Liberto v. Holfeldt

Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This action in tort, based on a violation of the statute requiring removal of the ignition switch key from a motor vehicle when it is permitted to stand unattended, presents a novel question to this Court. The appeal is from a judgment absolute for costs entered ⁶⁴ by the Superior Court of Baltimore City, after the granting of a motion for a directed verdict in favor of Jean L. Holfeldt (the defendant and owner of the stolen automobile), against Samuel Joseph Liberto (the plaintiff and owner of the automobile in which he was injured), who had sued the defendant for personal injuries and property damage arising out of the collision between their respective automobiles at a time when the defendant’s automobile was being operated by a stranger, who was apparently the thief: On February 12, 1958, the defendant, in leaving her automobile unattended, neglected to remove the key from the ignition switch while she went into an animal hospital to get her dog. “Not a minute” later, when she returned to the place she had parked it, the automobile was gone. She reported the theft at once to the police but it was not immediately recovered.

Five days later, the stolen automobile, while it was being operated by Robert Johnson (Johnson), was driven through a red traffic signal at the intersection of Monroe and Pratt Streets—which intersection is a considerable distance across the city from the animal hospital at 3015 Greenmount Avenue—and collided with the automobile of the plaintiff, causing the injuries and damages for which he sued. Johnson fled the scene of the ■ accident, but was subsequently apprehended. Although he was joined as a party defendant, he was not summoned and was in prison when this case was tried, it having been continued as to him. It was conceded that Johnson was operating the automobile of the defendant without her authority.

The plaintiff, claiming that the act of violating the provisions of Code (1957), Art. 66j4, § 247, tended to establish negligence on the part of the defendant, contends that the lower court should not have granted the motion for a directed verdict and argues that the violation of the statute was at least one proximate cause of the accident even though, perhaps, it was not the sole proximate cause. The statute admittedly violated provides: “No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without ⁶⁵ first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key [emphasis added], or when standing upon any perceptible grade without effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the curb or the side of the highway.” Although this Court has on a previous occasion dealt with this statute as it applied to setting the brakes and turning the front wheels, we have never been required until now to construe it with respect to the effect of failure to remove the ignition key. In Hochschild, Kohn & Co. v. Canoles, 193 Md. 276, 283 , 66 A. 2d 780, 783 (1949), we stated that “[t]he purpose * * * [of the statute] was either to prevent some unauthorized person from starting a car or to prevent the start of a car by gravity. In either case the object was the protection of the public.” Thus, basically two interrelated questions are presented by the ruling in this case that the defendant was not liable for damages as a matter of law, i.e.: (i) did the act of violating the statute constitute a breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff; and, if that be established, then (ii) was the negligent act of leaving the key in the ignition switch the proximate cause of the injuries sustained.

Even though the violation of a statute may create a prima facie presumption of negligence, the mere breach is not per se enough to make a violator thereof liable for damages. See Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321 , 125 A. 782 (1924), and cases therein cited. So that in this case, in which the overall question of foreseeability is destined to play an important part in determining the answer to both of the interrelated questions presented by this appeal, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff, in order to recover damages from the defendant, to show not only a duty owed to the plaintiff and a breach thereof, but also to establish that the breach of that duty had not been interrupted by a break in the chain of