Long v. State

MURPHY, Chief Judge. * In this case we decide whether a circuit court may reconsider a pretrial ruling in which it granted a motion to suppress evidence that the defendant had claimed came from an unlawful search and seizure. We conclude that it may not. I A Maryland Rule 4-252 governs the filing of motions in criminal cases in Maryland’s circuit courts. Subsection (h)(2) of Rule 4-252 specifies the results that follow when a circuit court grants or denies a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

That subsection provides as follows: If the court grants a motion to suppress evidence, the evidence shall not be offered by the State at trial, except that suppressed evidence may be used in accordance with law for impeachment purposes. If the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a party and in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo and rules otherwise. A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal of a conviction. Maryland Rule 4-252(h)(2).

Rule 4-252, therefore, explicitly allows the circuit court to reconsider its denial of a motion to ⁶⁶⁵ suppress evidence if either party requests such a reconsideration. The rule does not mention whether the circuit court may reconsider its decision to grant a motion to suppress. B On October 29, 1993, Steven Blaine Long was arrested by Officer Matthew Trageser in the Elk’s Lodge parking lot in Frederick City. Charges were subsequently brought in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, accusing Long of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute.

Alleging that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, Long filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence seized incident to his arrest. The circuit court (Rollins, J.) held a suppression hearing to decide Long’s motion. At the hearing, Officer Trageser testified that on the night of Long’s arrest, he had received a radio transmission from Officer Charlie Davis. Officer Trageser testified that Officer Davis stated in his radio transmission that he had witnessed a purchase of suspected crack cocaine by a confidential informant.

Officer Trageser also testified that he went to the parking lot with the purpose of arresting the perpetrator described by Officer Davis. Officer Trageser stated that when he arrived at the parking lot and approached Long, he observed Long making a throwing motion with his hands. Officer Trageser told the court that while he was twenty to thirty feet away from Long, he observed Long apparently throw what appeared to be a baggie containing cocaine. Officer Trageser testified that he identified himself as a police officer and ordered Long to the ground.

The baggie was recovered by the police and was found to contain six tenths of a gram of cocaine. Officer David Armstrong, who was assigned to process, fingerprint, and photograph Long, testified at the suppression hearing that Long had told him at the police station that “he was only selling the stuff to pay his mother’s phone bill.” Following the suppression hearing, the circuit court granted Long’s motion, stating that there was insufficient evidence by ⁶⁶⁶ the arresting officer about Officer Davis’s observations. The court also noted that there was no evidence that the arrest had taken place in a high-crime or drug area or that Long had tried to flee. As a result of its ruling, the circuit court prohibited the State from using either the cocaine or the státements made to Officer Armstrong as evidence.

The State filed a motion to reconsider, which Long opposed and the circuit court granted. A second suppression hearing was held, at which Officer Trageser testified that he had worked with Officer Davis on previous assignments and had found the information provided by Officer Davis on those occasions to be reliable and trustworthy. Officer Trageser testified that Officer Davis had described the person selling crack cocaine to him, and that Long fit this description. Officer Trageser also testified that he announced himself as an officer and ordered Long to the ground before he observed the throwing motion.

Following the second hearing, the circuit court denied Long’s motion to suppress. At trial, the court found Long guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, based upon the evidence that Long sought to exclude. Long sought review by the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a writ of certiorari before the intermediate appellate court rendered a decision.

C Long asserts that under Rule 4-252, the circuit court was precluded from reconsidering its decision to grant Long’s motion to suppress. Long’s argument is based upon the fact that Rule 4-252 explicitly provides for reconsideration of a court’s denial of a suppression motion, but has no complementary provision that would apply when such a motion is granted. Applying the legal maxim expressio unius est exelusio alterius, 1 Long claims that the lack of an express provision for ⁶⁶⁷ reconsideration when a suppression motion is granted signifies that the circuit court did not have the authority to reconsider its ruling. The State counters by arguing that Rule 4-252 was amended to allow both the State and the defendant to request reconsideration of the denial of a suppression motion.

Under the previous rule only the defendant could make such a request. This goal of treating the State and defendant equally, the State argues, mandates that the State be allowed to seek reconsideration when a suppression motion is granted. II A We apply the same principles of interpretation in construing our procedural rules that we apply in construing statutes: We have repeatedly stated that the canons and principles we follow in construing statutes apply equally to an interpretation of our rules.... When construing a rule, we must first look to the words of the rule, giving them their ordinary and natural meaning....

If the words of the rules are clear and unambiguous, our analysis ordinarily ends.... Generally, it is only when the words of the rule are ambiguous that we must look toward other sources to glean the intent of the rule.... Furthermore, we must give effect to the entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used.... Our mission is to give the rule a reasonable interpretation in tune with logic and common sense.

In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012 (1994) (citing New Jersey v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270 , 627 A.2d 1055 (1993) and Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263 , 619 A.2d 105 (1993)) (citations and quotations omitted). Long asks us to apply these principles to Rule 4-252, and to conclude that the rule’s provision for reconsidering a suppression motion when that ⁶⁶⁸ motion is denied necessarily implies that no such reconsideration is allowed if the motion has been granted. We look to the rule’s history to aid us in discerning the reasonable intendment of the language used in the light of the purpose to be effectuated. Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29, 41 , 333 A.2d 37 (1975); Brown v. State, 237 Md. 492, 504 , 207 A.2d 103 (1965).

The language presently embodied in Maryland Rule 4-252(h)(2) was drafted more than thirty years ago in response to this Court’s desire that evidentiary rulings on the suppression of evidence be made before trial. In 1963, this Court reversed a conviction for burglary because the record was insufficient to determine whether or not the arresting officers possessed probable cause for the arrest and subsequent search. Edwardsen v. State, 231 Md. 332, 336-37 , 190 A.2d 84 (1963). In that case, the officers arrested the appellant on the basis of information told them by his employer.

Id. at 334 , 190 A.2d 84 . The specifics of the information were unknown because the State had admonished the testifying officer not to repeat the employer’s words. Id. Although the officers might, indeed, have had probable cause to arrest the appellant, the record was “devoid of any such showing.” Id. at 336 , 190 A.2d 84 .

Since the record contained only the “bare fact that the officers ‘received certain information,’ ” this Court concluded that there was an insufficient showing of probable cause for the arrest, and any evidence discovered as a result of the arrest should have been excluded. Id. at 336-37 , 190 A.2d 84 . The following year, this Court revisited the same issues in Farrow v. State, 233 Md. 526 , 197 A.2d 434 (1964). We upheld the warrantless arrest and subsequent search in that case and discussed at length the State’s need at times to introduce hearsay statements to demonstrate that the police possessed probable cause at the time of the arrest: [I]n many cases coming before this Court where the lawfulness of an arrest and of a search incidental thereto are in issue, direct evidence to show the basis upon which the ⁶⁶⁹ arresting officers acted either is not offered at all, or is alluded to guardedly as “information received” or in some other and equally uninformative manner (doubtless designed to avoid an objection that it is hearsay), or is actually excluded as hearsay.

On the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant it clearly is hearsay and hence is inadmissible; but on the issues of probable cause and the lawfulness of arrest and of the admissibility of evidence obtained through any search made in connection with the arrest, such testimony, even if hearsay, is directly relevant and is admissible. Id. at 532-33 , 197 A.2d 434 . The Court suggested that the question of probable cause should be determined as a preliminary motion, out of the jury’s presence: [T]he determination of the admissibility of evidence which is dependent upon the lawfulness of an arrest should be made by the trial judge as a preliminary matter quite apart, of course, from the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused; and if the case is being tried before a jury, such a matter should be heard out of the presence of the jury. Such a question may be raised[ ] before trial by a motion to exclude any evidence claimed to have been improperly obtained.

Id. at 533 , 197 A.2d 434 . On February 21, 1964, the Court of Appeals Standing Committee On Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules Committee) considered “a problem arising out of the recent case of Farrow v. State.” Rules Committee Minutes, Feb. 21, 1964, at 5. The committee discussed the portions of Farrow quoted above. See id.

(quoting the sections from Farrow discussing the determination of suppression issues through a preliminary hearing). The committee determined that the contents of a rule regulating motions to suppress evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure should be referred to the Subcommit ⁶⁷⁰ tee on Chapter 700. Id. at 6. 2 In referring the issue, the committee asked the subcommittee “whether or not the rule should prohibit reconsideration of a motion on the same grounds by the trial judge after [a] pre-trial ruling by another judge.” Id. at 7. On May 22, 1964, the Rules Committee considered the subcommittee’s first report on the “[pjroposed rule relating to motions to suppress evidence illegally obtained.” It agreed upon several matters of policy, and decided to refer the draft rule back to the subcommittee “for further study and report____” One of the matters of policy agreed upon by the committee was [t]hat the trial judge[,] contrary to the general rule, should be bound by the preliminary determination of a motion to suppress evidence illegally obtained, except that it should be made clear that the ruling is not binding for purposes of appeal or in connection with a motion for a new trial.

Id. The subcommittee issued its second report on June 29, 1964. With some amendments not relevant here, the Rules Committee approved the subcommittee’s draft rule as Rule 729. In April 1965, the Rules Committee issued its 24th Report, in which it proposed that Rule 729 be adopted by the Court of Appeals.

See Twenty-Fourth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 2-3, 17-21 (1965). This Court initially declined to adopt Rule 729, and the Rules Committee decided to resubmit it in 1966. See Rules Committee Minutes, April 29, 1966, at 6. The Rule was adopted without change in 1967.

See Thirtieth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 2, 13A-17 (1967). In the form drafted by the subcommittee, proposed by the committee, and adopted by this Court, Rule 729 clearly distin ⁶⁷¹ guished between the results following the grant of a motion to suppress, and the denial of such a motion. Subsection (g) of Rule 729 described the effect to be given to a pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress: g. Binding effect of Pre-trial Ruling 1.

Where Granted If such motion or petition is granted prior to trial, the property shall be delivered to the person entitled thereto and shall not be offered in evidence by the State at the trial on the merits in the criminal proceeding. 2. Where Denied If such motion or petition is denied prior to trial of the criminal case, the pre-trial ruling shall be binding at the trial unless the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion grants a hearing de novo on the defendant’s renewal of his motion or objection. A pre-trial ruling, denying a motion or petition to suppress, exclude or return property seized, shall in any event be reviewable on appeal to the appropriate appellate court or on a hearing on a motion for a new trial. Maryland Rule 729 (1967).

Reading Rule 729 in context, we conclude that the rule embodied the Rules Committee’s