Kane v. Board of Appeals

CATHELL, J. This case concerns the interpretation and application of the Prince George’s County Code, Title 17, Subtitle 11 Fire Safety (“County Code”). 1 At issue are citations issued by the fire department to a landlord and its management agent, pursuant to § 11-162, for violations of § 11-161. 2 Petitioners (Realty ¹⁴⁹ Development Group, Inc. and James L. Kane, Jr.) appealed the citations to the Board of Appeals for Prince George’s County, sitting as the Board of Administrative Appeals; the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County; and the Court of Special Appeals. The Board, the Circuit Court, and the Court of Special Appeals found that the citations were properly issued. Petitioners filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on May 3, 2005, and we granted certiorari on June 16, 2005. Kane v. Bd. of Appeals, 387 Md. 465 , 875 A.2d 769 (2005).

Petitioners present three questions for our review: “A) [WJhether the plain language of the Prince George’s County Code precludes issuing Correction Orders to and otherwise penalizing the owners of the leased premises for the conduct of their renters involving the renters’ personal property; “B) whether the County Fire Code, as applied in this case, violates the Petitioners’ rights to due process; and ¹⁵⁰ “C) whether the County Fire Code, as applied in this case, ' violates the Petitioners’ rights to equal protection under the law.” We hold that the plain language of the County Code allows the fire department to issue citations solely to the owners of the properties. Furthermore, we hold that the County Code sections in question, as applied here, did not violate the petitioners’ rights to due process or equal protection. I. Facts and Procedural History Realty Development Group, Inc., (“RDG”), owns three rental properties located at 4204, 4205, and 4206 Knox Road, College Park, Maryland. James L. Kane, Jr., an agent of RDG, manages the properties (Mr. Kane is sometimes hereafter referred to as petitioner).

As required by the County Code, the Prince George’s County Fire Department conducts regular inspections of the properties. 3 On March 30, 2000, Captain Steven Hess, a fire department employee, inspected the buildings. The tenant of unit 7, at 4204 Knox Road, allowed Captain Hess to inspect the apartment. Captain Hess determined that the unit was unsafe and later stated: “The dangerous accumulations of trash and rubbish that I observed during my inspection was such that there was approximately a three foot pile high [of] newspaper, magazines, pizza boxes, other food type containers strewn throughout this [tenant’s] unit to the point that he could open his door approximately a foot and a half to allow us ¹⁵¹ entry to check the smoke detector, and in the event that [the tenant is] in his room and there is a fire in his unit the likelihood is that not only will the abundant accumulation of this combustible material not allow him to exit his unit properly, it will probably facilitate the fire to spread more quickly. I found that to be a dangerous accumulation not only for him but also for the tenants that reside in that building.” Captain Hess found that the conditions of the apartment violated § 11 — 161(a)(1).

He also found that a room in 4205 Knox Road, used by a tenant as a storage closet, also contained the building’s boiler and water heater. Captain Hess determined that the tenant’s use of the storage room was a violation of § 11-161(a)(1) as it created “[d]angerous conditions which are liable to cause or contribute to the spread of fire in or on said premises, building, or structure, or endanger the occupants thereof.” As a result of these findings, Captain Hess issued a “Correction Order,” pursuant to § 11-161. The order named James L. Kane as the owner and it stated that: “All storage rooms must be locked, supervised by fire sprinklers or be 100% empty and have a smoke detector. In addition, access must be provided to officials of the Prince George’s County Fire/EMS Department to inspect these common areas of the property for hazards or appliances as the Fire Chief or his authorized representative may designate. “The tenant in 4204 Knox Road # 7 must immediately clean all trash and debris from the unit in order to eliminate the dangerous conditions found in the room.” The form stated that both conditions were cited pursuant to § 11 — 161(a)(1).

The order also provided that it was the “1st Notice” and that “the owner/manager must act immediately to correct the listed issues, prior to the next scheduled appointment,” which was set for May 1, 2000. Captain Hess gave the order to a rental manager who refused to sign, acknowledging ¹⁵² receipt of it. 4 After his second visit on May 1, 2000, Captain Hess issued a “2nd Notice” to Mr. Kane stating that the conditions described on the first notice had not been corrected. In addition, this notice stated that “[fjailure to comply could result in a $1000.00 fine and/or 180 days in jail upon conviction” 5 and that the next scheduled appointment would take place on May 17, 2000. The manager again refused to sign the order.

Finally, after inspecting the buildings a third time, Captain Hess issued a “THIRD and FINAL notice” on June 12, 2000. The final notice provided that the conditions found in the previous two occasions had not been corrected. 6 Captain Hess gave the notice to Mr. Kane who refused to sign it. ¹⁵³ Petitioner Kane filed a notice of appeal to the Board of Appeals of Prince George’s County (the “Board”) 7 on May 10, 2000, challenging the Correction Order dated May 1, 2000. In his notice of appeal, petitioner Kane argued that he was incorrectly identified as the owner, he denied the existence of any storage rooms in the buildings in question, and stated that “[a]ny recommendation to a tenant in any building (4204 Knox Road, # 7) which concerns that tenant’s particular personal habits should be directed to that tenant. Any correction order to a tenant should specifically describe the offending conditions and the alleged violation(s).” On June 20, 2000, petitioner Kane filed a notice of appeal to the Board, challenging the Correction order dated June 12, 2000.

In the notice, petitioner Kane again denied being the owner of the property. He also denied the existence of any storage rooms in the building. He acknowledged, however, the existence of the small room in which the furnace and hot water heater were located, but denied that the tenants had access to the room. He maintained his position that any complaints regarding the leased premises should be addressed to the tenants.

The Board held hearings on petitioners’ appeals on June 7 and July 12, 2000. At the hearing on June 7, only petitioner Kane was present and he denied being the owner of the properties. The Board decided to postpone the hearing until the property owners were properly identified, notified and represented. On July 12, satisfied that all parties in interest were properly represented, the Board then conducted a hear ¹⁵⁴ ing on the .merits of the appeal.

Petitioners (both RDG and Mr. Kane) were represented by the same counsel. Petitioners and the County stipulated that they had come to an agreement as to most of the violations for which the petitioners had been cited. Both parties asked for the Board to make a determination on whether the owners and agent of the leased properties alone can be cited for the violations created by the tenants. 8 The Board heard evidence from petitioners including petitioner Kane explaining the situation in 4204 Knox Road # 7: “That’s a single sleeping room. I have no control over it.

It’s just basically ... a rooming house building. I have no control over, in my view, the tenant so long as the tenant does not disturb other tenants, the tenant[’]s matters do not spill over in the common areas, what the tenant does behind that door, as far as I’m concerned, is the tenant’s business. Others don’t like that then I think they should directly address their concern to the tenant.” The Board heard evidence from the fire department and made the following findings: “1. James Kane, Jr. has a legal interest in the properties at issue. “2.

The owner of the property located at 4204 Knox Road # 7, College Park, Maryland, is responsible for removing all trash and debris from the unit in order to abate a dangerous condition and bring the unit into compliance with Prince George’s County Code Section ll-161(a)(l) and 11-159. “3. The room in dispute at the premises located at 4205 Knox Road, College Park, Maryland, constitutes a storage room and must be in compliance with Prince George’s County Code Sections ll-161(a)(l) and 11-159.” The Board did not assess any fines against the petitioners at that time. Following that decision, petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. In the Circuit ¹⁵⁵ Court, petitioners argued that the Board’s reading of the County Code was erroneous and, as applied, violated the petitioners’ rights to due process and equal protection.

Finally, petitioners argued that the statute was void for vagueness. On August 13, 2001, the Circuit Court remanded the case to the Board and “ORDERED that given the equal protection concerns raised by the Petitioners, the Board of Appeals of Prince George’s County, sitting as the Board of Administrative Appeals shall determine why the tenants were not cited for the violations at issue in this matter.” On remand, the Board held meetings concerning this issue on three different dates October 3, 10, and 24, 2001. Petitioners were not advised of the dates and times of the meetings and were not given an opportunity to be heard. After the October 24 meeting the Board issued an “Order of the Board on Remand from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland” stating: “After reviewing the Order of the Circuit Court, the members of the Board met in executive session with counsel to the Board to discuss the law.

At the Board’s regular meeting on October 24, 2001, the matter was discussed in open session. The members agreed that this matter involved a rational basis test, versus strict scrutiny, and there was no violation of equal protection in declining to cite the tenants for the violations at issue — landlords have the ability to control their tenants, whether they do or not cannot hinder the local government from fulfilling its duty to protect the citizenry’s health, safety and welfare, and it would require a ‘Registry of Landlord-Tenant Agreements’ to make tenants anywhere near as susceptible to enforcement as landowners are by virtue of the County tax records. Under the law, the decision by the Board to uphold the determinations of the County Fire Inspector -withstands an equal protection analysis.” The Board determined that their prior decision met a rational basis inquiry and affirmed the correction orders. The Circuit Court, unsatisfied with the Board’s explanation, remanded the case once again with specific instructions to determine why ¹⁵⁶ the tenants were not cited; whether “there is a County policy to charge landlords rather than tenants where, as here, the tenant is equally or more accessible to code enforcement officers than the landlord;” and if such policy did exist explain the rationale behind it.

Furthermore, the Circuit Court directed the Board to give petitioners notice of the new hearing and “an opportunity to be heard and participate fully.” The Board held a remand hearing on July 17, 2002, in which the Fire Department and petitioners were allowed to present their arguments. Following the hearing, the Board issued a decision answering the Circuit Court’s questions, which stated: “The inspectors in this case are hereby determined, as a matter of credibility, to have cited the properties in question for the legitimate reasons set forth in the violation notice(s), and the landlord was served in good faith inasmuch as the law gives landlords ultimate responsibility for the condition of their real property (including the improvements thereon). As for a ‘policy,’ this Board finds that there is no ‘policy’ in terms of the government desiring to impose upon or inconvenience landlords as opposed to tenants; the County’s inspectors simply follow the common sense of using the tax records and similar readily-available sources of information to enforce the County Code as efficiently and effectively as possible. (As stated previously in these proceedings, there is no ‘tenant registry’ readily-available to government employees, s'o there is no way a government employee can be sure the person answering the door of a rental unit is the actual tenant — conversely, the tax records provide a fairly reliable indication of who the landlord is, and in this case Mr. Kane has not seriously contended that there was error in that regard here with respect to the Knox Road unit(s) in question.)” The Board then determined: “In sum, this Board concludes that the landlord/owner was cited rather than the tenant(s) because this method of serving the citation is most likely to cause the corrective ¹⁵⁷ actions to be carried out as directed; to the extent that this manner of serving violation notices is a ‘policy,’ it comports with all laws, including the equal protection clause.

The actions of the inspector(s) are hereby affirmed in all respects, on all grounds.” 9 ¹⁵⁸ The Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that there was a rational basis for the fire department’s practice of citing the owner and/or management agent of the building and not the tenants. The Court determined that “[t]he ordinance provides wide discretion for the County to cite whomever it believes would most likely remedy the problem.” As a result, “[u]nder the rational basis test so long as the means are reasonable and the ends legitimate, the Court must give deference to the County’s decision.” Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That court found that the plain language of the statute allowed the County to cite the landlord. The court also found that the County Code, as applied, met the rational basis inquiry required under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and Article 24 of Maryland Declaration of Rights.

The Court of Special Appeals determined that the petitioners had the burden of demonstrating that the County Code as applied to them was unconstitutional. The intermediate appellate court found that the petitioners failed to meet that burden, in part, by not introducing a copy of the tenant’s lease on the record showing the petitioners’ lack of authority over the tenant’s actions. The court took judicial notice of the fact that most leases in the state have clauses allowing the landlord to exercise control over the tenants by requiring them to comply with all laws and reserving the landlord’s right to enter the premises if he or she has “good cause to believe the Tenant may have damaged the premises or may be in violation ¹⁵⁹ of county, state, or federal law.” The Court of Special Appeals then affirmed the Circuit Court’s judgment.

II

Standard of Review Judge Harrell, writing for the Court, recently stated: “ ‘We review an administrative agency’s decision under the same statutory standards as the Circuit Court.’ ” Annapol is Market Place, L.L.C., v. Parker, 369 Md. 689, 703 , 802 A.2d 1029, 1037 (2002) (quoting Jordan Towing, Inc. v. Hebbville Auto Repair, Inc., 369 Md. 439, 449-52 , 800 A.2d 768 (2002)). In Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-69 , 729 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1999), Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court, explained the standard of review for administrative agency decisions: “A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is narrow, United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576 , 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994); it ‘is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.’ United Parcel, 336 Md. at 577 , 650 A.2d at 230 . See also Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222(h) of the State Government Article; District Council v. Brandywine, 350 Md. 339, 349 , 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-1351 (1998); Catonsville Nursing v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 568-569 , 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998). “In applying the substantial evidence test, a reviewing court decides ‘whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.’ ” Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512 , 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978). See Anderson v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 330 Md. 187, 213 , 623 A.2d 198, 210 (1993).

A reviewing court should defer to the agency’s fact-finding and drawing of inferences if they are supported by the record. CBS v. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687, 698 , 575 A.2d 324, 329 (1990). A reviewing court ‘ “must review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to it; ... the agency’s decision is prima ¹⁶⁰ facie correct and presumed valid, and ... it is the agency’s province to resolve conflicting evidence’ and to draw inferences from that evidence.” CBS v. Comptroller, supra, 319 Md. at 698 , 575 A.2d at 329 , quoting Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 834-835 , 490 A.2d 1296, 1301 (1985). See Catonsville Nursing v. Loveman, supra, 349 Md. at 569 , 709 A.2d at 753 (final agency decisions “are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity”). “Despite some unfortunate language that has crept into a few of our opinions,[ 10 ] a ‘court’s task on review is not to “substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency,” ’ United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, supra, 336 Md. at 576-577 , 650 A.2d at 230 , quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., supra, 283 Md. at 513 , 390 A.2d at 1124 .

Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. Lussier v. Md. Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 696-697 , 684 A.2d 804, 811-812 (1996), and cases there cited; McCullough v. Wittner, 314 Md. 602, 612 , 552 A.2d 881, 886 (1989) (“The interpretation of a statute by those officials charged with administering the statute is ... entitled to weight”).[ 11 ] Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field ¹⁶¹ should be respected. Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, 337 Md. 441, 455 , 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995); Christ v. Department of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 445 , 644 A.2d 34, 42 (1994) (legislative delegations of authority to administrative agencies will often include the authority to make “significant discretionary policy determinations”); Bd. of Ed. For Dorchester Co. v. Hubbard,, 305 Md. 774, 792 , 506 A.2d 625, 634 (1986) (“application of the State Board of Education’s expertise would clearly be desirable before a court attempts to resolve the legal issues).” See also Dep’t of Pub.

Safety and Corr. Servs. v. Palmer, 389 Md. 443 , 886 A.2d 554 (2005). Using these standards, we now turn to the Prince George’s County Board of Appeals’ decision.

III

Discussion We shall discuss the three specific issues presented: the plain reading of the Prince George’s County Code, the validity of the statute as applied under the Due Process Clause and the validity of the actions taken under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Maryland Constitutions. First, we note the framework for our discussion. A. Statutory Construction-Plain Meaning This Court has previously stated that “[ljocal ordinances and charters are interpreted under the same canons of construction that apply to the interpretation of statutes.” O’Connor v. Balt. County, 382 Md. 102, 113 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004).

It is also a well settled principle of law that “ ‘[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature,’ ” in this case the County Council. Rockwood Cas. Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 385 Md. 99, 108 , 867 A.2d 1026, 1031 (2005) (quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)).

For that purpose, “we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute, and, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly under ¹⁶² stood meaning, we ordinarily end our inquiry there also.” Comptroller of the Treasury v. Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567 , 826 A.2d 467, 469 (2003). Finally, this Court must “construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.” Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453 , 879 A.2d 1111, 1115 (2005). Prince George’s County Code § 11-162 provides in pertinent part: “[A]ny order or notice issued pursuant to this Subtitle shall be served upon the owner, operator, occupant, agent or other person responsible[ 12 ] for the condition or violation ...” (emphasis added). Petitioners contend that the plain language of the statute requires the fire department to cite only the “other person responsible for the condition or violation,” i.e., the tenant.

The County, on the other hand, argues that the qualifier “responsible for the condition or violation” only modifies the term “other person” and, as a result, the fire department may cite the “owner” and/or “agent” even if they did not cause the condition or violation. The Circuit Court and later the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the County’s interpretation. The analysis of this statute in respect to “plain meaning” involves a three step process. First, we analyze the effect of the qualifying clause.

We continue with an analysis of the punctuation used within the section. Finally, we address the use of the term “other” within that section. i. Qualifying Clauses We commence our analysis by utilizing the “generally recognized rule of statutory construction that a qualifying clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately preceding words or phrase — particularly in the absence of a comma before the qualifying clause.... ” Sullivan v. Dixon, 280 Md. 444, 451 , 373 A.2d 1245, 1249 (1977); Annapolis Market Place, 369 Md. at 707 , 802 A.2d at 1040 ; Md. Dep’t. of Env’t. v. ¹⁶³ Underwood 368 Md. 160, 175 , 792 A.2d 1130, 1139 (2002); Schmerling v. Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434 , 452 n. 9, 795 A.2d 715 , 725 n. 9 (2002); but see Employment Sec. Admin, v. Weimer, 285 Md. 96, 102 , 400 A.2d 1101, 1104-05 (1979) (noting that this is not an absolute rule, but an aid to determine the intent of the legislative body enacting the rule).

In Underwood, the Court analyzed Md.Code (1982, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), § 9-276(a) of the Environment Article, which provided that “all expenditures ... by the Department ... shall be reimbursed to the Department ... by the owner or operator of the site or any other person who caused the ... violation of this subtitle.” 13 Underwood, 368 Md. at 174 , 792 A.2d at 1138 . Interpreting the language of the statute, Judge Harrell, writing for the Court, stated: “Respondents’ interpretation of this section would have the clause ‘who caused the ... violation of this subtitle’ modify all three categories of potential responsible parties described in the statute, i.e. the ‘owner,’ the ‘operator,’ and ‘any other person.’ That interpretation, however, ignores the clear meaning of the structure and relationship of the words as they appear in the statute.... ” Id. at 175 , 792 A.2d at 1139 . More specifically, the Court determined that such interpretation would disregard the rule described in Sullivan and require that, in order to be found liable under the statute, the owner or operator must also have caused the violation. The Court then explained: “The language of § 9-276 does not contain commas setting apart the three categories of potential responsible parties and the modifying clause (e.g. ‘the owner or operator of the site, or any other person, who caused the [violation] ...’), nor does it explicitly apply the modifying clause to all three parties.

In the absence of such context, it is clear that the modifying clause ‘who caused the [violation] ... ’ ¹⁶⁴ was intended to apply only to ‘any other person.’ Consequently, the language of § 9-276(a) mandates that liability for reimbursement to the [Department] may be placed on any of 3 categories of persons who violate the subtitle: (1) an owner of a site [where the violation occurred]; (2) an operator of a site [where the violation occurred]; or (3) any other person who caused the [violation].” Id. at 176, 792 A.2d at 1139 . ii. Punctuation: the Importance of a Comma Like the statute in Underwood, § 11-162 does not contain commas setting apart the clause from the different categories of individuals named in the list. When the qualifying clause is set apart by a comma, it is clear that it modifies every element within the list. For example, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The comma following the word “property” clearly indicates that the qualifying clause “without due process of law” applies to all three terms: life, liberty, and property.

The Court of Special Appeals recognized that the qualifying clause was not set apart by a comma and was therefore limited to modify only the term “other person.” Petitioners, in response, argue that the intermediate court “ignored the comma before ‘or,’ which comma applies the entire subsequent phrase to ‘owner’ or ‘agent.’ ” There is no such comma in the statute. Interestingly, however, although — as we indicate— there is no comma after agent in the text of the actual statute, it somehow made it’s way into the petitioners’ briefs. 14 ¹⁶⁵ iii. Meaning of the Word “Other” Under the County Code Petitioners argue that this reading of the County Code renders the word “other” superfluous. In support of their contention they point to Underwood as well.

In addition to determining who was liable for the violation, the Underwood Court also determined that — under the statute — the action to seek reimbursement was a “legal action.” Md.Code (1982, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), § 9-276(b) of the Environment Article provided that “[i]n addition to any other legal action authorized by this subtitle, the Attorney General may bring an action to recover costs and interest from any person who fails to make reimbursement as required under subsection (a) of this section.” Underwood, 368 Md. at 174 , 792 A.2d at 1138 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the use of the word “other,” which is modified by the qualifying clause “legal action,” indicated that the action to recover costs under that section was a “legal action.” Underwood, 368 Md. at 184 , 792 A.2d at 1144 . As a result, petitioners contend that under this interpretation of § 11-162 of the County Code, use of the term “other” indicates that the other persons named in the list must also be responsible for the condition or violation in order to be cited. The use of the words “other” and “legal action” in that ¹⁶⁶ particular part of Underwood, however, related to a different context than that of the present case and offers little support for petitioners’ position in the current context.

Petitioners’ argument, moreover, fails to reconcile the Court’s interpretation, in the same opinion, of two adjacent sections of the same statute containing the term “other.” As described supra, the Court limited the effect of the qualifying clause in § 9-276(a) of the Environment Article to “any other person,” interpreting “other” to exclude the owner or operator of the site. Underwood, 368 Md. at 176 , 792 A.2d at 1139 . 15 Then, the Court interpreted the term “other” in § 9-276(b) of the Environment Article to mean that such action was also a “legal action.” Id. at 184, 792 A.2d at 1144 . These apparent incongruent interpretations can be easily and reasonably explained. Section 9-276(a) of the Environment Article, like § 11-162 of the County Code (the section at issue here in the case at bar), involves a list of persons responsible for a violation of the code.

Section 9-276(b) of the Environment Article, on the other hand, does not refer to a list of persons who have violated a statute, but to a type of action similar to that of different sections described in the Code. Furthermore, § 9-276(a) of the Environment Article and § 11-162 of the County Code could have easily been written to include all the ¹⁶⁷ persons of the list by the addition of a comma or an express provision in the statute to that effect. As petitioners suggest, an interpretation of the statute must not render any word within it superfluous or nugatory. See Moore, 388 Md. at 453 , 879 A.2d at 1115 .

The use of the word “other” supports the conclusion that the County Council intended to limit the qualifying clause to those persons, other than the ones in the specific list, responsible for the condition or violation. If the Council had intended that only the persons responsible for the violation were to be cited, then the use of the terms “owner, operator, occupant, agent” would be rendered superfluous. Had that been the intention of the drafters, they could simply have stated: “Notice shall be served upon the pérson responsible for the condition or violation.” Such language, had it been used, might have restricted application of that section to only those persons who caused the condition or violation. But, the statute was not so drafted.

Applying the Sullivan standard to the facts of the case sub