Maryland Department of the Environment v. Ives

DAVIS, Judge. This appeal by the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) is from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In adjudicating a grievance filed by appellee Antoinette Ives, an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had ruled that appel ⁵⁸⁴ lee, who suffered a disabling occupational disease, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, while employed at the MDE, was not entitled to convert “sick/annual leave and compensatory time” to accident leave. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the ALJ’s ruling and remanded the case for further administrative proceedings.

The MDE’s appeal from that judgment presents the following question for our review: Did the trial court err in holding that Md.Code (1997 Repl.Vol.), Pers. & Pens. § 9-701(a) permits State employees to use work-related accident leave for treatment of an occupational disease? FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellee was employed as a Police Communications Operator II with the MDE. Appellant notified the MDE, in February 1996, that she had sustained an injury as a result of her daily computer data entry work and that she had been diagnosed with Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. The Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission), after a hearing on May 6, 1997, determined that .appellee had sustained a disabling occupational disease arising out of and in the course of her employment on November 5, 1995.

Between June 19, 1996 and November 18,1997, appellee used a total of 238.5 hours of annual/sick leave and compensatory time for medical treatment and therapy related to the Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. On November 20, 1997, appellee submitted a written request to the MDE asking the agency to reimburse 238.5 hours of annual/sick leave by converting it to work-related accident leave (which would provide appellee with ample sick leave should she need it in the future). The MDE denied appellee’s request on January 30, 1998. Appellee filed a grievance disputing the MDE’s denial and, after two hearings at the agency level, appellee’s claim was again denied.

Appellee appealed the agency’s denial to OAH. At the OAH hearing, the MDE moved for summary judgment, which the ALJ granted, ruling that appellee did not “sustain her burden to show that she is entitled to convert used sick/annual leave and ⁵⁸⁵ compensatory time to accident leave.” Subsequently, appellee appealed the legal conclusions of the ALJ to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, which reversed the ALJ’S ruling. DISCUSSION Appellee contends that the circuit court was correct in its ruling that a State employee who sustains an occupational disease arising out of his or her employment is entitled to work-related accident leave pursuant to State Pers. & Pens. § 9-701(a). Appellee agrees with the findings of fact of the ALJ but asks us to reverse his legal conclusion and affirm the circuit court.

We review an administrative agency’s decision under the same standard as the circuit court reviewed it. Our primary goal is to determine whether the agency’s decision is “ ‘in accordance with the law or whether it is arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.’ ” Curry v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Servs., 102 Md.App. 620, 626-27 , 651 A.2d 390 , (1994), cert. granted, 338 Md. 252 , 657 A.2d 1182 (1995), cert. dismissed, 340 Md. 175 , 665 A.2d 1038 , (1995) (quoting Moseman v. County Council of Prince George’s County, 99 Md.App. 258, 262 , 636 A.2d 499 , (1994)). The agency’s fact-finding and application of the law to the facts will be upheld, as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 627, 651 A.2d 390 .

Substantial evidence is defined as “ ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion....’” Anderson v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187, 213 , 623 A.2d 198 , (1993) (quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 283 Md. 505, 512 , 390 A.2d 1119 ,(1978)). The proper approach for determining whether there is substantial evidence is if a reasoning mind could reasonably have come to the factual conclusion that the agency reached. Id. When deciding issues of law, however, our review is expansive, and we may substitute our judgment for that of the agency if there are erroneous conclusions of law.

Curry, 102 Md.App. at 627 , 651 A.2d 390 . ⁵⁸⁶ Gigeous v. Eastern Correctional Institution, 132 Md.App. 487, 494 , 752 A.2d 1238 (2000). Because appellee only asks us to reverse the agency’s decision based on its erroneous conclusions of law, we limit our review to the statutory construction of State Pers. & Pens. § 9-701, which provides: (a) In general.—Each employee in the State personnel Management System, except a temporary employee, is entitled to work-related accident leave with sick pay if: (1) the employee sustains a disabling personal injury that would be compensable under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act; and (2) a physician examines the employee and certifies that the employee is disabled because of the injury. (b) Right to file Workers’ Compensation Claim.—The appointing authority of an employee entitled to work-related accident leave shall notify the employee of the employee’s right to file a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission. Appellee maintains that the phrase “disabling personal injury,” within subsection (a)(1), encompasses occupational diseases such as Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and, therefore, she is entitled to work-related accident leave.

Appellant, on the other hand, contends that the circuit court erred in determining that State Pers. & Pens. § 9-701 allows State employees to use work-related accident leave for occupational diseases. Appellant avers that the court’s finding is contrary to the plain language of the statute, arguing that if the legislature intended to expand the accident leave statute to cover occupational diseases it would have provided for such, expressly, in the text of the statute. It is well settled that when the meaning of a statute is at issue, the court’s inquiry begins with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, also ends there. Tidewater/Havre de Grace, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344 , 653 A.2d 468 (1995) (citations omitted).

If the ⁵⁸⁷ words of the statute are clear and free from ambiguity, we need not look further; there ordinarily is no need to look beyond the words of the statute to determine its meaning or scope. Id. at 345 , 653 A.2d 468 . In other words, we “are not at liberty to disregard the natural import of words with a view towards making the statute express an intention which is different from its plain meaning.” Id. (quoting Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep’t, Inc., 309 Md. 347, 353 , 524 A.2d 61 (1987)).

State Pers. & Pens. § 9-701 is clear and unambiguous. By its plain language, the statute entitles a State employee to work-related accident leave if the employee satisfies two conditions: (1) he or she sustains a disabling personal injury that would be compensable under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act and (2) a physician examines the employee and certifies that he or she is disabled because of the injury. In the case mb judice, the Commission found that appellee sustained an “occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment, and the first date of disablement was November 5, 1995,” and ordered MDE to pay for her medical expenses. There is evidence in the record to indicate that appellee had been examined by a physician; moreover, she had an operation for her injury and these facts presumably were part of the Commission’s determination.

Thus, both parties ask this Court to divine the legislature’s intent when it employed the phrase, “disabling personal injury.” Before we attempt to construe the meaning of the statutory language of State Pers. & Pens. § 9—701(a)(1), we shall revisit the ALJ’s findings of fact, as agreed upon by both parties, as the findings, in conjunction with the time frame of appellee’s disability, will direct our final resolution of this case. Neither appellee nor appellant, however, has directed our attention to the law that was in effect when appellee sustained her disabling condition, nor did the circuit court in its memorandum opinion. We note, however, as did the administrative law judge, that the issue of when appellee’s disablement began, in conjunction with the controlling law in effect, is ⁵⁸⁸ critical to our disposition of this appeal. The following findings of facts by the ALJ are determinative of our decision: The regulatory provision governing accident leave, which was in effect during the period the [appellee] used the 238.5 hours of annual/sick leave and compensatory time (June 19, 1996 to November 18, 1997), and during the period her request to convert said leave and compensatory time to accident leave was considered and denied