsel. Id. Finding that a postponement would have been necessary if the revocation were to be granted, the court noted that only the County Administrative Judge (or his/her designee) was authorized to exercise that discretion.

Jones, 175 Md.App. at 79-85 , 924 A.2d at 348-51 . The Court of Special Appeals found that Judge North, acting in that capacity, properly exercised her discretion and that the postponement request was properly denied. Id. Further, the Court of Special Appeals determined that Judge Goetzke had not abused his discretion in finding that Judge North had determined the postponement for the purposes of securing counsel.

Jones, 175 Md.App. at 84-85 , 924 A.2d at 351-52 . Finally, the court determined that Judge Goetzke properly exercised his discretion in denying Jones’s request to be sent back to Judge North. Id. The intermediate appellate court also examined his assertion that Judge North improperly denied his request for a postponement to further review the State’s provided discovery materials.

Applying to Judge North’s actions the ²⁸⁸ standard of Maryland Rule 4-271 (a), 7 the court determined that she had not abused her discretion in denying Jones’s request. Jones, 175 Md.App. at 85-86 , 924 A.2d at 352 . Finally, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with his claim that the convictions for negligent driving and failure to maintain a reasonable and prudent speed merged into the conviction for reckless driving as lesser included offenses. Jones, 175 Md.App. at 86-89 , 924 A.2d at 352-54 .

Thus, the court vacated Jones’s fines for “negligent driving” and “failure to maintain a reasonable and prudent speed,” but otherwise affirmed the convictions. Id. Granting Jones’s petition for writ of certiorari 8 ( 401 Md. 172 , 931 A.2d 1095 (2007)),. we accepted this case to consider whether Judge North, the County Administrative Judge’s designee, and Judge Goetzke, the trial judge, properly exercised their respective discretion regarding Jones’s postponement requests and his attempt to revoke his waiver of the right to counsel. 9 ²⁸⁹ Ill A. According to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” Doubtlessly, “[t]he right of one charged with [a] crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 , 83 S.Ct. 792, 796 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). In like vein, Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states, in applicable part, “in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be allowed counsel.... ” This right is of great import.

Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.

He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and ²⁹⁰ illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.

If in any case, civil of criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 , 53 S.Ct. 55, 64 , 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Equally fundamental, however, is a defendant’s right to proceed without counsel—the right to self-representation. U.S. Const, amends.

VI & XIV; Md. Decl. of Rights, Art. 21. “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 , 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2530 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (citing Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236, 241 , 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). Indeed, it is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want. The value of state-appointed counsel was not unappreciated by the Founders, yet the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to them.

And whatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34 , 95 S.Ct. at 2540 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ; see also Gregg v. State, 377 Md. 515, 548 , 833 A.2d 1040, 1060 (2003) (noting, like Faretta, that the right to counsel “grants the accused not only the right to be represented by counsel, but also the right to make [a] defense without assistance of counsel”). A defendant may assert the right to self representation in a criminal matter by a known and intentional relinquishment of the right to representation by counsel. State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 627 , 870 A.2d 217, 223 (2005) (“A waiver of