Judy v. Schaefer

ELDRIDGE, Judge. The petitioners in this case are indigent individuals representing themselves and certified classes of recipients of General Public Assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and Medical Assistance State Only. They challenge the validity of the Governor’s action reducing appropriations pursuant to Maryland Code (1985, 1988 Repl-Vol.), § 7-213 of the State Finance and Procurement Article. Section 7-213 of the State Finance and Procurement Article authorizes the Governor, with the approval of the Board of Public Works, to reduce, by not more than 25%, any appropriation that the Governor deems unnecessary. 1 Pursuant to ²⁴² § 7-213, on September 30, 1992, the Governor submitted a plan for the reduction of many appropriations for Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 to the Board of Public Works for approval.

A reduction of $30.8 million appropriated to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) and a reduction of approximately $20 million appropriated to the Department of Human Resources (DHR) were proposed. The $30.8 million DHMH reduction represented the elimination of health care coverage under the grant for Medical Assistance State Only. The $20 million DHR cut resulted from reducing grants to disabled indigents in the General Public Assistance program and from reducing assistance to families under the Ad to Families with Dependent Children program. The Board of Public Works approved the Governor’s proposed reductions with amendments not relevant to this case.

Thereafter, pursuant to an order signed by the Governor, the Comptroller adjusted the accounts of all state agencies to reflect the reduced appropriations. 2 ²⁴³ On November 2, 1992, the petitioners filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City a complaint seeking to enjoin the Governor, the Treasurer, the Comptroller, the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene from reducing their public assistance benefits and from eliminating their medical coverage. On November 16, 1992, the circuit court issued an interlocutory injunction preventing these officials from implementing the challenged reductions. On November 18, 1992, in response to a petition by the State, the Court of Special Appeals stayed the circuit court’s interlocutory order. Thereafter, the parties filed in the circuit court cross motions for summary judgment.

The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that § 7-213 was inconsistent with Art. Ill, § 52, of the Maryland Constitution and was thereby unauthorized. They further argued that the General Assembly’s grant of authority to the Governor to reduce appropriations under § 7-213 violated the principle of separation of powers set forth in Art. 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it failed to set forth sufficient standards to guide the Governor’s discretion. 3 The plaintiffs contended that the Governor’s action in reducing these appropriations and the Board of Public Works’s action in approving them was arbitrary, capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the 25% limitation on reductions under § 7-213 was violated when the sum appropriated to DHMH was reduced by eliminating the Medical Assistance State Only grant. The State contended that § 7-213 did not violate the principle of separation of powers and was consistent with Art. Ill, § 52, of the Maryland Constitution.

It further asserted that action of the Governor and the Board of Public Works pursuant to § 7-213 was not judicially reviewable for arbitrariness, ²⁴⁴ capriciousness or lack of evidentiary support. The State also argued that the elimination of the Medical Assistance State Only grant did not violate the terms of § 7-213. On December 2, 1992, the circuit court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and denied that of the plaintiffs. The trial court expressed the reasons for his action as follows: “It is my conclusion from the undisputed facts in evidence that the Governor’s action and that of ... the Board of Public Works, on September 30th was lawful and constitutional.

I believe that the Governor and the Board of Public Works took the actions that they did on September 30th pursuant to Section 7-213, and, I believe .that Section 7-213 was constitutionally enacted pursuant to the provisions of Article III, Section 52, Subsection 13 of the Maryland Constitution. “I also believe that not only did the Governor act pursuant to that statute which I find to be lawful and constitutional, but I find that he exercised the authority and powers vested in him under that statute properly and in accordance with the law. 4: # sfc iH 4* “I do not think there has been any violence done in these enactments to the separation of powers of the State of Maryland____ I think that the total picture that emerges from our constitution is, as the defendants suggest, a very strong and powerful Governor, particularly when it comes to budgetary matters____ So I think that our mothers and fathers over the years constructed the type' of separation of powers on the state level that vests considerable power and authority to the Governor. V H* H* H* “I think we have to look at Section 7-213 in that light and harmonize it with the overall budgetary process that the Maryland Constitution sets forth. To me, the Legislature, with all of this framework in mind, I believe did have the authority to say that in view of our framework, and for a ²⁴⁵ more orderly government, we believe the Governor should have this power, that is to the peoples’ interest that he have this power, and that we not have gridlock. I don’t think its surrendering legislative power to the Governor.

I think it is the Legislature’s intent to further define and expurgate just what the Governor is able to do with a State budget, and reinforces the preeminent role which ... the Governor has in the State of Maryland in the budgetary process.” The plaintiffs noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on December 17, 1992, and then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari. Prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a writ of certiorari to consider the important issues presented. 329 Md. 168 , 617 A.2d 1085 . I. As the trial court recognized, fundamental to the resolution of this dispute is the nature of Maryland’s executive budget system. This Court, on several occasions, has discussed the requirements and history of that system.

See Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 310 Md. 437, 450-461 , 530 A.2d 245, 251-257 (1987); Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 567-569 , 392 A.2d 67, 71-72 (1978); Md. Act. for Foster Child. v. State, 279 Md. 133, 140-153 , 367 A.2d 491, 495-502 (1977); Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 505-509 , 232 A.2d 891, 893-895 (1967); McKeldin v. Steedman, 203 Md. 89, 96-103 , 98 A.2d 561, 563-567 (1953); Dorsey v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 241-244 , 13 A.2d 630, 636-647 (1940); Baltimore v. O’Conor, 147 Md. 639, 644-646 , 128 A. 759, 761 , 40 A.L.R. 1058 (1925). We have not, however, dealt with the authority of the Governor to reduce an appropriation after the budget bill has passed. In 1916, in response to fiscal irresponsibility which led to deficits, the voters of the State of Maryland ratified an amendment to the Constitution which established an executive budget system, Art. Ill, § 52, of the Maryland Constitution. See Md. Act. for Foster Child. v. State, supra, 279 Md. at 145 , 367 A.2d at 497-498 ; McKeldin v. Steedman, supra, 203 Md. at 96 , 98 A.2d at 564 ; Goodnow Commission Report, Journal ²⁴⁶ of Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, for the Legislative Session of 1916, at 129-134 (“Goodnow Commission Report”); Hooper S. Miles, The Maryland Executive Budget System and a Review of its Administration, 1916-1941, at 7-8 (1942) (“Miles”).

The amendment had been proposed by the “Commission on Economy and Efficiency on the Budget System” 4 and was designed “to bring about a fundamental change in State appropriations” by vesting in the Governor responsibility for the fiscal affairs of the State. Md. Act. for Foster Child. v. State, supra, 279 Md. at 145 , 367 A.2d at 498 . The driving force behind the implementation of a budget system in which the executive plays a dominant role was the desire to avoid further deficits and to ensure a balanced budget. In order to fully understand the context of the constitutional arguments raised in this case, a description of the budgetary process under § 52 is appropriate.

There have been some changes to the budget amendment since 1916. Currently, the system functions as follows. Ordinarily, on the third Wednesday in January, the Governor submits to the General Assembly a comprehensive budget and a budget bill for the ensuing fiscal year, Art. Ill, § 52(3). 5 In ²⁴⁷ this budget, the Governor estimates the State’s revenues and establishes the fiscal priorities of the State by setting forth a complete plan of proposed expenditures. Ibid.

The authority to revise estimates received from State agencies and to propose expenditures was granted solely to the Governor in order to establish responsible executive control over budgetary matters. 6 The Goodnow Commission Report discussed the reasoning of the Commission for the concentration of both power over and responsibility for the budget in the Governor, stating (Goodnow Commission Report, supra, at 131): “It will also be noted that the party platform providing for the Commission limited its choice in determining the responsibility for making the final estimates for submission to the Legislature, to the Board of Public Works on the one hand, and to the Governor on the other. We have concluded that this responsibility should be placed on the Governor. We have felt that to make use of the Board of Public Works as a Budget Commission would have the disadvantage of dissipating personal responsibility for financial propositions, and would also run the risk of not securing party responsibility.” Thus, neither the General Assembly nor the Board of Public Works has the authority, in the initial budget process, to ²⁴⁸ propose an expenditure. Only the Governor may propose an expenditure in the initial budget.

Upon receipt of the Governor’s proposed budget and budget bill, the presiding officer of each House must introduce the bill. Art. Ill, § 52(5). 7 Thereafter, the Governor may amend or supplement the budget bill by revising, adding or eliminating any appropriation. Ibid. The General Assembly is authorized to amend the Governor’s budget bill under certain circumstances.

The General Assembly may not amend the bill in such a way as to affect the obligations of the State under Art. Ill, § 34, of the Maryland Constitution, or to affect the public schools or the salaries required by the Constitution to be paid. It may increase or reduce the items in the Governor’s budget relating to the General Assembly and the Judiciary. It may reduce but not increase all other items in the Governor’s budget. Art. Ill, § 52(6). 8 When both houses of the General Assembly ²⁴⁹ pass the budget bill, it becomes law without further action by the Governor.

Ibid. These limitations were seen as essential to the task of devising a system that would avoid the accumulation of a deficit and ensure that the Governor’s plan of proposed expenditures could not be amended in such a way as to exceed estimated revenues. Article III, § 52(5a), expressly mandates that the Governor propose and maintain a balanced budget. 9 The Goodnow Commission Report, supra, at 129-130, states: “It will be noted that the [Democratic Party] platform provides for a budget system prepared by the Governor or the Board of Public Works, the items of which can be reduced or eliminated, but not increased, by the Legislature. “This limitation is fundamental in our judgment for a sound budget system.” Although the broad authority of the Governor was essential and virtually unanimously supported, the Goodnow Commission grappled with what it described as “the most difficult problem in connection with the formulation of a budget plan, ... the determination of the powers of the Legislature rela ²⁵⁰ tive to the estimates to be submitted by the Governor.” Goodnow Commission Report, swpra, at 131. To address this concern the Commission proposed that the Legislature be given “the power to initiate appropriations for objects for which the Governor has made no estimates” but that that power be restricted so that it could not be used “in such a manner as to produce a deficit in the State’s finances.” Ibid.

Accordingly, the Goodnow Commission proposed a method whereby, after the budget bill has passed, the General Assembly may consider other appropriations in the form of supplementary appropriation bills. Art. Ill, § 52(8). 10 These supplementary appropriation bills originate in the General Assembly. Each must address a single work, object or purpose and must contain a tax provision to provide the revenue necessary to pay the appropriation. Ibid.

The supplementary appropriation bills are presented to the Governor for his signature as any other bill. In this manner the Governor and the General Assembly together, with the Governor having a preeminent role, enact a budget for the ensuing fiscal year based on departmental estimates of needs and on estimated revenues. The fiscal year begins on July 1 of a calendar year and ends on June 30 of the next calendar year, § 2-101 of the State Finance and ²⁵¹ Procurement Article. Thus, there is a substantial period of time between the submission of revenue estimates and the expiration of the fiscal year.

During part of this time the General Assembly is not in session. 11 Given the complex and changing needs of the State over the course of a year, a system was needed to administer the budget. 12 Article III, § 52(13), of the Constitution provides that “[t]he General Assembly may, from time to time, enact such laws not inconsistent with this section, as may be necessary and proper to carry out its provisions.” In the first budget bill passed under Art. Ill, § 52, the General Assembly began to enact a statutory scheme for the administration of the budget. 13 Until 1939, this statutory scheme was reenacted bi-annually as part of the budget bill. 14 Consistent with the constitutional provi ²⁵² sions, the bulk of the responsibility for the fiscal affairs of the State during the fiscal year was vested by this statutory scheme in the Governor. The first budget bill passed after the ratification of the budget amendment to the Maryland Constitution provided (Ch. 206 of the Acts of 1918, § 3): “That the items and amounts which hereinafter follow the sums appropriated, and which are, respectively, entitled ‘Schedule,’ do not constitute appropriations but represent the initial plan of distribution and apportionment of the appropriations to which they, respectively, refer. Each appropriation shall be paid out only in accordance with the Schedule therefor, if any, unless such Schedule be amended in the following manner: Any department, board, commissioner or officer may at any time submit in writing to the Governor an amended Schedule for the distribution and apportionment of the appropriations made to it or him, or any unexpended balance thereof, different from the manner set forth in the Schedule contained in this Act. The Governor may himself make such an amended Schedule, if the same be necessary, with respect to the appropriations for the Executive Department.

If the Governor shall make such an amended Schedule with respect to the appropriations for the executive Department or if he shall approve an amended Schedule when submitted to him as aforesaid, then he shall transmit the same with his certificate of approval to the Comptroller, and thereafter the appropriation, or the unexpended balance thereof, shall be paid out in accordance with such amended Schedule. Any amended Schedule, so submitted to the Governor may be withdrawn and amended to meet any objections of the Governor, and then resubmitted. Any such amended Schedule may be again amended, at any time, in like manner and with like effect. All amendments in Schedules thus made or approved by the Governor shall be reported by him to the next session of the General Assembly.” Thus, the concept of the budget bill being an “initial plan of disbursement” has been an element of the executive budget ²⁵³ system since its enactment.

As Judge Alan M. Wilner, now Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals, explained in his book The Maryland Board, of Public Works: A History, at 85 n. 20 (1984), “This authority [to reduce an appropriation deemed unnecessary by 25%] was in addition to the even more comprehensive control delegated to the governor. In the 1931 budget (Acts of 1931, ch. 150), the General Assembly had stated that the items enumerated in the bill constituted only an ‘initial plan of disbursement’ and that the governor could, if he chose, amend that schedule with respect to executive agencies. Sec. 7 of the 1933 budget retained the concept of ‘initial plan of disbursement,’ but in contrast to its predecessors it required all executive agencies to submit to the governor an amended itemized schedule and permitted disbursement only to the extent the governor approved the amended schedule. This, in effect, made the budget bill a mere starting point and gave the governor total control over the state budget...” In the 1920 Budget Bill, the General Assembly added that the Legislature “may by resolution provide for or authorize the amendment of its schedule.” Ch. 487 of the Acts of 1920, § 7. 15 Similar provisions for the administration of the budget were passed as part of every budget bill from the inception of ²⁵⁴ the budget system to their codification in 1939 as “the Budget and Procurement Act.” See Ch. 206 of the Acts of 1918; Ch. 487 of the Acts of 1920; Ch. 500 of the Acts of 1922; Ch. 176 of the Acts of 1924; Ch. 654 of the Acts of 1927; Ch. 134 of the Acts of 1929; Ch. 150 of the Acts of 1931; Ch. 597 of the Acts of 1933; Ch. 92 of the Acts of 1935; Ch. 515 of the Acts of 1937.

An additional measure for the administration of the budget was included in Ch. 597 of the Acts of 1933 and Ch. 92 of the Acts of 1935, as the General Assembly attempted to deal with “the devastating effects of the economic depression.” Miles, supra, at 28. In the period prior to the 1935 legislative session, the State Treasury faced the first deficit since the establishment of the executive budget system. Miles, supra, at 29-30. On January 2, 1935, Governor Ritchie addressed the General Assembly, stating (Miles, supra, at 31): “ ‘In this State the estimates of revenues and disbursements for Budget purposes must be prepared more than two and a half years before the close of the two-year budgetary period.’ ‘At best this is a difficult thing to do’ and the effects of the economic depression began “within the past year or more’ to be reflected in a decline in State revenues.” In order to allow for greater flexibility between legislative sessions for the administration of the budget, especially in times when the State’s revenues had been greatly overestimated in the budget bill, the General Assembly enacted as § 11 of the Budget Bills of 1933 and 1935, the following provision: “And be it further enacted, That the Board of Public Works is hereby authorized and empowered to supervise the expenditure of all appropriations contained in this budget and for that purpose the said Board shall have power to reduce or eliminate any appropriation which it may deem unnecessary, except the appropriation for the payment of interest and the retirement of the State debt and the appropriation to the Legislature and the judiciary and no officer, department, commission or employee shall be authorized to expend ²⁵⁵ any appropriation or part of an appropriation which the Board of Public Works deems to be unnecessary.

The said Board shall have full power and authority to establish rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, to carry out the powers conferred by this section.” By Ch. 64 of the Acts of 1939 the General Assembly enacted Article 15A of the Maryland Code, entitled “Budget and Procurement Act.” In addition to codifying the sections passed in previous budget bills, the Act also recast the above-quoted § 11 of the 1933 and 1935 Budget Bills. The new language was described by then Treasurer of Maryland, Hooper S. Miles, as follows (Miles, supra, at 66-67, 79): “Before adjourning sine die on April 3, 1939, the Legislature passed another Administration Bill, known as the ‘Budget and Procurement Bill’ .... Under the Act, the Governor now may, with the approval of the Board of Public Works, impound up to 25% ‘of any item of appropriation which he may deem unnecessary except appropriations for the payment of interest and the retirement of the State debt and appropriation to the Legislature, the Public Schools and the Judiciary.’ ... The Act also strengthened and broadened the authority of the Board of Public Works in exercising control over the fiscal practices and related administrative policies of the departments, institutions and agencies of the State. “The adoption of the ‘Budget and Procurement Act’ by the Legislature of 1939 constituted not only a noteworthy step forward in support of the Budget System, but should mark the beginning of a more effective and enlightened administration of the Budget System and the fiscal affairs of the State than at any time in the past.” Most of this “Budget and Procurement Act” is currently codified as Division I, State Finance, of the State Finance and Procurement Article.

Title seven of Division I deals with appropriations and subtitle two of title seven addresses the distribution of appropriations by the executive branch of the ²⁵⁶ State government. These sections provide that “[mjoney may be disbursed from the State Treasury only in accordance with the current appropriation for a program as amended from time to time in accordance with this title,” § 7-205 of the State Finance and Procurement Article. 16 Thus, while the “initial appropriation for a program is set forth in the appropriation act ... the appropriation for a program may be increased or reduced as provided in this subtitle.” § 7-206 of the State Finance and Procurement Article. The subtitle goes on to describe various amendments which can be made during the fiscal year. Section § 7-208 provides that when the General Assembly is not in session, “the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates jointly may authorize an amendment of an appropriation for a program of the Legislative Branch of the State Government.” Likewise, § 7-208.1 provides that the “Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may authorize an amendment of an appropriation for a program of the Judicial Branch.” In either case, the amendment “may not increase the sum of the appropriations for all the programs” of the Legislative or Judicial Branches respectively. §§ 7-208(e) and 7-208.1(b).

Sections 7-209 and 7-213 detail the Governor’s authority to change the amounts appropriated. The Governor may alter an appropriation for a program of the Office of the Governor, § 7-209(a). Whenever an officer or unit of the Executive Branch of the State Government requests a change in an appropriation, the Governor may approve the change, § 7-209(b). 17 Such an amendment “may not increase the sum of the appropriations for all the programs of the officer or unit,” § 7-209(c). The Governor also may amend an appropriation ²⁵⁷ by reducing, by not more than 25%, any appropriation which he deems to be unnecessary, § 7-213.

The Governor may not, under this provision, reduce an appropriation for the Legislative or Judicial Branches, for the payment of principal of or interest on the state debt, for the public schools, for the salary of a public officer during the term of office, or for the salary of an employee in the classified or unclassified service, except as provided in the Merit System Law. § 7—213(b). Each one of the above-described amendments to appropriations is subject to the restriction that it “may not change any language or substantive provision in the State budget,” § 7-210(a). The post-legislative “budget amendment” process applies primarily to the “monetary figures of an appropriation,” § 7-210(b). This comprehensive scheme for an executive budget system, including the administration by the executive of appropriations, has, as its main objective, the maintenance of a balanced budget as required by Art. Ill, § 52(5a), of the Maryland Constitution.

See McKeldin v. Steedman, supra, 203 Md. at 98 , 98 A.2d at 564 (“The constitutional objective ... [is] to prevent the possible disturbance of the balanced budget which the plan contemplated”).

II

The plaintiffs present several challenges to the action of the Governor and the Board of Public Works in this case. They argue that § 7-213 is inconsistent with Art. Ill, § 52, and thus is unauthorized. In addition, they contend that the statute violates the principle of separation of powers set forth in Art. 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it constitutes a delegation of legislative power to the Chief Executive and lacks sufficient standards to guide the Governor’s exercise of authority. If this Court determines that § 7-213 is consistent with § 52 and does not violate the principle of separation of powers, then the plaintiffs urge this Court to overturn the action of the Governor and Board on the ground that it was arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence. ²⁵⁸ Finally, the plaintiffs maintain that the action with respect to the Medical Assistance State Only grant did not comply with the 25% limitation in § 7-213.

A. As the summary in Part I of the requirements and history of the executive budget system demonstrates, the budget system as it has evolved in Maryland imposes the power over and the responsibility for the fiscal affairs of the State primarily in the Governor. Article III, § 52(13), authorizes the General Assembly to enact statutes which are “not inconsistent” with the constitutional budget process and which are “necessary and proper” for the process to function. The statutes providing for the administration of the budget process, including § 7-213, were enacted in accordance with § 52(13) of Art. III. The budget bills beginning with 1918 acknowledged that, given the dynamic economic needs of the State, flexibility in the distribution of appropriations was needed.

See, e.g., Ch. 206 of the Acts of 1918 (“the items and amounts which hereinafter follow the sums appropriated ... do not constitute appropriations, but represent the initial plan of distribution and apportionment of the appropriations”); Commission on Administrative Organization of the State, First Interim Report: The Maryland Budget System, at 8 (1951) (“Whatever the figures used, [in the budget bill,] sound administration will require that they be changed by budget amendment according to changed conditions when the spending time comes”). The enactment of § 7-213 “constituted not only a noteworthy step forward in support of the Budget System, but [also] mark[ed] the beginning of a more effective and enlightened administration of the Budget System and the fiscal affairs of the State.” Miles, supra, at 79. The plaintiffs’ contend that § 7-213 is inconsistent with Art. Ill, § 52, because it allows the Governor to reduce appropriations. According to the plaintiffs, the authority to reduce appropriations was assigned solely to the General Assembly by Art. Ill, § 52.

In apparent disregard of the ²⁵⁹ Governor’s major role in every aspect of the budgetary process, the plaintiffs state (brief at 7): “The power to amend legislation and the power to reduce appropriations are ... functions committed solely to the legislative branch under our state constitution.” This is simply an inaccurate statement. Section 52 of Art. Ill allows the Governor to revise departmental estimates and, in the event that departmental requests exceed estimated revenues, § 52(5a) mandates that the Governor reduce those departmental estimates. Md. Act. for Foster Child. v. State, supra, 279 Md. at 151 , 367 A.2d at 501 (“[T]he Constitution itself gives the Governor authority to reduce estimated appropriations in all categories except those for the General Assembly, for the Judiciary and for the public schools as provided by law”). In addition, the Constitution expressly provides that the Governor may amend or supplement the budget bill, Art. Ill, § 52(5).

The authority given to the Governor in § 7-213 corresponds to the power vested in the Governor by Art. Ill, § 52. Section 7-213 merely allows the Governor to accomplish at the end of the budget process what he is required to do when he submits his initial budget. If the revenue estimates for FY 1993 had been accurate at the time the budget bill was being prepared for submission to the General Assembly, the Governor would have been required to impose the reductions at that juncture. The revenue estimates for FY 1993 turned out to be inaccurate after the enactment of the budget bill, just as they turned out to be inaccurate in the 1930’s.

The General Assembly, well aware of the problem in the 1930’s and the possibility of its recurrence, enacted § 7-213 in 1939 in order to forestall the accumulation of deficits in subsequent fiscal years. Section 7-213 comports with Art. Ill, § 52, because the statute recognizes and perpetuates the preeminent role of the Governor in the budget process, a role considered by the Goodnow Commission to be “fundamental ... for a sound budget system.” Goodnow Commission Report, supra, at 130. ²⁶⁰ Furthermore, because § 7-213 furthers the requirement of maintaining a balanced budget throughout the fiscal year, it is precisely the type of legislation which the framers of Art. Ill, § 52, contemplated. The plaintiffs also contend that the balanced budget requirement was intended to apply only during the preparation of the budget and its passage. This argument is inconsistent with the language and history of Art. Ill, § 52.

The single unifying theme of the move to develop a budget system was to avoid a deficit and to maintain a balanced budget. See Goodnow Commission Report, supra, at 130-131; Miles, supra, at 7-8; Md. Act. for Foster Child. v. State, supra, 279 Md. at 145 , 367 A.2d at 497-498 . Every budget bill since 1918 has contained language prohibiting State officials from spending money in excess of their appropriations. See, e.g., Ch. 206 of the Acts of 1918; Ch. 487 of the Acts of 1920; Ch. 500 of the Acts of 1922; Ch. 176 of the Acts of 1924; Ch. 654 of the Acts of 1927; Ch. 134 of the Acts of 1929; Ch. 150 of the Acts of 1931; Ch. 597 of the Acts of 1933; Ch. 92 of the Acts of 1935; Ch. 515 of the Acts of 1937.

In times of revenue shortfall, the